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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the demobilization of veterans of the Great Patriotic War in 
Leningrad and the surrounding countryside between 1944 and 1950. This was a period 
of immense social and economic change, as late Stalinist society struggled with the 
aftermath of total war. Demobilization is examined here as the processes by which 
veterans returned home and readapted to peace. Throughout the twentieth century 
European and North American societies have faced difficulties reabsorbing veterans. In 
contrast Soviet propaganda heralded demobilisation as a success. Veterans were 
presented as exemplary citizens and beneficiaries of state support and upwards social 
mobility. Based on archival research, published sources and oral history interviews, this 
thesis peels back the multiple layers of propaganda woven around demobilization to 
reveal a compelling tale of war‟s aftermath. It examines how veterans readjusted to a 
civilian life after exposure to mass death and extreme violence, and the challenges faced 
in returning to a society devastated and traumatized by war. 
 
Veterans expected certain privileges in exchange for wartime service. 
Entitlement, however, rarely manifested itself in practical advantage. Veterans were not 
protected from the post-war scramble for jobs and housing. The failure to meet post-war 
expectations generated enormous resentment. State assistance could never adequately 
reward veterans. The physical costs and psychological trauma created by industrialized 
warfare were routinely ignored. Disabled veterans were particularly angered by 
inadequate state support. Many were marginalized by a society unable to provide 
adequate support. Not all veterans made the transition to mainstream civilian life; a 
minority became involved in crime. Violent criminality was not the result of 
brutalization, but rather the product of trauma and poverty. Although the state was 
unconcerned by ex-servicemen‟s criminality, it feared that veterans were a source of 
anti-Soviet opposition. War transformed veterans‟ mentalities, yet the majority of 
veterans were not interested in formal politics. 
.   
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Introduction 
This dissertation is a study of the difficult transition from war to peace made by Red 
Army veterans in the city of Leningrad and the surrounding region between 1945 and 
1950. The war on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945, known as the Great 
Patriotic War, was one of the most violent and destructive conflicts ever witnessed. 
Victory was won at an enormous human, social and economic cost. An estimated 
twenty-seven million Soviet citizens lost their lives during the war. This was a 
demographic catastrophe. Approximately seventy-five per cent of wartime deaths were 
amongst men, creating a major post-war gender imbalance. In 1946 there were ten 
million fewer men aged twenty to forty-four than in 1940. In addition to the millions of 
widows and orphans there were tens of millions of refugees, evacuees and displaced 
people. Whole cities were left in ruins. Over 1700 towns and more than 70,000 villages 
were totally destroyed.
1
 Those soldiers who survived the frontline carnage witnessed 
terrible things and endured enormous suffering. After years of exposure to mass death 
and extreme violence, returning home and rebuilding an ordinary civilian life must have 
seemed an impossible prospect. Yet in the summer of 1945 millions of veterans began 
flooding home. Demobilizing one of the largest standing armies ever assembled was a 
colossal national undertaking. Between June 1945 and the end of 1948 over eight and 
half million Soviet veterans were discharged from the armed forces, including three and 
a half million soldiers by the end of September 1945 alone.
2
 For a war-ravaged society 
re-integrating ex-servicemen and women presented an enormous social, economic, 
political and cultural challenge.  
Over sixty years since the end of the Red Army‟s mass demobilization we know 
little about the process by which soldiers became civilians. In general historians have 
devoted greater attention to questions of how wars begin and how they are fought, than 
the complex ways in which societies manage the transition from war to peace in the 
aftermath of conflict. Nowhere is this difference more apparent than in the fleeting 
                                                 
1
  Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of the World War II in Russia 
(New York: Basic Books, 1994), p.96; Sheila Fitzpatrick, „Post-War Soviet Society: The “Return to 
Normalcy”, 1945-53‟, in Susan J. Linz (ed.), The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa, 
NJ.: Rowmann & Allenheld, 1985), pp.29-56. 
 
2
  V.N. Donchenko, „Demobilizatsiia sovetskoi armii i reshenie problem kadrov v pervye poslevoennye 
gody‟, Istoriia SSSR, No.3 (1970), pp.96-102; V.N. Ponomarev, et. al. (eds), Istoriia SSSR s dreveishikh 
vremeni do nasshikh dnei. Tom.11. Sovetskoi soiuz na puti k ravitomy sotsializmy, 1945-1961gg. 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp.53-57. 
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scholarly attention paid to demobilization. In most historical narratives demobilization 
is treated as part of the backdrop to post-war reconstruction, or perhaps a concluding 
chapter drawing a line under soldiers‟ wartime experiences. Demobilization, however, 
deserves closer scrutiny. Throughout history combatant societies have experienced 
difficulty reintegrating returning war veterans into mainstream society. In the twentieth 
century, in the wake of the violence of modern industrialized warfare, demobilizing 
mass conscript armies proved exceptionally difficult. Many of these problems are still 
with us today. Veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to face difficulties 
rebuilding their lives. In any post-war society ensuring that veterans quickly become 
productive members of society is a matter of great economic, social and political 
importance. The handling of demobilization not only influences the lives of veterans 
and their families, but affects whole societies. Demobilization is an important moment 
of negotiation and contingency between veterans, local communities and nation states, 
which reveals a great deal about how societies recover from war. This study of the 
demobilization of Red Army veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast uncovers a 
compelling history of how veterans and societies came to terms with the individual and 
collective costs of modern total warfare. 
This thesis attempts to address the imbalance in existing scholarship by focusing 
directly on the difficulties and complexities of demobilization at the local level. Even in 
a highly authoritarian society, closely controlled from the centre, veterans‟ experiences 
of demobilization were heavily influenced by local factors. The demobilization process 
and veterans‟ post-war prospects varied enormously across the Soviet Union. Important 
decisions about demobilization were, of course, taken in Army headquarters, in 
Ministries and the offices of central political leaders. But the actions of officials at the 
local level, at demobilization points, in factory personnel offices, and local housing 
departments all influenced veterans‟ future prospects. 
The thesis addresses two main questions. First, how were veterans reintegrated 
into civilian society in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast in the five years following 
the end of the Great Patriotic War? The focus is therefore on the everyday experience of 
Leningrad‟s veterans, and their constant interaction with civilian Leningraders, officials, 
bureaucrats and municipal authorities. It pays particular attention to the problems of 
readjustment to post-war realities in the most unpromising of social and economic 
circumstances. In addressing this question the thesis closely examines how veterans 
found housing and employment, and how they dealt with the physical and psychological 
12 
impact of war. Following on from this question, the thesis asks; how successfully were 
demobilized veterans re-assimilated into civilian society, and how successful were they 
in resuming ordinary lives? The progress in turning soldiers back into civilians, or lack 
of it, would have serious implications for Leningrad‟s, and by implication the Soviet 
Union‟s post-war recovery. It provides a opportunity to assess the continuing impact of 
war upon the men and women who fought it. 
At the outset it is worth clarifying my use of the terms demobilization and post-
war readjustment. Demobilization is usually defined as either, the bureaucratic and 
institutional process by which military formations are dissolved following major 
conflicts, the process by which soldiers are released from the military at the end of an 
agreed period of service, or more generally as the way in which societies draw down 
war efforts.
3
 Here, we are concerned with the process by which the wartime Red Army 
was dismantled. I do not, however, use the term in the same way as military or political 
historians. I am not primarily interested in the administrative process by which military 
units are physically broken up, soldiers are transported home, are debriefed and released 
from their service obligations. This is only part of the story I intend to explore. 
Demobilization is not simply mobilization in reverse. It is more than the moment when 
citizens pass between the social categories of soldier and civilian. I use demobilization 
to mean the fuller process by which soldiers readjusted to ordinary life in the months 
and years following their release from armed service. The experience of combat and the 
culture of the Red Army fundamentally reshaped veterans‟ identities and sense of self. 
The disruption to veterans‟ careers, family life and personal circumstances would take 
years to fully resolve. Therefore, demobilization was a social, economic, cultural and 
psychological process as well as a bureaucratic one. In this dissertation the term 
demobilization is closely related to post-war readjustment or re-adaptation; the long-
term process by which veterans learned to live ordinary civilian lives in the wake of a 
destabilizing and disorientating war. Demobilization was not simply an event in 
veterans‟ lives but a complex process, which reveals a great deal about the difficult 
transitions faced by all post-war societies. 
It is also worth noting my use of the interchangeable terms demobilized soldier 
and veteran. Both refer to any soldier who served in the Red Army, in any capacity, 
during the Great Patriotic War and was subsequently demobilized. War invalids, former 
                                                 
3
  For a fuller exploration of definitions of the term demobilization see Adam R. Seipp, The Ordeal of 
Peace. Demobilization and the Urban Experience in Britain and Germany, 1917-1921 (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009), pp.7-8. 
13 
prisoners of war (POWs) and female medical orderlies are all treated as war veterans. 
However, the specific problems faced by POWs are largely beyond the remit of this 
thesis. Sadly requests for information about the repatriation of POWs in Leningrad were 
routinely refused by Saint Petersburg archives. I avoid the use of the term war 
participant (uchastnik voiny) since it rarely appears in documents from the late 1940s. 
This term started to be used about a decade after the end of the war, and enjoyed 
widespread usage in the Brezhnev era. The definition of an uchastnik voiny was 
narrower than the late Stalinist definition of veteran. By the end of the 1970s many 
people awarded medals as veterans in the immediate wake of war were not permitted to 
call themselves uchastniki voiny. The term frontline soldier (frontovik) is preferred to 
indicate veterans‟ active participation in combat.  
 The thesis starts from the premise that the history of demobilization and 
veterans‟ readjustment in and around Leningrad has been obscured by multiple layers of 
myth. Officially, returning veterans were welcomed home as heroes, were given 
extensive state assistance and quickly adapted to civilian life. Propaganda suggested 
that demobilization was a smooth process through which veterans were reunited with 
their families, were reintegrated into the workforce and which enabled veterans to 
demonstrate that they were exemplary citizens. Red Army veterans were repeatedly 
presented as heroic supermen who enjoyed a special status in late Stalinist society, and 
made the transition back into civilian life with remarkable ease. According to the 
official myth Soviet veterans were immune to the psychological traumas experienced by 
veterans of other conflicts. The veteran was supposedly an ideal type perfectly equipped 
for the challenges of the era of post-war reconstruction. Rather than experiencing a 
difficult period of adjustment veterans devoted themselves to rebuilding their homes, 
careers and communities. They settled into civilian life and blended into the 
background. 
 The propaganda image of the heroic welcome extended to Soviet veterans and 
their successful reintegration has proved remarkably durable. For a country reeling from 
the material and social costs of total war the rapid demobilization of eight and half 
million men was indeed a remarkable achievement. However, numerical success has 
largely obscured the difficulties and hardships of demobilization. Few Russians can 
now remember a time when veterans of the Great Patriotic War were not a privileged 
stratum of society. Over time a patriotic cult of the war developed, which enshrined the 
Great Patriotic War as a foundational moment for Soviet culture. Under Brezhnev war 
14 
veterans became valued and prominent members of society rewarded with enhanced 
pensions, free holidays, travel and other benefits. Each and every year on 9 May, 
Victory Day (Den‟ pobedy), veterans are placed at the centre of the ritualized 
celebration of Russia‟s victory. On that day veterans are treated as heroes. They receive 
the thanks of local and national politicians, gifts from former employers and the 
adulation of friends and relatives. Veterans were not always so fortunate. Indeed, in the 
years following their demobilization veterans, in contrast to the official myth, were 
rarely beneficiaries of any special treatment. 
The central argument advanced by this thesis is that reintegrating Leningrad‟s 
veterans after the experience of modern industrialized warfare was far more 
complicated than either the official narrative of demobilization or the patriotic myths 
suggested. The disparity between the myth and reality of demobilization was enormous. 
First, the official stereotype of ex-servicemen as exemplary citizens was often untrue. 
Veterans settling in and around Leningrad were often poorly skilled rural immigrants 
who found it hard to adjust to new circumstances, rather than highly skilled industrial 
workers, or committed party members. Furthermore, veterans were not immune to the 
forms of psychological trauma experienced by survivors of other conflicts. Many were 
disorientated by their return home. Others were unable to find work or housing and 
drifted to the social margins, becoming involved in petty criminality and socially 
disruptive behaviour. Secondly, the thesis argues that there was no single shared 
experience of demobilization and post-war readjustment. The Red Army was a 
remarkably diverse social organization. It included men and women of all ages, social 
backgrounds and professions. Consequently, there was no such thing as a typical Red 
Army veteran or a typical pathway to post-war normality. Different ex-servicemen and 
women faced different post-war challenges, which they responded to in a variety of 
ways. Finally, veterans were not a privileged social group united by the entitlement to 
substantial welfare benefits. In Leningrad the limited privileges extended to veterans 
rarely amounted to a meaningful practical advantage. Rather than beneficiaries of post-
war affirmative action or upwards social mobility veterans were in direct competition 
with civilians for jobs, housing, healthcare and a range of other services. Indeed, for 
many veterans there could never be an adequate way of repaying the enormous personal 
cost of victory. 
The myth of the Red Army‟s successful demobilization sits uncomfortably 
alongside what is known about the experience of other demobilizing armies and 
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societies. Reintegrating war veterans creates difficulties for any society, but throughout 
the twentieth century the process of demobilizing mass conscript armies after the 
violence of modern industrialized warfare proved exceptionally difficult. While Soviet 
veterans were presented as well adjusted heroes devoted to the reconstruction of late 
Stalinist society, in the west the standard image of veterans is of disgruntled and 
disenchanted men struggling to readjust to civilian life. Damaged veterans are not just 
the constructs of Vietnam War films or literary accounts of the First World War, but are 
familiar figures from histories of the First and Second World wars. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine how the history of the impact of war could be written in Western Europe or 
Northern America without reference to mental and physical trauma, or the failure of 
some veterans to readjust.   
 Leningrad and its rural periphery provide a unique vantage point from which to 
study attempts to turn demobilized soldiers into ordinary civilians. Studies of Leningrad 
traditionally consider the city in isolation, treating metropolitan history as separate from 
developments in the city‟s hinterland.4 Here I attempt to examine demobilization in the 
Leningrad oblast and Leningrad alongside each other. Leningrad, despite attempts to do 
so, could not be sealed off from the surrounding countryside. The histories of city and 
countryside were closely interwoven. Leningrad was repopulated after 1944 with rural 
migrants from surrounding regions. Leningraders were reliant on agricultural produce 
grown in the land surrounding the city. Nearly every factory, industrial enterprise and 
public institution had its own parcel of land in which food was grown. Many 
Leningraders made regular journeys out of the city centre into the neighboring towns 
and villages to tend plots, find food, visit friends and relatives or to relax. The 
examination of post-war crime undertaken in chapter five, for example, reveals that 
crime in the city and the oblast were closely inter-related with offenders travelling 
between city and countryside to commit offences. It is therefore logical to examine 
Leningrad and the surrounding region together rather than as separate entities. 
Demobilization in Leningrad was anything but a return to normality. Conditions 
in the city and the Leningrad oblast were not typical of a wider Soviet experience, but 
rather an extreme example of the violence and destructiveness of modern industrialized 
warfare. The Siege of Leningrad was an experience specific to Leningrad. Few other 
                                                 
4  See for example: W. Bruce Lincoln, Sunlight at Midnight. St Petersburg and the Rise of Modern Russia 
(Oxford: Perseus, 2001); Arthur George and Elena George, St Petersburg: The First Three Centuries. UK 
edition (Stroud: Sutton, 2004); Blair A. Ruble, Leningrad. Shaping a Soviet City (Berkley, CA.: 
University of California Press, 1990). 
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Soviet or European cities confronted a post-war legacy as traumatic as that of 
Leningrad. The „nine hundred days‟ of blockade left a permanent imprint on the city, its 
residents and the surrounding countryside. After flying over the Leningrad oblast in 
1947 John Steinbeck described a war-ravaged landscape, “pitted and scabbled like the 
faces of the moon,” and littered with discarded military technology and the remains of 
burnt-out villages.
5
 To this day there are still battlefields like Nevskii Piatachok, several 
kilometers south of Kirovsk, where gas masks, shoes, live ammunition and fragments of 
skeleton can still be found lying around. Farms, factories, hospitals and schools were all 
destroyed. Whole villages and towns disappeared from maps. It is, however, the better 
documented destruction of the imperial palaces in Pushkin, Pavlovsk and Peterhof 
which symbolized the level of destruction.
6
 Leningrad itself suffered enormous physical 
damage. More than 107,000 high explosive bombs and 150,000 artillery shells hit the 
city.
7
 In comparison to Stalingrad, Smolensk, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don or Novgorod 
the city survived remarkably intact.
8
 Yet, wartime damage continued to impinge on 
Leningraders‟ lives for many years. The real impact of the blockade, however, was 
measured in terms of death rather than destruction. No city in modern history has ever 
suffered a greater loss of human life. More than ten times the number who died in 
Hiroshima died in Leningrad. Conservative post-war estimates put the death toll at 
around 700,000. More recent research has suggested that closer to a million 
Leningraders lost their lives. Those who survived starvation and the freezing cold would 
never forget their suffering, or that of the people around them.
9
 
This unique local wartime experience heavily influenced veterans‟ post-war 
readjustment, but not necessarily in ways which might be anticipated. Leningrad‟s 
veterans were returning to a community divided by the legacy of wartime violence 
rather than united by suffering. Civilian normality was particularly difficult to find in a 
society in which the shadow of mass death was ever present. As ordinary Leningraders 
                                                 
5
  John Steinbeck, A Russian Journal (London: Heinemann, 1949), p.12. 
 
6
  Suzanne Massie, Pavlovsk: The Life of a Palace (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990).  
7
  V.A. Ezhov, „Vosstanovlenie Leningrade (1943-1950)‟, in V.A. Kutuzov and E.G. Levina (eds), 
Vorozhdenie: Vospominaniia ocherki i dokumenty o vosstanovlenii Leningrada (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 
1977), pp.5-8 (p.5).   
 
8
  On levels of destruction in other Soviet cities see Mark B. Smith, „Rubble to Communism. The Urban 
Housing Programme in the Soviet Union, 1944-1964‟, Ph.D Dissertation, SSEES/UCL, University of 
London, 2007), p.48. 
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were on the frontlines for much of the Great Patriotic War, veterans did not enjoy a 
monopoly on claims to special treatment and enhanced social status. Veterans‟ 
theoretical entitlements were often in direct competition with those extended to 
blockade survivors and re-evacuees. In Leningrad, perhaps more than any other Soviet 
region, civilians could claim an equality of sacrifice with, and even superiority over, ex-
servicemen and women. Although returning to a society devastated and traumatized by 
total warfare brought added complexities, there were aspects of Leningrad‟s tragic 
wartime experience which facilitated greater understanding between civilians and 
former soldiers. Veterans of twentieth-century war routinely felt alienated from civilian 
society, which they believed could not begin to understand the reality of combat and 
soldiers‟ suffering. But in Leningrad returning veterans encountered a society better 
informed about what soldiers had been through. Paradoxically the prospects of creating 
a stable accommodation between civilians and ex-servicemen may have been brighter 
amidst Leningrad‟s rubble and mass graves than in a location less affected by the war. 
 The importance of Leningrad as a case-study of mass demobilization goes 
beyond the city‟s extraordinary wartime story. Leningrad, as the Soviet Union‟s second 
city, was at the centre of both Russian and Soviet post-war history. Although some 
historians have argued that the impact of the blockade led to a provincialization of the 
city, Leningrad was not a provincial backwater.
10
 It remained one of the most 
economically and politically important cities in the Soviet Union, second only in 
importance to Moscow. The city proudly boasted of a unique cultural tradition, 
Revolutionary heritage and the newly conferred status of Hero City. Although the 
history of the Leningrad oblast is often obscured by that of the city which dominates the 
region, it was also amongst the most economically important regions in the Soviet 
Union. Before the war the region had boasted a thriving industrial sector, and a number 
of enterprises of national economic importance. The oblast‟s richness in natural 
resources, particularly construction materials, ensured that the region played a critical 
part in both the local and national reconstruction effort. Veterans returning to, or 
arriving for the first time in, Leningrad and the Leningrad region were therefore 
resuming their civilian lives in a location of national economic, social and cultural 
significance. 
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 The centrality of Leningrad made it a particularly important location in mass 
demobilization. The opportunity to contribute to Leningrad‟s phoenix-like rebirth and 
the opportunities for work and housing in a severely depopulated city made Leningrad 
an especially attractive destination for demobilized veterans. More ex-service personnel 
were demobilized in Leningrad than in any other major Soviet city. By 31 July 1947, 
little over two years since the start of mass demobilization, 268,378 veterans had been 
demobilized in the city.
11
 By the beginning of January 1947 there were a further 53,334 
disabled veterans, demobilized and recorded through other mechanisms, registered with 
district social security offices.
12
 Tens of thousands more veterans, discharged in 
neighboring regions, would be drawn to Leningrad in the months and years following 
their demobilization. This remarkably rapid influx of veterans after 1945 played a very 
important role in shaping the region‟s recovery. The blockade severely depopulated the 
city. In 1945 Leningrad‟s population was less than a third of its pre-war level. Although 
it had increased dramatically by 1947 it was still over a million citizens lower than in 
1941.
13
 This made veterans an important and highly prominent presence in the post-war 
city.  
 There are, however, more subtle reasons for focusing on Leningrad, other than 
the unprecedented scale of demobilization in a city with an impaired capacity to re-
assimilate returning soldiers. First, Leningrad‟s post-war history was closely interwoven 
with the course of late Stalinist high politics. Key moments in political history, such as 
the opening stages of the Zhdanovshchina in 1946 and the Leningrad Affair in 1949, 
had their geographical locus in Leningrad and would provide the political backdrop to 
veterans‟ readjustment. How these moments of local and national political turmoil 
impinged on veterans‟ post-war lives reveals something specific about the progress of 
demobilization in Leningrad. Secondly, Leningrad‟s status as a leading centre of 
scientific research, particularly in the field of medical science, provides a unique 
perspective on demobilization. The presence of academic institutions researching 
prosthetics, military psychiatry and the employability of disabled veterans cast the 
difficulties of post-war readjustment, particularly for war invalids, into sharper focus. 
The presence of psychiatric and psychological researchers in Leningrad does indicate 
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that war traumas did affect the city‟s veterans, although the level of support was 
frequently inadequate. In other places, which lacked this scientific infrastructure, trauma 
and mental illness were even more likely to be ignored or go unidentified. 
 There are also personal reasons for focusing upon Leningrad and its rural 
periphery. I, like countless other historians, have been captivated by „Pieter‟, as insiders 
like to refer to the city.
14
 Ever since my first visit to the city to study Russian in the 
autumn of 2004 I too have been fascinated by the city and its history. Amidst the 
imperial architectural splendor and rarified atmosphere of Russia‟s cultural capital I felt 
the past to be closer to the surface. No doubt this was the product of finally having the 
opportunity to spend a year in a city which I had read so much about. In between my 
lectures I had plenty of opportunity to explore the city. I had time to not only visit its 
palaces and museums, but glimpse behind the grand façades and explore the back 
streets, industrial districts and the city‟s less attractive visage. However, the more time I 
spent in the city the more apparent it became that Saint Petersburg has an ambivalent 
relationship with its past. Monuments and memorial plaques, for example, located 
across the city from all periods of its history give the impression of a past which is 
physically present but simultaneously absent.
15
 In Saint Petersburg, perhaps more than 
any other European city, history has been replaced by a mythologized version of the 
past. Pieter is a city built on myths. As such it is the ideal location in which to examine 
the myths woven around the story of demobilization and veterans‟ contribution to the 
recovery of late Stalinist society. 
Spending time in the city it became clear that several visions of the past are in 
direct competition with each other. Juxtaposed against Saint Petersburg‟s rich tsarist 
cultural heritage are sites of importance in Petrograd‟s revolutionary struggle, and traces 
of Leningrad‟s participation in socialism‟s grand social experiment. Although the city 
and its citizens are rightfully proud of their city and its heritage, I felt strongly that a 
willed amnesia surrounded much of the city‟s past, particularly Leningrad‟s wartime 
and post-war experience. The extraordinary social and cultural impact of the war and 
blockade is ever present, but at the same time unspoken.  
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 Visitors to the city do not have to wait long before they are confronted with a 
vivid example of the disparity between the mythic representation of the city‟s past and 
the historical reality as experienced by ordinary Leningraders. The first „sight‟ foreign 
visitors being transferred from Pulkovo airport to the city centre encounter, and 
deliberately so, is the Monument to the Heroic Defenders of Leningrad, completed in 
1978. It consists of a forty-eight meter obelisk bearing the dates 1941–1945 and a ring 
of twelve meter high sculptures depicting the city‟s defenders which dominates the local 
landscape.
16
 The monument is an embodiment of the official myth of the Great Patriotic 
War, and the willed amnesia surrounding Leningrad‟s wartime experience. It is not a 
local monument to the blockade. The dates placed on the obelisk are those of the war, 
not those of the 900 day blockade. Rather than an account of the suffering of women 
and children during the blockade, the sculptural tableaux around the monument depict a 
largely male story of military glory. Civilians‟ uncomfortable experience during the 
blockade is consigned to the sunken courtyard and the underground museum. Yet even 
the sculptures of young, square-jawed, muscle-bound soldiers are mendacious. These 
images elide the enormous physical injuries which soldiers sustained, and the manner in 
which combat had aged and weakened veterans. The official myth of the war, as 
embodied by this monument, was silent about the enormous obstacles veterans would 
face in rebuilding their lives. Although soldiers were clearly presented as victors, ex-
service personnel demobilized in Leningrad between 1945 and 1948 rarely felt that they 
had been welcomed back and treated like victorious heroes.  
 A number of Soviet historians have touched on the role demobilized veterans 
played in the reconstruction of Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast. They have 
suggested that highly skilled veterans made a major contribution to the city‟s industrial 
recovery, and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure.
17
 Where historians have referred 
to the lives of Leningrad‟s veterans they have tended to reinforce the notion that ex-
servicemen were beneficiaries of post-war privilege. However, no previous work has 
focused exclusively on the history of demobilization in this region. Historians have 
tended to be attracted to the remarkable story of the blockade and its legacy. A wealth 
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of recent research has dramatically broadened and deepened our knowledge and 
understanding of history‟s most deadly siege.18 A wealth of declassified archival 
material, newly published memoir evidence and a range of new oral history approaches 
applied by both western and Russian scholars has examined a range of new research 
questions.
19
 This new research has helped inform the background and set the context for 
the conditions that awaited Leningrad‟s returning veterans. Yet, since the opening of the 
archives relatively little has been written about Leningrad‟s post-war recovery that 
would challenge the pre-existing Soviet narrative of rapid recovery. There has been no 
western study of the local circumstances of reconstruction and recovery comparable 
with those produced by historians of Kalinin Province, Sevastopol or Rostov-on-Don.
20
  
The one notable exception to the history of post-war Leningrad is Aleksandr 
Vakser‟s book Leningrad poslevoennyi, 1945-1982 published in 2005.21 The first 
section of the book, dealing with the late Stalinist period, 1945-1953, is amongst the 
best surveys of metropolitan life, administration and government in Leningrad 
available. Although the book has little to say directly about demobilization it does 
provide important insights into the society to which soldiers were returning. On points 
of fact about population, transport, healthcare, urban development and living standards 
the book makes an important contribution. The level of detail far surpasses the volume 
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devoted to post-war Leningrad in the official Soviet history of the city, to which Vakser 
contributed as a younger man. Vakser clearly knows the archives for this period 
extremely well. I was fortunate enough to be able to benefit from this expertise. I 
remain deeply indebted to Vakser for his generous suggestions of fondy and published 
sources of relevance to my research.  
Vakser is both a proud Leningrader and a veteran. He has, for example, 
published parts of his wartime correspondence with his mother.
22
 However, despite 
knowing of my intention to interview veterans, Vakser never mentioned this. Veterans 
today are still reluctant to discuss much about their wartime experiences and the 
difficulties of readjusting to civilian life after demobilization. Even for an eloquent 
scholar the barriers to discussing the less heroic side of demobilization remain. This 
reticence to discuss individual experiences is also reflected in Vakser‟s research. 
Although he has done his best to incorporate the revelations of new archival materials 
into his work, Vakser, as we all are, is a product of his academic training. Leningrad 
poslevoennyi, despite its importance, is a book dominated by statistics and official 
information, rather than an interest in the texture of ordinary lives. The choice of 
evidence and thematic structures creates an impression of Leningrad as a more orderly 
city than is perhaps justified. Vakser and I also depart in our relations to our sources. 
Vakser‟s work on popular opinion amongst Leningraders, and my research into the 
attitudes of ex-servicemen share similar materials, but we approach the issue from 
different historiographical positions and with very different results.
23
  
The challenges of demobilization and post-war adaptation after 1945 were not 
unique to either the Leningrad region, or the Soviet Union. Although the focus of the 
present work is local, the difficulties of readjusting to life after war have been 
experienced by all post-war societies. European and North American societies, for 
example, confronted the prospect of having to re-assimilate veterans of extremely 
violent industrialized wars twice during the twentieth century. After both 1918 and 1945 
the demobilization of mass conscript armies had a profound effect on the future 
development of combatant nations. The demobilization of Leningrad‟s veterans is not 
simply a matter of national significance or local interest, it is an important example of 
the lasting impact of war upon veterans‟ lives and the difficulties of readjusting to 
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civilian life, something which all veterans experienced. It therefore seems inappropriate 
to evaluate demobilization in Leningrad in a separate silo. Since aspects of post-war 
readjustment were common to British, German, American and French veterans, and 
crossed national borders, there is much to be gained from viewing the Red Army‟s 
experience in comparative context. Historians of Soviet veterans have generally failed 
to take advantage of opportunities for comparison with other post-war societies, 
something which may help to explain the relative lack of research into mental trauma 
and criminality amongst former soldiers. 
This thesis is not comparative in the sense of Adam Seipp‟s study of 
demobilization in Munich and Manchester, or Deborah Cohen‟s analysis of the 
treatment of disabled First World War veterans in Britain and Germany.
24
 The purpose 
of comparison here is to stress areas of synergy between European and North American 
post-war societies, but also to highlight what was unique about demobilization in an 
extreme example of post-war readjustment.
25
 Throughout the thesis post-1945 
Leningrad is compared with Britain, America and Germany after both the First and 
Second World Wars. Comparing late Stalinist society with Britain after 1918, for 
example, may seem anachronistic, but this chronological and geographical scope helps 
provide examples drawn from societies with similarly traumatic wartime experiences, 
which undertook large scale mass demobilization, and from both defeated nations and 
victors. 
Historians have approached writing the history of war veterans and 
demobilization in Europe and North America in a number of different ways. At the most 
basic level historians have restricted themselves to examining the logistical and 
administrative tasks of releasing veterans from the armed forces. This approach is 
particularly strong in studies of demobilization after 1945 when governments were 
anxious to avoid the perceived failures of demobilization after the First World War and 
invested great effort in planning for the troops‟ return.26 Closely related are studies of 
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policy making debates and the implementation of welfare policies designed to support 
veterans during and after demobilization. In many nations the benefits awarded to ex-
servicemen after wartime service marked important stages in the development of 
modern welfare states.
27
 Consequently the privileges extended to veterans have attracted 
extensive analysis. Of particular importance are studies of the American Serviceman‟s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill, one of the most ambitious and 
influential pieces of social policy in American history, which shaped economic 
prosperity, social mobility, education provision and popular interaction with the state.
28
 
A third approach has been to focus on the development of veterans‟ organizations and 
movements, which played a role in lobbying for improving assistance for former 
soldiers. Perhaps the best example remains Antoine Prost‟s study of veterans‟ 
movements in interwar France.
29
 A fourth popular approach is to treat veterans as a 
special generation forged in the crucible of war. Robert Wohl, for example, has argued 
that veterans of the First World War regardless of nationality were united by shared 
wartime experiences and a shared set of values and expectations fostered in the 
trenches.
30
 The idea that veterans were a remarkable generation, however, has been co-
opted by patriotic and celebratory popular histories. Indeed, the notion of the „greatest 
generation‟ underpins much of the popular oral history about veterans published in 
recent years. Little reference has been made to these mass market accounts of veterans‟ 
wartime and post-war experiences.
31
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 Of greater relevance are works which concentrate on the specific challenges 
facing disabled veterans. Attempts made by disabled veterans to organize and campaign 
to improve disability pensions and their social and political position were part of this 
story.
32
 But of particular importance are works by Deborah Cohen and David Gerber 
which offer a more subtle social and cultural analysis of the difficulties facing the war 
disabled.
33
 The interest in the disabling effects of war upon combatants spans beyond 
physical damage to include the traumatic psychological exposure to mass death and 
extreme violence. Military psychology, war-trauma and post-traumatic stress now have 
their own specialist historiography.
34
 Another fruitful approach, applied to Second 
World War veterans in particular, has been to examine the return of veterans through 
the prism of family and gender history.
35
 However, some of the best research into the 
demobilization of veterans and their readjustment to civilian life combines all of these 
approaches, weaving points about the trauma, personal and emotional readjustment into 
larger narratives of social, economic and political reconstruction.
36
  
Against this historiographical background the range of approaches deployed by 
historians of late Stalinist Russia towards Red Army veterans is comparatively narrow. 
In the past twenty years there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of research 
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examining Soviet history after 1945. There was a time when Stalinism was viewed as a 
continuous period stretching from Stalin‟s ascent to supremacy in the late 1920s until 
his death in 1953. Few historians considered Stalin‟s post-war years as a period distinct 
from the 1930s with its own specific tensions and logic. Stalin‟s last years were 
characterized as the apotheosis of totalitarian control, of interest to only a handful of 
historians working on the period‟s high politics, and journalists or diplomats with first-
hand experience of the period.
37
 Late Stalinism was regarded as, “a kind of bleak desert 
separating two fertile battlegrounds: on the one side Stalin‟s rise, industrialization, 
collectivization, the purges and the high drama of the Second World War; on the other 
the succession struggle, de-Stalinization and Khrushchev‟s thaw.”38 However, the view 
of late Stalinism as a neglected period of Soviet history is no longer tenable. Since the 
so-called archival revolution the history of the post war years has been rewritten. 
Historians have asked new questions, and examined new thematic areas, ranging from 
youth cultures and housing, to healthcare and corruption.
39
 New insights have been 
offered into both high political history and the responses of ordinary citizens to the 
challenges of reconstruction. 
40
 The view of late Stalinism as a period of absolute 
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political control has been thoroughly re-assessed. Although there remains much that is 
unclear and unanswered about the last years of Stalinist rule a more complicated picture 
of a post-war society in transition, in which the tensions between state and society were 
in constant negotiation is gradually emerging. 
Despite the importance of the Red Army‟s demobilization for understanding 
post-war Soviet society, demobilization has frequently been overlooked as a subject 
meriting serious academic research. Most of the writing about veterans has been popular 
and celebratory in tone. The first attempts at studying the Red Army‟s demobilization 
were made by V.N. Donchenko in an article published in 1970. This article set the 
parameters for discussing demobilization for years to come. It equated demobilization 
with re-employment, and treated veterans‟ return primarily as an economic problem, 
rather than a social or cultural one. Donchenko‟s central argument was that returning 
ex-servicemen provided the solution to post-war labour shortages, and provided 
veterans with an opportunity for upwards social mobility. This is an argument which 
has proved and continues to prove influential, and which I will seek to challenge in 
chapter two.
41
 My point here, however, is that there have been remarkably few attempts 
to assess the effects of armed service and exposure to extreme wartime violence upon 
veterans‟ future lives. Demobilized veterans and the difficulties they faced feature 
prominently in many general surveys of the period and of post-war reconstruction. 
However, such works often make crude generalizations or assumptions about ex-
servicemen and their social position, based on dubious Soviet research. 
There are, or course, some important exceptions. Elena Zubkova, who is often 
credited with single-handedly resurrecting interest in the late Stalinist period, has made 
veterans an important part of her analysis of post-war Soviet society.
42
 She has 
highlighted many of the difficulties faced by ex-servicemen in rebuilding their lives, 
and raised important questions. However, she is not exclusively concerned with 
veterans, and the points she makes require further exploration. Amir Weiner, like 
Zubkova, also considers veterans an important social group. He has written persuasively 
about the sense of assertiveness and confidence that the war generated amongst 
veterans. Weiner‟s research is not primarily an examination of the difficulties of 
demobilization or post-war adaptation, although it has some important things to say 
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about the changes war prompted in soldiers‟ behaviour. Veterans are just part of 
Weiner‟s examination of the role war played in reshaping the ideology, beliefs and 
practices of the Stalinist regime. Weiner‟s analysis of how identities were reshaped 
during and after the war is derived from a study of the Ukrainian Vinnitsa oblast. It has 
important implications for Soviet history, but it has often been assumed that shifts 
discerned in Vinnitsa were typical of Soviet society.
43
 Veterans did, for example, 
dominate the local party in Vinnitsa, but the evidence that something similar happened 
in Leningrad and the surrounding region is less convincing. The chapter devoted to 
demobilization in Catherine Merridale‟s Ivan‟s War provides the most eloquent 
examination of the Red Army‟s demobilization currently available.44 One of the great 
strengths of Merridale‟s account is the manner in which demobilization is woven into 
the narrative of the ordinary soldier‟s war. Post-war readjustment only makes sense 
when viewed alongside wartime experience. Merridale understanding of violence of the 
Great Patriotic War and how it shaped soldiers‟ lives adds dimensions lacking in many 
other accounts. Trauma and the psychological difficulties of returning home, as one 
would expect of an expert on trauma, are more sharply focused than any other previous 
account.
45
 Yet, in such a short space it is impossible to explore the subject in the depth it 
merits. 
The first full length work on the subject of Soviet Second World War veterans 
and their demobilization, written by Mark Edele, was not published until 2008.
46
 This 
book and a number of supporting articles have done much to stimulate interest in 
veterans and their post-war lives.
47
 Edele makes a major contribution to the existing 
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scholarship. His analysis has a great deal to commend it. Edele traces the emergence of 
veterans as a social group and a movement over a period of nearly fifty years. He re-
examines the formal demobilization process, explores the circumstances of veterans‟ 
post-war readjustment in the immediate aftermath of the war; and charts attempts to 
create an organized veterans‟ movement from the mid 1950s onwards. It is a study that 
is as ambitious in its chronological and geographical scope, as it is impressive in the 
range of archival sources deployed. However, my case of demobilization in Leningrad 
concentrates on a shorter chronological period, between 1945 and 1950. In these years, 
as Edele acknowledges, veterans were not yet a cohesive social group with a collective 
interest, united by entitlements, a shared sense of generational identity, nor by organized 
veterans‟ movements. My research also focuses on different thematic areas. The central 
strand of Edele‟s work, for example, namely the intriguing socio-political phenomenon 
of the gradual emergence of popular veterans‟ movements in an authoritarian society, 
hardly features in this study. In contrast, my research devotes much greater attention to 
darker aspects of the demobilization process, such as veterans‟ involvement in 
criminality or individual psychological trauma. These themes emerge as an integral part 
of the narrative of Leningrad‟s veterans‟ readjustment, while they have been under-
explored in previous studies. A local study, centring on a region with a particularly 
extreme wartime experience is always likely to differ from a national narrative, which 
draws its examples more widely. The pressures and challenges of post-war adaptation 
are inevitably framed very differently in local and national reports. The local nature of 
this study and on just the first five years of peace focuses the lens in a very different 
direction, exploring different themes and asking different questions. 
The present study is the result of extensive archival research in eight Russian 
archives.
48
 The vast majority of research was carried out in Saint Petersburg and the 
Leningrad Oblast archive in Vyborg. The general perspective of this research is from 
the local level upwards to the political centre. Although the present work makes use of 
national reports its intention is to concentrate upon the local circumstances of 
demobilization as faced by ordinary veterans. Contrary to what some historians have 
suggested the late 1940s, at least at the local level, did not witness any tangible 
improvement in Soviet administration and record keeping.
49
 Local bureaucracies, 
certainly on the evidence of the Leningrad region, were over-worked and under-staffed. 
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Thie led to disorganization and even administrative chaos. Consequently, the archival 
record is often incomplete or confused. The quality of information that party and 
governmental officials in Leningrad fed upwards through official channels to the central 
party-state in Moscow was very different from the texture of internal reports. Where 
there are gaps and questions that Saint Petersburg archives could not answer, I have 
turned to national archives. As well as containing individual documents illuminating 
local conditions, national archives provide evidence of the national demobilization 
experience which highlights what was unique about Leningrad‟s. Finally, I was 
fortunate enough to make several brief visits to the Natsional‟nyi arkhiv Respubliki 
Kareliia in Petrozavodsk in search of confirmation of rumors about the existence of a 
colony for war invalids exiled from major Soviet cities. This research forms an 
important part of chapter three. 
In order to offer the fullest examination of veterans and their post-war lives I 
have examined a wide range of source material, including: statistical reports, summaries 
of public opinion, letters of complaint, administrative decisions, official reports, party-
investigations, court-records, prosecutor‟s files and the archives of medical research 
institutes. Since the opening of the Soviet archives in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
debates have raged about the use, meaning and reliability of the vast range of newly 
declassified documents. Controversies continue to rage about the comparative merits of 
certain sources, and how historians should approach and interpret others. Public opinion 
reports, for example, a source which I make use of, have proved particularly 
controversial.
50
 Attempting to observe historical reality through the Soviet source lens 
presents a unique set of challenges. There is no such thing as the perfect source. All 
sources have their own advantages and disadvantages and these constantly have to be 
weighed up against each other. Rather than privileging one form of document above 
another my approach has been a traditional one. In the knowledge that all documents 
have their weaknesses, my aim has been to draw evidence from a wide source base, and 
then to „triangulate‟ between as many different points as possible.  
This study also makes extensive use of a number of important published sources. 
Foremost amongst these are regional and local newspapers, particularly Leningradskaia 
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pravda, Vechernii Leningrad and Smena. With the largest and widest distribution 
Leningradskaia pravda was the most important of these three periodicals. More than 
any other local newspaper it reflected and drove the local political agenda. Vechernii 
Leningrad, renamed and relaunched in December 1945, was a more lively publication 
containing greater local detail and a less officious style. As such it tends to offer a 
clearer indication of the texture of everyday life.
51
 Smena was the local Komsomol 
organ, and offered a form of reporting aimed at youthful political activists. The research 
also draws upon a number of less well-known newspapers with much smaller 
circulations produced by prominent industrial enterprises or party committees in rural 
districts. These sources, as Donald Filtzer has shown, can offer valuable insights into 
local conditions.
52
 However, as countless historians have found Soviet newspapers are 
dull in format and style and thin and repetitious in content.
53
 As Duskin observes it, “is 
undeniable that post-war newspapers, and journals, are filled with material that is 
dismayingly repetitive and even when compared with publications from the 1930s, 
dreadful to read.” Yet despite the frustrations of working with newspapers they do 
provide a wealth of revealing material.
54
 At the most basic level newspapers 
communicated official priorities and policies to returning soldiers. The propaganda 
campaigns waged in the local press attempted to demonstrate to veterans what their 
responsibilities were in the post-war era. As well as attempting to shape public opinion, 
the press also provides an indication of what ex-servicemen may have been thinking. Of 
particular interest are the letters of complaint writen to the editors of Leningrad 
newspapers, many penned by veterans angered by the difficulties they experienced on 
their return. Although these are far from a representative and unmediated expression of 
public opinion, they do indicate that the state was prepared to acknowledge certain 
difficult aspects of demobilization albeit within very strict limits. As Jeffrey Brooks 
argued the press was not coterminous with public expression, but it did help 
                                                 
51
  On the style of reporting contained in evening newspapers see Christine G. Varga-Harris, „Green is the 
Colour of Hope?: The Crumbling Facade of Postwar Byt Through the Public Eyes of Vechernaia 
Moskva‟, Canadian Journal of History, Vol.34, No.2 (August 1999), pp.193-219. 
 
52
  Filtzer makes extensive use of factory newspapers in Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism. 
 
53
  Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State. Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.224-35. 
 
54
  Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction, p.3. 
 
32 
contextualize the Soviet experience and impose a structure on the way that ordinary 
citizens, even non-believers, thought.
55
 
In addition to the press I make extensive use of two local journals which 
published edited versions of the decisions and resolutions passed by the Leningrad city 
and oblast soviets.
56
 Surprisingly, few scholars have made use this rich resource. Both 
journals proved to be of great practical assistance and a mine of interesting detail. 
Whereas archives were often reluctant to release records of local soviet and party 
decisions the published record remains freely available. Specialist medical journals and 
published accounts of the research activity of the Bekhterev Institute were invaluable in 
exploring the physical and psychological cost of war in chapter three. These published 
accounts were of enormous assistance in contextualizing archival records and the 
complicated language of Soviet medical and psychiatric research.
57
 Finally, the thesis 
makes use of a number of important collections of published documents produced by 
archives and leading scholars on both a national and local level.
58
   
Reference has been made to a number of published memoirs, but these were a 
less fruitful source than I had initially hoped. Demobilization and the difficulties of 
readjusting to family life and civilian routines rarely feature in biographies. Veterans 
were prevented from publishing wartime memoirs in the aftermath of the war. They 
would have to wait decades for the opportunity to explore their wartime experiences in 
print. By the time it was possible to publish their biographies, either in edited 
collections or single volumes, the narrative and linguistic conventions of the Patriotic 
Cult of the War had reshaped their wartime memories. Indeed, the focus on the war as 
the single most important event in an individual‟s life often resulted in the experience of 
demobilization being completely overshadowed in memoirs and biographies by the 
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grand narrative of the war. In many memoirs discussion of the war, and its impact on 
future lives, ends on 9 May 1945 or the day an individual left the ranks. The hardships 
of the months and years following the end of the war were forgotten. There was no 
opportunity to consider in print the war‟s continuing legacy and the tremendous cost 
paid by veterans.
59
 
In comparison oral history offers a more rewarding insight into how individuals 
navigated the demobilization process. As part of the research for this thesis I was 
fortunate enough to conduct a dozen interviews with veterans, either individually or in 
groups, or with their wives and widows. While they are still alive and willing to talk to 
researchers, as Merridale notes, there can be no substitute for talking to veterans 
themselves.
60
 The shape and texture of this thesis owes a great deal from what I learnt 
talking to ex-servicemen. The vivid personal testimony, the scorn which met certain 
questions and the language with which veterans‟ described their demobilization told me 
a great deal about veterans‟ mentalities but also the flaws in my approach. Many of the 
insights gained from these interviews could never have been gleaned from official 
documents. Indeed, the process of interviewing and the stories I heard have shaped my 
relationship with archival sources, enabling me to scrutinize individual documents in 
different ways. 
Oral history is a complicated and difficult research technique. Interviewing is a 
slow process which requires a sensitivity and enormous patience on both sides. Memory 
is a complicated process. Memories are often fractured and confused. Recollection can 
not be turned on like a tap. Old age and distance in time make it difficult for 
respondents in their eighties to recall their return to civilian life. For decades veterans 
have been told to forget about uncomfortable aspects of their wartime experience. 
Individual memories were constrained and regulated by collective myths. The mental 
barriers to talking about personal difficulties had to be constantly negotiated.
61
 The 
vagaries of memory only partly explain the difficulties of conducting oral history. As a 
young educated westerner with no military experience a certain gulf, at least initially, 
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existed between interviewer and respondent. Many veterans, as in published biographies 
tended to privilege wartime experiences ahead of post-war problems. For most veterans 
the divide between the wartime and post-war periods was not clearly drawn. Narratives 
which began by recounting wartime service made the point, explicitly or implicitly, that 
demobilization and civilian readjustment could only be understood through the prism of 
wartime experience. The two were inextricable linked and could not be disassociated in 
their minds.  
 
35 
Prologue: The Troops Come Home 
 
In the early hours of the morning of 9 May 1945 the news of Germany‟s unconditional 
surrender began to filter through to Leningrad. It spread rapidly across the city and the 
Leningrad region. Many Leningraders had kept their radios on overnight in anticipation 
of an announcement. Others had stayed awake to wait for the moment which they had 
been dreaming about for four years. Ordinary citizens were not the only ones to have 
had a sleepless night. Propaganda and agitation officials had been making frantic 
preparations to celebrate what was shortly to be announced as a national holiday. The 
streets of Leningrad and provincial towns in the surrounding countryside had to be 
decorated with flags, slogans and portraits.
1
 Political meetings had to be hastily 
organized for the city‟s workers and the regions‟ collective farmers. From five in the 
morning farmers and workers began to gather in village clubs and workshops to hear 
political speeches.
2
 Approximately 1300 students attended a meeting in the main hall of 
the Leningrad State University. The crowd had started assembling from three in the 
morning.
3
 Once the political ritual had been fulfilled the music, dancing and drinking 
could begin. Before long the city centre was thronged with large crowds. Soldiers, 
sailors and civilians gathered along Nevski Prospect, the city‟s main artery, and in 
Palace Square. In parks, gardens, squares and streets across the city other celebrations 
began, many lasting late into the night. For a brief moment Leningrad was united by the 
joy of victory. The release of tension, anxiety and emotion would make Victory Day 
(Den‟ Pobedy) an occasion few Leningraders would ever forget.   
  That same morning hundreds of thousands of Leningraders serving in Red Army 
divisions scattered across Central and Eastern Europe were also celebrating victory. In 
some units peace came as a surprise. In his memoirs one soldier recalled his confusion 
at the military salute which heralded victory. He momentarily mistook the unexpected 
shouting and shooting as a German attack.
4
 Elsewhere the news had been anticipated for 
some time, and partying had begun several days earlier.
5
 Soldiers celebrated in time 
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honoured ways: songs were sung, vast quantities of alcohol were consumed and 
weapons fired in the air. Yet not all soldiers marked victory in the same way. Some 
frontline soldiers fresh from battle were too exhausted for wild excess. Large numbers 
of seriously injured soldiers spent Den‟ Pobedy in military hospitals. Confined to their 
beds they were deprived of any opportunity for carousing. For others pride and joy in 
victory were balanced by other emotions. Those of a reflective frame of mind had an 
opportunity to think about the deaths of their fallen comrades, and their own wartime 
suffering. Many wondered about what their families and loved ones back home had 
endured, and what would await them on their return. 
 Victory day released a heady mixture of emotions. In a brief moment of national 
celebration soldiers and civilians seemed united by a remarkable victory. However, this 
sense of unity and belonging was largely illusory. Civilians and soldiers were often 
separated by large geographical distances. Families were still waiting to be reunited, and 
had little idea when they might see their loved ones. It was the demobilization process 
in the following months that would finally bring soldiers and civilians into closer 
proximity. Indeed, in Leningrad demobilization would reveal many of the divisions and 
fault lines that continued to exist between veterans and the rest of society, which 
Victory Day temporarily obscured. 
The 9 May 1945 is usually understood as an important turning point in Soviet 
history. It marks the end of the Great Patriotic War and the beginning of the late 
Stalinist period. To contemporaries, however, the transition from war to peace was far 
less clear-cut. The moment of celebration had been welcome, but for many soldiers the 
war was far from over. Approximately ninety Soviet divisions, totalling 1.5 million 
soldiers would embark on the long and exhausting journey east to fight Japan.
6
 In the 
months and years following May 1945 large numbers of Soviet soldiers would be 
deployed to fight quasi civil wars in newly conquered borderlands in Western Ukraine 
and the Baltics. Most of the opposition had been eliminated by the end of 1948, but 
isolated fighting continued into the 1950s.
7
 Dangers remained for many soldiers. On 
Victory Day Tamara Chumakova was serving in a unit disarming mines on the 
Leningrad front. The work was exhausting and extremely dangerous. Between April 
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1944 and September 1945 over 320 of Tamara‟s comrades were killed. Her war would 
not be over until freed from this work.
8
 Many soldiers would not consider their war to 
be over until they were finally demobilized.  
 For most soldiers Den‟ Pobedy marked the beginning of a curious period of 
limbo, a „phoney peace‟ as it were. Once the celebrations had ended and hangovers had 
been nursed the sense of relief and joy was gradually replaced by confusion, doubt and 
anxiety. With the primary enemy now defeated the main reason for military service had 
been removed. The fighting had ended, but the discomforts, frustrations and petty 
humiliations of army life remained. Military routine, army discipline and separation 
from families still had to be endured. Soviet soldiers knew nothing about their 
government‟s plan for their release from armed service, and when they might return 
home.  
 The Red Army was not the only army to experience a lull following the long-
awaited victory. The extent of wartime mobilization meant that all armies required time 
to prepare for returning veterans. However, both Britain and America, mindful of the 
need to avoid the mistakes of demobilization after the First World War, had begun 
planning years earlier. In both countries detailed release criteria and a framework for 
demobilization were publicly announced in September 1944, after many months of 
careful preparation. British and American plans aimed for transparency and fairness. 
The United States Army had invested considerable energy in developing a points-based 
system for demobilization. A draft proposal had been circulated to over 20,000 soldiers; 
their views were used to shape the final system. Points were awarded for length of 
service, length of service overseas, combat experience and parenthood. Furthermore, the 
unveiling of the points system followed closely upon Roosevelt‟s approval of the 
Servicemen‟s Readjustment Act in June 1944.9 In Britain the criteria for demobilization 
and the measures taken to ease soldiers return to civilian life were published in Release 
and Resettlement, an official guide to the process. The order in which the majority of 
soldiers were to be released could be calculated from a simple table published in the 
guide. In essence the longer the period of service and the older the soldier, the earlier 
demobilization could be anticipated. Soldiers had plenty of opportunity to scrutinize the 
plan, and familiarise themselves with its finer details well before the war‟s end. On 12 
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May 1945, barely a week after the end of the war in Europe, Ernest Bevin announced to 
the House of Commons that demobilization would commence on 18 June 1945.
10
 
Therefore, in May 1945 British and American soldiers, unlike their Soviet allies, knew 
that planning for mass demobilization was in place, that their return home was 
imminent and that they were well informed about the process and the welfare system 
designed to support them. 
 In contrast the Red Army and the Soviet state appear to have made little 
preparation for mass demobilization prior to Germany‟s defeat. Although further 
evidence may eventually emerge from closed military archives it appears that detailed 
planning for the Red Army‟s demobilization did not begin until after May 1945. 
Ordinary rank and file soldiers and their immediate officers knew nothing about their 
governments‟ plans for their demobilization. They could only speculate about when 
they might return home. 
Krasnaia zvezda, the Red Army‟s newspaper, attempted to create the impression 
that in the days and weeks following the German surrender life in the Red Army was 
gradually returning to normal peacetime rhythms. Although training and political 
education were increased, there was also time for leisure. Soldiers garrisoned in Vienna, 
Budapest and Berlin were reported to be visiting theatres, galleries and museums, 
playing football and volleyball or spending their evenings singing songs of home.
11
 In 
reality the discipline and morale of occupation forces was somewhat different. 
Violence, looting and drunkenness were more common than an interest in cultured or 
sporting pastimes. The uncertainty about demobilization added to the tension and 
decline in morale. Boredom, anxiety and additional propaganda and training created a 
climate in which rumours that soldiers were being prepared for a future war with 
America spread rapidly.         
Demobilization Legislation  
  
The news that the Red Army had been nervously anticipating finally came on 23 
June 1945, just over six weeks after Victory Day, when the Supreme Soviet approved 
its first piece of demobilization legislation: the Zakon o demobilizatsii starshikh 
vozrastov lichnogo sostava deistvuiushchei armii (Law on the demobilization of the 
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oldest age groups of the standing army). The announcement of the law, as befitted a 
moment of great national importance, received extensive publicity. The full text of the 
law was reprinted in all the important national and regional newspapers, sometimes 
alongside a report on demobilization by the Chief of the General Staff, General 
Antonov.
12
 The official satirical journal Krokodil published cartoons drawing attention 
to the law and the imminent return of demobilized soldiers.
13
 Despite the public fanfare 
greeting the announcement, the Soviet response to demobilization was slow. To put this 
in perspective five days after the first British soldiers were scheduled to start returning 
home the Soviet Union announced the legislative framework for soldiers‟ homecoming. 
Delay in commencing demobilization was not the only reason most soldiers had 
to be disappointed by the announcement. Rather than adopting a points-based system, as 
favoured by the British and Americans, the Red Army chose a system of demobilization 
by age group. The Zakon o demobilizatsii starshikh vozrastov applied to men born 
between 1893 and 1905, the thirteen oldest birth cohorts officially serving in the Red 
Army. Some historians have suggested that older men were prioritized because it was 
assumed that men with established families and careers would be the most impatient to 
return home.
14
 Bureaucratic concerns, however, provide a more plausible explanation. 
Demobilization by birth cohort was much easier to administer than a points system. It is 
doubtful whether Red Army service records were sufficiently detailed to allow officials 
to calculate how long soldiers had spent in the frontlines or to assess their personal 
circumstances. Certainly trying to administer such a system would have required a 
massive additional commitment of manpower and resources, and would have slowed 
release rates. Decisions about demobilization were rarely made in the interests of 
veterans. The needs of wider society or the officials administering the process were 
frequently placed ahead of individual soldiers. This, however, was not just a purely 
administrative decision. Demobilizing soldiers on the basis of their age had a profound 
effect on the shape of demobilization and veterans‟ prospects of readjustment. Younger 
veterans had to wait the longest to resume civilian lives, something which placed them 
at a disadvantage. Older age groups returning in the earlier phases of mass 
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demobilization had more stable family lives and established careers to fall back on. 
They were also at the front of the queue for the limited opportunities that were 
available. 
In many units there were relatively few soldiers eligible for the first phase of 
demobilization. One Leningrader, Yuri Popov, recalled the day when the law was 
announced to the massed ranks of his regiment. The soldiers to whom the law applied 
were ordered to take a pace forward. Only four men moved.
15
 Although mass 
demobilization had been set in motion the majority of serving soldiers still had no idea 
when they might be returning home. For many the waiting lasted months even years.  
Complaints about delays in demobilization and the slowness of the process were 
not unique to the Red Army. Throughout the twentieth century the process of 
demobilizing mass conscript armies was simply not fast enough for the ordinary soldier 
waiting to return home. In Britain in early January 1919 there were disturbances 
amongst several thousand soldiers in Folkestone and Dover demanding 
demobilization.
16
 In Germany in the autumn of 1918 and in the months following the 
Armistice many soldiers impatient to return home self-demobilized, winding up their 
military units themselves and drifting home on their own initiative.
17
 In the wake of the 
Second World War there was considerable dissatisfaction about the slow pace of 
demobilization in both the British and American armies.
18
 As Stouffer wrote in his 
classic study of the American soldier; “As demobilization proceeded, critics of the 
Army in and out of uniform formed a swelling chorus of discontent over the alleged 
slowness with which the Army was discharging men.”19 There were protests of 
American troops in Manila, and spontaneous outbursts in Western Europe, India, China 
and Korea. By the end of January 1946 approximately 50,000 British airmen stationed 
from Egypt to Malaya had participated in so called „demob strikes‟.20 Even armies with 
more transparent demobilization plans faced pressure to quicken the pace at which 
soldiers returned home.  
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In the Red Army it was inevitable that continuing uncertainty about when 
soldiers might be released generated frustration. However, in a highly authoritarian 
society resentment rarely developed into insurrection. Transports of returning ex-
servicemen had the capacity to descend into drink-fuelled mob violence, but there is no 
evidence of soldiers awaiting demobilization mounting protests.
21
   
Unsurprisingly many soldiers were eager to get out of the army as soon as 
possible. Many soldiers wrote letters home to their wives and families outlining their 
future plans and expressing their impatience to escape the army.
22
 Former students from 
the Leningrad State University‟s geography department bombarded the faculty with 
requests to be permitted to resume their studies. Many pleaded with the head of 
department to write to commanding officers and ask for their release.
23
 It is likely that 
other specialists wrote to the city soviet suggesting that their skills would be better 
deployed in civilian reconstruction rather than treading water in the army. Repeated 
delays and disappointments made the waiting almost unbearable. One veteran 
demobilized at the end of March 1950, interviewed as part of this research, recalled a 
feeling of disbelief when he was finally discharged. Waiting at the platform for the train 
home two of his comrades were hauled back, having been mistakenly considered for 
release. For the rest of the journey home he expected something similar to happen to 
him.
24
 These were hardly promising circumstances in which to return home and start to 
rebuild one‟s life. 
Although many soldiers longed for demobilization there were compensations for 
continuing armed service. Many ex-servicemen would subsequently miss the sense of 
comradeship and belonging that the wartime army had given them. Small groups of 
soldiers supported and understood each other in ways which veterans could not always 
expect from their families or colleagues. Soldiers stationed beyond Soviet borders had 
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opportunities to interact with a society very different from their own, and also to acquire 
loot from the local population. In many respects living conditions were better in the 
army than in post-war Leningrad. Food was often more plentiful in occupied Europe 
than back at home. News that life after demobilization was tough quickly filtered 
through to serving soldiers. Prior to his demobilization in 1947 Boris Mikhailov 
received a letter from his father informing and advising him that: “In Russia there is 
famine. In Leningrad there is rationing. It‟s very difficult to live. If you have any 
opportunity, try and stay in the army.”25 However, he was determined to get home. As 
another Leningrad veteran, Evgenii Moniushko, put it: 
“Although everyone understood very well that they were going back to the 
hard labour associated with reconstruction and rebirth instead of „heaven‟, 
and that there/ might not be shelter or food, everyone yearned to return 
home. Therefore, every delay was a tragedy.”26     
It was not until 25 September 1945 that a USSR Supreme Soviet decree set in 
train a second wave of demobilization. It extended the provisions of the Zakon o 
demobilizatsii starshikh vozrastov to the next ten birth cohorts, soldiers born between 
1906 and 1915. In addition it offered soldiers who had completed higher, technical or 
agricultural education, former teachers, lecturers, students, people who had sustained 
three or more wounds, soldiers with seven or more years‟ continuous service and 
women, regardless of age, the prospect of release.
27
 A third wave of demobilization was 
announced on 20 March 1946, releasing soldiers born between 1916 and 1921. Further 
waves of demobilization were on a smaller scale, releasing single birth cohorts and 
relatively small number of veterans. The youngest age groups might have to wait until 
the spring of 1948 before finally becoming eligible for demobilization.
28
   
Demobilization legislation and announcements were not solely about the order 
in which service personnel were to be released from the armed forces. The Zakon o 
demobilizatsii starshikh vozrastov also extended a range of benefits to demobilized 
veterans, which the second and third waves of demobilization reiterated.  The legislation 
theoretically guaranteed demobilized veterans free transportation to their homes, food 
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for the journey, and a full uniform including a set of footwear. In addition soldiers and 
officers were to receive a one-off cash payment calculated on the basis of length of 
service and rank. Finally, returning soldiers had a range of housing and employment 
rights, which will be examined in closer detail in chapters one and two.  
Although the state undertook to transport soldiers home the journey was 
inevitably a lengthy and uncomfortable experience. Just getting demobilized soldiers 
back to their homes and families was a formidable logistical undertaking. Troops 
usually travelled in freight or cattle wagons with rudimentary facilities, something 
which most soldiers were accustomed to. The unexpected delays in journeys caused by 
the dilapidated condition of the railway network and mismanagement caused greater 
frustration. Some trains appear to have been abandoned for several days at a time. In 
such circumstances soldiers often turned to violence or drink, sometimes resulting in 
mass alcohol poisoning, to punctuate the endless journeys.
29
    
In comparison to the welfare payments and benefits offered to British or 
American troops these privileges were meagre. Worse still the beleaguered late Stalinist 
state frequently failed to meet even these modest legal responsibilities. Demobilization 
benefits were not universally applied. Shortages of uniforms meant that many veterans 
returned in incomplete or tattered outfits. In his memoirs Evgenii Moniushko recalled 
that in the autumn of 1945 soldiers in his regiment were stripped of their uniforms and 
footwear in order to adequately clothe those about to be demobilized.
30
 Many veterans 
would still be wearing their uniforms months or even years after their return home. 
Reports written by Leningrad‟s military prosecutor reveal that throughout 1945 and 
1946 even privileged NKVD troops were often released without the payments, supplies 
and equipment which they were promised by officers and agitators, and to which they 
were legally entitled.
31
 Similar problems were reported across the Soviet Union. For 
proud soldiers shortages of underwear and the confiscation of personal property prior to 
demobilization were deeply humiliating.
32
 Even feeding the thousands of veterans 
passing through Leningrad each day, on their way to be demobilized in other places, 
created practical problems. There was no guarantee that soldiers would get the rations 
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they were entitled to.
33
 Finally, the range of privileges which took shape between 1945 
and 1947 started to be dismantled during 1947 and 1948. Indeed, the soldiers released 
by the last wave of demobilization in 1948 were no longer entitled to even the limited 
privileges of the 1945 demobilization law.
34
 
The Soldiers’ Return  
 
On Sunday 8 July 1945 a military parade was organized through the centre of 
Leningrad to honour the city‟s heroic wartime defenders. Soldiers specially selected 
from three elite guards divisions serving on the Leningrad Front marched through 
Leningrad in three separate columns. The parades began in Kolpino, Pulkovo and 
Uritsk, heavily damaged suburban towns on Leningrad‟s southern periphery. They 
continued onward through Leningrad‟s southern industrial districts, passing through the 
city centre, past historic landmarks, and over famous bridges, before parading through 
workers‟ districts in the north of the city. The routes were deliberately designed to cover 
as much of the city and its hinterland as possible.
35
 Hundreds of thousands of 
Leningraders thronged the routes to pay tribute to the troops. The spectacle of thousands 
of pristine soldiers marching past in disciplined lines was thrilling. The parade received 
extensive local and national press coverage. Newspaper articles and photographs 
captured women and children showering the troops with thousands of flowers. Soldiers 
and civilians seemed temporarily united by the celebration of their combined wartime 
achievements. Even the heavy police presence failed to dampen the crowds‟ spirits.36    
The image of military parades triumphantly entering the city has frequently been 
confused with demobilization. The myth of demobilization equated these celebrations 
and the crowds‟ enthusiasm for the parading soldiers with demobilization. The parade 
was supposed to be a vivid demonstration of the unity of soldiers and civilians, 
something which would be continually tested throughout mass demobilization. 
However, the jubilation which greeted the parades was not entirely spontaneous. It was 
the product of a well-oiled propaganda machine. Little was left to chance. The route and 
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timing for the parade were meticulously planned. Triumphal arches were erected at the 
points that parading soldiers would enter the city. A party official was made responsible 
for decorating the city with flowers, wreathes, slogans and portraits of Lenin, Stalin, 
members of the Politburo and military leaders. Political rallies were organized alongside 
each route. Each city district was given a minimum quota for the number of workers to 
attend. Over 6000 workers were to be mobilized for the meeting in Palace Square. 
50,000 copies of a propaganda leaflet were printed, and were to be dropped from 
aeroplanes or thrown from moving vehicles. The parade and political meetings was to 
be covered by journalists, photographers, newsreels and live radio broadcast. School 
children were given the responsibility of gathering wild flowers from the city‟s outskirts 
to make bouquets. Drink stands were to be arranged along the route to provide 
refreshment throughout the festivities.
37
 
Four days later, on 12 July 1945, the first genuine demobilized veterans, rather 
than parading troops, began to arrive at Leningrad‟s railway termini. The first troop 
trains (eshelons) brought back 1774 veterans from Tallinn and 2001 from Latvia. On 13 
July 1307 veterans made the short journey from Vyborg, followed a day later by 1329 
demobilized soldiers from Latvia.
38
 In the first days and weeks of mass demobilization 
Leningraders greeted returning soldiers with great enthusiasm. The same pomp and 
circumstance which characterized the military parades on 8 July were extended to the 
first homecoming veterans. Cheering women and children clutching bouquets crowded 
the platforms of Leningrad‟s railway stations anxious to be reunited with their loved 
ones. The reception of demobilized troops, at least in the early stages, was carefully 
orchestrated. Frantic preparations had been made to ensure that railway stations were 
ready for returning heroes. Platforms and the battered trains which brought soldiers 
back were bedecked with flowers, posters, propaganda slogans and portraits of Stalin. 
Local Komsomol cells were mobilized to make the necessary arrangements and 
decorate railway platforms.
39
 Once again newspaper reporters and photographers were 
there to document the celebrations and the preparations made to welcome returning 
                                                 
37
  TsGAIPD-SPb/f.24/op.2v/d.7003/ll.94-100. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, pp.113-14.   
 
38
  TsGAIPD-SPb/f.24/op.2v/d.7023/l.75. 
 
39
  TsGAIPD-SPb/f.K-598/op.5/d.232/ll.16-17; „Vstrechaem dorogykh voinov‟, Smena, 16 July 1945, p.2. 
46 
heroes.
40
 Similar, albeit more modest festivities, were organized in provincial towns 
across the Leningrad oblast. 
 
Figure 1: Leningraders meet the first troop eshelons of demobilized veterans arriving in the city.
41
 
Returning soldiers in the first weeks of mass demobilization were hit by the full 
force of the Soviet propaganda machine. In theory every effort was made to greet ex-
servicemen in a manner befitting returning heroes. All returning eshelons were 
supposed to be greeted by delegations of between 500 and 1000 workers and a brass 
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band. Special rostrums were built at railway termini to provide a platform for party and 
soviet dignitaries and agitators. Arriving troops were treated to short political meetings, 
speeches from important local figures and a short explanation of the rest of the 
demobilization process.
42
 On occasion the subjects of these speeches are preserved in 
the archival record. In Volkhov party secretary Teren appeared before demobilized 
troops with a lecture entitled, “The town of Volkhov during the Patriotic War.” His 
colleague party secretary Mikhailov gave a talk on “Volkhov district – active help for 
the front.”43 Ex-servicemen arriving in Leningrad‟s Sverdlov district heard similar 
speeches designed to remind frontoviki of the contribution of Leningrad‟s civilian war 
effort, and allay potential friction between civilians and veterans.
44
 National and local 
propagandists made a genuine effort to demonstrate that returning veterans were 
welcomed home as heroes. The central party propaganda apparatus issued directives 
encouraging local and regional newspapers to report on the celebrations welcoming 
troops home, and demonstrate that veterans were reintegrating well.
45
  
Finally, having been warmly welcomed home and reminded of their future 
responsibilities, returning veterans passed through demobilization points. Detailed 
preparations were made to ensure that reception points were well equipped and veterans 
would be able to complete the necessary paperwork quickly and inefficiently. In a report 
written on 18 July 1945 Trakhachev, head of the Party Military Department, calculated 
that it would take between fifty and eighty minutes to draw up most soldiers‟ civilian 
documents. In addition to being issued with the relevant military paperwork veterans 
were to be given passports, ration cards and tokens which could be redeemed for vodka 
and tobacco.
46
 In theory veterans were now free to re-enter ordinary civilian life. In the 
long-term, however, predictions that soldiers would pass through demobilization points 
smoothly and efficiently, and quickly readjust to life outside the army, proved over 
optimistic. 
The propaganda campaign implemented in the first weeks and months of mass 
demobilization is responsible for one of the most enduring myths about veterans‟ 
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demobilization, namely that soldiers were welcomed home to universal acclaim, were 
smoothly reintegrated and quickly readjusted. The propaganda campaign surrounding 
soldiers‟ return proved remarkably successful, shaping the way that demobilization has 
been viewed ever since. Images of veterans reunited with their families on railway 
platforms or parading through Palace Square or Nevskii Prospect have become 
synonymous with demobilization. Men like Gapaniuk, an infantryman demobilized in 
Leningrad‟s Primorksii district were the lucky ones. He understood and appreciated his 
good fortune: 
“I fought in frontline positions for four years. I lived in dugouts and 
trenches. I had to experience a lot of hardships. Now I have returned to my 
hometown to my beloved family. At home I found everything in order. I 
was warmly met at the reception point. It all goes to create a good kindly 
feeling. I will relax a little and then return to work.”47  
 
Most ex-servicemen and women, however, did not receive a hero‟s welcome. 
Many soldiers did not have families to return to, who could help them readjust. A large 
number of Leningraders serving in the Red Army had lost their entire families during 
the siege. Others found that their relatives were as yet unable to return from re-
evacuation. Soldiers who returned at the start of a new demobilization wave were more 
likely to receive an organized reception. But ordinary Leningraders soon tired of 
ceremonies to welcome home soldiers. Once the initial novelty of demobilization wore 
off ex-servicemen were met with less fanfare and eventually with silence. Even those 
who were welcomed home warmly soon learnt that demobilization was not all bunting 
and brass bands. 
Amongst the veterans attempting to rebuild their lives in Leningrad were many 
new arrivals with no roots and no family ties in the region. Veterans were not entirely 
static following their demobilization. In theory ex-servicemen were supposed to return 
to the place in which they had volunteered or had been conscripted. In practice many 
exploited opportunities to move to other cities and regions. Many veterans arrived in 
Leningrad not on troop echelons, but on civilian trains from the places where they had 
previously been demobilized. They too were unlikely to receive the warm welcome 
extended to the first veterans arriving in Leningrad. In contrast to the heroic myth there 
was no shared experience of demobilization. Different groups of soldiers had very 
different experiences of taking their first steps towards civilian life.  
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Disabled Veterans 
 
 Disabled veterans were largely excluded from the celebrations and propaganda 
circus of the first few weeks of mass demobilization. Large numbers of soldiers 
considered unfit for further military service had been discharged from the Red Army on 
medical grounds long before the announcement of mass demobilization. Indeed, they 
were amongst the first soldiers to have the opportunity to return to civilian life. Their 
return during the war, however, was in very different circumstances to either their able-
bodied comrades released through mass demobilization, or fellow war invalids released 
from military hospitals after May 1945. First, war invalids did not return in dedicated 
troop transports exclusively for military use, but were required to make their way home 
under their own initiative in smaller groups or sometimes on their own. Given that many 
disabled veterans were still struggling to adjust to a loss of mobility, the journey on 
crowded civilian trains could be an ordeal. Secondly, war invalids were not welcomed 
back by cheering crowds and were not immediately surrounded by frantic agitation 
work. In many ways their return was anonymous. Finally, there was a significant gap 
between the experiences of war invalids demobilized before and after the summer of 
1945. During the war disabled veterans enjoyed a relatively high status.
48
 For civilians 
they served as an important channel of information about life of the frontlines and an 
emotional connection with the friends and relatives serving in the army. With 
manpower at a premium many war invalids enjoyed reasonable employment prospects. 
Once the war ended war invalids arriving in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast 
received a far less satisfying reception. With the start of mass demobilization in July 
1945 injured and disfigured former soldiers were displaced from the pantheon of heroes 
and disappeared from the official commemoration of the war. Worse still many disabled 
veterans would be replaced in their jobs by able-bodied veterans, and they would be 
made to feel increasingly unwelcome. 
Women Veterans and Technical Specialists 
 
 The war disabled were not the only group of soldiers to be demobilized before 
the start of mass demobilization, or outside the framework of the Zakon o 
demobilizatsii. Women in particular appear to have been viewed as something of a 
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special case, meriting earlier release from the military. On 5 November 1944, 
approximately nine months before the first eshelons of demobilized veterans began 
arriving in Leningrad, a secret report discussed the possibility of demobilizing between 
700 and 800 women from active service on the Leningrad front.
49
 It is unclear why this 
decision was taken. Military commanders may have considered that as the war 
approached its final stages women were no longer needed. Alternatively, women may 
have been viewed as an unwelcome or disruptive presence in the military. Although the 
numbers were relatively small other fronts may also have taken steps to reduce the 
number of women soldiers well before the war‟s end. However, the early 
demobilization of women may have been a local innovation. Nationally women were 
not given privileged rights for demobilization until the announcement of the second 
wave of demobilization at the end of September 1945. Despite lingering misogynistic 
fears about the place of women in the Red Army their skills could not be dispensed with 
immediately. Indeed as the Red Army was often reliant on women to fulfil medical, 
technical jobs and ancillary services this may have even acted as an obstacle to their 
demobilization.   
In contrast highly skilled technical specialists serving in the Red Army, usually 
men, had the enhanced prospect of being pushed up the demobilization queue. If the 
skills of an individual soldier or officer were sufficiently important the usual 
demobilization mechanisms could be circumvented. The Leningrad city soviet, and 
institutions under its control, barraged army headquarters and commanding officers with 
hundreds of requests to release highly skilled workers considered essential for post-war 
reconstruction and the normal functioning of the city. Requests were made to 
demobilize road-builders, staff from the State Hermitage Museum, the former director 
of Lenzhilsnab, one of Leningrad‟s leading housing construction trusts, as well as 
architects and restoration workers with the specialist knowledge to restore the city‟s 
architectural treasures.
50
 On 13 July 1946, for example, Basov, one of several deputy 
chairman of the Leningrad soviet, wrote to Chief Commander of Central Army Group 
requesting that Vladimir Lodukhin was demobilized. Before the war Lodukhin had 
worked as the director of museums, palaces and parks in Pushkin, and had helped 
supervise the evacuation of valuables from Leningrad‟s palaces and museums. His 
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experience was considered invaluable in the mammoth task of rebuilding the Catherine 
Palace, and evacuating valuable cultural artefacts.
51
  
These alternative mechanisms were not comparable with the measures 
implemented by other armies to prioritize the release of key workers. In Britain, for 
example, Class B demobilization was introduced to release managers, technicians and 
overseas salesmen (who all made an important contribution to labour creation), as well 
as teachers, students and skilled manufacturing, mining and agricultural workers. 
Approximately ten per cent of British veterans were demobilized under these 
regulations.
52
 In contrast, the Leningrad soviet requested the demobilization of at most a 
thousand soldiers. This then was an ad-hoc local solution to specific problems, rather 
than a permanent arrangement sanctioned from the centre.     
POWs 
 
Finally, one further group of former soldiers had a very different experience of 
demobilization compared to that of the veterans who stepped off trains to universal 
applause and acclaim. At the end of the war the Soviet repatriation administration had 
record of 2,016,480 POWs, 1,836,562 of whom were eventually repatriated.
53
 Returning 
POWs were deprived of any public celebration or recognition of either their wartime 
sacrifices or their contribution to victory. In the majority of cases ordinary soldiers were 
captured fulfilling their military duty and through no fault of their own. But the 
notorious wartime order number 270, which branded captured soldiers traitors, 
stigmatized POWs, and resulted in them being treated like criminals. At best official 
policy towards POWs was suspicious, at worst it was hostile. Returning POWs were not 
welcomed home by their government. Instead they were subjected to a process known 
as filtration (filtratsiia), by which they were screened for participation in the Vlasovite 
Russia Liberation Army, possible collaboration in POW camps and possible anti-Soviet 
activity.  
Leningrad‟s borderland position made it an important location in the repatriation 
of POWs. Its proximity to Finland and the Baltics ensured a steady flow of repatriated 
soldiers and civilians. The filtration system consisted of two tiers: Verification-
Filtration points and Verification-Filtration Camps. The Leningrad oblast had one main 
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filtration point, located in Vyborg, established in October 1944 which was amongst the 
busiest in the entire Soviet Union. In 1944 approximately 45,000 repatriated Soviet 
citizens passed through filtration points in the Leningrad region. This represented about 
forty-six per cent of the total number of Soviet repatriates for 1944.
54
 Between the end 
of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 the Vyborg filtration point was receiving between 
2000 and 5000 repatriates every day.
55
 The Leningrad oblast boasted two filtration 
camps. Camp No.317 was established in January 1945 in the village of Nevdubstroi, 
located on the October railway to the East of Leningrad close to Kirovsk. Camp No.323 
was opened in April 1945 at Kotly, a village near the Estonian border, also with railway 
links. These are reputed to have been amongst the largest filtration camps in the entire 
Soviet Union.
56
 It is unclear how many POWs arriving in the Leningrad region were 
transferred from filtration points to filtration camps. At a national level somewhere 
between sixty-one and sixty-seven per cent of returning POWs were transferred from 
one to the other.
57
 There were of course local variations in practice. The Tosnenskii 
district NKVD department, for example, sent all returning POWs to filtration camps 
regardless of individual circumstances.
58
  
 The filtration process was one of the most vivid demonstrations of the repressive 
power of the late Stalinist state. On crossing the Soviet border former POWs fell under 
immediate suspicion, regardless of the circumstances of their capture or their conduct in 
captivity. Fresh from suffering in Nazi concentration camps many POWs found that one 
camp regime was replaced by another. Conditions were little different from either the 
Gulag or the camps in which German POWs were imprisoned. Filtration camp inmates 
were forced labourers in all but name. Whilst undergoing the humiliation of 
interrogation and investigation at night, former POWs were expected to work 
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exhausting eleven hour days. Both of the Leningrad oblast‟s camps used former POWs 
for reconstruction projects. Camp No.323 deployed prisoners in the reconstruction of 
the October railway line and construction projects for the Baltic Fleet. Inmates of camp 
No.317 played a crucial role in the reconstruction of the Dubrovskaia power-station.
59
 
Filtration camps appear to have been deliberately located near important industrial 
centres or enterprises in order that former POWs could contribute to reconstruction.
60
 
However, the real purpose of filtration camps remained rooting out supposed traitors 
and collaborators. According to figures cited by one historian between January and 
March 1946 a total of 12,351 individuals passed through these two filtration camps. 507 
former POWs were arrested and 3108 sentenced to special exile for periods of at least 
six years.
61
  
Although there was much that was shameful about the treatment of returning 
POWs in the Leningrad oblast, the filtration system appears to have been marginally 
less repressive than some historians have imagined. As Mark Edele has noted historians 
have often exaggerated the violence of filtration: “Stressing the arbitrariness of the 
process of filtration, some accounts leave the reader with the impression that the typical 
experience was the bullet in the head or the life of a concentration camp inmate (zek) in 
Stalin‟s Gulag.”62 This was often not the case. Rank and file soldiers, for example, were 
treated more leniently than former officers. Given the level of violence the Stalinist state 
was capable of, the number of POWs killed or arrested as a result of filtration was 
surprisingly low.  
Yet even POWs who passed through filtration points and camps relatively 
easily, found that the stain upon their character was not removed. Suspicion hung over 
repatriated citizens for the rest of their lives. Returning POWs were required to register 
with local NKVD offices within days of their arrival, where they remained on 
surveillance lists. Former POWs clearing filtration were also prevented from living in 
major Soviet cities. Several thousand native Leningraders, perhaps even tens of 
thousands, who had found themselves in enemy captivity, were unable to return to their 
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homes and families. In effect they were displaced by their own state. Employers, 
perhaps mindful of being accused of insufficient vigilance, were reluctant to hire former 
POWs. Between 1944 and 1947 repatriated POWs were treated like second class 
citizens. They did, however, enjoy many of the theoretical privileges extended to 
demobilized veterans. But in 1947 the political atmosphere changed. No official policy 
shift was announced, but the political centre stopped sending positive signals about the 
desirability of reintegrating repatriates and stopped enforcing the legal rights of former 
POWs. Very quickly former POWs were subject to greater surveillance, frequent 
harassment and the increased risk of arrest.
63
  
The specific problems facing the reintegration of former POWs in the Leningrad 
region are largely beyond the scope of this thesis. In part this reflects the ruling that 
former POWs were not permitted to live within a 100 kilometre zone of Leningrad. 
Although former POWs undoubtedly slipped through this cordon, the total number 
living in the region was relatively low. The comparative lack of discussion about the 
prospects of assimilating POWs also reflects the limits of current archival access. While 
I was permitted to pursue research about veterans, requests for files relating specifically 
to POWs were routinely rejected. Local archivists steadfastly maintained that POWs 
and veterans were very different social constituencies, rather than overlapping groups. 
In administrative terms this is true. It was not until the breakdown of the Soviet Union 
that the last obstacles to the rehabilitation of POWs were finally removed. Legal 
recognition that POWs were „war participants‟ on an equal footing with other veterans 
was only granted in 1995.
64
 Archival practice has tended to group documents about 
demobilized veterans and former POWs in different parts of the archive. Furthermore, 
in an era when the old patriotic narratives of the Great Patriotic War are being 
reasserted the repressive treatment of POWs at the local level is a particularly sensitive 
issue. As the official memory of the war once again tightens and becomes a symbol of 
national pride documents describing the harassment of former POWs are unlikely to be 
declassified.  
Demobilization Statistics 
 
 The return of veterans to Leningrad and the surrounding region had taken time 
to organise and started slowly. What began as a trickle would rapidly become a torrent. 
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From mid July 1945 onwards thousands of soldiers began arriving in the city of 
Leningrad on an almost daily basis. The scale and pace of demobilization was 
impressive. By 31 July 1947, the last available set of figures, a total of 268,376 veterans 
had been demobilized in Leningrad.
65
 By 1 January 1947 a further 47,618 soldiers had 
been demobilized in the Leningrad oblast.
66
 The number of veterans demobilized in the 
Leningrad oblast was significantly lower than in other comparable regions. The locally 
generated figures, however, suggest that more veterans were demobilized in Leningrad 
than any other major Soviet city. 246,218 veterans had been demobilized in Leningrad 
by 1 January 1947, compared to 212,866 in Moscow, 44,571 in Kiev and 32,571 in 
Gorkii.
67
  
Furthermore, these figures underestimate the total number of veterans settling in 
Leningrad. They exclude disabled veterans, former POWs and migrants not recorded 
amongst the soldiers passing through demobilization points. On 1 May 1946 there were 
an additional 48,643 war invalids registered with district social security officers in 
Leningrad, Petrodorets, Kolpino, Pushkin and Kronstadt.
68
 Unfortunately there are no 
reliable figures for the number of Red Army veterans who chose to migrate to either 
Leningrad or the Leningrad oblast in the months and years following their 
demobilization. As they were not demobilized in Leningrad they were not counted. 
Since many were arriving without permission or paperwork they went reluctant to make 
themselves too visible to local administrators. Similarly, there are no readily available 
statistics for the number of POWs returning to the Leningrad region. Presumably most 
of the material documenting the supervision and surveillance of POWs is preserved in 
closed FSB archives. Although, the total number of Red Army veterans, in the broadest 
definition of the word, can never be fully established, former soldiers were a highly 
prominent presence in the post-war city. Given the reduction in Leningrad‟s population 
they represented approximately ten to fifteen percent of the city‟s total population. 
 The dynamics of demobilization in Leningrad were also different from the 
national picture. According to Donchenko‟s research a staggering forty per cent of all 
soldiers released during mass demobilization returned between July and September 
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1945 as part of the first wave of demobilization.
69
 In comparison, 45,770 soldiers had 
been demobilized in Leningrad by 1 October 1945, the approximate end of the first 
demobilization wave. This amounted to just seventeen per cent of the total number 
demobilized in the city. Although the pace of demobilization quickened in the summer 
of 1945, it was not until the autumn of 1945 that the process reached full capacity. 
45,000 soldiers were demobilized in November 1945; approximately the same number 
as the first three months of mass demobilization.
70
 Throughout the last quarter of 1945 
and the whole of 1946 demobilization in Leningrad progressed at a steady rate. By 
January 1947 the bulk of demobilizing veterans had been completed. Only 22,160 
veterans, just eight per cent of the total, were demobilized in Leningrad between 
January and July 1947.
71
  
As far as the military were concerned demobilization was achieved when 
soldiers left the army and returned home. However, the difficulties of readjusting to 
civilian life were only just beginning. Demobilized veterans returned as victors, but they 
would have to fight further battles to find their place in post-war society. While the 
number of soldiers who returned to the region represented only a fraction of those who 
volunteered to fight or who were conscripted, re-assimilating so many veterans in such 
a compressed period of time created enormous social pressures. Just as different 
veterans had different experiences of returning home, not all veterans readjusted to 
civilian life with equal success.  
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Chapter 1: “Homes for Heroes”: Veterans and the Post-war Housing Crisis 
 
Re-housing the hundreds of thousands of veterans arriving in Leningrad and the 
Leningrad oblast represented one of the greatest challenges facing local decision makers. 
Housing shortages were a constant problem during late Stalinism, to which there was no 
quick or easy solution. One of the first, and certainly the most intractable problems, 
facing Leningrad‟s veterans was finding somewhere to live. This chapter explores the 
official mechanisms by which veterans were allocated housing, as well as the many and 
varied tactics they employed to obtain housing on their own initiative. It argues that 
providing veterans with temporary or permanent housing proved beyond the means of 
the Leningrad soviet and the Leningrad party. Although ex-servicemen and their 
families had legal entitlements to housing, the right to new housing or to reclaim former 
homes was far from automatic. The chapter also examines ex-servicemen‟s attitudes to 
housing shortages, the inequalities of housing distribution and the abysmal living 
conditions they often encountered. The failure of the state, and its local representatives, 
to provide “homes for heroes” inevitably created disappointment. As a result some 
veterans privately questioned official claims that the state was making unprecedented 
efforts to reward veterans. Veterans‟ views of these issues provide an important 
indication of how they evaluated post-war society and their place in it. Housing, to quote 
the historian Rebecca Manley, was “a contested terrain in which individuals and groups 
fought not only over scare material resources, but over who won the war, and the extent 
to which the war would determine the post-war order.”1 Housing, therefore, provides a 
prism through which the experience of post-war re-adaptation can be refracted, casting 
light upon the difficulties of demobilization, but also separating out the winners and 
losers in post-war society. 
 
 Housing is not just an important theme because it offers an opportunity to 
evaluate former soldiers‟ attitudes towards demobilization. Housing provision for 
demobilized veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast provides a litmus test to 
judge theories of entitlement. One of the principal ways historians have approached 
writing about demobilization has been to focus on the social welfare benefits extended 
to veterans.
2
 Throughout modern history European and North American societies have 
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created expectations that armed service deserves tangible material rewards, sometimes 
referred to as „the military covenant‟ or „reciprocity‟. The rhetoric that returning soldiers 
deserve special treatment is still very much with us today. Notions of entitlement have 
also formed an important part of how historians have written about Red Army veterans. 
Mark Edele, in particular, has argued that in the years before the establishment of an 
organized veterans‟ movement, it was a shared sense of entitlement which bound 
veterans together as a group.
3
 As Edele writes, “Soviet war veterans in the first post-war 
decade formed a socially relevant group because they tended to act alike, as they shared 
a sense of individual entitlement vis-à-vis the community they had fought for.”4 Clearly, 
state benefits played an important role in easing ex-servicemen and ex-servicewomen‟s 
transition into civilian life, and entitlement veterans‟ identities. However, being a 
veteran was not just a matter of legal status or entitlement, but also the effects exposure 
to extreme violence and mass death had upon soldiers‟ lives. More importantly, as Edele 
acknowledges, entitlement, the claim to special treatment, and privilege, the 
institutionalisation and reciprocation of these claims, were very different things.
5
 The 
distribution of housing in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast and the implementation of 
veterans‟ housing rights offer the opportunity to examine to what extent veterans were 
able to transform legal entitlement into concrete privilege or special status.  The 
complexities of the local post-war housing crisis suggest that few veterans, at least in 
Leningrad, extracted practical advantage from theoretical privilege. The complexities of 
the local post-war housing crisis prevented veterans from emerging a single privileged 
social group.  
Destruction, Damage and Housing Conditions 
 
 In February 1946 Vasilii Aleksandrov was invalided out of the Red Army. In mid 
March he was greeted at the railway station in Ordezh, approximately 130 kilometres 
south of Leningrad, by his mother, aunt and a cousin. The following day they set off on 
the twenty-five kilometre walk home. He was shocked by what awaited him:        
 
“On the way we passed the village of Pochap which had been partially burnt 
down, but the next village Beloe had been completely burnt down, only two 
homes and two barns remained. Not one building remained in the villages of 
Tren‟kovo and Khrenelki. Our village Moshkovye Poliany had also suffered, 
fourteen buildings had been burnt down, but around fifty remained. Of all the 
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surrounding villages, and there had been nine... before the war, only one 
remained, ours.”6   
 
Veterans like Vasilii Aleksandrov returned to a landscape scarred by trenches, pitted by 
shells and littered with burnt-out villages. By 1947 parts of the oblast still resembled a 
moonscape.
7
 Sixteen towns and 2032 villages were destroyed or severely damaged by 
fighting. In August 1945 the oblast soviet calculated that 56,720 residential buildings 
were totally destroyed.
8
 Districts to the south of the city, where the fighting had been 
particularly intense, suffered disproportionately. Sixty-two villages and 6778 homes 
were burnt down in the Mginskii raion (district). One hundred sixty-nine villages and 
12,811 homes were destroyed in the Tosnenskii raion. Only twenty residential buildings 
survived in the Kirishskii raion. Important towns such as Pavlovsk, Pushkin, Mga and 
Tosno were all but flattened. In Kolpino, twenty kilometres south of Leningrad, eighty-
five per cent of housing was destroyed, causing an estimated 620 million roubles of 
damage.
9
 The Leningrad oblast had also been dramatically depopulated. By August 
1945 its population was just 492,952 people, less than a third of its pre-war level.
10
 The 
homes and communities to which many veterans were returning had changed beyond all 
recognition.  
 Many veterans found the villages where they had once lived and worked had 
entirely disappeared. Others discovered that their homes were now occupied by other 
people. Veterans returning to the Volosovskii lime factory in 1946 found that they were 
homeless. In 1944 a camp for German POWs had been established in the factory‟s 
residential buildings. Because POWs were now essential to the factory‟s operation the 
NKVD refused to relocate the camp.
11
 No wonder many veterans believed that their 
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sacrifices had been forgotten, when the residential needs of the former enemy were 
placed above their own. Finding somewhere to live in this war-torn landscape was 
difficult. Indeed, it may have led many veterans to decide to move to Leningrad where 
the prospect of work and housing seemed brighter. 
 
Another solution to the destruction of housing was the construction of temporary 
shelters and dugouts known as zemlianki. In July 1945, according to a report written by 
Danilin, head of the local Department for State Aid for Soldiers‟ Families, there were 
approximately 2000 servicemen‟s families living in zemlianki in the Leningrad oblast.12 
Compared to the Pskov, Smolensk and Orlov oblasts this figure was low. This, 
however, was scant compensation for those directly affected.
13
 Despite widespread 
concern, the number of families living in such conditions did not improve as quickly as 
officials hoped. Danilin‟s annual report forwarded to Moscow in December 1945 noted 
that 2000 service families were still living in dugouts.
14
 It was unlikely that an oblast 
soviet decision passed in December 1945 succeeded in re-housing all of these families 
by March 1946 as planned.
15
             
Significant numbers of industrial workers shared these living conditions. In 
December 1945 approximately 232 families and 593 single people were working on the 
construction of the Dubrovskii power station in Kirovsk. Three hundred and fifty-eight 
people were living in tents, forty-three families in plywood huts, and 173 families and 
233 individuals in zemlianki.
16
 Plans to employ veterans in key industries drawn up in 
mid-December 1945 recommended that 250 veterans were employed at the Svir-3 
hydroelectric power station in the north-west of the oblast.
17
 On arrival they found 
construction workers living in zemlianki, conditions they would share through the 
winter of 1945-46. Demidov, the site‟s construction chief, was ordered to re-house 412 
families by 1 March 1946. Despite the construction of some new barracks, on 9 
February 1946 there were still 1444 people, including 350 families, crammed into 260 
zemlianki. The dugouts were crowded, deep, dilapidated and therefore extremely 
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dangerous. It was almost impossible to keep the cold, damp and dirt at bay. 
Tuberculosis and rickets were widespread. Worse still many zemlianki were under 
imminent threat of collapse. One official feared that if people were not re-
accommodated by the springtime thaw deaths were unavoidable.
18
  
Housing conditions were only marginally better in Leningrad. Compared to 
other Soviet cities or fire-stormed German cities, Leningrad survived the war relatively 
intact. Whereas Stalingrad, Smolensk, Voronezh and Rostov-on-Don all lost in excess 
of seventy-five per cent of their housing, approximately twenty per cent of Leningrad‟s 
housing was destroyed.
19
 Foreign observers remarked that much of the city, particularly 
its historic centre, was remarkably well preserved. Much had been done to preserve 
architecturally important buildings and monuments, and reconstruction work had begun 
even before the blockade was lifted.
20
  
Nevertheless, damage to Leningrad‟s housing was extensive. 107,000 high 
explosive bombs and 150,000 artillery shells had been dropped on the city. In 
November 1947 Lazutin, chairman of the city soviet, estimated that a million 
Leningraders had lost their homes during the war. Vakser puts the figure somewhere 
between 500,000 and 700,000.
21
 The most authoritative figures suggest that 3174 
buildings with a living space of 3,300,000 m
2
 were totally destroyed and 7143 buildings 
were severely damaged with a loss of 2,200,000 m
2 
of housing. A further 9000 wooden 
buildings, many of them residential, were dismantled to provide fuel.
22
 The damage was 
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not uniformly distributed across the city. While the city centre was relatively well 
preserved outlying districts in the north and west were devastated. The Kirovskii, 
Vyborgskii and Leningradskii raiony lost 65, 42 and 40 per cent of their housing 
respectively.
23
 Many veterans and re-evacuees hardly recognised their neighbourhoods. 
Like many late Stalinist cities the condition of Leningrad‟s housing was 
abysmal. Few buildings had escaped damage or dilapidation. In 1944 approximately 
eighty per cent of buildings required re-glazing, repairs to roofs and re-plastering of 
façades. Electricity, gas, and water supply networks had been seriously damaged. Water 
supply had ceased to function in at least 40,000 apartments, approximately ten per cent 
of the total stock.
24
 In order to ease the housing shortage buildings unfit for habitation 
were pressed into temporary service. People continued to live in workshops and 
basements; just as they had done during the blockade. A number of trade organisations 
billeted their workers in warehouses, a practice the city soviet tried to outlaw.
25
 On 1 
July 1946 Nikulin, head of Leningrad‟s State Sanitation Inspectorate, compiled an 
investigation of living conditions in basement accommodation. 3,566 people (1358 men, 
1698 women and 510 children) were living in basement dormitories. Average living 
space was 5.2 m
2
, although in places as low as 3 m
2
. In addition 7306 people, including 
1733 children, were living in underground apartments with an average living space of 
6.4 m
2 
per person. Much of this accommodation was over two metres below ground, 
and received little or no natural light. Even in summer basements were cold, damp and 
unsanitary. Standing water was a constant problem. Nikitin‟s report recommended that 
an end was put to housing people, even temporarily, in basements. However, the 
Sanitary Inspectorate had raised these issues before; and it was unlikely that it was any 
more successful in eradicating the problem this time.
26
  
 By 1950, according to the official narrative of post-war recovery, Leningrad was 
once again a thriving metropolis, restored to its former glory. Propagandists emphasised 
the startling rapidity of reconstruction. Scholars and citizens alike boasted of successes, 
in defiance of predictions from the west that rebuilding would take twenty years. Initial 
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results were impressive. 1,600,000 m
2 
of living space, 3,000,000 m
2 
of roofing and 
940,000 m
2 
of facade were repaired between 1944 and 1945. Leningraders contributed 
approximately 52,000,000 man-hours of voluntary labour.
27
 Between 1945 and 1946 a 
further 1,500,000 m
2 
were repaired in lightly damaged buildings.
28
 During the first post-
war five year plan (1946-1950) 2,400,000 m
2 
of living space was constructed, 
considerably more than during the entire 1930s. Approximately 400,000 citizens 
obtained new housing.
29
 By 1950 the city housing stock reached 22,800,000 m
2
, 
approximately eighty to ninety per cent of the pre-war stock.
30
 Most historians have 
suggested that at some point between 1948 and 1950 damage to housing and basic 
urban infrastructure was finally repaired.
31
 
 The successful reconstruction of the city, however, was largely a myth. Rather 
than bringing discernable improvements post-war reconstruction recreated the 
overcrowded standards of the 1930s. Dark, damp, cold and dirty housing remained the 
norm. In 1950, even after new construction and extensive restoration, the average per-
capita living space was 6.4 m
2
, well below the theoretical sanitary norm.
32
 Self-
contained apartments, the apex of the urban housing hierarchy, were largely reserved for 
privileged members of the élite.
33
 The standard form of urban housing remained 
communal apartments (kommunalki), in which each room housed a single family. Yet, 
for those a rung lower on the housing ladder kommunalki were luxurious by 
comparison. Leningraders living in crowded barracks or filthy dormitories enjoyed even 
less privacy, security and comfort. Throughout the late Stalinist period living conditions 
in dormitories (obshchezhitie) were a constant source of concern. Despite numerous 
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inspections, anxious reports and resolutions from local soviets abysmal living 
conditions persisted.
34
  
After her demobilization Elena Babina settled in Leningrad. She found work at 
the Kirov factory, and was given a bed in a women‟s dormitory. 
“There were seven beds in my room already and mine was the eighth. Later we 
all got married, one by one, and brought our husbands to live in the hostel, 
although the room measured only 24 square metres... We lived in the hostel for 
seven years... And then, after seven years, we were given – not flats, but rooms 
in communal flats. We were all very glad.”35  
Such conditions were far from unusual at the Kirov works, one of Leningrad‟s largest 
employers, or the city as a whole. In January 1951 Aleksei Gonchukov, an ex-
serviceman, was appointed as an assistant to the director of the Kirov factory. In 
unpublished memoirs written in 1967 he described his shock at workers‟ living 
conditions. Over 2000 families were living in dormitories which Gonchukov considered 
unfit for human habitation. Several obshchezhitie presented a „nightmarish sight‟ 
(koshmarnoe zrelishe). Eighty-two families were crammed into a dormitory located in a 
converted hospital, which had no kitchen, lavatories or running water. Another 
dormitory was described as a „concentration camp‟; language not to be employed 
lightly. A converted secondary school on prospect Stachek, used as a dormitory since 
1944, attracted the worst criticism. By 1951 over 1600 people were living there. Rooms 
housing as many as ten families were sub-divided into small spaces by sheets, towels 
and sheets of paper hung from strings. With Gonchukov‟s help these workers were re-
settled by May 1952.
36
 The continued existence of such terrible conditions years after 
the war‟s end cut against the myth that the normal housing conditions had been re-
established by 1950.  
The Official Response – Law and Entitlement 
 
 Leningrad‟s veterans were not returning to a promised land. Where housing was 
available it was of a low standard, and in many cases much worse than the barracks and 
garrisons serving soldiers had known in occupied Germany. Yet, regardless of the 
conditions that awaited them, many veterans returned with hopes for a better and freer 
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post-war life. Much has been written about the spirit of freedom fostered by the war.
37
 
Post-war society was suffused with an optimistic atmosphere, and a faith that life would 
quickly improve.
38
 Many veterans, in the words of Ilya Ehrenburg, believed that:  
 “...after victory everything would suddenly change... When I recall 
conversation at the front and at the rear, when I re-read letters, it is clear that 
everybody expected that once victory had been won people would know real 
happiness. We realized, of course, that the country had been devastated, 
impoverished, that we would have to work hard, and we did not have fantasies 
about mountains of gold. But we believed that victory would bring justice, that 
human dignity would triumph.”39 
Amidst the heady atmosphere of post-war optimism it was possible to believe that 
wartime service had reconfigured the relationship between state and society.
40
 Soldiers 
and citizens alike believed that wartime sacrifice would be rewarded by the state and 
that they would receive tangible benefits. At the top of veterans‟ list of demands was a 
right to housing; „Homes for Heroes‟ as it were.  
Historians have frequently presented demobilized soldiers as post-war 
Stalinism‟s most privileged group; enjoying rights, entitlements and a level of upward 
social mobility unimaginable to other citizens. In theory serving soldiers, the war 
disabled, demobilized veterans and their families did enjoy privileged access to housing, 
something unavailable and unimaginable to other citizens. A Sovnarkom resolution 
issued on 5 August 1941 guaranteed those serving in the Army, Navy and NKVD forces 
and their families, the right to reclaim pre-war living space on return from armed 
service. Service families who lost homes as a result of wartime destruction were entitled 
to equivalent accommodation.
41
 Further legislation, passed in May 1942, made housing 
provision for disabled ex-servicemen a high priority.
42
 The 23 June 1945 demobilization 
law, the legal bedrock of demobilization, re-iterated veterans‟ housing rights. The law 
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contained a commitment to provide veterans with accommodation and to extend to them 
a system of preferential credit for the reconstruction and repair of housing.
43
  
Although veterans‟ welfare benefits would be eroded after 1947, many veterans 
continued to assume that spilt blood entitled them to privileged access to housing. 
Leningrad‟s veterans were still invoking their perceived moral rights as former soldiers 
in appeals for better housing under Khrushchev. Military service, however, was only 
one component in veterans‟ attempts to present themselves as deserving citizens. To 
maximise the effectiveness of their petitions veterans also asserted other identities and 
sources of entitlements, including proletarian social backgrounds, managerial or 
research skills and long-term residency in Leningrad.
44
 Wartime military service did not 
replace social class as the determinate of Soviet identities, but rather superimposed 
another layer of meaning onto existing notions of what it meant to be Soviet.
45
  
 Veterans had plenty of opportunity to familiarise themselves with their 
entitlements either before or after their discharge from the military. Soviet propaganda 
reinforced this sense of entitlement.
46
 Demobilization legislation was widely reprinted 
in the press.
47
 Leningradskaia pravda, Vechernii Leningrad and local factory 
newspapers regularly reported on the welfare payments and support available for 
veterans.
48
 Pocketbooks drawing together relevant legislation, political speeches, rules 
and regulations provided a handy reference guide for entitlements.
49
 Soldiers awaiting 
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demobilization were the targets of intensive propaganda and agitation from officers and 
political commissars. In July 1945 Colonel Ivanov, deputy head of Political 
Administration on the Leningrad Front, reported on his work. Great efforts were made 
to ensure soldiers understood what they were entitled to and that they had the 
documents to support their claims. Captain Gladkii, the head of one party cell, for 
example, discussed demobilization legislation separately with every individual eligible 
for discharge.
50
  
 Despite the propagandists‟ best efforts many veterans failed to grasp what 
entitlement meant in practice. Leningrad‟s ex-servicemen, especially at the beginning of 
mass demobilization, were often confused about their rights. Armies awaiting 
demobilization are often a fertile breeding ground for myths and rumours. This was 
particularly the case in the Soviet example, when soldiers imagined benefits never 
officially sanctioned. Official communications, therefore, were in constant competition 
with unofficial sources of information.
51
 Housing was a prominent source of anxiety. 
Veterans inundated party agitators, demobilization officials, housing bureaucrats and 
lawyers with questions about obtaining or reclaiming housing.
52
 By 29 July 1945 
Leningrad‟s demobilization reception points had received 1470 enquiries for further 
information; 1020 of which related to housing.
53
 The questions officials at the Vyborg 
district registration point received were dominated by housing: 
“How does one receive living space if one‟s home has been destroyed, and 
in what timescale will it be provided? By what means can occupied living 
space be freed? Who should provide living space if a demobilized veteran 
lived in an employer-controlled building before entering the army? Where 
can one obtain building materials?...”54 
An important source of information and advice for Leningrad‟s veterans and their 
families were legal consultations provided free of charge at locations throughout the city 
by the Leningrad City College of Lawyers.
55
 The demand for legal advice from veterans 
was unprecedented. Between 1 April 1945 and 1 April 1946 lawyers spent 2488 working 
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days in voluntary service at demobilization reception points, the central city officers‟ 
club, district social security offices, district offices of the Department for State Aid for 
Soldiers‟ Families, the executive committees of district soviets, and at large employers, 
like the Kirov, Bolshevik and Skorokhod factories. In total 65,082 people were assisted 
with free consultations. In addition in the second half of 1945 lawyers gave 94 lectures, 
mainly to veterans, followed by a further 381 lectures between January and March 
1946.
56
  
The demand for legal assistance was so large it could not be met by free voluntary 
provision. The legal complexities surrounding obtaining and reclaiming housing 
required professional resolution, and led to an explosion in demand for commercial legal 
assistance. Approximately eighty per cent of free legal consultations developed into 
cases where lawyers received payments.
57
 During 1945 the City College of Lawyers 
gave paid advice to over 185,000 citizens, four and a half times more than in 1944.
58
 
Some lawyers exploited the legal confusion created by the housing crisis and charged 
excessive fees. A meeting of the College of Lawyers reported that in May 1945 the 
average monthly earning for a lawyer was 2892 roubles, by September it had reached 
4851 roubles. By April 1946 there were reports of lawyers earning up to 10,000 roubles 
in just six months.
59
 
Despite extensive propaganda many questions about what support veterans could 
expect whilst finding or reclaiming housing remained. The demobilization law, and its 
local reiterations, contained little detailed information about how the law would be 
implemented or what to do when individual circumstances departed from the norm. 
Advice on how to bring a law-suit to reclaim an occupied apartment, or obtain 
temporary housing was not freely available. Therefore, many veterans depended on local 
and official advisers to help resolve their housing problems. 
Official Planning 
 
Local planning to accommodate veterans was largely a reaction to Moscow‟s 
vague commitment to provide housing for returning veterans. Forced into action by the 
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Zakon o demobilizatsii the Executive Committee of the Leningrad oblast soviet 
(Lenoblispolkom) passed a resolution on 28 June 1945 interpreting the law and offering 
local solutions.
60
 The Executive Committee of the Leningrad city soviet 
(Lengorispolkom) produced a similar resolution on 5 July 1945.
61
 Local plans delegated 
the responsibility for re-housing veterans. District soviets, industrial employers and 
collective farms were encouraged to take all necessary measures to create normal living 
conditions for former soldiers and their families. Inspections were to ensure that pre-war 
living space, where it survived, met minimum standards. Reserves of empty 
accommodation and temporary dormitories were to be created in every district to assist 
veterans without housing. Dormitories containing between thirty and fifty beds were to 
be created in all towns and district centres in the oblast. In Leningrad a housing reserve 
of 1200 rooms was to be established. Each raion was to organise a dormitory with a 
capacity of between 300 and 350 beds by 15 July 1945. Supplies of building and 
decorating materials were to be distributed to veterans. Free timber was to be made 
available for construction and repairs of housing in rural areas. 
The official discourse of law, planning and entitlement was detached from the 
reality of the housing crisis gripping both city and countryside. Given the rushed nature 
of Soviet demobilization planning, local authorities had little opportunity to develop and 
implement suitable plans for accommodating veterans. From the start of the process 
sections of the party-state in Leningrad were aware of the difficult task ahead. Within 
days of local plans being approved thousands of demobilized veterans began arriving in 
Leningrad. A party organisation-instructional department report dated 26 July 1945 
openly stated that; “To more or less fully satisfy the claims of all the demobilized, in 
particular of families, to separate living space can‟t even be pretended to be possible.”62 
Party officials acknowledged that the, “question of billeting many thousands of 
demobilized (soldiers) was the greatest difficulty for a city which had lost three million 
square metres of living space during the war.”63  
The plan to create a housing reserve proved especially difficult to achieve. 
Investigations into the implementation of the Gorispolkom resolution from 5 July 1945 
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revealed a catalogue of problems. Only 800 rooms, two thirds of the proposed reserve, 
had been found and vacated within the proposed timescale.
64
 Many city districts failed to 
fulfil their quota; the Petrogradskii district soviet contributed only forty of a planned 
hundred rooms. The condition of housing within the reserve was far from luxurious. 
Many of the rooms were far below the standard considered acceptable for returning 
heroes. Many rooms were tiny. Others were located in basements or in contested 
property where only local courts could determine future use.
65
 Most importantly the 
modest reserves envisaged by local officials were simply unable to cope with the 
volume of veterans with a legal entitlement. Local planners consistently underestimated 
demand for housing from veterans. 
Housing Waiting Lists 
 
As an officer V.M. Evseev had confidently informed soldiers that they would be 
provided with housing following demobilization. In his personal experience the opposite 
was the case. On contacting his local district housing administration he was told that 
there was no free housing and that he would be placed on a waiting list.
66
 Tens of 
thousands of veterans would share this experience. As the pace of demobilization 
quickened housing waiting lists rapidly lengthened. The number of veterans‟ families 
registered on waiting lists was recorded in statistical reports produced by both the city 
soviet‟s Housing Department (between January and September 1946) and the Planning 
Statistics Department (between November 1945 and October 1946). Despite minor 
inconsistencies, both statistical series documented a steady increase in the number of 
demobilized soldiers and service families waiting for permanent accommodation.
67
 
When demobilization was announced in June 1945 the families of 10,512 serving 
soldiers and war invalids were registered on housing waiting lists.
68
 By 1 September 
1945 waiting lists included 1959 veterans, 1762 war invalids and 14,187 service 
families.
69
 A year later on 1 September 1946 a total of 93,211 people, including the 
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families of 9981 veterans, 2775 war invalids and 18,134 serving soldiers were on 
waiting lists.
70
 Rather than easing with the passing of time Leningrad‟s housing crisis 
intensified. In February 1947 Gosteev, head of the city soviet Housing Administration, 
claimed that there were over 59,000 families on waiting lists, including 12,000 veterans‟ 
and 3000 war invalids‟ families.71 To put this figure in perspective Moscow, a larger and 
more populous city, had 23,000 families on housing waiting lists. Gosteev attributed 
Leningrad‟s difficulties to the widespread destruction of wooden buildings during the 
blockade.
72
 Waiting lists, however, were still to peak. Gosteev feared that the imminent 
arrival of the fourth demobilization wave would aggravate an already tense situation.
73
       
By 1 October 1946 the families of 4173 veterans had received a total of 65,954 m
2
, 
at an average of 15.8 m
2
 per family. Yet 10,073 families remained on the waiting lists.
74
 
Between November 1945 and October 1946 the number of housing recipients 
consistently hovered below forty per cent of those registered on lists.
75
 The number of 
veterans successful in obtaining housing in any given reporting period was tiny; between 
1 and 15 September 1946 only forty families received housing.
76
 For every veteran 
allocated housing many more joined the list. Although 125 families obtained rooms 
between 1 and 15 January 1946, the waiting list lengthened by 425 families.
77
 
Investigations into the implementation of local demobilization planning complained that 
securing living space for veterans whose pre-war accommodation had been destroyed or 
illegally occupied was progressing extremely slowly.
78
 It would take many veterans 
many years to obtain housing through official channels.  
 Khristofor Tur‟ev was demobilized on 25 October 1945, having served 
continuously since 10 June 1941.
79
 When the wooden building in which his wife and son 
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lived was dismantled in January 1943 they were resettled by the Vyborgskii district 
housing administration.
80
 On 27 July 1946, after nine months of civilian life, he received 
notification from the Vyborgskii district procuracy that his family was to be 
„administratively resettled‟. The pre-war occupant of the room into which the Tur‟evs 
had been moved in 1943 had been demobilized and was re-asserting his tenancy. The 
family, including a newly-born daughter, were about to be thrown onto the streets.
81
 Due 
to extreme shortages the Vyborgskii district housing administration was unable to 
provide them with alternative accommodation, predicting that suitable housing would 
not be available until 1947 or 1948.
82
 
 The tidy bureaucratic world of entitlements, waiting lists and housing regulations 
was largely an imaginary one, which bore little resemblance to reality. Administrative 
and legal chaos was inevitable in the exceptional circumstances created by the blockade. 
Detailed instructions on how to register vacant living space and establish the tenancy 
rights of previous occupants issued in March 1942 were never properly implemented.
83
 
Speaking at a meeting in February 1947 Gosteev acknowledged that a process of 
housing reallocation, in which individuals and families relinquished their former and 
registered their new living space never formally took place.
84
 In January 1946 the 
Primorskii and Vasileostrovskii district housing departments were castigated for failing 
to keep registers of vacant accommodation and accurate waiting lists, for not inspecting 
the living conditions of those registered on waiting lists and for a general attitude which 
created the potential for corruption.
85
 The card indexes maintained by district housing 
administrations were out of date. An inspection of the waiting list in the Smol‟ninskii 
district revealed that ten per cent of names were „dead souls‟ (mertvye dushi). Many 
people had moved on or had resolved their problems themselves. Furthermore, there 
were thousands of people who could not be contacted by district housing departments, 
because there was no record of their workplaces or temporary addresses. Gosteev 
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recommended a full re-registration of names on housing waiting lists.
86
 This was 
formally proposed in July 1947, and duly conducted in September 1947.
87
  
Reclaiming Housing 
 
The war had ruptured pre-war patterns of settlement in Leningrad and the 
surrounding countryside. As Leningraders moved within the city, in order to escape the 
results of destruction and dilapidation, and the threat of death, the tenancy of living 
space became confused. While some individuals and families sought refuge with 
relatives in other areas of the city others found space in undamaged buildings. Mass 
death and evacuation left plenty of empty apartments for people whose homes had been 
destroyed.
88
 District housing administrations sanctioned some moves, but many families 
acted on their own initiative.
89
 Inevitably many thousands of veterans, war invalids and 
re-evacuees returned to find that their homes were occupied by other people. Other 
former tenants found their homes had been turned into offices, workshops, warehouses 
and even woodsheds.
90
 This reshuffling of housing patterns was not unique to 
Leningrad. In Kharkov, for example, the oblast prosecutor claimed that not a single 
person was living in the same apartment as before the war.
91
 In 1945 the reception room 
of the USSR Supreme Soviet received 10,148 appeals related to housing, 45 per cent of 
which were from former owners whose living space were occupied.
92
 However, in 
Leningrad the blockade had created a sense of entitlement and sacrifice amongst 
soldiers, evacuees and blokadniki which made the resolution of housing claims 
especially complicated and emotionally charged. 
The legal right to preserve the living space of serving soldiers, a right which the 
city soviet reiterated on several occasions, was a bureaucratic veneer which obscured 
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the chaos of local housing administration.
93
 Rules were routinely ignored. Housing was 
found wherever it was available, regardless of the rights of former tenants. Housing 
administrators made little concession to what might happen after the war. Orderly 
paperwork was a low priority. In theory demobilized veterans had the right to reclaim 
their pre-war accommodation. Administrative re-settlement powers gave courts and 
prosecutors the power to remove „illegal‟ occupants from contested living space. 
Tenants were given a date by which to voluntarily vacate accommodation, after which 
they faced police eviction. In practice, however, disentangling the complex interwoven 
patterns of settlement and entitlement created a legal and administrative nightmare, 
which could take months to unravel.
94
  
 As the pace of demobilization and re-evacuation quickened the number of 
administrative resettlement cases mushroomed. District courts and prosecutors were 
swamped.  In the second half of 1945 city courts examined 15,998 housing cases, an 
increase of over 300 per cent on the first half of the year.
95
 A total of 22,967 cases of 
administrative settlement were brought in 1946, approximately 17,000 or seventy-five 
per cent involved serving soldiers.
96
 Administrative resettlement was a disruptive 
process. For every family or individual successful reclaiming pre-war living space, 
another lost their “home”.  Eviction forced another family onto waiting lists, into 
temporary accommodation, and even into pursuing their own disputes. The stakes for 
both parties in housing claims were high: preserving or reclaiming one‟s home was a 
matter of great importance. Consequently, the already enormous caseload was swelled 
by a huge volume of correspondence as individuals attempted to further their cases by 
additional lobbying or by disputing rulings. Between July and October 1945 the city and 
district prosecutors received 21,183 letters of complaint and personally received 55,980 
petitioners.
97
 
 Despite this enormous bureaucratic undertaking only a fraction of administrative 
re-settlement case files survive in the archives of the Leningrad city procuracy. These 
files, never previously examined by historians, provide a valuable insight into the 
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arbitration of housing disputes, and further challenge the image of veterans as the 
beneficiaries of privileged access to housing. The surviving files are the product of re-
examinations of individual cases prompted by letters of complaint (zhaloby) and 
petitions (zaiavlenie) produced by interested parties. As such they represent an 
unrepresentative sub-set of housing disputes. However, these documents vividly 
demonstrate the complexity of individual circumstances and the personal tragedies 
which lay behind legal battles. Many of the files contain zhaloby and zaiavlenie from 
both sides of the dispute preserved alongside the efforts of procuracy officials to 
disentangle enmeshed entitlements and substantiate rival claims. As such they provide 
an exceptionally rich source of information about arbitration and the tactics claimants 
employed to strengthen their claims.
98
  
On the basis of this evidence housing entitlements were not as straightforward as 
law codes suggested. Even the most skilled administrators found the labyrinthine 
complexity of housing claims confusing. Legislation did not envisage many of the 
complicated situations arising in Leningrad. Many aspects of housing entitlements 
remained unclear and unresolved months after the war‟s end. Ambiguities about the 
rights of war-invalids, servicemen and veterans who had previously lived in employer 
controlled accommodation, or veterans with no residential status after ending 
professional military careers lasting fifteen years or more were still being discussed in 
February 1947, despite such issues being amongst the questions asked by returning 
veterans in July 1945.
99
 Administrative procedure, especially where housing was 
involved, rarely operated according to the exact letter of the law. Incorrect decisions 
breaking the law or observing it too rigidly were a constant problem for district courts 
and prosecutors.
100
 The circumstances in which individuals could be resettled had to be 
regularly reiterated in procuracy reports.
101
  
  The volume of paperwork generated by the process was remarkable. The file 
relating to the dispute between Evgenii Riushkin, a veteran medically discharged in July 
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1944, and Ekaterina Zolina, a nurse demobilized in July 1945, contained 279 sheets of 
paper, many of them handwritten letters scribbled on notepaper, squared paper torn 
from exercise books, the back of wallpaper and musical scores. These complaints were 
addressed to, amongst others, the city procuracy, the Supreme Court of the USSR, the 
USSR Procuracy, the general staff of the Red Army, Sovnarkom and Stalin. Copies of 
these letters were then forwarded back to the Leningrad procuracy for further 
investigation.
 102
 Attempting to reclaim or retain residency required a considerable 
investment in time and energy and infinite patience. Returning to Leningrad after 
demobilization in July 1946 L.I. Mikhailov found his pre-war living space occupied and 
began the lengthy process of reclaiming it. He refused to accept several decisions ruling 
against him.
103
 On 12 October he addressed a detailed and lengthy letter to the chairman 
of the Leningrad soviet, explaining his situation and complaining about the „callous‟ 
attitude of the procuracy.
104
 In time this letter was forwarded to the city procuracy and 
led to a re-examination of the case.
105
 In mid November 1946 the city prosecutor ruled 
in Mikhailov‟s favour. However, the current occupants Mariia Sadovskaia, her daughter 
and husband, a disabled veteran, also had certain rights.
106
 Their home in the Vyborg 
district had been dismantled, and they had already been relocated twice.
107
 Delays 
ensued while the Dzerzhinskii district soviet found the Sadovskiis suitable 
accommodation.
108
 The situation was finally resolved in March 1947.
109
 
Veterans, serving soldiers and members of their families rarely failed to 
emphasise frontline military service in their appeals. Peter Mikhailov‟s letters recounted 
how, prior to his demobilization on 10 December 1945, he had spent five years 
commanding a tank unit, that he had been awarded four medals, had been wounded 
twice and heavily shell-shocked twice (kontuzhen tiazhelym sotriaseniem mozga).
110
 His 
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approach was typical of the ways in which veterans framed their entitlements. They 
listed length of service, date of demobilization, medals awarded, and physical injuries as 
proof of the validity of their claims. Other appeals were more forceful in stressing their 
sense of wartime sacrifice. Both sides in a fractious dispute over the tenancy of a 
prestigious apartment on Admiralty embankment, in the centre of the city, highlighted 
their service records. Liashenko emphasised that he had been mobilized on the first day 
of the war, had won two medals and spent three years on the frontlines spilling his 
blood for the Soviet cause.
111
 His opponent, Goncharov, was angered that a serving 
soldier could be “thrown onto the street.”112 At their most basic such appeals drew 
attention to the fact that the correspondent was a veteran or serving soldier with legal 
rights.  
Veterans, however, did not enjoy a monopoly upon claims to special treatment. 
Blockade survivors and re-evacuees also had a theoretical right to re-claim housing. 
Yet, historians have repeatedly suggested that ex-servicemen, serving soldiers and their 
families had stronger and more durable rights than evacuees. Indeed, Leningrad‟s 
evacuees found their rights progressively eroded by central and local political bodies 
both during and after the war.
113
 Manley argues, “the rights of evacuees to the return of 
their living space were frequently abrogated in the name of the rights of servicemen.”114 
Furthermore, “the rights of service people were substantially extended by officials on 
the ground, encroaching upon the less well-defined, but nonetheless recognised rights of 
others.”115 This, however, did not mean that the rights of ex-servicemen automatically 
held sway. In 1942 all the inhabitants of a wing of a building on Baburin lane in the 
Vyborgskii district were moved out. During 1943 and 1944 the wing was refurbished, 
and used as housing for disabled ex-servicemen. From mid 1945 the district prosecutor 
began to evict these war-invalids in order to return pre-war tenants to their homes.
116
 
Military service was just one of many factors which determined the outcome of housing 
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disputes. Social background, party-membership, pre-war residency, ethnicity, family 
circumstances, persistence and even luck could all influence the eventual result. 
Leningraders rarely divided into neat categories of soldiers and civilians. The 
chaos and confusion created by death, destruction and population movements 
transcended administrative categories, and affected veterans and ordinary civilians in 
almost equal measure. Many demobilized veterans settling in Leningrad were outsiders 
with no previous connection to the city and its people. But in many cases the fate of 
demobilized Leningraders and ordinary civilians were inter-linked.  Re-evacuated 
citizens and the families of serving soldiers, fallen heroes, disabled or demobilized 
veterans were often the same people. As such they had rights beyond their status as re-
evacuees. The claim that veterans derived privilege at the expense of re-evacuees fails 
to appreciate the sheer complexity of social arrangements in post-war Leningrad. 
Indeed, the responsibility for pursuing housing claims frequently fell upon wives and 
mothers returning to Leningrad before the demobilization of husbands and sons. Close 
relationships to former and serving soldiers were frequently invoked in attempts to 
reclaim or retain disputed living space.
117
 On occasion women undertook the burden of 
fighting legal battles ahead of their apathetic or incapacitated husbands. Evgeniia 
Smirnovaia lobbied to keep two rooms, one of eighteen m
2 
and one of nine m
2
, that she 
shared with her husband, a demobilized veteran, and her daughter. Her husband passed 
away before the dispute could be resolved. This led the procuracy to conclude that a 
single eighteen m
2
 room was now adequate for her smaller family.
118
  
Furthermore, demobilized veterans were not only in competition with re-
evacuees and new migrants, but also their fellow ex-servicemen. Housing disputes 
between veterans were by no means uncommon. In the face of the post-war scramble 
for housing the „frontline brotherhood‟ was fragile. Whilst stressing their own 
entitlements veterans simultaneously refuted their rivals‟ claims. Khristofor Tur‟ev, for 
example, argued that as his opponent had joined the Red Army in 1942 whilst in 
evacuation, he was only entitled to accommodation in his place of conscription, and had 
lost the right to housing in Leningrad.
119
 Tur‟ev also argued that it was unjust that his 
family faced eviction, while a single person enjoyed an excessive twenty-one m
2 
of 
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living space.
120
 On 2 November 1946 the district prosecutor concluded that the decision 
to evict Tur‟ev was correct.121 Housing disputes did little for social cohesion amongst 
veterans, or between veterans and the wider community. The idea that war and blockade 
had united Leningraders was largely a fantasy created by a mixture of propaganda and 
wishful thinking. Shortages of housing placed Leningraders, and newly arrived 
migrants, in direct competition. Just as in the 1920s and 1930s housing remained a 
deficit commodity that people would go to extraordinary lengths to obtain or protect.
122
 
In this respect arbitration had much in common with the apartment disputes of the 
1930s.
123
   
Temporary Hostels 
 
 In theory demobilized soldiers arriving in Leningrad without accommodation, 
for whatever reason, were entitled to receive a bed in temporary hostels. Hostels were 
envisaged as a critical component of the plan to provide veterans with temporary shelter 
whilst more permanent accommodation was found. 200 beds for ex-servicemen and 20 
for former officers, for example, were organised at the Moscow station for veterans 
passing through Leningrad on their journey home.
124
 This aspect of veterans‟ housing 
provision, like so many others, did not operate as envisaged. Creating between 300 and 
350 beds in every city district proved beyond the means of most district housing 
administrations. In August 1945 a Gorispolkom investigation into the implementation of 
demobilization planning revealed that hostels in the Petrogradskii and 
Krasnogvardeiskii districts were equipped for just 220 and 110 people respectively. The 
report euphemistically declared that the failure to realise this aspect of the plan might 
lead to “serious organisational problems,”125 presumably a mixture of homelessness and 
disaffection. 
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By November 1945, according to statistics compiled by the City Housing 
Administration and the Statistical Planning Department, just six of fifteen city districts 
had organised hostels with more than three hundred spaces. The Volodarskii and 
Primorskii districts had only mustered one hundred beds between them.
126
 Little had 
improved by the eve of the arrival of the third demobilization wave in April 1946. 
Gosteev was deeply troubled by the „negligible‟ number of beds available in temporary 
hostels. A Gorispolkom resolution in order to increase the number of beds available, 
passed on 14 February 1946, was ignored. Indeed the Frunzenskii, Vyborgskii and 
Vasileostrovskii districts were closing hostels rather than opening new ones.
127
 The 
3573 spaces, 2475 for men and 1098 for women, organised by November 1945 marked 
the highpoint in provision.
128
 In subsequent months, just as waiting lists lengthened, the 
number of hostel beds decreased. By May 1946 dormitories could accommodate just 
1272 veterans, approximately a third of the number seven months previously.
129
 
 Despite the steady reduction in the total number of beds, the number of veterans 
registered in temporary hostels consistently exceeded capacity. On 1 December 1945 
there were 5294 veterans registered in hostels intended to accommodate 2032 people. 
The situation was even more striking in individual examples. In the Volodarskii district 
in January 1946 there were 161 men and 201 women registered in hostels equipped to 
house 35 men and 65 women.
130
 By mid May 1946 there were still 2337 people 
registered in 1272 spaces.
131
 This, however, was not evidence of extreme overcrowding. 
Although there were occasionally reports of overcrowded hostels, the number of 
veterans registered in hostels frequently bore no relation to the actual number of 
residents.
132
 On 1 November 1945 there were 4018 veterans registered in 3553 spaces. 
In reality there were only 1294 occupants, leaving 2259 beds empty.
133
 According to 
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Trakachev, head of the city party military committee, on 1 December 1945 there were 
5294 veterans registered in temporary hostels but only 1054 actually living there.
134
 
 There were two explanations for this situation. First, there were advantages to 
registering in hostels but living elsewhere. A number of veterans, according to one 
report, registered in hostels but lived with relatives and friends, believing that they 
would receive living space more quickly if officials thought they lived in temporary 
hostels.
135
 More importantly, registering in a veterans‟ hostel created the possibility of 
obtaining a residence permit (propiska), a document vital in obtaining employment and 
state assistance. As it had been in the 1930s obtaining a propiska was a source of 
constant anxiety for Leningraders. Without the requisite stamp in passports Soviet 
citizens were liable to deportation and criminal convictions. 32,865 people in 1946, and 
a further 37,681 in 1947 were forced to leave Leningrad because they lacked residency 
permits.
136
 Veterans, in particular, had great difficulty obtaining residence permits. 
These problems regularly featured in letters incepted by the military censor.
137
 In 
Moscow, for example, veterans were often refused propiski in their spouses‟ living 
space, because they lacked the paperwork to prove marriage or pre-war residency. One 
veteran described the vicious circle of not being able to obtain a propiska: because he 
did not have a marriage certificate, which he could not obtain because the police would 
not issue a passport because he did not have a propiska.
138
 A thriving black market in 
fake permits in wartime and post-war Leningrad developed to service the large demand 
for permits. Corruption rackets in Red Army units on the Leningrad Front were 
producing false pre-war permits in significant numbers.
139
 In comparison, registering in 
temporary hostels offered a cheaper and safer method of obtaining propiski without 
resorting to the black market.  
 Secondly, conditions in veterans‟ hostels were horrific. Only veterans with no 
alternative remained in hostels for more than a few days. In December Konopel‟no, a 
member of the city soviet, inspected conditions in temporary hostels in the Dzershinskii 
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raion. In a hostel on ulitsa Nekrasova inner window frames were unglazed, the walls 
were damp and covered in mould. One room contained ten beds but nobody was living 
there. According to Konopel‟no; “Naturally, nobody is living in the hostel, and nobody 
would live in it.”140 At a hostel on ulitsa Chernyshevskaia several veterans were 
sleeping on the floor and unglazed window frames were stuffed with pillows.
141
 
Elsewhere hostels had dirty bedding, no hot water nor electric light and windows were 
boarded with plywood.
142
 Security was often non-existent. Hostels had no locks on their 
doors, and no places where valuables could be kept.
143
  
The profusion of inspections by a number of state representatives suggested 
official concern about the effects substandard temporary accommodation might have 
upon veterans. On 14 February 1946 the city soviet passed a resolution aimed at 
improving conditions in temporary hostels. Yet by mid April conditions were still 
described as „extremely unsatisfactory‟. Hostels remained cold, damp and dirty. As a 
result a number of veterans were suffering from skin diseases such as impetigo and 
eczema.
144
 As late as October 1947 a Gorispolkom resolution described the terrible 
conditions in two hostels for demobilized veterans in the Volodarskii district. The 
dormitory was home to eight-three adults and twenty-two children, with three or four 
families crowded into fifteen or sixteen m
2
. The building needed major repairs. The roof 
was leaking, plaster was crumbling from walls, doors were broken, windows unglazed 
and running water only worked intermittently.
145
 Even for veterans who had previously 
lived in barracks and dormitories such conditions were a disappointment. As a number 
of veterans complained; “It isn‟t as if we have been at the front for four years and 
haven‟t earned (separate) rooms.”146  
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State Assistance versus Personal Initiative 
 
 Official propaganda combined with legal entitlements created the impression 
that veterans were given great assistance in obtaining housing. In reality most ex-
servicemen resolved their difficulties themselves. By 1 May 1946 approximately 
171,967 veterans had been demobilized in Leningrad.
147
 Yet by 15 May 1946 only 3223 
veterans‟ families had been allocated housing by district housing administrations, 726 
veterans were resident in hostels, and a further 8584 veterans‟ families were registered 
in housing lists.
148
 Even accounting for the turnover in temporary hostels the number of 
people directly assisted by Leningrad‟s housing administrations represented a tiny 
fraction of the total number of ex-service personnel.
149
 The overwhelming majority 
found living space through their own initiative rather than state help.  
Since employers controlled a much greater proportion of housing than the city 
and oblast soviets, they were a particularly important source of housing. However, 
Leningrad‟s employers often had difficulty providing sufficient housing for their rapidly 
expanding workforces. In 1946, for example, Elektrosila had to call a temporary halt to 
recruitment due to housing shortages.
150
 In February 1946 the Wagon Repair 
Workshops of the Tram and Trolleybus Administration revealed that construction of 
housing for the factory‟s employees had ceased due to a shortages of materials and 
inadequate construction plans. Over 300 veterans employed in the workshops were 
waiting to receive housing, a backlog which hindered further recruitment.
151
 Those 
veterans who found housing in employer-controlled building found that conditions were 
just as inadequate as in other buildings. Veterans living in employer controlled 
communal apartments or dormitories did not derive privilege from their legal 
entitlements. Veterans were living literally side by side with the rest of the population. 
Their living conditions were indistinguishable from other members of society.  
 Personal networks played a vital role in assisting veterans in finding housing. 
Official records tend to neglect or underestimate their importance, but unofficial 
networks were vital in veterans‟ transition to civilian life. The generosity of friends and 
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families filled the gap left by inadequate state provision. Evseev was demobilized in 
January 1946. His home and property in Leningrad had been destroyed. He returned to 
the ruined village where his wife and daughter were now living.
152
 After some months 
the opportunity to return to Leningrad arose. His brother-in-law offered to make a small 
room in his apartment available to the family while they sought alternative 
accommodation. This proved a vital staging post, eventually allowing the family to 
exchange their relative‟s small room for a larger one elsewhere.153 Other veterans spent 
months moving between the homes of friends and relatives. The city soviet was aware 
of these informal mechanisms for obtaining housing, but largely powerless to prevent 
them. Indeed, it relied upon them to shelter the influx of veterans. In February 1947 
Gosteev even suggested permitting individuals to settle and register their relatives in 
their homes provided there was adequate space, thereby formalising a practice already 
occurring without official sanction.
154
  
Reconstruction and Repair 
 
 Ultimately the long-term solution to Leningrad‟s post-war housing crisis lay in 
reconstruction. The plan for Leningrad‟s renovation was extremely ambitious. 
Restoration plans had been developed by the city‟s architects and planners even before 
the Blockade was lifted in January 1944. Conscious decisions were taken to preserve 
the architectural integrity of Leningrad historical centre.
155
 But beyond that, widespread 
destruction created opportunities for redrawing urban plans. The reconstruction of the 
city was the subject of a massive propaganda campaign. Official slogans called for the 
city to be rebuilt so that it was better and more beautiful than in the past. The press was 
full of articles and photographs reporting on the reconstruction of the city, showing 
people labouring on building sites, restoring key buildings and reporting reconstruction 
plans. Rapid reconstruction became a badge of honour for Leningraders. The official 
narrative of a city rapidly and successfully rebuilt thanks to the efforts of both 
government and the people became a feature of collective memory. For a community 
impoverished and traumatized by war there was much that was impressive about 
reconstruction. For people accustomed to rubble and bombsites frantic rebuilding work 
created a deep impression.  
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  Leningraders had every right to be proud of their efforts to rebuild their beloved 
city. However, the propaganda campaign and official myth of reconstruction had more 
to do with the restoration of Leningrad‟s public image, than a substantive improvement 
in housing conditions. The city‟s chief architect, Baranov, was more concerned with 
projects to restore historical monuments and grand public spaces than domestic 
construction.
156
 Although the restoration of war damaged buildings in the centre of the 
city did provide additional housing, this was not its exclusive purpose.
157
 Some scholars 
view the reconstruction of the city‟s historical centre as part of the state‟s amnesiac 
agenda. By removing ruins and repairing any traces of wartime damage local politicians 
were consciously reshaping the memory of the war. Ruined buildings which might have 
become focal points of memory were removed, to be supplanted by official 
monuments.
158
 In contrast Maddox suggests that the recreation of the historical centre 
was envisaged as a fitting tribute to Leningraders‟ suffering. Reconstruction provided a 
means of memorializing the blockade and the resilience of Leningraders.
159
 Either way, 
the attempt to materially recreate the past carried important messages about the 
restoration or normality, the healing of wartime wounds and a sense of local patriotism 
based on Leningrad‟s status as an unconquered „hero‟ city. Re-plastering frontages, 
clearing away rubble and providing waste bins created an orderly public image. 
Aesthetic initiatives to plant trees and shrubs and even grow sunflowers on balconies 
improved the public mood, and even carried messages about rebirth and renewal, but 
they did little to replace destroyed housing.
160
 Reconstruction plastered over the cracks, 
sometimes literally. The re-imposition of order in post-war Leningrad was a façade. 
Scratch below the surface and reconstruction‟s achievements were less impressive. 
 Of course many demobilized veterans did benefit from new construction. From 
1944 efforts were made to repair and rebuild the homes of service families, disabled ex-
servicemen and demobilized veterans. In Leningrad in 1944 the living space of 28,083 
service families was repaired. In the spirit of socialist competition city districts were 
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encouraged to compete to repair the most rooms.
161
 By repairing the servicemen‟s 
families‟ homes the oblast and city soviets were reducing future demand for housing 
amongst the families of men yet to be demobilized. In response to the difficulties of 
creating housing reserves and lengthening waiting lists Sovnarkom issued a resolution 
on 21 September 1945 which required that ten per cent of all newly repaired and 
constructed living space was reserved for demobilized veterans, war-invalids, the 
families of serving and fallen soldiers.
162
 Instances when veterans and war-invalids were 
given rooms and apartments in newly constructed or refurbished accommodation were 
regularly reported in the local press.
163
 However, once the propaganda rhetoric was 
stripped away the benefits veterans derived from reconstruction were less persuasive. In 
February 1947 as a result of the slowness of reconstruction Gosteev recommended that 
the percentage of repaired or newly constructed housing made available to service 
families was doubled to twenty per cent.
164
  
Although reconstruction was publicly hailed as a success, evidence of official 
frustration and popular dissatisfaction abounded. Housing construction lagged behind 
plan almost everywhere.
165
 Articles about reconstruction and photographs of building 
sites in the local press not only celebrated achievements, but exhorted Leningraders to 
Stakhanovite efforts of reconstruction.
166
 Between 1945 and 1950 the oblast and city 
soviets repeatedly demanded improvements in construction rates. Nearly every rural 
district was criticised at some stage for failing to meet reconstruction targets. In Tikhvin 
in 1946 the plan for reconstruction was fulfilled by just thirty-one per cent.
167
 Leningrad 
city soviet decisions complained that reconstruction in the first half of 1945 was 
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seriously behind plan, and lower than the equivalent period in 1944.
168
 Industrial 
enterprises, amongst the city‟s largest employers, were routinely criticised for failing to 
build sufficient housing. Money, materials and labour were routinely diverted away 
from housing construction in order to meet the all-important production plans.
169
  
 Shortages of even the most basic building materials provided a major brake 
upon construction. Demands to increase the production of building materials appeared 
in the press in the spring and summer of 1947, reminding readers that construction 
depended upon the production of timber, cement, stone and bricks. Surprisingly, for a 
city with the vast forestry resources of the Karelian isthmus at its disposal timber 
remained in shortage.
170
 A shortage of bricks was aggravated by the loss of one of the 
city‟s main brick factories. The factory‟s kilns had been used as crematoria for blockade 
victims and then levelled. The site was to become the Moskovskii victory park.
171
 Glass 
was exceptionally difficult to obtain.
172
 In the early stages of demobilization the city 
soviet simply did not have glass to distribute to veterans needing to repair windows.
173
 
Shortage meant that the windows of many residential buildings were still boarded over 
with sheet metal and plywood in July 1949.
174
 Material shortages continually held up 
construction. It was estimated that the plan to repair 260,000 square metres of roofing in 
the Smol‟ninskii district required 1,000 tons of sheet metal. In the previous six months 
the district had managed to procure just 59 tons.
175
  
Shortages even influenced the types of buildings being constructed. New two 
storey buildings designed to make maximum use of available building materials, 
frequently built by German of POWs, appeared in many of the districts cleared of 
wooden buildings. Many of these structures were built in the Vyborgskii raion in the 
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vicinity of Marx and Engels prospects and in Udel‟naia and Novaia Derevnaia.176 I.Z. 
Maseev, demobilized in September 1945, returned to Lenproekt to work on prototype 
plans for pre-fabrication of housing aimed at rationalising the use of materials and 
accelerating reconstruction.
177
 Such ideas were ahead of their time, but would find 
widespread application during Khrushchev‟s mass housing campaign. 
 Compared to other sections of the population veterans enjoyed privileged access 
to building materials. A number of different organisations distributed building materials 
to veterans whose accommodation needed repair or redecoration. 18,098 sheets of 
plywood, 27 tons of chalk, 22.5 tons of alabaster, 24.8 tons of limestone 2354 m
2
 of 
glass, 5.6 tons of nails, 10,000 metres of electric cable and 52,393 sheets of wallpaper 
were issued to demobilized veterans, war-invalids and service families by September 
1945. In the first half of 1946 the Dzerzhinskii district soviet distributed 161 cubic 
metres of timber, 8 tonnes of chalk and limestone, 1438 m
2 
of glass, 330 kilograms of 
nails, 2070 metres of wire, and 31,830 sheets of wallpaper. Access to building materials 
was of great advantage, however the quantities of materials available to former and 
serving soldiers was unlikely to completely satisfy total demand, or to have been 
distributed equably. This may explain why veterans looted building materials from 
occupied Europe. 
Although the state provided many veterans with building materials, they would 
be responsible for conducting the necessary repairs themselves. Once again promises of 
state assistance and entitlement were counterbalanced by individual initiative and 
action. Popular grass-roots activism played an important part in Leningrad‟s 
reconstruction. In August 1945 the city soviet established social commissions for 
assistance in the repair and utilisation of housing. These organizations drew together 
workers, engineers, technicians and skilled tradesmen to repair buildings and the 
electrical, heating and water supply systems. By 1948 over 20,000 individuals 
organized in 2832 commissions had volunteered their skills. Between 1946 and 1947 
these commissions repaired over 77,000 rooms and over a 1,000,000 m
2 
of roofing. The 
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commissions proved so successful that the RSFSR Council of Ministers recommended 
that other cities follow Leningrad‟s example.178 
 The combination of state assistance and individual initiative was a key feature of 
one final piece of public policy intended to increase construction. Demobilization 
legislation extended a scheme for preferential credit for the repair and reconstruction of 
housing to veterans.
179
 Historians, however, dispute the scheme‟s effectiveness. 
Outcomes were variable and dependent upon the effectiveness of local soviets, 
enterprises, trade-unions, branches of the communal bank and the energy of the local 
population. Implementation was hamstrung by lack of funds, shortages of building 
materials, a lack of technical awareness and construction skills, and excessive red-
tape.
180
 The scheme appears to have been particularly important to veterans settling in 
rural areas. In the course of 1945 a total of 1455 demobilized soldiers and service 
families received a total of 5,968,000 roubles in reconstruction credit.
181
 In Leningrad, 
however, the quantity of individual construction was negligible. Workers in the Stalin 
metal-works, for example, planned just nine buildings in the whole of 1947.
182
 
Individual building appears to have been discouraged in the city centre, probably 
because of the disruption it might cause to the recreation of an idealized version of the 
pre-war cityscape envisaged by architects and planners.
183
 When individual construction 
was permitted it was concentrated in the suburbs surrounding the city.
184
 In January 
1949 the city soviet issued a set of regulations for individual construction in suburban 
areas which specified streets in Kolpino, Petrodvorets and Pushkin, and a list of towns 
including Pavlovsk, Pargolovo, Pesochnaia, Levashovo and Beloostrov suitable for 
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further development.
185
 The scheme also came under official suspicion after it was 
revealed to have become subject to systematic corruption. Funds obtained from the 
communal bank as part of this scheme were obtained on forged documents, and were 
not used to finance construction.
186
 In 1946, for example, A.V. Shershenev, a 
demobilized veteran, borrowed 3000 roubles from the Tikhvinskii branch of the State 
Bank and then disappeared.
187
 
 There were easier ways to obtain housing in the Leningrad oblast. In the north of 
the oblast, in territory only recently acquired from Finland, there were large numbers of 
homes left empty by Finns fleeing their homes. Deliberate attempts were made to 
repopulate the rural Vyborgskii, Koivistovskii, Iaskinskii, Rautovskii, Kannel‟iarskii 
and Keksgolskii districts with demobilized veterans and their families. A thousand 
veterans and their families were to begin a new life as collective farmers in these areas. 
Rather than build new homes it seems likely that many occupied the empty dwellings 
littering the countryside.
188
 Something similar occurred in Latvia, where levels of 
individual construction were low, something attributed to the mass appropriation of 
dwellings left vacant by owners fleeing the oncoming Red Army.
189
 The surfeit of 
wooden buildings in the Leningrad oblast was such that corrupt officials ran scams to 
sell, break-up and relocate them to other districts. In September 1946 the police arrested 
Georgii Pozdiankov head of the Rautovskii district housing department. In exchange for 
bribes Pozdniakov had sold uninhabited buildings to private individuals. In cooperation 
with Krylov, a driver with the oblast transport department, with a lorry at his disposal, 
arrangements were made to dismantle and transport wooden buildings to different 
locations. Grigorii Sokol, a disabled veteran employed at a tram depot in Leningrad, 
paid 1500 roubles for a building to be moved to Pargolovo.
190
 Such practices were 
sufficiently widespread for the oblast soviet to pass a decision banning the breaking up, 
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theft and unauthorised relocation of houses and other building by official organisations 
and private individuals.
191
  
Disappointment and Resentment 
 
Veterans returning to Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast clearly did not expect 
to return to a flourishing region. Soldiers stationed on the Leningrad front would have 
known something of the damage wrought upon their homes. Elsewhere veterans learnt 
of the damage inflicted by German invaders from official propaganda. Returning 
soldiers understood the destructive capabilities of modern warfare as well as anybody. 
They did not, however, anticipate the treatment which they ultimately received. The 
failure to provide „homes for heroes‟ created widespread disappointment and enormous 
resentment amongst Leningrad‟s veterans. Expectations of deriving tangible benefits 
from theoretical privilege were quickly replaced by disappointment and dissatisfaction. 
Veterans‟ anger and disenchantment were recorded in reports written by 
Leningrad‟s military censor, part of the regional secret police administration. These 
secret reports, headed „special communications‟ (spetssoobshchenie), were based on 
excerpts of private letters written to families and friends.
192
 However, the value of these 
sources as evidence of public opinion has been questioned. Spetssoobschenie have 
much in common with svodki, a summary reports of public opinion, which have been 
the subject of intense methodological debate. Popular opinion reports created by a 
militantly ideological state were far from a value free indication of what people really 
thought.
193
 These sources inevitably over-represented „harmful attitudes.‟ 
Spetssobschenie were highly mediated documents. They were written according to 
official guidelines and templates, and the product of an extensive bureaucratic 
apparatus, which filtered out negative sentiments and then selected the most appropriate 
material for inclusion in reports.
194
 Furthermore, as Davies writes, “the choice of 
subjects warranting reports were dictated by regime priorities, which did not necessarily 
coincide with the people‟s own interests (or with those of a future historian for that 
                                                 
191
  Biulleten‟ Lenobispolkoma, No.15, 1946, p.7. 
 
192
  For background on the operation of the military censor see Robert Dale, „Rats and Resentment: The 
Demobilization of the Red Army in Postwar Leningrad, 1945-50‟, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol.45, No.1 (January 2010), pp.113-33 (pp.124-25). 
 
193
  Hellbeck, „Speaking Out‟, pp.71-96. 
 
194
   Viola, „Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s‟, pp.45-69; Graziosi, „The New Soviet Archival 
Sources‟, pp.54-56. 
92 
matter)...”195 The difficulties of housing, however, were amongst the greatest challenges 
facing post-war Leningrad and therefore highly represented.  
Despite similarities in production, these sources are qualitatively different from 
svodki. The letters from which spetssoobshchenie were compiled were „real letters‟ sent 
to friends or family either oblivious or defiant of the censor. Large sections of letters 
were quoted with little or no commentary or analysis. The language in which veterans 
expressed their frustrations has an authenticity lacking in other sources. Rather than the 
„contrived Soviet self-representations‟ or rehearsed discourses typical of zhaloby or 
zaiavleniia, or the anaemic language of party officials „speaking Bolshevik‟ the letters 
included in these reports give the impression of real people, confronting extraordinary 
problems and expressing genuine emotions. To quote Rimmel these sources if they, “do 
nothing else, they help us humanize an often inhuman era.”196 
Finding that their homes were destroyed, occupied and that official planning had 
failed to make adequate provision for their return many veterans were understandably 
angry. Some found themselves living in corridors, without any hope of finding suitable 
housing.
197
 Others were totally homeless. This was not the heroes‟ return that veterans 
felt they deserved or which they had been promised. Rage and disappointment flooded 
from veterans‟ pens. Zakharov, amongst the first veterans demobilized in 1945, 
questioned why he fought for four years, yet on his return had nowhere to live, and 
nothing to put on his feet; “little matter, that I slept for four year in bogs (bolotakh), in 
the rain, and I arrived here and things aren‟t any sweeter.”198 Rather than 
disappointment some veterans felt insulted. Bogdanova returned from demobilization in 
July 1945. 
“Leaving the unit so many promises were made to us, but they all turned out 
to be empty. Having been to the district military registration office (raiony 
voennyi kommissariat), they offered me (a place in a) hostel. All the girls 
are disappointed that they returned home to the city they defended. Four 
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years wandering between and crawling around dugouts and suddenly this, 
it‟s very offensive.”199  
This resentment was not confined to the first eshelons of veterans, although the military 
censor was more alarmed by the earliest expressions of dissatisfaction. A.I. Zaitsev 
vented his anger about veterans‟ housing provision in November 1946. His frustration 
tipped over into depressive thoughts. 
“For what, I ask, is there to live for now, it would have been better to have 
been killed, than live like this. In the name of what did I fight for seven 
years, I didn‟t gain anything, they won‟t even give me my own room back. I 
ask, what is there to live for now? Where is the truth – I don‟t know! How 
much longer can I wander between hostels like an old monk (starets) with a 
sack?”200 
For a number of veterans it was the interminable waiting to receive permanent 
housing that generated the most anger. One wrote in November 1946 that he had been a 
civilian for two months, had failed to find either work or housing, and was no closer to 
receiving any form of solution.
201
 On 18 July 1945 N.I. Novikov wrote to his wife about 
the progress of demobilization. For him any satisfaction derived from leaving the army 
was tarnished by not finding housing. 
“I began the torment (connected with obtaining) living space, they promised 
me (housing) no sooner than in five-six months, but I suppose that deadline 
won‟t be kept... I‟ve temporarily registered in a hostel for demobilized 
veterans, but at night I stay with Marusa. I want to explore different options 
to try and speed up receiving living space.”202  
Novikov‟s prediction was almost certainly right; most veterans waited months even 
years. A.T. Zarubin was demobilized on 13 July 1945. He was impressed by the 
welcome veterans received at the station, and the way in which they were transported to 
their homes by car. Reality kicked in the following day, when he went to the district 
housing department and was told there were no available apartments. He spent five 
days, from morning to night, kicking his heels at the office.
203
 Zarubin‟s eloquent letter 
was amongst several which prompted an investigation by the Leningrad soviet. His 
home had been broken up for fuel during the blockade, and his family was still in 
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evacuation. Having been placed on the housing waiting list, he returned to the district 
housing administration seven times. On 24 July he temporarily registered with an 
acquaintance.
204
 
 Veterans hated paperwork, lengthy queues and being constantly pushed from 
one office to another. As one veteran wrote in August 1945:  
“You can‟t find an end anywhere; they only write that there is everything 
for the demobilized. You go to one institution and they send you to another 
and so on. And so you travel from one end of the city to the other without 
end.”205   
Another veteran spoke of having to do a daily round visiting the chairman of the 
district soviet, the district prosecutor, the district housing administration, the building 
administrator, and the police. She felt that she would go mad before she succeeded in 
getting her room back. “In general there is a lot of talk about the reception of the 
demobilized, but when I arrived, I wasn‟t able to get anything from anywhere.”206 F.I. 
Khaitovich‟s apartment on ulitsa Rubinsteina had been occupied by a re-evacuee in 
October 1944.
207
 He was angered that it took so long to enforce his rights: “We 
fought, we tormented ourselves, we suffered, and how cruelly we suffered. We 
returned as victors and suddenly... this terrible inertia and bureaucracy.”208 This 
Kafkaesque bureaucratic nightmare was a world away from legal entitlement and 
privilege.  
 Worse still was the cold-hearted, sometimes mocking, attitude of bureaucrats. 
The official who placed Pavlov, an officer demobilized in the autumn of 1946, on the 
housing waiting list insensitively told him to marry a woman who already had a 
room.
209
 One female veteran, helped by a friend to write a letter, reported that the 
district prosecutor and chairman of the district soviet just laughed at her when she went 
to see them.
210
 Khaitovich complained of the, “loathsome and outrageous attitude 
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towards the demobilized,” amongst officials.211 Veterans often felt that they were 
dealing with a layer of society which lacked basic decency, and had been corrupted by 
the war. On his return M.I. Krylov learnt that he was to lose the room in which he and 
the five members of his family had lived before the war. Faced with the prospect of 
moving his family into a hostel for single veterans he expressed the burning rage typical 
of resentful veterans: 
“all of this [veterans‟ entitlements and rights] remains empty words, thanks 
to those who saved their skins deep in the rear camouflaged from the threat 
of death, who accumulated sizeable capital and now having returned home 
get the best apartments, we who lived through the horrors of the hardest 
days of the war once again have to wander around as if we are unworthy of 
society, for the salvation of which we spilt our blood and covered the 
motherland with the everlasting glory of victory and all of that to turn up 
discarded on the edge of life.”212 
It wasn‟t just angry young men who learnt to „speak veteran‟.213 An intercepted letter 
written by a female veteran on 1 August 1945 expressed low regard for bureaucrats. In 
her mind concern for veterans extended no further than clean floors and a vase of 
flowers at demobilization points. 
“When I began to speak to the prosecutor about how my living space had been 
demolished and that I had nowhere to live, he tried to change the conversation 
to any other subject, if only to escape a sore point... It would have been better to 
have come back earlier, to not return home to see these disgusting bureaucrats, 
which during the war were able to firmly entrench themselves in the rear, and 
arrange their own well-being, and now take up prominent positions in order to 
support their own existence.”214 
 Accusations that some form of „lubrication‟ was required to get administrative 
wheels to turn were a constant feature of veterans‟ letters. Writing in June 1946 one 
veteran was convinced that; “The queue for receiving living space exists as a screen, 
while space is given out by blat and bribes. It is only possible to get two metres of land 
on death.”215 Estimates of the size of bribes passing hands to secure accommodation 
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ranged from 3000 to 25,000 roubles.
216
 On the evidence of veterans‟ intercepted letters 
the belief that housing allocation was corrupt was widespread. Although this may have 
reflected the military censors‟ sensitivity towards mention of corruption there was 
abundant evidence that corruption was a genuine problem. The scarcity of housing 
created a situation in which bribery and corruption became highly lucrative, something 
against which the city soviet waged a semi-public war. Almost every issue of 
Leningradskaia pravda and Vechernii Leningrad carried reports of corruption and 
rudeness amongst housing officials.
217
 A.F. Shigoreva, a building administrator 
(upravkhoz), was arrested in May 1946. She had kept information about vacant living 
space from the district housing department, hiding it from official registers. In exchange 
for bribes she illegally housed people in these spaces. Over a year she illegally settled 37 
rooms. A further nine empty rooms were discovered on her arrest.
218
 Another upravkhoz 
was not only speculating in empty rooms, but also selling the property of deceased, 
evacuated or conscripted former residents.
219
 Other building administrators would add 
people to housing waiting lists in exchange for bribes.
220
 Given this background 
veterans‟ accusations of corruption were entirely plausible.  
The feeling that veterans would have been better off had they remained in the 
army was a constant refrain in veterans‟ letters. Many wrote to comrades still in uniform 
telling them precisely this. The possibility that the Red Army offered a more 
comfortable existence than civilian life was perhaps the most eloquent evidence of the 
state‟s failure to meet veterans‟ expectations. In the minds of resentful veterans, the 
experience of finding somewhere to live quickly revealed the rhetoric of Stalinist care 
and concern for the glorious defenders of the motherland to be a fiction. The 
complexities of reclaiming housing through legal channels and/or obtaining living space 
through district housing administrations were amongst the first interactions many 
veterans would have with state representatives after their return. This first post-war 
encounter with officialdom would set a pattern for their future dealings with minor state 
functionaries. In the minds of many veterans heartless and corrupt „rear-line rats‟, who 
had shirked military service in favour of administrative jobs safe in the rear, became 
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their preferred scapegoats. Encouraged by specific attacks on bureaucrats published in 
the local press and a public culture which continually blamed „enemies‟ for social, 
economic and political difficulties, disenchanted veterans vented their spleens at minor 
state functionaries, channelling their anger away from central political leaders or the 
vagaries of the Soviet political system.
221
   
Conclusion 
 
 Veterans‟ treatment at the hand of housing officials and legal representatives led 
many to question their wartime sacrifices and created doubt about how easy it would be 
to fit into a society in which bureaucracy and corruption were now commonplace. 
Ultimately the difficulties of finding housing stemmed from the level of damage to the 
housing stock and basic infrastructure in Leningrad and the surrounding region, the high 
demand for housing amongst veterans, re-evacuees and new migrants, the slowness of 
reconstruction and the policies pursued by the central party-state and local leaders. 
Although the sympathetic help of a conscientious housing administrator could soften the 
disappointment ex-servicemen felt at the loss of housing or the prospect of years on 
waiting lists, the shortage of housing remained a constant problem. Complete 
reconstruction of the city would take decades rather than years. Despite their theoretical 
entitlements Leningrad‟s veterans could not be protected from the post-war housing 
crisis. Years before the systems of privileges extended to veterans was eroded and 
dismantled, veterans in and around Leningrad already understood that such benefits 
only existed on paper. In the sphere of housing, at least, reintegration to civilian life 
meant sharing in the abysmal living conditions experienced by other Leningraders. 
 Finding that official entitlements rarely corresponded with reality many veterans 
pursued their own strategies to obtain housing. Some individuals were so disenchanted 
by the hassle involved in obtaining handouts that they made their own arrangements 
wholly independent of the state; others found ways to circumvent the official 
distribution mechanisms. Veterans barraged legal authorities and local government with 
appeals for assistance and letters of complaint, attempted to discredit opponents in 
housing disputes, exploited loopholes in the residency permit rules, or obtained living 
space through informal channels, which included paying the bribes which so angered 
many of their comrades. Rather than being a privileged layer of society rewarded by the 
state, veterans were forced onto their own resources. Ironically, entitlement and 
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privilege did not create a loyal social class grateful to the state, but a resentful body of 
men and women aggrieved by the difficulties they experienced on their return.  
99 
Chapter 2:  “As in battle– as in labour”. The Re-mobilization of 
Demobilized Veterans 
 
 
Figure 2: V. Koretskii, Kak v boiu - tak i v trude (As in battle - as in labour)1948.
1
 
 
Human societies have faced the challenge of finding suitable employment for 
returning veterans for as long as war has existed.  But, the difficulties of demobilization 
have changed dramatically over past centuries. Before the advent of mass standing 
armies in the modern era military service was largely seasonal and military campaigns 
relatively short. While soldiers spent less time away from home reintegration into the 
civilian economy was comparatively straightforward. With the creation of professional 
armies, introduced into Imperial Russia in the eighteenth century by Peter the Great‟s 
military reforms, re-employing discharged soldiers became increasingly difficult. The 
longer soldiers spent within the military the harder it became to begin successful 
civilian careers.
2
 In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries a new set of pressures 
were created by the development of modern industrialized warfare fought by mass 
                                                 
1
  Reproduced in N.N. Glushko et. al., Velikaia pobeda i vozrozhdenie Moskvy (Moscow: Kontakt-
kul‟tura, 2005), p.79. 
 
2
  Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, „Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldiers‟ Families in Servile Russia‟, The 
Journal of Military History, Vol.59, No.2 (April 1995), pp.215-35. 
100 
conscript armies. After both World Wars almost all combatant nations experienced 
difficulties re-employing the large numbers of veterans whose working lives had been 
temporarily interrupted by war. Post-war labour markets were flooded by returning 
soldiers. The state was increasingly expected to play a role in helping veterans find 
work. Creating employment opportunities in economies being recalibrated from 
wartime to peacetime production was extremely challenging. 
 
From the perspective of individual veterans finding employment was a critical 
moment. Work provided an important way for ex-servicemen to regain control of their 
lives. After years of having food, clothing and shelter provided by armies work gave 
veterans their independence. Although there was a strong material dimension to finding 
work it was about more than earning money. Work is central to human society. It 
provides an experience that frames our lives, occupies the majority of our time and 
helps define identities. Work was central to the process of civilian readjustment. By re-
entering the workforce veterans became fully productive members of society, wiping 
away any liminality in their social position. By resuming pre-war trades and 
professions, or learning new skills, demobilized veterans could put their wartime 
experiences behind them and focus on the future.  
 
 In the years following the First World War European and North American 
societies were far from successful in re-employing demobilized veterans. In Britain after 
1918 unemployed ex-servicemen became familiar figures. Robert Graves recalled in the 
early 1920s: “Ex-service men continually coming to the door selling boot-laces and 
asking for cast-off shoes and shirts.”3 By January 1922 unemployment in Britain had 
reached over two million. The British Legion claimed that there were half a million 
unemployed ex-servicemen.
4
 Veterans were given remarkably little assistance in re-
entering the workplace. A bankrupt economy was unable to give veterans the support 
they deserved. American First World War veterans returned to face high 
unemployment, runaway inflation and rising living costs. Defeated German veterans 
feared the spectre of mass unemployment, created by the cessation of war production. In 
late 1918 and early 1919 German unemployment peaked at approximately six to seven 
per cent of the labour force. Politicians feared that unemployment threatened the fabric 
of German society and the state‟s future viability. However, the fear of unemployment 
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has been exaggerated. As Richard Bessel writes; “Most soldiers returned to their jobs 
fairly quickly, and the sudden shift of millions of men from field grey into mufti does 
not seem to have put the German labour market out of joint.”5 Unemployment was 
largely short-term and remarkably low given the extent of post-war problems. 
  
 Memories of unemployment after the First World War, although exaggerated, 
heavily influenced planning for demobilization after the Second World War in both 
Britain and America. Many observers feared that demobilization would result in a return 
to mass unemployment. In Britain forty-three per cent of respondents to a Mass 
Observation study conducted in the autumn of 1943 expected heavy post-war 
unemployment.
6
 Fifty-six per cent of American soldiers surveyed in May 1945 
anticipated a depression.
7
 Legislators and planners were keen to avoid the supposed 
mistakes of 1919-20, and were conscious of the need to support dislocated labour 
markets by re-employing veterans.
8
 The US Army‟s Research Branch, for example, 
began studying soldiers‟ post-war employment plans as early as the summer of 1943.9 
The combination of active social policy, combined with an acute labour shortage, made 
it easier to re-employ British and American veterans after 1945 than had been 
anticipated. Soldiers were rarely reduced to selling matches on the streets as they had 
been after 1918. As Allport writes; “Postwar Britain would be a bleak and austere place 
in many ways, but few who wanted work were left idle.” Although veterans often found 
the transition back into paid employment difficult, many were the beneficiaries of 
opportunities created by a consistently high demand for skilled labour throughout the 
late 1940s.
10
 
 
 Although re-employment played an important part in demobilizing armies in all 
post-war societies, the historiography of the Red Army‟s demobilization after the Great 
Patriotic War has focused particularly closely on veterans‟ economic remobilization. 
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This contrasts with a lack of interest in the return to work of several million men in less 
than three years amongst historians of the British labour force.
11
 The very first Soviet 
studies of veterans‟ homecomings treated demobilization and re-employment as 
synonyms. The most influential of these studies, published by Donchenko in 1970, 
explored the injection of manpower provided by demobilized veterans. Donchenko 
argued, on the basis of national statistics, that veterans quickly and successfully 
returned to work, and provided a solution to a post-war cadres problem. Ex-servicemen 
included large numbers of skilled workers, as well as individuals who had acquired 
administrative and political skills in the army, which equipped them to assume 
managerial roles in the industrial and agricultural sectors, and in party, soviet and social 
organisations.
12
  
 
This argument mirrored the official version of demobilization and has become 
the standard narrative. It has had supporters amongst western historians, most notably 
Sheila Fitzpatrick. Writing in 1985, without the level of archival access currently 
enjoyed by researchers, Fitzpatrick argued that military service during the Great 
Patriotic War led to upward social mobility for Red Army veterans. Large numbers of 
veterans returning to the village became kolkhoz chairmen, other peasants took 
advantage of their relative freedom of movement to join the urban workforce, while 
soldiers who had risen through the ranks or who had joined the party were promoted to 
administrative or managerial positions.
13
 Although Fitzpatrick‟s questioning of what 
constituted normality in post-war Soviet society is of lasting importance, the level of 
social mobility amongst veterans is ripe for reassessment. A number of historians, 
however, continue to view ex-servicemen largely in terms of their economic 
contribution to late Stalinist society.
14
 More recently Edele has offered a more subtle 
analysis of veterans‟ prospects for economic and social advancement.15 He argues that 
individual veterans enjoyed social mobility, but collectively veterans‟ increased wartime 
status did not translate into elevated civilian status. There was no large-scale post-war 
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cadres exchange, comparable to that in the 1920s and 1930s described by Fitzpatrick, to 
be exploited by veterans.
16
 In practice; “There was little official across-the-board 
affirmative action policy for veterans qua veterans in the immediate post-war years, 
which would have contributed to a general elevation of the social standing of all 
veterans.”17   
 
This chapter examines the reintegration of Leningrad‟s veterans into the urban 
and rural workforce in the months and years immediately following their return. The 
workplace was conceived as the most important battleground in turning ex-servicemen 
back into ordinary citizens. The state‟s main yardstick for measuring demobilization‟s 
success was the rate at which veterans were re-employed. As such it provides an 
important indication of veterans‟ post-war readjustment. This chapter challenges the 
official myth of veterans‟ successful remobilization. It argues that the transition back 
into the civilian workforce was exceptionally difficult even for veterans who found 
suitable employment. It builds upon Edele‟s analysis of veterans‟ prospects for social 
advancement, offering a detailed local analysis of how veterans were reintegrated into 
the workforce. Leningrad provides an important illustration of how difficult many 
veterans found it to obtain employment. Despite wartime damage Leningrad remained a 
major city at the heart of the Soviet industrial economy. The Leningrad oblast was home 
to important industrial enterprises, raw-material production plants and agriculture. 
Wartime depopulation created a local labour shortage that if Donchenko‟s model of 
veterans‟ upward social mobility were true, should have created a wealth of 
employment opportunities. But the situation in Leningrad was more complicated. 
Rather than enjoying upward mobility, Leningrad‟s veterans were largely unable  to 
satisfy their expectations for „good‟ employment. Former soldiers were often forced to 
accept menial or low-paid positions. Veterans‟ attitudes towards the process of re-
entering the workplace and the kinds of work obtained reveals much about their hopes 
and expectations for civilian life, and their general attitude towards demobilization. 
Veterans were far from a cohesive social group with a collective experience of re-
entering the workplace. They found employment in all areas of the economy, not just 
heavy industry and agriculture. The experience of finding work varied enormously; 
different veterans had different problems, and women, officers and the youngest 
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veterans faced specific problems, which have largely been obscured by the propaganda 
myth of upward mobility.  
Propaganda and the Duty to Work 
 
Soviet veterans, when compared to their former British and American allies, 
were given remarkably little support finding employment. British veterans were entitled 
to fifty-six days of paid discharge leave. Their pre-war employers were required to re-
hire them for between six to twelve months, depending on the length of their pre-war 
employment. Veterans had to contact their employers within a month of demobilization, 
and begin work within a further month.
18
 The American G.I. Bill offered veterans 
unemployment benefit of $20 a week for up to a year, the so called 52-20 club, as well 
as loans to start businesses and financial assistance for vocational training. Federal 
agencies and state administrations also pursued a policy of veterans‟ preference in civil 
service appointments.
19
 
 
 Red Army veterans were led to believe that Soviet state support far surpassed 
anything planned by its former allies. The propaganda campaign which accompanied 
the passing of Soviet demobilization regulations stressed that only Soviet socialist 
society could guarantee to meet ex-servicemen‟s needs.20 The claim that “there is not 
another country in the world where demobilization legislation was so suffused with care 
for soldiers and their families,” became an official mantra.21 Demobilization legislation 
was celebrated as an expression of Soviet society‟s respect for veterans. The idea that 
only socialism could guarantee veterans work and a secure future became a central 
propaganda message.
22
 In October 1945 A. Falin, Leningrad‟s chief prosecutor, 
reiterated the uniqueness of the Soviet promise to re-employ veterans: “Such a wide 
formulation is only possible in a socialist country. In any other state concern about work 
placement (trudoustroistvo) of demobilized soldiers is their private business.”23 The 
press hammered home this point by reporting international plaudits for Soviet 
                                                 
18
  Allport, Demobbed, pp.136-37. 
 
19
  Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens, p.6; Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Home, pp.31-32; Richard 
Severo and Lewis Milford, The Wages of War. When America‟s Soldiers Came Home – From Valley 
Forge to Vietnam (New York: Touchstone, 1989), p.289. 
 
20
  Edele, Soviet Veterans, p.34. 
 
21
  „Vsenarodnaia zabota o demobilizovannykh voinakh‟, Krasnaia zvezda, 10 July 1945, p.1. 
 
22
  „Demobilizovannym voinom dostoinyiu vstrechy‟, Trud, 6 July 1945, p.1. 
 
23
  A. Falin, „Okhranit‟ prava demobilizovannykh‟, Leningradskaia pravda, 14 October 1945, p.2. 
105 
legislation, and by contrasting Red Army veterans‟ prospects with those of veterans in 
capitalist societies.
24
 Krokodil, the official satirical journal, for example, published a 
number of cartoons highlighting the plight of unemployed American veterans, including 
images of veterans sleeping on street benches and begging for work alongside 
Washington‟s Capitol building.25 The Soviet experience of remobilizing veterans, as I 
will argue, was more a matter of image than reality.  
 
 Veterans‟ employment rights were outlined in clause seven of the 23 June 1945 
demobilization decree. Ex-servicemen were required to resume work within thirty days 
of demobilization. Local soviets, the management of industrial enterprises and other 
local institutions were obliged to provide demobilized soldiers with work no lower than 
their pre-war employment and commensurate with skills and experiences obtained in 
the army. Volunteers had the theoretical right to regain their pre-war jobs.
26
 Legislation 
was silent on how employment rights would operate in practice, or whether post-war 
jobs should be equivalent to pre-war jobs in status or salary. There was no guidance on 
how to treat veterans whose workplaces have been destroyed, closed, evacuated or 
converted to another form of production; all serious problems in Leningrad. In such 
circumstances local officials appear to have had a measure of flexibility in how the law 
was applied. Demobilization legislation then was not implemented uniformly across the 
Soviet Union. Local factors clearly influenced veterans‟ chances in the post-war 
workplace. 
 
 Demobilization was increasingly presented as a gift earned by veterans, not the 
state‟s duty towards those who fought for it.27 Demobilization came with strings 
attached, most importantly the commitment to become a productive citizen. What 
Jeffrey Brooks terms the Stalinist economy of the gift required ex-servicemen to repay 
the state for its fatherly attention.
28
 As one propagandist explained: 
“You honestly served the motherland (rodina) during the years of 
the war, you were in the first ranks of fighters for the freedom, 
honour and independence of the Soviet fatherland (otchizna), you 
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will now be in the first ranks of workers in the USSR, fighting for 
the reconstruction and further blossoming of the power and glory of 
the Soviet state.”29 
Veterans‟ post-war duty was clear. They were to return to work and devote themselves 
to production with the same diligence and determination demonstrated at the front. This 
message was projected most clearly by propaganda posters. The artist Viktor Koretskii, 
for example, produced posters which exhorted veterans to devote themselves to civilian 
labour as if it was an extension of battle. Popular slogans formed the posters‟ titles: We 
were victorious in battle – we will be victorious in labour, 1947 (Figure 3) and As in 
battle – as in labour, 1948 (Figure 2).30 Visually the posters were split into frames 
juxtaposing veterans‟ wartime past with their future civilian achievements. Infantrymen 
were transformed into miners; tank drivers into combine-harvester drivers. 
Commanders of guns became commanders of production.
31
 
 
Throughout the second half of 1945 and 1946 the national and local press were 
full of reports describing veterans returning to work, usually in skilled or managerial 
positions.
32
 Although the language of these articles now appears stale and repetitious 
they nonetheless carried important signals for the average Soviet citizen, and they reveal 
a great deal about official priorities.
33
 Demobilization and trudoustroistvo became 
synonymous; confirming the state‟s obsession with harnessing veterans‟ labour. 
Newspapers which failed to devote sufficient attention to veterans‟ re-employment 
faced intense criticism. Between August and October 1946 several regional newspapers 
failed to comment on veterans‟ trudoustroistvo, and even failed to mention it in editions 
celebrating Den‟ Tankistov (Tankists‟ Day).34  
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Figure 3: V. Koretskii, Pobezhdali v boiakh - Pobezhdaem v trude ( We were victorious in battle - we 
will be victorious in labour), 1947.
35
 
 
The regional press in the Leningrad oblast was acutely aware of the importance 
of communicating to veterans their duty to return to work. Leningradskaia pravda, 
Vechernii Leningrad and factory and district newspapers were full of reports about 
veterans returning to work. These articles stressed that Leningrad‟s veterans were highly 
skilled workers making a vital contribution to post-war reconstruction, or were 
employed in administrative or managerial capacities.
36
 They also created the impression 
that veterans were returning to the same factories, sometimes even the same workshops 
and workbenches, from which they had been mobilized. These articles evoked the 
metaphor of a family reunited, something highlighted in their titles. Veterans were said 
to be working enthusiastically, and to have been well received by their colleagues. The 
emphasis on veterans‟ returning to pre-war jobs and communities projected important 
messages about the healing of wartime wounds. This was particularly important in 
Leningrad where the blockade had destroyed family networks and whole communities. 
In other post-war societies women and families were often expected to ease veterans‟ 
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reintegration into civilian society.
37
 Yet with so many civilian deaths and so many 
service families still in evacuation, Leningrad‟s workplaces were given a critical role in 
facilitating veterans‟ transition. Propaganda suggested that the nurturing and supportive 
functions routinely considered a woman‟s duty were, at least in part, being discharged 
by workplace collectives.
38
 
 
In attempting to balance the imperative to re-mobilise veterans‟ productive 
capacity, with an emotional need to recognise wartime achievements propaganda 
disseminated mixed messages.
39
 It encouraged veterans to become ordinary citizens, but 
simultaneously suggested that veterans enjoyed a special status, distinguishing them 
from the rest of society. This paradox could be hard to reconcile in soldiers‟ minds. On 
one hand the war was presented as an aberrant experience, which had disrupted normal 
lives. Veterans were therefore expected to demobilize, reintegrate and stop claiming 
special rewards as quickly as possible.
40
 They were encouraged to think of themselves 
as workers first, and veterans second. Returning to work was partly about resuming 
normal quotidian rhythms after the drama and excitement of war. As one newspaper 
article from January 1947 explained thousands of heroes, their chests covered in medals, 
were returning to ordinary jobs, where they could once again become ordinary 
citizens.
41
 Veterans were to put the war behind them, and concentrate upon the future. 
Indeed, the privileges of demobilization depended on a tacit agreement to repress darker 
memories of wartime experience and not to wash the Red Army‟s dirty linen in public.42 
Yet, as one poet observed wartime memories could not be packed away as easily as an 
old uniform.
43
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On the other hand the Great Patriotic War became a founding moment for Soviet 
society, which allegedly fostered positive qualities amongst soldiers. The bravery, 
decisiveness, stubbornness, resourcefulness, self-confidence and leadership skills that 
veterans demonstrated at the front had a practical application in the civilian economy. 
Exemplary veterans were celebrated as role models for Soviet society. In March 1946 
Vechernii Leningrad, for example, published an article describing veterans as the „gold 
reserve‟ of Soviet labour: 
“These cadres have been through the rigorous school of the Great Patriotic 
War. They have learned to surmount any difficulty; they found liberty and 
persistence in achieving these ends. They occupy an honoured and glorious 
place in the struggle for the realization of the grandiose Stalinist Fourth Five 
Year Plan.”44  
 
Re-employed veterans were required to become exemplars of labour discipline, to be 
active participants in socialist competition, and leading workers in the battle to fulfil 
and over-fulfil production plans.
45
 A wave of popular novels built upon tropes in the 
press, and played an important part in the creation of a propaganda stereotype of 
veterans as exemplary citizens.
46
 Devoted to the reconstruction of the countryside or 
raising industrial production ex-servicemen become the positive hero par excellence.
47
  
 
Special status was balanced by social expectations. Victory could not be allowed 
to go to veterans‟ heads. Veterans were not to rest on their laurels. As a pocketbook for 
ex-servicemen reminded its readers:  
“You are obliged, as your duty before the motherland, to always and 
everywhere uphold the highest honour and virtue of the Red Army, and on 
returning to the motherland to be an example of modesty, discipline, 
orderliness and procedure.”48 
 
Rather than being judged on wartime achievements, the true mark of a hero was how he 
behaved after demobilization. As the hero of Babaevskii‟s Cavalier of the Gold Star is 
reminded:  
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“You‟ll have to renew your military glory every day in your work, 
so it will not be tarnished and appear corroded with conceit. They 
say that the decorations on a soldier‟s chest are the mirror of his 
soul. That‟s probably quite right. But in that mirror people see only 
our past and our present; the future must find its reflection in our 
deeds.”49 
Surrounded by agitation before, during and after demobilization it was hardly 
surprising that many veterans internalized this rhetoric. The propaganda campaign‟s 
strangely hypnotic language was designed to penetrate consciousness. Both Edele and 
Weiner have observed veterans‟ strong identification with the heroes of post-war 
novels.
50
 Red Army veterans were attracted to characters which reflected their own self-
image, in the same way that American soldiers in Vietnam emulated the characters John 
Wayne played in war films.
51
 After demobilization many veterans did exactly what was 
expected of them; they immediately became exemplary workers and started to over-
fulfil the plan.
52
 According to the press Leningrad‟s veterans were clear on their duty to 
become model workers. In October 1945 a conference of demobilized veterans 
organized in Voznesenskii district of the Leningrad oblast demonstrated veterans‟ 
ability to assimilate familiar propaganda tropes. One veteran was reported to have 
declared; “We weren‟t afraid of bullets, nor shells, nor whistles over our heads. Why 
would we be afraid of work?” Another former soldier was reported stating; “Our duty is 
to prove that we are not only good soldiers, but good labourers.”53 On 19 August 1945 
Krest‟ianskaia pravda, the Luzhskii raion‟s district newspaper, published a series of 
pledges from veterans to work as they had fought in battle.
54
 Virtually every factory 
proudly boasted of exemplary veterans achieving impressive feats of Stakhanovism. 
Elektrosila‟s factory newspaper reported many veterans fulfilling their production 
targets many times over.
55
 One of Elektrosila‟s demobilized employees concluded an 
article with a typical expression of official rhetoric. “Everybody asks me: well frontovik, 
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how are you doing? How are you adapting to civilian life after the war? Well I answer: 
it‟s like this – you‟ve got to roll up your sleeves and work, and work.”56 
 
In many of these instances veterans were „speaking Bolshevik‟, and merely 
parroting official language in public settings, whilst maintaining private attitudes 
towards their post-war social status. The propaganda press could be expected to 
propagate the image of veterans as exemplary figures. Yet internal party documents 
reported the same readiness for veterans to knuckle down to reconstruction.
57
 This 
suggests that not only had many veterans internalized official rhetoric, but also so had 
many of administrators monitoring veterans. However, we should not dismiss the 
prospect that many ex-servicemen genuinely identified with the image of the model 
worker. Leningrad was a city with a strong industrial heritage proud of the 
achievements of its working class. Having left the army behind Leningraders may have 
found readopting working class identities a comfort in a confusing environment. 
Furthermore, the manner in which veterans were incorporated into the workforce was 
impressive. Many made an important contribution to reconstruction, achieving 
remarkable things in difficult circumstances. But, the experience of finding work and re-
integrating into the workforce was often more complicated than the official version of 
demobilization acknowledged. Although historians have accepted much of the 
propaganda campaign surrounding veterans‟ re-employment as fact, un-employment 
and under-employment were real problems. 
The Return to the Post-war Workplace 
 
Settling back into the civilian workplace was a challenge for all veterans. 
Former soldiers were not returning to model workplaces, but confusing and disorderly 
environments. Soldiers, like Konstantin Simonov and Boris Galen, who imagined life as 
a holiday or fairy-tale like existence, were bound to disappointed by their rapid 
remobilization.
58
 Of course almost anything would have been a disappointment when 
compared to wartime dreams. Work, especially in heavy industrial and construction 
industries, was exhausting and relentless. Many workplaces continued to demand that 
their employees worked long shifts, even after the eight-hour day had theoretically been 
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reinstated. The return to work was anything but a therapeutic return to normality. As 
one veteran wrote to his brother:  
“I will tell you openly that civilian life and employment did not 
receive us as I thought. We rushed home and it turns out that there is 
very little joy here. One puts one‟s entire soul into work from the 
morning to late at night. In general one works like a horse and lives 
like a dog.”59 
In material terms workplaces in both Leningrad and the surrounding countryside 
were not the same places that veterans had known before the war. Aleksei Gonchukov, 
who we encountered earlier, succeeded in engineering a return to his factory in 
November 1946. He was struck by how much the factory had changed. 
“The factory was not the same factory which we left behind when 
leaving for the front. War had left deep wounds on the factory. The 
factory was separated from the enemy‟s position by three to four 
kilometres. Looking at the factory made you involuntarily remember 
all the unhappiness that the war brought our people.”60 
Such a description could have applied to any number of Leningrad factories. 
Workplaces, like housing, suffered from heavy wartime bombing and shelling. The 
Izhorskii factory‟s premises in Kolpino, for example, were heavily damaged.61 When 
veterans began to return to work many factories were still being rebuilt. Unglazed 
windows and broken heating systems made it difficult to protect workers from the 
elements. The only source of heat in many workshops during Leningrad‟s harsh winters 
continued to be braziers.
62
 In November 1946, for example, three workers at the 
Bolshevik factory complained that temperatures were so low it was impossible to work. 
Similar complaints were recorded at other plants.
63
 Many factories were uncomfortable, 
chaotic and even dangerous places. A party report from February 1946 painted a 
frightening picture of dilapidated workshops where snowdrifts piled up in broken 
window frames and sections of rusty ventilation piping frequently fell from roofs onto 
the workers below.
64
 Industrial accidents were commonplace. In November 1946 one 
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worker was killed and nine others were injured when compressed oxygen cylinders 
exploded in a workshop.
65
  
 
 The workforce to which veterans returned had also changed beyond all 
recognition. In April 1945 women constituted 76 per cent of Leningrad‟s industrial 
workforce, compared to 47 per cent in 1940. By 1950 women still amounted to 57 per 
cent of the workforce.
66
 The change was even more striking in some production sectors. 
Women‟s share of the workforce in garment factories rose from 83.4 per cent in 1940 to 
98.6 per cent in 1945, from 79.6 per cent to 90.2 per cent in textile production; 55.9 per 
cent to 89 per cent in wood working; 31.5 per cent to 69.6 per cent in metal working 
and 28.7 per cent to 69.1 per cent in power stations.
67
 Just as soldiers had initially 
objected to having to share the trenches with women, many veterans now resented that 
many workplaces were dominated by women. This was something that Leningrad‟s 
male veterans would have to accept. Demographic structures had been so fundamentally 
disrupted, that women could not be pushed out of the workplace as quickly as occurred 
in other societies.
68
 
 
The repopulation of Leningrad and the replenishment of its workforce was 
largely achieved by importing rural migrants to the city, something that many 
Leningraders suggested contributed to Leningrad‟s post-war provincialization. As Ruble 
writes; “Behind the neo-classical and baroque facades of the Moika and Fontanka came 
to live, not dispossessed gentry and honoured revolutionary heroes, but one more 
generation of peasants in workers‟ clothing.”69 According to a party official from the 
Kirov factory 75 to 85 per cent of the workforce in 1945 were completely new 
workers.
70
 These were not the highly skilled workers that had been the pride of „Red 
Petrograd‟ during the Revolution. Many of the new migrants had low levels of literacy. 
Combating adult illiteracy would become an area of great concern for both district 
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soviets and the city soviet.
71
 Many of these workers were also younger than veterans, 
coming from the generation that had escaped frontline service.
72
 However, we should be 
careful not to exaggerate the impact new arrivals had. Waves of rural migration were 
nothing new in Leningrad. Indeed, many of the veterans returning to Leningrad were 
themselves former peasants who had migrated to the city in the 1930s. 
 
Returning veterans could find it difficult to fit into these new collectives. 
Although propaganda stressed the language of families reunited when discussing 
veterans‟ re-employment, there was little continuity between pre-war and post-war 
workforces. Veterans now knew very few of their colleagues. Many ex-servicemen 
would have been acutely aware of the conspicuous absence of friends and colleagues 
who had either died at the front or during the blockade or who had been evacuated. The 
shift from tightly knit primary groups of men, to an environment in which women had 
gained increased presence and power could also be difficult. Making friends amongst 
newcomers was not easy for many ex-servicemen. Most preferred to stick together with 
fellow veterans with whom they felt they had something in common. Demobilization, 
then, could be disorientating even for those individuals who returned to established 
careers. While soldiers had been away serving their country a great deal had changed on 
the home front. For some it was galling how easily their fallen comrades had been 
replaced, and how production continued in their absence.  
 
Workplace morale was much lower than propaganda suggested. In January 1946 
L. Ganichev, Pravda‟s Leningrad correspondent, wrote to his editors with a list of 
infractions of labour discipline in the Krasnogvardeiskii and Volodarskii districts. The 
Bolshevik factory‟s workers came in for the most serious criticism. “In the workshops 
slackness and a decline in labour discipline reigns. Workers mooch about without 
purpose, often they return to the workshop after lunch in a state of intoxication.” 
Elsewhere workers objected to working a ten hour day, expressed alleged „anti-Soviet‟ 
ideas and even failed to arrive for work.
73
 Having internalized the message that their 
duty was to become exemplary workers some veterans objected to the chaos and 
disorder they encountered when they restarted work. In April 1946 a dozen highly 
qualified veterans employed by Leningrad‟s tram and trolleybus administration wrote to 
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Leningradskaia pravda complaining that they had spent three months waiting to start 
meaningful work. A lack of spare parts, tools and the attitude of management had 
frustrated their attempts to knuckle down to work.
74
 In September 1946 Saisov, who had 
risen from the ranks to become a captain, complained about the lack of labour discipline 
where he worked. Having grown accustomed to strict military discipline he was 
infuriated by the tendency of fellow employees, particularly trainees, to arrive late for 
work, to be rude to senior staff and to demand regular smoking breaks.
75
 Ex-servicemen 
who denounced their former colleagues were unlikely to make themselves popular with 
their colleagues.  
 
 Work very often failed to provide the kind of therapeutic space in which 
veterans could readjust to post-war normality. Working environments were confusing 
and disorientating. Veterans were not returning to the welcoming bosom of the 
factories, offices and farms they had left behind, as propaganda encouraged them to 
think. In many ways these places no longer existed. Not only were workplaces 
populated by different people, veterans themselves were very different people with 
different outlooks. The clock could not be turned back, no matter how much veterans or 
their government wished that it could. 
 
The Mechanisms of Re-mobilisation  
 
Official statistics support the claim that returning veterans rapidly re-entered the 
civilian workplace. In mass demobilization‟s first months re-employment rates amongst 
veterans in both the city and oblast reflected initial successes. By 1
 
November 1945, 
approximately four months after the arrival of the first veterans, 71 per cent of veterans 
demobilized in the oblast and 71.5 per cent of veterans demobilized in Leningrad had 
been re-employed. In just four months the countryside found work for 11,335 veterans, 
and the city employment for 52,500 veterans. With the passing of time, as veterans 
settled down and officials gained experience, re-employment rates steadily improved. 
On 1
 December 1946, a month later, 80.9 per cent of the city‟s demobilized soldiers, 
95,842 out of a total of 118,500, had returned to work.
76
 Further improvements were 
recorded in following months. 86 per cent of Leningrad‟s veterans had been re-
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employed, amounting to 126,291 veterans out of a total of 148,000, by January 1946.
77
 
By the end of June 1947, the last set of available figures, it was calculated that 258,548 
out of 267,253 demobilized approximately 96.7 per cent veterans were once again in 
civilian employment.
78
 These figures suggest that Leningrad and its rural periphery 
were remarkably successful in finding employment for veterans. In mid March 1946 a 
Central Party Organisational-Instructional Department reported that 94 per cent of 
veterans had been re-employed. This compared favourably with a national average of 
71.1 per cent.
79
 As in Britain and America after 1945 there seems to have been no 
shortage of work for Leningrad‟s demobilized soldiers.  
 
The official version of veterans‟ return to work was only part of the story. 
Official statistics related only to the rate at which soldiers demobilized in Leningrad 
found work. War invalids discharged from military hospitals during and after the war, 
former POWs released from filtration camps and veterans migrating to the region after 
demobilization elsewhere are not included in these figures. All three of these groups 
were probably less successful in finding employment than veterans demobilized straight 
from the army. No matter how impressive the percentage of former soldiers engaged in 
full-time employment a significant number of those arriving in the city and oblast found 
obtaining employment a challenge. Contrary to the propaganda myth Soviet society had 
not fully eradicated unemployment. In letters intercepted by the military censor veterans 
complained about the difficulty of finding employment. Many veterans were not 
seamlessly reintegrated into civil society. As one veteran explained in December 1946: 
 “Things in Leningrad are bad with work, there isn‟t work anywhere 
and I don‟t know what to devote myself to. All the second-hand 
things I had I‟ve sold for nothing. Nobody pays the demobilized any 
attention. One only gets nonsense from the decrees and orders about 
benefits and the like.”80  
Another veteran wrote to his family in early 1946: “It is hard to find suitable work. 
Yesterday I met a major, he has already been searching for work for a month. Wherever 
you go, in the majority of places, you hear the answer: “everything is already 
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occupied.”81 In desperation A. Skorokhdov wrote to Leningradskaia pravda with a list 
of employers that had refused to employ him due to a lack of experience.  
“Before the war I finished at ten-year school, enrolled at a 
university, from where I was taken into the army, I was demobilized 
with the rank of major, five years in the party. I am twenty-eight 
years old and I can‟t find work for myself. I have a father and 
mother as dependents... Tell me, what I have to do? Where do I need 
to apply?”82 
 On the whole the reintegration of veterans into the civilian economy was 
impressive. Despite numerous obstacles the Soviet economy added approximately 
twelve million people to its workforce between 1944 and 1950.
83
 Over twenty years ago 
Sheila Fitzpatrick argued that; “There was no systematic attempt to coordinate army 
demobilization, re-evacuation, and industrial recruitment of labour, though some 
enterprises took the initiative in trying to hire demobilized veterans.”84 This was not the 
case in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast between mid 1945 and 1948, and 
particularly in the first eighteen months of demobilization. The rapid expansion in the 
civilian workforce was the product of extensive planning and the intervention of a 
number of state institutions, not just the actions of large employers or individuals‟ 
responses to their own circumstances. Re-integrating veterans into the local workforce 
was taken very seriously. A number of administrative bodies prioritized trudoustroistvo 
for ex-service personnel. These included employers, trade-unions, local soviets, party 
committees, the Komsomol, military registration offices (voenkomaty) and Offices for 
the Calculation and Distribution of Labour Forces (raspredbiuro). Propaganda also 
communicated to officials the importance of facilitating veterans‟ transition. The 
remobilization of veterans‟ productive capacity was far from spontaneous. Veterans 
could not be left as isolated elements in Soviet society, whose minds had time to dwell 
on the past. They had to be made into productive citizens as quickly as possible.
85
 
Although planning to accommodate veterans was inadequate, local officials paid much 
closer attention to directing veterans towards work. This was typical of Stalinism, which 
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was always more successful in mobilizing populations than meeting material or 
consumer needs.  
 
The task of re-mobilising former soldiers began almost as soon as their arrived 
in the city. Demobilization points were key locations for recruiting veterans. Industrial 
managers, factory directors and party factory committees were supposed to visit 
demobilization points regularly in order to meet potential employees. The Primorskii 
district demobilization point maintained a list of specialists required by local employers, 
but also organized an exhibition of the products manufactured by eight prominent local 
enterprises.
86
 A number of Leningrad‟s major industrial plants employed recruiters as 
their permanent representatives at demobilization points in order to attracting suitable 
candidates to their factories. Sharonov was employed by Elektrosila as a recruiter at a 
demobilization point to, “familiarize those arriving with the factory, its history and to 
tell those wishing to come to our factory about the professions we can train them in.”87 
Recruiters were not always entirely scrupulous in their dealings with veterans. In March 
1946 a group of ex-servicemen wrote a letter of collective complaint about Rog, the 
head engineer of Automobile Repair Factory No.61. In order to recruit veterans Rog had 
promised each future worker: firewood, shoes, work clothes, help in repairing 
apartments, high salaries and 150 kilograms of potatoes and vegetables each. Promises 
which neither he nor the factory could honour.
88
  
 
The most important institutions in re-mobilizing veterans‟ labour were district 
offices for the Calculation and Distribution of Labour Resources (raspredbiuro), an 
organization subordinated to local soviets. Raspredbiuro were intended to function as a 
traditional labour exchange, acting as a middle man between veterans and potential 
employers. Like recruiters they maintained a presence at demobilization points. In 
theory raspredbiuro were to liaise with employers in their district, ascertain their labour 
requirements and then match individual veterans‟ skills and experience to specific 
vacancies. According to a Leningrad city raspredbiuro report written in October 1945 
all veterans were supposed to be issued with work assignments (nariady na raboty) at 
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demobilization points at the same time they were issued with passports, proof of 
military service, military registration cards and ration cards.
89
 
 
The work of employing veterans was closely monitored by district military 
registration offices (Voenkomaty), and reported to local party committees. These bodies 
routinely produced detailed reports documenting the number of veterans in and out of 
employment, the type of work they had obtained, which factories and organisation were 
re-employing veterans in large numbers, training initiatives and unfortunate failures in 
the demobilization system. The Leningrad city Voenkomat collated this information and 
compiled regular statistical reports capturing the number of soldiers demobilized in the 
city, and the percentage re-employed.
90
 This created a situation typical of Soviet 
administration. A party institution was tasked with monitoring the actions of a 
bureaucracy controlled by local soviets. This created administrative duplication but 
ensured that the actions of any one organization were supervised and counter-balanced 
by a potential competitor. 
 
 In practice veterans had greater control over their choice of employment. Formal 
work allocation mechanisms, just as with housing distribution, competed against 
informal practices. According to national data, cited by Mark Edele, between November 
1945 and November 1946 the majority of veterans, rising from fifty-one to sixty-one 
per cent during this period, did not use state infrastructure to find work, preferring to 
use their own initiative.
91
 Many of Leningrad‟s veterans contacted their former 
employers and made arrangements to return to their pre-war positions wholly 
independent of state work allocation mechanisms. Others exploited personal contacts. 
The factory committee of one optical factory reported that between January and June 
1946 it recruited half of its workers from demobilization points, but it also encouraged 
existing employees to recommend friends and relatives. Of 707 new employees 219, 
approximately thirty per cent, were ex-servicemen.
92
  
 
Despite the rhetoric of Soviet economic planning market mechanisms played a 
role in recruiting veterans. When N. Maiorov was demobilized in August 1945 he found 
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announcements inviting the demobilized to work in factories and enterprises wherever 
he looked.
93
 Throughout December 1945 and January 1946 the back pages of the newly 
established Vechernii Leningrad published a raft of advertisements offering veterans 
employment. The building administration Narkomstroi advertised for a wide range of 
professions and trades including; engineers and building technicians, tractor, lorry and 
excavator drivers, metalworkers and pneumatic drill operators.
94
 A garment factory 
advertised for tailors, sewing machine operators, assistant workers and offered disabled 
veterans training.
95
 Another construction trust advertised for: carpenters, joiners, 
bricklayers, stove-fitters, roofers, plasterers, painters, decorators, glaziers, plumbers, 
metal-workers, electricians, electro-welders, concrete workers, blacksmiths and general 
fitters. Other advertisements sought experienced engineers for the city‟s gasification 
project, demobilized sailors to work on ships, metalworkers for factories, and machine 
operators in a knitted-goods factory.
96
 Clearly, there was great demand, and some 
competition, for veterans‟ labour particularly in the reconstruction and building trades.  
 
 Despite the existence of informal mechanisms raspredbiuro and voenkomaty 
played an important role in mobilizing veterans in the Leningrad region. From the start 
of mass demobilization Leningrad‟s officials were anxious about veterans‟ 
trudoustroistvo. Moscow, by way of comparison, had a more relaxed attitude to re-
employment. In July 1945 a conference of Moscow‟s district party and soviet chairmen 
declared that employment was not prompting any complications or concern, “as the 
people are still assessing the situation before acting, are choosing where best to go, not 
knowing what would be best, and the choice is unlimited.”97 Leningrad‟s officials were 
more forceful in directing veterans towards employment, having anticipated a more 
rapid re-mobilization of veterans than that envisaged by demobilization legislation. 
Decisions about remobilising labour were not made in the interests of individual 
veterans, but rather the state‟s objective of a rapid economic recovery.98 
 
                                                 
93
  „Zasuchit‟ rukava, da rabotat‟, rabotat‟‟, Elektrosila, 12 November 1945, p.1. 
 
94
  Vechernii Leningrad, 17, 20 and 22 December 1945, p.3 and 3 January 1945, p.4. 
 
95
  Vechernii Leningrad, 17 and 22 December 1945, p.4. 
 
96
  Vechernii Leningrad, 2 January 1946, p.4. 
 
97
  M.M. Gorinov, et. al. (ed.), Moskva poslevoennaia, 1945-1947: arkhivnie dokumenty i materialy 
(Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 2000), p.299. 
 
98
  Vakser, Leningrad poslevoennyi, p.16.  
121 
Veterans found that their freedom to choose employment was constrained by 
official policy, and the determination of the local party-state to direct veterans towards 
key economic sectors. Veterans‟ labour was envisaged as a key resource in 
reconstruction and economic recovery. In December 1945 the Executive Committee of 
the Oblast Party drew up plans for remobilizing veterans as quickly as possible. The 
document included a list of the oblast‟s key industrial enterprises, and the number of 
veterans district raspredbiuro were to direct to each workplace. There were 8905 
positions in total, in raw material production and industries linked to reconstruction, 
including: brick factories, sawmills, forestry, turf cutting enterprises and railway 
reconstruction gangs. The largest single employers were the Boksitogorskii mine (600 
workers) and the Pikalevo cement factory (500 workers) in the Tikhvinskii district, the 
Volkhovskii aluminium factory (600 workers) in Volkhov, the Svirskaia power station 
project (400 workers) in the Podporozhskii district, and the Naziia turf cutting enterprise 
(350 workers) in the Mginskii district. Positions for skilled workers and managers, 
which propaganda linked with veterans, were only a tiny fraction of these positions. 
Veterans who had worked in agriculture prior to mobilization were to return to kolkhozy 
or sovkhozy, while former tractor drivers and soldiers with experience driving military 
vehicles were to be directed towards employment at machine and tractor stations.
99
 In 
Volkhov, Vyborg and the Mginskii district Komsomol cells compiled lists of vacancies 
suitable for returning veterans.
100
  
 
In Leningrad a similar list of industries and infrastructure projects towards 
which veterans and re-evacuees were to be directed was drawn up in December 1945. 
The tram and trolleybus administration was to employ 4500 workers, over half of the 
projected vacancies, to repair Leningrad‟s transport network.101 City Party Committee 
reports confirm the intention to remobilise veterans for reconstruction work, the project 
to provide gas to homes and workplaces, the reconstruction of tramlines and as workers 
in major industrial enterprises.
102
 On 30 May 1945 the city party committee passed a 
resolution, which made formal provision for workers to be redirected towards 
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employment in reconstruction work.
103
 Official reports stressed that large numbers of 
veterans found work in the industrial sector, on building sites and on infrastructure 
projects. Between 17 October and 8 December 1945 the Dzerzhinskii district employed 
436 veterans in the city‟s gasification project.104 In November 1945 the Smol‟ninskii 
district reemployed 568 demobilized soldiers in the Gazoapparat and Gazosetsroi, work 
gangs linked to the project.
105
  
 
Leningrad‟s largest industrial employers played a significant role in providing 
work, but often to former employees. By January 1946, according to one historian, 
approximately sixty per cent, 88,000 in total, of Leningrad‟s veterans had been re-
employed in industrial enterprises.
106
 Gigantic industrial enterprises such as these were 
well placed to assimilate returning veterans. Yet major employers welcomed home only 
a fraction of the number of workers mobilized to fight. 1085 soldiers had been 
demobilized in Kolpino by the end of 1945. The town‟s largest employer the Izhorskii 
defence industry works employed 869 of these.
107
 In January 1946, to put this into 
perspective in January 1946, veterans were approximately eleven per cent of a 
workforce totalling 7694.
108
  
 
At the end of December 1945 a Leningrad procuracy report monitoring the 
implementation of demobilization legislation noted that the Kirov factory had hired 
around a thousand demobilized veterans, the majority of whom were former employees 
hired as skilled tradesmen or in an administrative capacity. 139 veterans found work at 
factory Number 678, an electrical production enterprise. 108 were previous employees 
with high qualifications. All of these were using their pre-war skills and trades. Six had 
been hired in a managerial capacity and forty as engineers or technicians.
109
 By the end 
of 1945 the Bolshevik factory had employed 641 demobilized soldiers.
110
 The Stalin 
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Steel factory employed 660 veterans: 516 of them in skilled positions.
111
 Fifty-four per 
cent of workers taking jobs at Elektrosila in 1946 were demobilized pre-war 
employees.
112
 Veterans were still a minority in the post-war workforce, despite their 
rapid influx into the region. The large number of veterans employed in Leningrad‟s 
gigantic industrial plants has sometimes been taken as proof of high skills levels 
amongst veterans. Some historians have mistaken the large numbers of veterans 
employed by major industrial enterprises as evidence of their privileged position in the 
labour market. However, this was a reflection of the nature of the local economy, rather 
than an indication of veterans‟ desire to become exemplary industrial workers. 
 
The mechanisms developed to reintegrate veterans into the workforce prioritized 
the needs of the party-state, rather than the individual veteran‟s interests. What 
administrators, and subsequently historians, seized on as the success of demobilization, 
namely the rapid remobilization of large numbers of returning troops, was achieved by 
infringing upon veterans‟ legal entitlements. Demobilization legislation theoretically 
guaranteed veterans employment matching their skills and experience in positions no 
lower than their pre-war jobs. But in order to achieve a rapid remobilization of veterans 
and to direct them towards reconstruction work or employment in industries prioritized 
in the post-war Five Year Plan officials frequently ignored previous qualifications and 
skills. Throughout 1945 and 1946 the editors of Leningradskaia pravda received many 
letters from returning troops complaining that they were unable to find work matching 
their skills.
113
 Before the war P.Krugliakov, for example, had worked as a metal-worker 
at the Izhorskii factory in Kolpino. Following demobilization in January 1946 he was 
re-employed in a different factory, with a position and salary five rungs lower on the 
pay scale.
114
 The disparity between pre-war and post-war occupations was often more 
striking. Two veterans, one a cobbler the other an artist, were sent to work at a tram 
depot.
115
 In November 1945 a holder of the prestigious Order of the Red Star 
complained the Volodarskii district demobilization point had been unable to find him 
work in his previous career. A week after demobilization he was sent to work as an 
unskilled labourer for Lengazstroi on the gasification project. His letter of complaint, 
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addressed to the chairman of the Leningrad soviet, questioned whether demobilization 
legislation had ever been circulated in the Volodarskii district.
116
 These problems were 
not unique. The under-utilization of workers‟ skills affected all sections of the 
population not just veterans. In April 1945 a party orgburo report bemoaned that work 
assignments were issued without consideration of pre-war trades and skills.
117
 Yet for 
soldiers with valuable skills, and expectations of privileged treatment, having to accept 
menial or unskilled work was especially insulting. As one veteran complained: 
“Is it fair? We return from the army, our native factories wait for us, 
and make requests for our labour, the raivoenkomat shelves these. 
And here we are, defenders of the motherland, but we have to go 
like little boys to learn new professions and to live half-starving 
without anything to wear.” 118 
 The timeframe for resuming work highlighted another important tension 
between the official narrative of demobilization, and the reality experienced by 
veterans. In Leningrad many veterans were forced back into employment sooner than 
they had envisaged. Locally issued work assignments required veterans to start new jobs 
within five days of demobilization. In the Leningrad oblast a rest period of ten days was 
permitted.
119
 Raspredbiuro directives dictated that ration cards were not to be issued to 
those who had not accepted work assignments. Those who did were given rations for a 
further five days, and received a permanent ration card only when they committed to a 
workplace.
120
  
 
 According to a report dated 13 October 1945 written by Trakachev, the head of 
the Leningrad city voenkomat, demobilization points‟ work was complicated by the fact 
that many military units incorrectly explained demobilization legislation to soldiers. 
“All demobilized (troops) say that they were told in their units that they would receive a 
month‟s furlough, and after that they themselves could choose what kind of work they 
wanted.”121 This perceived „misunderstanding‟ of the legislation was widespread. 
Despite the repeated description in the press of workers returning to work immediately 
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after their homecoming, many ex-servicemen continued to demand that the law entitled 
them to a thirty day rest period.
122
 Trakachev continued;  
“Having encountered this situation some demobilized soldiers 
declare that nobody had the right to send them to work right now as 
they had been granted a month‟s leave, that demobilization law was 
being broken, and that they would write to comrade Stalin about this 
arbitrariness and so on.”123  
Falin, Leningrad‟s chief prosecutor, reported instances when returning soldiers refused 
to work. This insistence on a period of rest was repeated across the Soviet Union.
124
 For 
soldiers who had served for four years, longer for those who had served in the Finnish 
War, a month‟s rest hardly seemed extravagant. This heavy handedness generated 
enormous resentment.  
 
 The link between employment and the allocation of ration cards introduced an 
element of compulsion. Control of ration cards was intended to allow raspredbiuro to 
pressurise veterans back into civilian employment, even when they physically and 
mentally needed time to recuperate. Perversely the link between employment and 
ration-cards, in certain circumstances, could prove a barrier to veterans‟ reemployment. 
Veterans‟ attempts to find employment on their own initiative were often thwarted by a 
shortage of ration cards. Workplaces had a limited quota of ration cards. Once the limit 
was reached they were prevented from hiring further workers.
125
 This proved to be a 
particular problem in the autumn and winter of 1946, when the number of ration cards 
issued to the population was restricted. During these months many enterprises were 
forced to turn away prospective employees. In October 1946, for example, Leningrad‟s 
Sverdlov machine tool factory refused fifteen demobilized veterans, all former 
employees of the factory with between five and fifteen years‟ experience, work because 
of the ration card shortage.
126
 A letter sent from Leningrad to a serving soldier in 
November 1946, presumably between comrades, painted a bleak prospect of finding 
work. 
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“I am not working at present, I was laid off, and many 
manufacturers are reducing their staff. They are not giving out ration 
cards... A second blockade has begun and they aren‟t hiring new 
workers, because everywhere a reduction (in staff) is ongoing. Well 
I don‟t know what is best to advise you when you leave the army. 
Perhaps you can still stay and gossip in the army, or arrange to come 
home to Leningrad and die from the cold.”127 
Veterans who encountered these difficulties were inevitably disappointed and became 
disenchanted. Hopes and expectations of privilege and a special place in post-war 
society quickly evaporated. As a veteran wrote in December 1946: 
“I have been demobilized. I have been kicking my heels for two 
months in order to find work, but they don‟t give out ration cards. You 
can enter work, but you have to live on just holy-spirit. There is no 
kind of concern for demobilized (troops). Just try and live, I am 
surviving by selling my last rags.”128  
 The mechanisms established to ease veterans‟ transition were not the model of 
efficiency that propaganda suggested. Failures in working practices were serious and 
widespread. Raspredbiuro were responsible for arranging employment for re-evacuees 
as well as veterans. Consequently, many district offices were unable to cope with the 
volume of work. Administrators were under great pressure and working in highly 
stressful environments. In 1944 and early 1945 Nina Mantula, head of the Chuibushev 
district raspredbiuro, had just two employees. Their workload was enormous even 
before demobilization began.
129
 In several districts extremely inexperienced members of 
staff, including assistants and support workers, were placed in charge of remobilizing 
frontoviki. During the inspection of a demobilization point in Leningrad‟s Sverdlovskii 
raion a teenage girl, a former manual labourer, was discovered to be in charge of labour 
allocation.
130
 Work at demobilization points was neither prestigious nor pleasant. It 
often involved communicating disappointing news to aggressive and traumatized 
frontoviki. Perhaps the employment of a young girl was a deliberate ploy to disarm the 
angry reactions of veterans aggrieved to find just how dramatically the reality of re-
employment differed from the propaganda image. 
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  Given staffing shortages and the pressure of work it was understandable that 
officials were abrupt or even callous in their attitude towards veterans. Frontoviki 
reacted to the administrators controlling re-employment with the same animosity 
directed at housing officials. Veterans who sought work with their pre-war employers, 
only to be told that they could not offer them anything, as Aleksei Gonchukov found at 
the Kirov works, were understandably angry.
131
 Others were aggrieved by the behaviour 
of paper-pushing „desk rats‟, who seemed to care little for veterans‟ predicaments. One 
veteran wrote to a friend in Kiev about his experience at the district Raspredbiuro 
office: 
“Well there sit such loathsome little people, they don‟t have a single 
drop of humanity, it‟s all facts with them - this and that piece of 
paper… Oh, I‟m tired with all this bureaucracy these formalities and 
stuffy paperwork… nearly everybody has lost their conscience.”132  
Other veterans, such as G.I. Dorokhin, complained about perceived corruption in the 
distribution of work assignments. In February 1946 he wrote that:  
 “Leningrad as a city, like all other cities has its bad side, in order to 
get a job one needs a lot of acquaintances or so-called pull (blat) or a 
colossal quantity of money… If you don‟t have money and many 
acquaintances then they won‟t send you to work in a profession but 
to work on seasonal employment.”133  
Seasonal employment was a euphemism for unpopular, low-paid and back breaking 
jobs in construction, agriculture and forestry.
134
 Failures in working practices, 
allegations of corruption and the resentments they generated may well have contributed 
to the decision, taken in mid October 1946, to dismantle the raspredbiuro network.
135
 
One Myth – Many Realities. Veterans’ Varied Experiences of Re-employment  
 
Leningrad‟s veterans were not just industrial workers or construction workers. 
15,753 veterans had passed through the demobilization point in Leningrad‟s 
Smol‟ninskii district demobilization point by the end of December 1945. Amongst them 
were 3278 metal workers, 925 builders, 2175 drivers, 194 textile workers, 203 
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woodworkers, 70 printers, 270 tailors, 372 shoemakers, 356 students, 283 nurses, 595 
labourers, 802 traders, 593 electricians and 3067 accounts clerks.
136
 Raspredbiuro and 
Voenkomaty were made responsible for recruiting 2000 demobilized soldiers and re-
evacuees to work as policemen by 1 December 1945. In November 1946 another party 
decision recommended that the police recruit 1100 demobilized junior officers.
137
 Other 
veterans returned to work in professions such as teaching, journalism or medicine. 
Between April 1945 and April 1946 sixty-one lawyers, returned from the armed forces 
and resumed practice in Leningrad.
138
 In November 1945 Smena, the Komsomol 
newspaper, reported that a number of demobilized soldiers were resuming careers as 
professional sportsmen.
139
 Veterans even found work in those administrative positions, 
such as district housing administrations and raspredbiuro, which their former comrades 
found so disagreeable.
140
  
 
While the state insisted on directing veterans towards jobs in heavy industry and 
other key economic sectors many veterans had very different ideas about what 
constituted desirable employment. Of course many welcomed a return to their former 
workplaces, and an opportunity to practice familiar skills. Yet, as a number of party 
reports made clear, many former soldiers were not interested in returning to humdrum 
jobs. What constituted a good job was a highly personal matter. It depended on a host of 
factors: pay, distance from home, the nature of the work and the people with whom they 
were working. For the majority of veterans labouring jobs on construction sites were 
extremely unpopular. Pay rates and working conditions in construction were extremely 
poor, and the work was backbreaking.
141
 Two hundred and fifty ex-servicemen released 
from the army in 1943 because of their injuries were mobilized into a construction gang. 
They couldn‟t wait to get out of this job. They were still petitioning the Ispolkom of the 
Leningrad oblast soviet to be released in May 1946, arguing that had they still been 
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serving they would have been demobilized long ago.
142
 Between March and April 1946 
the Supreme Soviet received over 2500 petitions from former Soviet POWs pleading to 
be released from quasi labour armies.
143
 Work on Leningrad‟s construction sites would 
almost certainly have brought veterans into contact with German POWs. There is also 
evidence that a small number of German POWs were working at both the Kirov and 
Elektrosila plants up to at least 1947.
144
 Quiet what victors thought of being forced to 
work alongside the former enemy is unclear, but it almost certainly reinforced their 
impression that demobilization had dealt them a bad hand.  
 
Rather than grumbling about the inequalities of employment allocation other 
veterans actively sought positions that would free them from production line drudgery 
or exhausting manual labour. As a Leningrad party report forwarded to Moscow at the 
end of July 1945 observed many veterans expressed a desire to work in food processing 
plants, in milk and meat production, in the trade network or in canteens. The Moscow 
district reception point directed 170 veterans to work at a meat processing plant, perhaps 
the closest thing to an ideal job.
145
 Veterans returning to the Frunzenskii district were no 
doubt pleased to learn that the Krupskaia chocolate factory and the district food trading 
administration were amongst the workplaces towards which veterans were being 
directed.
146
 These kinds of work were popular because they allowed veterans to divert 
food, perhaps the most valuable commodity in Leningrad especially given its recent 
history, from official distribution. What veterans and their families did not consume 
themselves could be sold on the black market.
147
 Jobs in canteens, cafés, bars and 
breweries serving, distributing or producing alcohol were highly coveted. The sums 
changing hands for employment in such positions were astronomical; the position of a 
vendor selling beer cost approximately 15,000 roubles or the head of a bar 30,000 
roubles, many times the annual salaries paid to skilled industrial workers.
148
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Many veterans strove to become drivers in distribution organizations or 
transport pools. This allowed them to continue using a skill developed in the military, 
from which men often derive personal satisfaction, while additional income could be 
earned from transporting people and their property, or trading in what „fell of the back 
of the lorry‟.149 A report investigating the progress of demobilization in the Leningrad 
oblast dated 15 December 1945 expressed concern that veterans‟ enthusiasm for these 
forms of work were damaging the interests of important industrial enterprises and 
construction sites. In the Efimovskii district over 300 unemployed veterans were trying 
to secure work in supply bases and warehouses, despite a severe labour shortage in the 
forestry industry. In other districts former kolkhozniki and sovkhozniki attempted to find 
work in warehouses or in administrative capacities, rather than in agriculture.
150
  
 
Some veterans hoped to begin new lives after a war which had transformed their 
entire world.  This was a war that plucked men and women everywhere from obscure 
workaday jobs to perform interesting, exciting and dangerous jobs in often unfamiliar or 
exotic places; after it, many were reluctant to return to safer, smaller and duller civilian 
lives.
151
 In the Soviet Union, as in Europe and the USA, the state attempted to make 
veterans‟ choices for them, but many veterans attempted to make a fresh start. By the 
end of 1945, for example, 81 of Leningrad‟s demobilized veterans and 44 war invalids 
had enrolled in the theatrical institute, no doubt hoping to begin a stage career.
152
 Others 
made more radical changes in their lifestyle. In 1939 L. Poliakov graduated from 
Leningrad‟s medical institute. For the next ten years he served as a doctor in the Soviet 
Army. During the war he found religion. In 1949, after his demobilization, he became a 
priest at the Preobrazhenskii church, close to Litenyi Prospect.
153
 In the village of 
Sablino, close to Tosno, a disabled veteran who had previously worked as a railway 
telegraphist made a living selling milk from his privately owned cow, and by 
conducting religious services, particularly christenings and funeral services, in people‟s 
homes.
154
 Such evidence challenges Weiner‟s assertion that a wartime religious revival 
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did not penetrate the Red Army.
155
 The end of the war, then, permitted some veterans, 
although perhaps fewer than in other societies, the opportunity to reinvent themselves 
and their lives. 
Younger Veterans and Students 
 
Reintegrating into the civilian workforce was hardest for inexperienced and 
impressionable young veterans born between 1923 and 1927, the so called „frontline 
generation‟.156 The war‟s psychological impact was deepest and longest lasting on these 
birth-cohorts; young men and women with little peacetime life experience. The frontline 
generation, as Edele writes, often enjoyed elevated military careers which, “did not give 
them adequate civilian competencies, and therefore demobilization often meant a step 
back in life-cycle stage and social standing, at least initially.”157 Veterans that had 
joined the army straight from the school bench, without any pre-war trade, profession or 
experience found obtaining work particularly difficult. Since the Red Army‟s 
demobilization was organized by age group the youngest birth cohorts were 
demobilized once the best employment opportunities had already been taken by their 
older comrades. Conscripts born in 1926 were not demobilized until 1950; those born in 
1927 not until 1951. By the time these young men were discharged from the army much 
of the program of entitlements had been dismantled. There was little or no support for 
these veterans. A veteran demobilized in 1950, interviewed as part of my research, 
laughed at my questions about the training opportunities for veterans. Such a thought 
was ridiculous. After a moment‟s thought he replied that the only real preparation he 
had for the workplace was the few months he spent working as plumber in Leningrad 
during the winter of 1941-1942, aged just fifteen or sixteen.
158
 
 
Not all veterans were forced to find work. Many used demobilization as an 
opportunity to resume an interrupted education or to enter higher or technical education 
for the first time. The enthusiasm of some veterans for an opportunity to gain further 
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qualifications was remarkable.
159
 For many a familiarity with military technology 
fostered an interest in science and engineering and a desire to develop this interest. In 
theory veterans enjoyed privileged access to education, including preferential 
admissions, exemptions from tuition payments, assistance in sitting entrance 
examinations and even additional maintenance grants.
160
 This reinforced the general 
framework of reconstruction and economic growth. Ex-servicemen attempting to enrol 
on courses at engineering, industrial construction, machine-building or railway 
engineering institutes were given additional support in preparing for entrance exams.
161
 
However, the total number of veterans was small. According to City raspredbiuro 
statistics 7210 veterans had enrolled in education institutions by the end of June 1946, 
approximately four per cent of the total demobilized.
162
 Soviet educational privileges 
were not the engine of social mobility created by the American G.I. Bill. Fifty-one per 
cent of American World War II veterans, almost eight million in total, took advantage 
of the G.I. Bill‟s education and training provisions. By 1947 veterans accounted for 
forty-nine per cent of students in American colleges.
163
 In comparison in 1947 veterans 
constituted seventeen per cent of students in Soviet universities, and just one per cent of 
veterans were students.
164
 
  
Not all former soldiers chose courses consistent with the state‟s economic goals. 
Frontoviki resuming or commencing their studies at Leningrad State University were 
spread across all departments; from physics and mathematics, biology and geography, 
and philology and history.
165
 Despite suggestions that veterans were beneficiaries of 
affirmative action, something often resented by their fellow students, many veterans 
proved themselves to be leading students and eventually began academic careers.
166
 The 
number of veterans reported to be achieving top grades and winning additional grants in 
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part reflected the propaganda that they should study as they had fought in battle.
167
 
Leningradskii universitet, the university newspaper, regularly carried reports about 
exemplary ex-servicemen‟s achievements.168 This was not entirely propaganda rhetoric. 
Many veterans were highly talented. Ivan Kotov, for example, a Hero of the Soviet 
Union celebrated in one article, would go on to teach economics and have a prestigious 
academic career.
169
 However, veterans were given much greater attention than their 
peers and in subsequent years they became the subject of almost hagiographical 
study.
170
  
 
Despite being in a minority veterans came to dominate local university 
structures. They gained a virtual monopoly of positions in university Komsomol cells, 
dominated university committees and controlled student societies.
171
 This „mafia-like‟ 
dominance did not always endear ex-servicemen to their fellow students, who felt poor 
relations compared to the men upon whom praise, attention and material support were 
lavished.
172
 Other students, many of whom had lived through the blockade, resented ex-
servicemen returning and throwing their weight around. Likewise veterans often felt 
that they had little in common with students who had escaped the frontlines, by virtue of 
being born just a few years later. Feeling estranged from their peers, ex-servicemen 
tended to stick together, preferring the company of fellow members of the frontline 
brotherhood to civilians. The mutual animosity between frontoviki and younger students 
aggravated an already difficult transition. Adapting to the slower pace of life in the 
classroom after the drama of army life was always going to be difficult. The routines of 
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university life were about as far removed from army life as was possible. A cartoon 
published in Krokodil alluded to the difficulties of adjustment. Two young men, one in 
uniform both wearing medal ribbons were pictured, surrounded by their fellow students, 
sitting drinking tea and reading textbooks. One observes to the other the absurdity of 
their situation: “Kolia, you and I took Warsaw, and then Berlin… and now here we are 
taking geology, mineralogy and chemistry…”173 For all that, some made the transition 
with surprising ease; a testimony to the esteem in which they held education. For them, 
the shift from war‟s physical challenges to a more cerebral life was embraced with 
enthusiasm. 
Female Veterans  
 
By the end of May 1947 a total of 265,192 veterans had been demobilized in 
Leningrad and its suburbs. Of these 29,780, approximately eleven per cent, were 
women.
174
 Women‟s experience of demobilization was often very different from that of 
their male comrades. Most women veterans arrived in Leningrad in a concentrated burst 
during the first six months of demobilization. 93.8 per cent of women veterans, 27,935 
in total, were demobilized by the end of December 1945.
175
 In the first five months of 
1947, according to Leningrad voenkomat figures, just two women were demobilized.
176
 
Subsequently monthly reports stopped analyzing the gender breakdown of veterans.
177
  
 
Reintegrating female veterans into the workforce presented specific challenges, 
as Kalinin acknowledged to a meeting of female soldiers on 26 July 1945. It was one 
thing to demobilize a kolkhoznik who already had a purpose, home and family to return 
to, and another to reintegrate a twenty-three year old woman, whose only work 
experience was at the front, and had gained her independence during the war. Yet 
Kalinin expressed confidence that ninety-nine per cent of women veterans would have 
no difficulty fitting back into civilian society. After all they were the physically and 
mentally toughest, as well as most politically conscious, examples of Soviet 
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womanhood.
178
 The small minority who might experience difficulties could rely upon 
the assistance of the Komsomol, which would do everything possible to assist girl 
soldiers‟ (devushki-voiny) transitions.179  
 
This was a responsibility that local Komsomol organizations took seriously. 
Across the Leningrad oblast Komsomol organizations directed over 600 female veterans 
to work in village readings huts, as nurses, as radio operators and accounts clerks.
180
 By 
November 1945 215 female veterans were given administrative or leadership roles 
within local Komsomol cells.
181
 However, the majority of female veterans appear to 
have been directed back towards gender appropriate employment. It was recommended 
that those female veterans demobilized from the Leningrad front in 1944 either returned 
to the land, or were given training in cooking, sewing or clerical work.
182
 A large 
number of women found work in traditionally female jobs, such as machine operators in 
Leningrad‟s textile factories.183 Many women, like their male counterparts, were unable 
to find civilian work that reflected the highly specialized and prestigious work they had 
undertaken during the war. Few Soviet airwomen, for example, were able to continue 
flying in either military or civilian aviation. Many would end up in low status and 
poorly paid jobs linked to aviation, or in other very different roles.
184
  
 
The experience of Leningrad‟s women veterans challenges Edele‟s assertion that 
the problems faced by female frontoviki, “were related to marriage chances, family life, 
and the politics of sexual morality rather than to employment and career.”185 A. 
Sokolova, for example, was demobilized from the Red Army in 1945. At the beginning 
of the war, aged just eighteen, she volunteered for the front, leaving behind her work as 
a shop-assistant. In four years of armed service she was wounded twice, received a 
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number of medals, and joined the Komsomol. The war changed her life beyond 
recognition. Yet, any hope that being a veteran would open doors was cruelly dashed. 
On her demobilization in the summer of 1945 she was sent to work at an organization 
distributing fruit and vegetables (Lenzagotplodoovoshtorg) checking the weight of 
produce. She was told that at the end of the growing season she would be released from 
this job and would have the opportunity for study further or return to shop work. Seven 
months later she still had not been released. She had worked as a stevedore and then a 
cleaner; earning just 200 roubles a month.
186
 Of course under-employment and the 
disappointment created by menial jobs cut across gender. Both sexes would both have 
to come to terms with post-war careers which failed to satisfy personal aspirations. But 
women had the added frustration that decisions about their future employment were 
made on the basis of assumptions about their gender.  
 
The disappointment that women veterans felt about the kinds of work they were 
allocated was not just an anxiety about material conditions. It also reflected a realization 
that pre-war misogyny and prevailing attitudes towards gender had not been eradicated 
by wartime experiences. The Red Army, especially in the summer of 1942 when young 
women were first recruited, was riven with misogyny.
187
 It was not unusual for male 
soldiers to make angry protests about women‟s participation in combat. According to 
Krylova the list of reactions amongst men included growing pale, open-mouthed 
gasping, swearing, depressed silence and even inarticulate screaming. Overcoming 
masculine prejudice and demonstrating their effectiveness as soldiers became an 
important part of women‟s combat motivation. There were also men who supported 
women‟s frontline involvement, who did not react in uniformly uncomprehending and 
antagonistic ways.
188
 For men who had witnessed women‟s skill at violence at close 
quarters initial scepticism about female combatants was gradually replaced by a 
begrudging acceptance of, respect for and even excitement about women soldiers. Over 
time male and female soldiers often formed close comradely bonds, and accepted each 
other as part of the same „military family‟. The acceptance that female soldiers sought, 
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and which many achieved, had implications for how they framed their own gender 
identities after the war.
189
 
 
Amongst fellow frontoviki female veterans, to a large degree, could expect to 
avoid male chauvinism. Yet following their demobilization they came into greater 
contact with civilians with little or no knowledge or understanding of women‟s military 
achievements.  „Rear-line rats‟ displayed a patronising attitude, which women veterans 
found particularly galling. The manner in which they were pushed into traditional 
female occupations, which ignored their wartime achievements, demonstrated that the 
war had changed society less than they had imagined. The battle for sexual equality 
would have to be fought all over again. Officially revered as heroes, many women 
veterans were treated with suspicion even outright hostility. When the medal „For Battle 
Merit‟ (za boevye zaslugi) was worn by women, it was often ascribed to sexual merit 
(za polevye zaslugi).
190
 Many women would attempt to hide the fact of their frontline 
service for fear that it would stigmatize them.
191
 It was not long before Krokodil began 
publishing smutty cartoons poking fun at women wearing their medals in public.
192
 Pre-
war gender structures then had not been fundamentally reworked by the war. Nor was 
military service a guarantor of respect. 
Officers 
 
 Rank was another dividing line influencing veterans‟ re-assimilation into the 
labour market.  Officers, unlike rank and file soldiers, enjoyed better prospects of 
extending their period of service beyond 1948. Although this was an attractive prospect 
for many an extraordinary number of former officers chose to settle in post-war 
Leningrad. By the end of July 1947, according to City Voenkomat statistics, 64,684 
officers had been demobilized in the city. Officers of all ranks constituted twenty-four 
per cent of the total number of Leningrad‟s veterans.193 This was a remarkably high 
proportion. It was unlikely that all of these individuals were native Leningraders. A 
large number were probably attracted to the Soviet Union‟s second city, despite the 
level of destruction and deprivation, in the hope of obtaining social advancement. More 
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than any other sub-group demobilized officers expected to achieve some form of post-
war social advancement. Although former officers were returning to a supposedly 
classless society most were keen to capitalize upon their status as officers. Career 
officers and soldiers who had risen from the ranks did not want to relinquish wartime 
prestige and social capital and return to humble civilian roles.   
 
Ex-officers were better placed than ordinary soldiers to assert their employment 
rights and demand appropriate work. S.A. Kuznetsov, a demobilized major, refused to 
return to his pre-war employment as a wagon craftsman, demanding an administrative-
managerial position. He refused several further positions including work as an inspector 
with a salary of 500 roubles, and the position of production leader in an asphalt and 
concrete factory with salary of 1000 roubles. He demanded a monthly salary no less 
than 1400 roubles a month.
194
 Kuznetsov was typical of many senior ranking ex-
officers, who arrived in Leningrad expecting to obtain managerial or administrative 
positions. A mixture of propaganda and policy stimulated these aspirations. As early as 
1944 Colonel General Golikov envisaged preferential employment for demobilized 
officers in provincial and district soviets, in party posts, particularly in military 
departments, in the defence industry and even as history teachers in secondary 
schools.
195
 The Frunzenskii district Military Department‟s annual report for 1945 noted 
before joining the army many demobilized officers had been ordinary workers, “during 
their years in the army they gained a great experience of administrative-managerial, 
party-leadership work and now aspire to positions which correspond with the 
experience obtained.”196 Many officers took it for granted that man-management skills 
developed in the armed forces would be in demand amongst Leningrad‟s employees.  
 
 There was no shortage of demobilized officers with glittering leadership 
credentials in post-war Leningrad. Between July and December 1945, the first six 
months of mass demobilization, 14,487 officers were discharged in Leningrad.
197
 
Although there were suggestions that officers were not given sufficient support finding 
suitable work, officers were re-integrated with moderate success. This would change in 
1946 as the pace of demobilization quickened. 23,182 officers were demobilized in 
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Leningrad between January and June 1946 and 19,420 between July and December 
1946. Nearly sixty-five per cent of all officers returned to Leningrad in 1946.
198
  The 
demobilization of officers would taper off in 1947, with just 7,595 officers demobilized 
between January and June.
199
 In 1946 competition for employment became intense as an 
influx of former officers all looking for well-paid managerial work flooded the post-war 
labour market.  
 
Given these problems re-employment rates amongst demobilized officers were 
impressive. By August 1946, for example, 91 per cent of junior and middle ranking 
officers and 89 per cent of senior officers had returned to work.
200
 Yet finding suitable 
work generated difficulties. Leningrad‟s local economy was simply unable to generate 
sufficient high status work to satisfy demand. The situation was sufficiently challenging 
for a city-wide commission for the trudoustroistvo of demobilized officers to be 
established in 1946, which helped foster co-operation between party and soviet 
structures. Indeed the commission claimed credit for raising rates of re-employing 
newly-arrived officers from 80 per cent between August 1945 and January 1946, to 
approximately 95 per cent in the seven months of 1946.
201
 Despite the commission‟s 
best efforts problems persisted. Perhaps the most significant difficulty stemmed from 
the large proportion of officers who had joined the army straight from school or had 
served for fifteen to twenty years and had no civilian employment experience.
202
 These 
men had little idea about how civilian administration operated and few professional 
skills outside of the army. Even within a society as authoritarian as late Stalinism, 
civilian man-management skills were radically different from army command 
structures.  
 
Finding vacancies for ex-officers in this position could be especially difficult. 
Colonel Ivan Ivanov, a professional officer, was refused work as: the head of a fire 
brigade for a building trust on 16 June 1946, the head of a warehouse at the Molotov 
factory on 3 July 1946; the head of a supply organization on 9 July 1946, all because of 
a lack of experience. He was eventually employed as the head of a supply department 
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for Lenpromstoi, an industrial construction trust, on 20 July.
203
 Despite efforts to collate 
requests for administrative work a large number of ex-officers remained unemployed, 
sometimes for several months. On 1 September 1946 there were 7402 unemployed ex-
officers.
204
 The majority of these made efforts to re-enter the workplace, but several 
hundred consistently refused the positions they were offered, insisted on administrative 
or managerial work, or work as teachers, doctors and book-keepers, some even absented 
themselves from the city to take lengthy summer breaks.
205
 In order to combat long-
term unemployment pressure was applied to recalcitrant ex-officers. 975 were 
summoned to explain the reasons for their unemployment in July 1946. In addition 
sixty-four former officers were investigated at their homes. Investigators made contact 
with thirty-eight, the rest according building administrators and neighbours were rarely 
at home.
206
 
Rural Veterans 
 
Although many officers did find well paid and prestigious positions it was not 
possible to satisfy the demand for suitable employment. There were limits on the 
number who could become senior administrators and managers. This was especially 
apparent in the rural economy. Historians have often claimed that veterans returned to 
take charge of the post-war village, becoming the chairmen of collective farms and rural 
soviets.
207
 Indeed, many veterans in the Leningrad oblast assumed the leadership of 
their communities or were newly promoted to positions of responsibility. Internal party 
reports noted that ex-servicemen were the main source of recruits for the chairmen of 
farms, village and district soviets.
208
 By the beginning of September 1945, for example, 
thirty veterans had been elected to leadership roles in the Volkhovskii district. These 
included three village soviets chairmen and fourteen kolkhoz chairmen.
209
 Similarly, the 
local press rarely missed an opportunity to report an instance where ex-servicemen were 
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appointed to positions of authority in the village.
210
 However, at the beginning of 1946 
there were just 1742 collective farms and ninety state farms in the Leningrad oblast.
211
 
The number of veterans who would be able to become local leaders was constrained by 
the number of farms.  
 
The decision to use a thousand former soldiers and their families to repopulate 
collective farms on the Karelian isthmus created additional opportunities. Veterans were 
to provide the backbone of new agricultural communities established in newly acquired 
borderlands. Tough, reliable and stoic heroes were cast as modern-day Cossacks, ideally 
equipped for new lives in a harsh landscape not ideally suited to collective 
agriculture.
212
 The plans were not entirely successful. By the end of 1945 only 200 
families had moved to the region. Indeed, partial figures suggest that seventy per cent of 
those who initially registered to move to the region later changed their minds.
213
  
 
As 1946 drew to a close Leningradskaia pravda published an article written by a 
veteran who had joined the Pobeda collective farm in the Keksgol‟mskii district. The 
article described the farm and its achievements in glowing terms.
214
 The minutes of the 
kolkhoz general meetings told a different story. A number of veterans joined the farm 
between September 1945 and March 1946, and the farm expanded from 56 to 122 
members between 1946 and 1947. The farm was far from a productive enterprise. By 
the beginning of 1948 there were just 28 able bodied men aged between 16 and 60 out 
of a population of 122 members.
215
 Despite their numerical inferiority veterans 
dominated positions of authority. Senior lieutenant Ivan Chernov joined the farm in 
September 1945, and by 5 April 1946 had risen to become its chairman.
216
 In contrast to 
the propaganda stereotype of the inspirational leadership of veterans turned collective 
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farm chairmen, Chernov‟s was unpopular.217 One member of the collective objected to 
Chernov‟s militaristic leadership style. When challenged why he was still at home at 
13.00 rather than working he responded: “We are not in the army now, as a former 
officer you should get used to that.”218 Discipline was a recurring problem. Pushkin, a 
former senior sergeant and member of the farm administration, repeatedly got so drunk 
that he started fights with other collective farmers.
219
 Similar behaviour was recorded in 
other farms in this district.
220
 
 
A return to agricultural labour was rarely an attractive prospect for ex-
servicemen. As the war drew to a close rumours circulated in the Red Army that the 
state was planning to abolish collective farms, something that said a lot about soldiers‟ 
attitudes to collective agriculture.
221
 Although peasants made up the bulk of the Red 
Army, a number of historians have suggested that large numbers of peasant soldiers 
chose not to return to their former homes and occupations, but contrived to find work in 
urban areas.
222
 More recently Edele has argued that the overwhelming majority of 
peasant veterans initially returned to the village. Aside from the administrative 
requirement to return to the location from which they were demobilized, most veterans 
had a psychological need to return to the homes, families and lives they had left behind. 
Only in subsequent years, once they had become thoroughly disenchanted with the 
reality of post-war rural poverty, did peasant veterans drift towards the city. Therefore, 
once Leningrad had assimilated all those veterans demobilized within its boundaries 
during mass demobilization, it would have to find further room for rural veterans 
attracted to the city in hope of a better life. 
Conclusion  
 
 The process of re-employing veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast 
was more complicated than the official narrative of demobilization suggested. The claim 
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that veterans were rapidly and successfully turned into civilian workers was partially 
true. Finding work for hundreds of thousands of veterans in a city and region devastated 
by war was a remarkable achievement. But such a rapid remobilization of veterans was 
achieved by infringing upon veterans‟ legal rights. A large proportion of Leningrad‟s 
veterans were directed towards key sectors of the local economy, often with a measure 
of compulsion, and usually within days of their arrival. The mechanisms used to 
remobilise veterans created complications. Forcing veterans‟ into low status jobs that 
did not take account of pre-war experience generated enormous resentment. Cynicism 
was an equally common response to the realization that the reality of the post-war 
employment did not correspond with hopes and expectations fostered by propaganda. 
Of course propaganda helped mobilize veterans; many identified with the stereotype of 
exemplary ex-servicemen. In contrast to the propaganda myth only a minority of 
veterans found employment as leading workers or experienced upward social mobility. 
Some veterans were fortunate in being able to return to well paid and respected jobs, 
others were pushed into menial and demeaning work.   
 
 The decision to encourage, even force, veterans back into employment within 
days of demobilization had another consequence. After years of physical exertion, 
emotional strain and psychological stress veterans were given no opportunity to obtain 
the rest and recuperation they needed. There was no opportunity to gradually adapt to 
civilian life. This aggravated veterans‟ already fragile physical and psychological 
health. Former soldiers were expected to knuckle down to the tasks allotted to them 
straight away. This also allowed frontoviki no time to dwell on their wartime 
experiences. Uncomfortable memories had to be repressed at all costs. Not all veterans, 
however, had the luxury of putting the war behind them. Disabled veterans, another 
important sub-group, had yet another experience of readjusting to civilian life. They 
found it even harder to come to terms with the disparity between the reality of 
demobilization and the official mythology.
144 
Chapter 3: Health, Disability and Trauma 
 
Approximately 250 kilometres from Saint Petersburg and twenty kilometres from the 
northern shore of Lake Ladoga, Europe‟s largest lake, stands Valaam, an archipelago of 
fifty islands. Valaam is perhaps best known for its Monastery of the Transfiguration of 
the Saviour, established between the tenth and fifteenth centuries by Orthodox monks. 
Today Valaam and its resurgent religious community is a place of pilgrimage and a 
tourist destination. Yet for historians of late Stalinism Valaam is famous for more 
sinister reasons. In 1947, according to popular mythology, Stalin ordered that city 
streets were to be cleared of disabled ex-servicemen.  These unfortunates were then to 
be exiled to „special colonies‟ in remote parts of the country, the most infamous of 
which was allegedly on Valaam.
1
 Leningrad‟s historians place the city at the centre of 
these stories. They claim that Valaam, which was conveniently close to Leningrad, was 
populated by war invalids, especially double amputees, cleared from their city‟s streets.2  
 
Stories of forced clearances and the use of Valaam as a dumping ground for the 
war-disabled have captivated ordinary Leningraders and professional historians. This 
local version of the myth, fixed on Leningrad and multiple amputees, was retold, 
without my prompting, in almost every oral history interview I conducted. If the way a 
society treats former soldiers, particularly disabled veterans, is a barometer of its 
humanity and compassion, then tales of maimed ex-servicemen being exiled to islands 
surrounded by ice for five months of the year, have symbolized the post-war plight of 
Leningrad‟s war invalids.3 The Valaam myth has enjoyed longevity because it appears 
to confirm accepted notions about the repressiveness of the Stalinist state and Soviet 
society‟s inhumanity towards the war-disabled. Veterans were publicly heralded as 
heroes, at the same time as their mangled bodies were hidden from view, because they 
provoked painful reminders of war‟s horrors. Valaam is perhaps the most eloquent 
expression of the disparity between the reality and myth of veterans‟ post-war 
reintegration. 
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Throughout history post-war societies have experienced difficulty in re-
integrating disabled veterans into mainstream society. These problems grew 
increasingly acute in the twentieth century. Developments in military technology 
created horrific new injuries. Mobilizations of mass conscript armies put ever more 
soldiers in the firing-line.
4
 By the end of 1918 there were approximately eight million 
disabled veterans in Europe.
5
 Advances in military medicine, particularly in infection 
control and antibiotics, ensured that severely injured soldiers survived the battlefield in 
greater numbers. During the First World War just twenty per cent of Canadian and 
American soldiers with spinal cord injuries survived to be repatriated. In the Second 
World War approximately ninety per cent survived. Sixty per cent of injured survivors 
of the First World War died in hospitals within two months of their return. In the 
Second World War mortality rates amongst British, Canadian and American soldiers 
were cut to between 2.2 and 7.8 per cent.
6
 Providing the increasing numbers of 
surviving disabled veterans of modern warfare with medical and financial support has 
posed a challenge for all post-war societies.  
 
The myths about Valaam suggest something especially shocking about the 
treatment of Leningrad‟s veterans, and by extension Soviet ones. The shameful 
treatment of the disabled was not, however, a uniquely Soviet problem. The treatment 
of disabled ex-soldiers, despite good intentions, has repeatedly fallen short of what they 
deserved. The stinginess of pensioning authorities in Britain and France after 1918, for 
example, was legendary. Successive governments dodged their responsibilities to 
disabled veterans, preferring to limit their liabilities rather than submit to veterans‟ 
demands for adequate compensation.
7
 Everywhere veterans complained of insensitivity 
and indifference from bureaucrats, who treated the war disabled as little better than 
beggars and frauds.
8
 Few twentieth century post-war societies have a history of treating 
disabled veterans well. Callousness and neglect towards amputees were common. 
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Claims for special consideration evaporated relatively quickly.
9
 Today disabled veterans 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan face these same difficulties. Ultimately, no matter 
what assistance is put in place to support the war disabled, they can never be adequately 
compensated for their sacrifice. 
    
The impulse to hide the war-disabled from public view was neither new nor 
specifically Soviet. Paris‟ Hôtel des Invalides and London‟s Chelsea Hospital were 
established in the seventeenth century to remove elderly and disabled veterans from the 
streets.
10
 In the twentieth century war invalids became one of the most conspicuous 
legacies of modern industrialized warfare. Bodies, upon which the war was literally 
inscribed, were sites of collective memory, which prompted uncomfortable reminders of 
war‟s horrors.11 It was not uncommon for severely mutilated and disfigured veterans to 
be segregated from wider society in specialist institutions, or for disabled ex-servicemen 
to withdraw from society. In the 1930s the British Broadcasting Corporation‟s 
Addressing Department, from where the Radio Times was distributed, was staffed by 
facially disfigured veterans, hidden from other workers‟ gaze.12 Disfigured soldiers 
routinely faced the aesthetic prejudices of civilians who found contact with the 
“grotesque” daunting or frightening. In Sidcup after 1918 public benches between the 
town and The Queen‟s Hospital, a purpose-built centre for plastic surgery, were painted 
blue to indicate that they were for the sole use of convalescing patients; a measure 
designed to protect patients and locals from potentially uncomfortable encounters.
13
  
 
The broader history of disabled veterans‟ marginalization lends weight to the 
myth of Valaam. But there is little direct evidence to substantiate stories of disabled 
veterans being cleared from the streets or exiled to isolated locations. Recent research 
challenges the myth of their disappearance from the streets in 1947. Fitzpatrick and 
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Edele have both suggested that the removal of war invalids from city streets was the 
product of a decree passed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet against “anti-social 
parasitic elements” in July 1951. This decree did not directly target disabled veterans, 
but beggars, tramps, prostitutes and other undesirable elements, which might include the 
war disabled. It gave the police the power to exile “harmful elements” to special 
settlements in distant regions for up to five years.
14
 It appears to have been inspired by a 
campaign against collective farm shirkers initiated by Khrushchev in June 1948.
15
 
These measures did not eliminate begging in Leningrad. In December 1952 a city soviet 
report accepted that begging continued on the streets, on public transport, in shops, 
parks, bath-houses and other public spaces.
16
 In the first nine months of 1953 over 2,500 
beggars were arrested in Leningrad.
17
 According to secret reports drafted by the Russian 
Ministry of State Control in January 1954 there were over 3250 unemployed disabled 
people within Leningrad, many of whom continued to „pursue a parasitic lifestyle.‟18 
Amongst Leningrad‟s most prominent vagrants were disabled veterans reduced to 
begging to fund their alcoholism. V.S. Cherepkhov and V.A. Alekseev, both disabled 
veterans in their fifties, were arrested for vagrancy nineteen and sixteen times 
respectively in 1953, and twenty-six and twenty times between December 1953 and 
February 1954.
19
  
 
Historians have been unable to offer any proof of the existence of a war invalids‟ 
colony on Valaam. References to it usually derive from Yuri Nagibin‟s novella Patience 
(Terpenie), published in Novyi Mir in 1982.
20
 The work is partially set on Bogoyar, an 
island in Lake Ladoga, a fictional equivalent of Valaam, “which served as a terminal 
shelter for those who were maimed by war and who either had not wanted to return to 
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their homes, or who were refused acceptance there.”21 Nagibin‟s novella and the 
Leningrad version of the Valaam myth have similarities, but it is unclear whether 
Patience was informed by myths already in circulation, or whether it breathed life into a 
pre-existing oral tradition. Most probably the two were inter-dependent. Historians have 
accepted the existence of Valaam on little more than these stories.  
 
Other evidence is at best fragmentary. In May 1988 Literaturnaia gazeta 
published a portrait of Alexander Podonesov, an inmate of the Valaam colony paralysed 
whilst fighting in Karelia, drawn by the anti-war artist Gennadii Dobrov (Figure 4).
22
 In 
2004 Evgenii Kuznetsov, a retired tour guide who began leading tours on the Valaam 
archipelago shortly after it began welcoming tourists in 1964, published his memoirs. 
According to Kuznetsov an institution for disabled veterans was established on Valaam 
in 1950 by the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian-Finnish Socialist Soviet Republic. His 
memoirs claim that approximately 600 patients were housed in the main territory of the 
Transfiguration Monastery, and a further eighty psychiatric patients on a separate 
island. Inmates were served by a staff of approximately 600 doctors, nurses, cleaners 
and other support workers.
23
 Although Kuznetsov claims to have been an eyewitness his 
account makes reference to, and owes a debt to, Nagibin‟s novella; a work Kuznetsov 
expresses great respect and admiration for.
24
 More frequently one encounters 
unsubstantiated references to Valaam as a dumping ground for disabled veterans in 
tourist guides or websites.  
 
Documents preserved in the National Archive of the Republic of Karelia, 
examined for the first time as part of this research, prove the existence of a residential 
home (dom internatov) for the disabled and elderly on Valaam. The institution was 
established by the Karelian-Finnish Council of Ministers on 5 May 1950, not as Edele 
suggests in 1952.
25
 Prior to this there had been plans to turn the Valaam monastery into 
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a sanatorium for the use of the paper production industry.
26
 Once established the dom 
internatov came under the control of the Karelian-Finnish Ministry of Social Security, 
the archives of which preserve fascinating evidence about residents‟ living conditions.  
 
 
Figure 4: Portrait of Alexander Podosenov, by Gennadi Dobrov, Literaturnaia gazeta, 25 May 1988, 
p.13. 
The reality of this institution was somewhat different from popular myths and 
historians‟ subsequent interpretations. Rather than being established to segregate 
disabled veterans rounded up from the streets, the Valaam “colony” was the result of the 
consolidation of seven smaller institutions scattered across Karelia. In total 775 patients 
and 177 employees were transferred from these institutions.
27
 Many of the patients were 
not disabled war veterans, but mentally ill, disabled or elderly civilians. In 1947 the 
institutions which later formed the Valaam dom invalidov contained just 75 disabled 
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veterans.
28
 In September 1952 a recommendation was made that separate institutions 
were created on Valaam for the elderly, industrially injured, the blind, the congenitally 
disabled and war invalids. The proposed facilities for the war disabled were to 
accommodate fifty veterans.
29
 
 
 Conditions were every bit as bad as historians have speculated. The Monastery‟s 
buildings, bombed in 1940, needed extensive reconstruction. Walls had to be repaired, 
plastered and painted; window frames repaired and re-glazed.
30
 The shortage of skilled 
construction workers meant that the majority of work was undertaken by disabled 
patients.
31
 By September 1952 Valaam was home to 904 disabled patients and 530 
members of staff.
32
 There were shortages of furniture, mattresses, blankets, pillows and 
sheets. Washing facilities, water-supply and heating systems were in disrepair, for want 
of parts and skilled specialists.
33
 In March 1953 the Karelian Ministry of Social Security 
conducted, in response to a letter of complaint, an inspection of the facility. The report 
listed a catalogue of problems. The cloisters, now converted into accommodation for 
residents, were cold and dirty. Hygiene was abysmal, no doubt hampered by problems 
with water-supply and washing facilities. Beds were infested with lice and cockroaches. 
An influenza epidemic prevented staff from washing patients for over two months. The 
resident doctor, hampered by shortages of basic medical supplies and equipment, 
provided only the most basic treatment. Fights regularly broke out between residents at 
mealtimes. The lack of adaptive equipment made eating a degrading experience. The 
shortage of mugs meant that disabled residents were forced to slurp tea from shallow 
bowls. The report also recommended that Svistunov, the dom internatov‟s director, was 
dismissed. His earlier reports of improving conditions on Valaam had been revealed as 
outright lies.
34
  
 
 Conditions did not improve. As late as September 1960, ten years after the 
home‟s establishment, the Karelian Council of Ministers was still demanding an 
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improvement in leadership, medical provision and living conditions. A month earlier 
residents had been hit by a mass outbreak of food poisoning, attributed to the unsanitary 
condition of the kitchen block.
 35
 Supplying an island located in Europe‟s largest lake, 
cut off from the mainland by ice for five months of the year, was very difficult. 
Attempts to grow grain and vegetables, harvest fruit and to fish met with limited 
success.
36
 Most of Valaam‟s food was brought in. But incompetent planning meant that 
the institution‟s warehouse and shop often contained little more than rye flour, 
processed fat and sugar. Vodka, however, was always available. It was probably the 
only thing that made life bearable for residents and staff, and may have even been used 
as a way of controlling residents‟ behaviour.37  
 
 Valaam‟s isolation also made obtaining equipment and recruiting medical staff 
difficult. Institutional tensions aggravated this situation. The Karelian Ministry of Social 
Security blamed the lack of medical facilities on the Ministry of Health‟s repeated 
failure to send doctors, nurses and equipment.
38
 For its part the Ministry of Health was 
baffled by the Valaam project. As Zhuralev, the Karelian Minister of Health, argued in 
September 1952; “When the decision was taken to organize a hospital (sic) on this 
island, the reason for this was not clear to us.” He was not concerned about Valaam‟s 
vulnerable residents. Zhuralev was perturbed that medical facilities were being 
organized for unproductive disabled citizens whilst ordinary workers on the mainland 
went without adequate provision. He argued that the money would be better spent 
improving the nearest hospital in Sortavalo.
39
  
 
 The organization of a dom internatov on Valaam for disabled and elderly 
citizens from Karelia was a disgrace. However, the truth about this institution was 
somewhat different from the stories and myths which continue to circulate today. The 
treatment of the hundred or so disabled veterans housed on Valaam was reprehensible, 
but the island was not home to war invalids cleared from Leningrad‟s streets. How then 
does one explain the emergence and persistence of the myth of Valaam, given its flimsy 
factual basis? The answer lies in the broader history of the difficulties faced by disabled 
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veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast in the years immediately following the 
end of the Great Patriotic War. In the rest of this chapter I examine the additional 
challenges that disabled veterans faced in readapting to life after the war. War invalids, 
unlike their able-bodied comrades, faced the added complexities of obtaining a pension, 
finding suitable employment and accessing the medical care they so desperately 
required. This was in addition to coming to terms with the lasting physical and 
psychological impacts of war, and widespread social stigmas attached to disability. I 
argue that despite their theoretical privileges Leningrad‟s war disabled were routinely 
pushed aside. In a society in which the real needs of the disabled, including war 
invalids, were often ignored, rumours that disabled beggars were cleared from the 
streets and consigned to institutions beyond the gaze of the community were entirely 
plausible.   
 
The Numbers of Disabled Veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast 
 
According to the Leningrad Research Institute of Work Fitness and the 
Organization of Work for the Disabled (Leningradskii nauchno-issledovatel‟skii institut 
ekspertizy trudosposobnosti i organizatsii truda invalidov – LIETIN), a key 
organization in assisting disabled veterans back into employment, 35,498 former 
soldiers were declared disabled by medical boards between June 1945 and June 1946.
40
 
Several historians cite this figure as a reliable measure of the number of war invalids 
resident in Leningrad,
41
 but in fact the number of disabled veterans was much higher. 
By 1 May 1946 there were 48,483 war invalids claiming pensions from district social 
security offices in Leningrad, Petrodvorets, Kolpino, Pushkin, and Kronstadt; 47,233 in 
Leningrad. Only sixty-five per cent or 30,729 were registered with the Medical Labour 
Commissions from which LIETIN compiled its figures.
42
 In subsequent months the 
number of disabled ex-servicemen claiming pensions in Leningrad grew. After all in 
May 1946 there were 1,046,000 soldiers still receiving treatment in Soviet military 
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hospitals, awaiting a future discharge.
43
 By the beginning of January 1947 there were 
53,334 disabled veterans registered with Leningrad‟s district social security offices.44 
War invalids, therefore, constituted approximately eighteen per cent of the total number 
of veterans demobilized in the city.
45
 This was an extraordinary number of disabled ex-
servicemen and women for a war-torn city to reintegrate and support. To put this in 
perspective, in 1948 there were 45,000 disabled veterans in the whole of Great Britain.
46
  
 
  Many disabled ex-servicemen settling in Leningrad were not “native 
Leningraders” (korennye Leningradtsy), but post-war migrants. The number of war-
invalids resident in the Leningrad oblast‟ was significantly smaller than the city. In 
January 1945, for example, the NKVD had record of 4134 disabled veterans in the 
oblast, although by July 1945 the regional social security offices paid pensions to 
13,951 war invalids.
47
 Disabled veterans who had once lived in Leningrad‟s rural 
hinterland, like war-invalids across the Soviet Union, may have chosen to take 
advantage of their relative freedom of movement and start their lives afresh in a new 
place.
48
 Post-war migrants were drawn to Leningrad for many reasons. Its historic 
cityscape, proud revolutionary heritage, heroic wartime myths and the special 
atmosphere of Russia‟s western-facing cultural capital were all part of the attraction. 
Practical considerations also played their part. Life in a major Soviet city, even one 
living in the shadow of mass death and wartime destruction, was an attractive prospect 
for war-invalids living in isolated villages. Finding suitable work and claiming a 
pension were likely to be easier in the Soviet Union‟s second city, than in an isolated 
village. Most importantly, Leningrad‟s standing as the leading centre of Soviet medicine 
made it especially attractive. In order to obtain medical treatment many veterans were 
obliged to move to places with the requisite resources, and the majority of veterans 
formally classified as disabled in the city had very serious injuries or illnesses. 
According to LIETIN‟s figures, the most common reasons for disability amongst 
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veterans were amputated limbs, damaged joints, and broken bones. 25.1 per cent of war 
invalids had damaged or amputated upper limbs and 28.5 per cent damaged or 
amputated lower limbs.
49
 These problems could not always be treated within villages. 
 
 The number of ex-service personnel classified as war-invalids poorly reflected 
the physical price paid by the Great Patriotic War‟s combatants. Fieseler estimates that 
eight per cent of all serving Red Army soldiers were permanently disabled by the war.
50
 
Yet many millions were seriously injured on the frontlines. Between 1941 and 1945 
there were over 22.3 million instances of hospitalization, including 14.7 million cases of 
injury and 7.6 million cases of sickness.
51
 Few soldiers escaped the war without 
experiencing some damage to their bodies. Most were hospitalized at least once during 
the war; many were injured multiple times. Listing the number and nature of injuries 
sustained at the front became key components in the formulation of post-war letters of 
complaint.
52
 By April 1946 1595 veterans had been demobilized as part of the second 
demobilization wave, because they had received three or more wounds.
53
 The rigid 
implementation of regulations governing what constituted invalidity hid the true extent 
of war related illness and sickness.  
 
Even if a soldier survived the war without disability, the conflict had taken its 
toll on their health. Official sources are largely silent about the lingering aches and 
pains, the long-term effects of malnutrition or even the dental problems experienced by 
veterans. But returning veterans were physically and mentally exhausted by the war. 
Most soldiers had served continuously since the day they volunteered or were 
conscripted without formal leave.
54
 Many were visibly aged by the stresses and 
privations of wartime armed service. Leningrad‟s doctors and nurses lacked the time 
and resources to pay much attention to the digestive complaints, raised blood pressure 
or heart problems observed amongst some veterans in the first few months of peace.
55
 
Only veterans with obvious physical wounds could expect medical treatment. Prevailing 
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conceptions of stoic masculinity and the gaunt figures of women and children persuaded 
many veterans that their own health problems were of secondary importance to that of 
their families.
56
   
 
Indeed disabled veterans were competing with the rest of the population for 
limited medical resources. The war had not only damaged combatants‟ health; it had 
been fought at the expense of that of the whole nation. Throughout the war 
malnourished civilians had been overworked and exhausted, compromising their 
immunity to illness and disease.
57
 The catastrophic state of sanitation made the urban 
population vulnerable to diseases such as tuberculosis, typhus, typhoid, dysentery and 
respiratory infections.
58
 These problems were particularly severe in post-war Leningrad. 
Civilians, reduced to little more than walking skeletons during the worst days of the 
blockade, suffered from the after-effects of starvation for the rest of their lives. Re-
evacuees often returned to Leningrad in poor physical condition, and required medical 
attention. Although the besieged city was miraculously spared a wartime epidemic of 
disease, it was left with a severely weakened population. Wartime survival often came 
at the expense of physical health. 
 
Disability Classification and Medical Labour Expert Commissions 
 
The first obstacle faced by war invalids was to be formally registered as disabled 
by a Medical-Labour Expert Commission (Vrachebno-Trudovaia Ekspertnaia 
Kommissiia – VTEK). Similar commissions had examined people with disabilities 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The Great Patriotic War‟s enormous physical cost, 
however, increased the demand for medical examination by VTEKi, and changed the 
purpose and procedure of these panels.
59
 The doctors, trade-unionists and social security 
officials who sat on VTEKi were responsible for determining the severity of injuries, 
making suggestions for appropriate future employment and issuing disability 
certificates, a document essential for claiming a pension. The extent of disability was 
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measured by three disability categories. Group I invalidity applied to individuals who 
had completely lost the capacity to work and required full-time nursing care. Group II 
applied to individuals who had lost the ability to work, but did not require regular 
medical care. Group III invalidity applied to people considered fit for work in low level 
employment, possibly with special working conditions and shortened shifts. Disability, 
in keeping with the Stalinist regime‟s productionist goals, was based on the ability to 
work, rather than an individual‟s state of health.60 
 
 Medical examination was the first step in the often lengthy and frustrating 
process of registering for a disability pension. Proud disabled frontoviki experienced 
administrative and bureaucratic obstacles as a series of petty humiliations and insults. 
Obtaining access to these commissions was difficult. Even in Leningrad, a city at the 
centre of the Soviet medical establishment, disabled veterans might have to wait over 
six weeks for an appointment, and then spend the best part of the day waiting to be 
seen.
61
 At times members of Leningrad‟s VTEKi claim to have at times worked eleven 
hour days, rather than the statutory eight hour day, to clear the backlog.
62
 In October 
1945 there were approximately 170 doctors working for fifty VTEKi spread across 
Leningrad.
63
 Outside of the city there were fewer commissions; by 1948 there were just 
forty-one VTEKi in the whole Leningrad oblast.
64
 Until 1948 VTEKi were permitted to 
examine individuals in their homes, but most examinations were conducted at hospitals 
and polyclinics.
65
 This created special difficulties for war invalids living in isolated 
rural settlements. Amputees, blind or paralyzed veterans were probably deterred from 
making the arduous and inconvenient journeys, something which prevented them from 
claiming a pension.
66
  
 
 Doctors and VTEKi officials rarely had sufficient time to conduct adequate 
examination, which as a result were often perfunctory and humiliating. They were 
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conducted in cold, unequipped and dilapidated buildings. Little attention was paid to the 
privacy or dignity of disabled veterans, who were likely to be uncomfortable bearing 
their scars or stumps in public. It was not uncommon for several examinations to be 
conducted simultaneously, in sight of each other.
67
 The pressure of work meant that 
VTEKi inevitably cut corners, made mistakes or treated the war-disabled with distain. 
VTEKi often restricted their activity to ruling on the level of disability, and frequently 
ignored the requirement to suggest suitable forms of employment for the disabled. This 
had consequences for future employability. Employers were reluctant to recruit 
potentially unproductive workers without documentary proof of their fitness for a 
specific role.
68
 VTEKi boards were unpopular; their members viewed as little better 
than the „rats‟ distributing housing and employment. One group of war-invalids wrote to 
the Leningrad Party Committee complaining that VTEKi chairmen and doctors were all 
Jews. The denunciation was taken seriously and investigated by officials.
69
 
 
 The workload under which Leningrad‟s VTEKi were struggling was partly the 
product of a requirement that disabled people underwent regular re-examinations, 
sometimes as often as every three months.
70
 Ministry of Social Security reports from 
June 1946 calculated that approximately fourteen per cent of war invalids were 
reviewed four times a year. A further forty-four per cent were re-examined every six 
months, the remainder annually.
71
 Until a reform of the VTEK system in 1948 even the 
blind, certain amputees and those with two or more paralyzed limbs had to undergo 
annual re-examination.
72
 Disabled veterans resented the inconvenience and intrusion of 
regular re-assessment. They often joked about the absurdity of the situation, questioning 
whether officials thought their amputated limbs might grow back.
73
 Black humour hid 
disappointment. The requirement for re-examination was indicative of the state‟s 
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suspicion towards disabled veterans. Veterans‟ hopes that the wartime sacrifices had 
reconfigured their relationship with their government were punctured by the state‟s lack 
of trust.  
 
The process of examination and re-examination was part of the late Stalinist 
state‟s attempt to minimise the financial burden created by unproductive war invalids 
dependent on disability pensions. Many veterans were placed in a lower disability 
grouping than their injuries merited. Re-examination often meant a downgrading in 
disability or complete declassification.
74
 This was particularly the case in Leningrad, 
where a higher proportion of disabled ex-servicemen were categorized as group III 
compared to the national average. According to LIETIN‟s figures 84.9 per cent of 
disabled veterans with an amputated arm, 83.7 per cent with an amputated leg and 57 
per cent with both arms amputated or severely damaged were classified as group III war 
invalids.
75
 This was not coincidence. A number of Leningrad doctors and social security 
officials associated with LIETIN advocated that disability classification was adapted to 
better reflect post-war circumstances. In 1945 in a lengthy article in Vrachebnoe delo 
N.A. Vigdorchik argued for a more „rational‟ form of classification, particularly in 
relation to group II invalidity, which better reflected the ability of many group II 
invalids to work.
76
 Averbakh, a leading expert at LIETIN, argued that eighty-five per 
cent of disabled veterans who had lost mobility could be allocated group III invalidity 
and assigned work in normal conditions.
77
 These views appear to have heavily 
influenced Leningrad‟s VTEKi and local decision making.   
Pensions 
 
Throughout the twentieth century the payment of disability pensions has been a 
source of tension between war invalids and the states for which they fought. After both 
the First and Second World Wars European and North American governments tended to 
restrict or limit the massive burden created by disability pensions. Viewed against this 
background the difficulties Leningrad‟s veterans had in securing pensions were far from 
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unusual. The resentment that Soviet war invalids felt about the meagre support provided 
by the party-state had much in common with the war disabled of other conflicts. Even in 
nation states which had relatively generous provisions for the war-disabled, soldiers 
whose minds and bodies had been severely damaged continued to demand more.  
 
The experience of claiming a disability pension conflicted sharply with disabled 
veterans‟ official status as the most privileged group of ex-service personnel. While 
labels such as „frontovik‟ or „veteran‟ were largely symbolic, an “Invalid of the Great 
Patriotic War” was an official administrative category, which came with a range of 
entitlements to practical assistance. War invalids enjoyed disability pensions and tax 
privileges, were exempt from higher education tuition fees, and were supposed to get 
preferential access to housing, food, fuel and other essential goods.
78
 Most veterans lost 
the residual entitlements linked to demobilization in the course of 1947 and 1948. 
Disabled veterans, however, kept most of their privileges. Propaganda campaigns 
continued to promote the message that the war disabled were the best protected of 
Soviet citizens. Pronouncements of „care and attention‟ (zabota) for disabled veterans 
made in political speeches and legislation, were quickly adopted as propaganda slogans. 
The press was full of articles detailing welfare payments and retraining schemes for 
war-invalids.
79
 Yet the reality of fitting back into mainstream civilian society was 
radically different from the propaganda campaign. The disparity between official 
commitments and the manner in which they were treated were not lost on individual 
veterans. In a letter intercepted by Leningrad‟s military censor one war invalid 
expressed his feeling of being unwanted by society:  
 
“You hear by radio (that everything) is simply splendid, you think that 
everyone is pleased to see you, but as you begin (to settle in) you aren‟t 
needed by anyone… A campaign of any kind is just a celebration, it‟s all 
just agitation, in fact there isn‟t anything; in general they are just blowing 
smoke in your eyes.”80  
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Obtaining a disability certificate from a VTEK was just the first stage in a 
lengthier struggle to claim a pension. There was more form filling, queuing and red-tape 
ahead. Leningrad‟s district Social Security offices, responsible for administering 
disability pensions, were as over-worked, under-resourced and inefficient as district 
housing departments or raspredbiuro. According to a letter published in Leningradskaia 
pravda in October 1946 lengthy queues began forming outside the Dzerzhinskii social 
security office from 07.00.
81
 Once inside disabled veterans often had to wait for hours 
in dark, dirty and crowded corridors, before finally gaining admittance to the officials 
responsible for their cases.
82
 Shortages of furniture meant that disabled people might 
have to wait for hours standing on uncomfortable prosthetic limbs or crutches.
83
 The 
official which dealt with disabled veterans could be indifferent to their plight. One 
veteran hobbled into a district social security office in the Leningrad oblast‟ hoping to 
register for a pension. He was told; “I see that your leg has been amputated, but we 
won‟t pay benefits while you don‟t have a certificate.”84  
 
A procuracy investigation of Leningrad‟s Social Security Department conducted 
in October 1948 revealed a catalogue of problems. Pensions applications were 
processed slowly, decisions about eligibility were often wrong, and over and under 
payments were common. Pensioners arriving from, or leaving for, other regions 
experienced lengthy delays in transferring their personal records. Letters of complaint 
went unanswered for weeks or months. Officials were even sacked because of rudeness 
towards pensioners.
85
 Social security officials in the Leningrad oblast had an even 
worse appreciation of the complexities of pensions‟ legislation. Miscalculations and 
mistakes were inevitable.
86
 An internal oblast‟ Social Security investigation conducted 
in November 1948 revealed that 50,312 roubles had been overpaid to war-invalids.
87
 In 
the Pashskii, Kingiseppskii and Luzhskii districts the committees responsible for 
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awarding pensions met only once or twice a month creating lengthy delays in the award 
and payment of individual pensions. There were even instances of social security funds 
being embezzled in both the city and oblast.
88
 In 1947 an RSFSR Ministry of Social 
Security investigation revealed an unhealthy working culture of mistrust, gossip and 
intrigue amongst Leningrad‟s officials. Twelve employees had awarded themselves 
5300 roubles from emergency funds intended to help war veterans. Other members of 
staff obtained clothing or sanatoria passes intended for the disabled.
89
 Corruption in 
Leningrad‟s social security apparatus had not reached the levels uncovered in other 
areas of the Soviet Union, but it did exist.
90
 
 
Once a veteran finally convinced officials of their eligibility for a pension 
receiving the money presented a further obstacle. Viktorov a disabled former officer 
wrote to Leningradskaia pravda about the difficulties collecting his pension from the 
Central State Bank on Nevskii Prospect. Standing in line for several hours in a jostling 
crush wasted the best part of the day, and would have been tiring for most Leningraders 
let alone a disabled veteran.
91
 Things were harder for pensioners resident in collective 
farms miles from the nearest banks or post-offices, who faced difficult monthly 
journeys to collect their benefits. Even those war invalids fortunate enough to receive 
pensions by post sometimes experienced masses of red-tape and lengthy delays in 
receiving payments.
92
 
 
Despite the propaganda, the pensions available to the Great Patriotic War‟s 
disabled veterans were not generous; at best they were modest and at worst wholly 
inadequate. The amount a war invalid received was dependent upon: disability category, 
military rank and previous earnings, and determining it was a complicated calculation. 
But for simplicity the legislation can be reduced to its key principles. The most severely 
disabled veterans received significantly higher pensions than those who had retained 
some work capacity. Officers and non-commissioned officers received slightly higher 
pensions, and professional soldiers were administered under different rules. Urban 
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workers received more than agricultural workers. Individuals who could prove they had 
earned more than 400 roubles a month before military service could expect higher 
pensions. Unfortunately, few disabled veterans were able to prove their former earnings. 
 
Based on the provisions of the 1940 pensions regulations monthly payments 
ranged from a maximum of 500 roubles for officers with group I invalidity and pre-war 
salaries over 400 roubles, to a minimum of 90 roubles for group III invalids from the 
ranks who had not worked, or those who had earned fewer than 150 roubles a month.
93
 
In January 1946 the minimum sums paid to group I war invalids injured on the 
frontlines were raised to 300 roubles for urban workers, and 250 roubles for agricultural 
workers, but such payments were not enough to drag the most seriously injured out of 
poverty.
94
 Even at their most generous disability pensions could not secure a 
comfortable existence. As Zubkova argues, “it was very difficult, almost impossible, to 
live on a single invalid‟s pension”, let alone support a family without supplementary 
income.
95
 Since disability pensions barely covered essential expenditure on food, fuel 
and clothing they did little to alleviate the misery of post-war life. Such meagre state 
pensions hardly seemed like adequate compensation for the sacrifices made by disabled 
ex-servicemen. As Mark Edele writes, most war invalids were, “in a situation where the 
symbolic affirmation of their status was coupled with poverty – a recipe for 
resentment.”96 
Work 
 
 For the late Stalinist state the overriding priority was reintegrating injured 
veterans into the workforce, rather than providing adequate pensions. Leningrad was at 
the centre of national policy discussions on the issue, and social security officials in the 
city, such as N.M. Obodan and A. Ia. Averbakh, both attached to LIETIN, were 
important participants.
97
 Both contributed to a book, published by LIETIN, which 
discussed the legislative and policy framework and disseminated practical advice on re-
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employing disabled veterans informed by the institute‟s research. The book became an 
important reference work and the RSFSR Ministry of Social Security ordered that 5000 
copies were circulated to medical institutions in Soviet Russia.
98
 Re-employment, as it 
was for able-bodied veterans, was envisaged as a pre-condition for turning soldiers back 
into civilians. Much greater effort was expended re-employing war invalids than other 
disabled citizens. This explains why overall levels of employment amongst the war 
disabled were higher than amongst other groups of disabled people.
99
  
 
 The determination to harness disabled veterans‟ productive capacity was not 
solely motivated by the therapeutic needs of the individual. Paid employment was also 
used as a means of reducing the financial burden placed upon the state. The payment of 
disability pensions was closely linked to employment. Group I and group II invalids 
received a full pension irrespective of income derived from work and agriculture. But, 
in January 1943 incentives were created to encourage group III war-invalids to work. 
Full pensions were paid regardless of additional income, but individuals avoiding work 
for more than two months could lose their pension.
100
 Legislation was tightened again in 
October 1948. Group III invalids had their pensions cut if their combined income 
exceeded their pre-war earnings. In the countryside pensions were cut for all group III 
invalids with an income other than from their wage.
101
 As Edele summarizes: “If during 
and/ immediately after the war a third group invalid could choose between not receiving 
a pension, and working and receiving a full pension, after October 1948 the choice to 
work as a rule only guaranteed a reduced pension.”102 These changes discouraged a 
small number of veterans resident in the Leningrad oblast, usually those with 
agricultural plots and family support, from working.
103
 
 
 In purely statistical terms social security officials and employers in Leningrad 
and the Leningrad oblast were highly successful in re-integrating veterans into the 
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workplace. Nationally employment levels amongst war invalids increased steadily from 
57.3 per cent in September 1942, to almost 80 per cent in January 1945 and reached 
91.2 per cent in April 1948.
104
 Moscow closely monitored these figures, and ranked 
cities and regions. In October 1945 Leningrad was ranked joint 31
st
 and the Leningrad 
oblast 48
th
 out of 54 places. 84.3 per cent of Leningrad‟s war invalids, and 77.7 per cent 
in the Leningrad oblast, were in employment or education.
105
 Low rankings were 
disappointing for a major Soviet city and its rural hinterland, but perhaps 
understandable in a region struggling to recover from war‟s aftershocks. In future years 
employment rates were compared to average levels for the RSFSR. Intense criticism 
was directed at places falling below this benchmark.
106
  
 
The city, oblast and district soviets closely monitored the trudoustroistvo of 
disabled veterans, and made it the subject of numerous resolutions. The reemployment 
of war invalids and able-bodied veterans was controlled by different institutions. The 
Ministry of Social Security, and its district offices, produced detailed plans for 
employing the war disabled, the implementation of which were constantly evaluated. 
Work placement commissions were established by district soviets to monitor the 
employment of disabled veterans and direct individuals towards suitable employment. 
In addition Leningrad‟s industrial employers had by June 1948 established a further 426 
work placement commissions.
107
 Major employers played a prominent part in hiring 
disabled veterans. By January 1946 the Kirov works was employing 442 disabled 
veterans out of a total workforce of 7694.
108
 Of the 580 disabled veterans registered 
with the Kolpino district social security office in January 1946, 483 were employed at 
the Izhorskii factory.
109
 Employers across the city and oblast‟ organized training courses 
to improve the skills and qualifications of disabled veterans.
110
 These schemes seem to 
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have been particularly important in enabling group II veterans to enter the workplace.
111
  
LIETIN in cooperation with the Leningrad Department of the Scientific Engineering-
Technical Society (Leningrad Otdeleniia Nauchnogo Inzhenerno-Tekhnicheskogo 
Obshchestva –LONITO) undertook scientific studies of suitable jobs for disabled 
veterans on the railway network, in printing and publishing, in paper production and the 
textile industries.
112
  While the infrastructure for re-employing most veterans had been 
dismantled by 1947, special assistance for reintegrating disabled veterans into the 
workplace was still in operation at the end of the decade.   
 
As post-war reconstruction gathered pace levels of employment amongst 
disabled ex-soldiers gradually improved. This was the product of administrators gaining 
in experience, the implementation of new initiatives, the death of the most severely 
disabled veterans and the creation of new employment opportunities. 87.3 per cent of 
Leningrad‟s disabled veterans were working or studying by January 1947. This rose to 
91 per cent by January 1949.
113
 The improvement was achieved across all disability 
groups (Table 1). The economic mobilization of group III war invalids could be 
anticipated. But, increases in the number of group I and II war invalids, who by 
definition needed regular medical, assistance was more surprising.   
 
The determination to turn severely disabled veterans into workers was not just 
about reducing the financial burden of disability pensions. Work served important 
functions for the war disabled. The Soviet Union, like other societies, stressed the 
curative qualities of work. In the correct circumstances “work-therapy” could teach 
disabled veterans how to become productive citizens and to build their physical 
strength.
114
 As Cohen writes; “At work, a disabled man became self-reliant and 
fulfilled, secure in his sense of purpose.”115 In a socialist society where work was 
considered to have a redemptive quality, work ensured the disabled soldier‟s 
reintegration into the community.  
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Table 1: Percentage of Disabled veterans in employment or education by disability grouping. 
 Percentage of disabled veterans in employment 
or education 
Date Place Group I Group II Group III 
January 1945 Leningrad 
oblast 
9 49 96 116 
June 1946 Leningrad 11.2 35.8 75.8 
117
 
June 1948 Leningrad 23.4 61.3 99.8 118 
January 1949 Leningrad 
oblast 
 58.7 98.4 119 
 
Different forms of disability presented different challenges to resuming working 
lives. LIETIN, whose responsibility it was to research appropriate employment for 
disabled veterans, had difficulties finding work for the most seriously injured. The best 
that could be expected for many was repetitive home working.
120
 The results of studies 
investigating jobs suitable for amputees who had lost an arm, the most common 
wartime injury, were not promising. In 1947 the suitability of 185 jobs were assessed on 
the Oktiabr‟skaia railway line. Just sixteen were considered suitable, and a further seven 
could have provided employment in the right circumstances. These, however, were 
skilled or semi-skilled jobs with monthly salaries between 340 to 750 roubles.
121
 Of 240 
jobs examined in the textile industry only 22 were suitable.
122
 However, demand for all 
of these positions was limited. Veterans with serious or multiple injuries found it harder 
to find suitable employment. Little provision was made for adapting workplaces to 
disabled people‟s needs. Given the shortage of materials and tools in workplaces it was 
hardly surprising that special adaptive technology was rarely installed. Even the 
acquisition of a swivel chair was celebrated as a special event. Universal provision of 
adaptive technology was little more than a utopian dream.
123
 Even those industrial 
enterprises which took work placement seriously, such as the Kirov, Stalin and Karl 
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Marx factories, did not consistently make the most of disabled veterans‟ skills. A study 
conducted at the Kirov factory revealed that 28.7 per cent of disabled workers 
complained about the difficulties created by inappropriate work.
124
    
 
Blind veterans, in particular, suffered from a lack of awareness about their 
particular needs. Officials and wider society rarely understood their capabilities. One 
national initiative, implemented in Leningrad, aimed to train blind veterans as 
musicians.
125
 By the beginning of 1946 there were 63 blind veterans training at a 
residential musical college located in the Dzerzhinskii district.
126
 By 1947 there were 
113 veteran students at the college, and approximately 100 in 1948 and 1949.
127
 The 
college, however, was unable to provide its students with sustainable musical careers. In 
November 1945 a delegate at a conference discussing the employment of blind veterans, 
with experience of working with blind people in pre-war Leningrad, described musical 
retraining as “the crudest of mistakes” and a “catastrophe” waiting to happen. Few blind 
veterans, even after extensive training, were capable of becoming professional 
musicians.
128
 In the 1948-49 academic year sixteen blind veterans graduated with good 
or excellent results, but six failed to qualify.
129
 Even successful graduates could not be 
guaranteed a musical career. Shortages of musical instruments threatened the whole 
scheme.
130
    
 
In one oral history interview a veteran told me the story of a much-loved family 
friend who had been blinded at the front. The blind veteran found work in a co-
operative for other blind veterans doing tedious manual tasks in a workshop located in 
an unlit basement. Left alone in the dark with little mental stimulation, members of the 
cooperative spent much of their time at work playing chess in their heads. Imagining the 
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board and pieces in their minds, a game could be begun or resumed at any moment, a 
situation that frustrated the cooperative‟s bosses.131 
 
 Training schemes for the war disabled routinely ignored veterans‟ real needs and 
physical capabilities. Those who could not be employed in the regular economy were 
often trained in craft or artisan trades, and were employed in invalids‟ cooperatives.132 
There were national schemes to retrain war invalids as photographers, cinema 
projectionists or accounts clerks. In Leningrad disabled veterans were more commonly 
trained as cobblers, tailors or as mechanics repairing typewriters and adding 
machines.
133
 State-funded training initiatives were poorly funded, resourced and 
planned. In April and May 1946 Leningradskaia pravda published collective letters 
from groups of disabled veterans, complaining that retraining of the war-disabled was 
not taken seriously. Veterans enrolled on training courses were sometimes left to sit idle 
for want of materials, tools and proper work. A large group of trainee tailors had just 
two broken sewing machines to train on. Workshops were hidden away in cold, dark 
and damp basements.
134
 Another workshop was organized on the third floor of a 
building, making it inaccessible to veterans on crutches and prosthetic limbs. As the 
signatories put it: “One feels the inattention to our needs literally at every step.”135  
 
A number of disabled veterans who had returned to Leningrad before either the 
end of the war or mass demobilization found work relatively easily, because of wartime 
labour shortages. But, as time passed and “healthy” veterans returned to the city many 
war invalids found that that they were muscled out of their jobs. Employers preferred to 
hire able-bodied workers, as disabled veterans of the First World War had found.
136
 
Although the state could place employers under great pressure to employ the war 
disabled, industrial managers still had to ensure the production plan was fulfilled. 
                                                 
131
  Interview, 21 March 2008, Disc No.10. 
 
132
  TsGAIPD-SPb/f.24/2v/d.8230/l.4. 
 
133
  GARF-RSFSR/f.A-413/op.1/d.974/l.210; TsGAIPD-SPb/K.-598/op.6/d.113/ll.87-88 (l.87). 
 
134
  „Pomosh‟ invalidam voiny ovladet‟ novoi spetsial‟nost‟iu (po pis‟mam redaktsiiu)‟, Leningradskaia 
pravda, 16 April 1946, p.3; „Pis‟ma v redaktsiiu – Navesti poriadok v skole invalidov‟, Leningradskaia 
pravda, 23 May 1946, p.3. 
 
135
 „Pis‟ma v redaktsiiu – Tak li nado obuchat‟ invalidov‟, Leningradsksaia pravda, 19 September 1946, 
p.3. 
 
136
  Cohen, „Will to Work‟, pp.302-3.  
169 
Nobody wanted to hire unproductive workers who posed a potential danger to 
themselves, their colleagues and valuable machinery.  
 
Instances of war invalids being dismissed from their jobs, with little 
justification, began in Leningrad as early as 1945. A report from the Dzerzhinskii 
district voenkomat revealed a tendency for managers to dismiss disabled people. Fadeev 
had worked as a fire-watcher for a construction trust for approximately four months, 
before being replaced by an able-bodied worker. Sudakov, a group II war invalid, was 
replaced in his job as a buffet manager. He was eventually reinstated after the 
intervention of the district social security office.
137
 In July 1946 another group II 
disabled veteran and his wife were expelled from a collective farm in the Volkhovskii 
district of the Leningrad oblast. Thanks to the intervention of the district procuracy the 
couple were reinstated.
138
 Similar situations were by no means uncommon.
139
 In late 
1947 the All-Union Ministry of Social Security observed numerous instances of war 
invalids being dismissed from their employment.
140
  
 
Most of these examples appear in the archival record when prosecutors, courts 
or social security officials intervened to reinstate disabled veterans. How many veterans 
accepted their dismissal with resignation or indifference without coming into contact 
with state agencies is impossible to know. Where disabled veterans excluded from the 
workplace were mentioned in reports they said little about the resentment and alienation 
proud ex-servicemen, injured whilst defending their country, inevitably felt. Yet a 
petition sent to Sovnarkom on 3 February 1946 by a former engineer, communist party-
member and war invalid from Leningrad captured this sense of bitterness and confusion. 
Released from the army as a group II invalid the petitioner held a number of positions 
of responsibility in industry and agriculture before returning to Leningrad in 1944. He 
was appointed director of a motor vehicle pool. In January 1946, after having been away 
from the city on business, he was informed that he had been demoted and replaced by a 
recently demobilized soldier. He sought an explanation for this injustice: 
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“I am now asking for an explanation for what reason I have been removed 
from my position. Why have I been dismissed? Is a man in this country 
really worth so little that he can be mocked for no reason?”141 
 
 The re-employment of disabled veterans was presented as a remarkable success 
by both state propaganda and official reports. The local and national press celebrated the 
achievements of disabled veterans in the workplace, surrounding disabled veterans with 
the same discourse as their able-bodied comrades.
142
 War-invalids were exhorted to 
become exemplary workers and to achieve spectacular feats of Stakhanovism. 
According to Dunham the press campaign encouraged, “something like a movement of 
Voropaevism,” a form of disabled veterans‟ Stakhanovism inspired by the boundless 
energy of Voropaev, the fictional hero of the post-war novel, Happiness.
143
 Local 
equivalents were singled out for praise. Mikhail Ivanov, a metal lathe operator at 
Elektrosila, was the epitome of this active community-conscious war invalid. In the first 
half of March 1946 he fulfilled his production norm for machining precision 
components by 455 per cent. In addition he was head of the factory Osoaviakhim 
branch, and an active candidate party member.
144
 Reports of disabled veterans returning 
to work and taking a full part in production were no doubt intended to reassure others 
about their place in society. In October 1945 Leningrad‟s social security administration 
forwarded a report to Moscow, which claimed that 12 per cent of war invalids employed 
in the city worked in managerial roles, 74.9 per cent in skilled positions and 13.1 per 
cent in non-skilled positions, mainly in bakeries, canteens or chocolate factories.
145
 
Statistics gathered in individual districts gave a similar impression.
146
  
  
The official version of the re-employment of Leningrad‟s disabled veterans sits 
uncomfortably alongside the popular myths of street clearance and Valaam. If 
Leningrad‟s social security officials and employers were so effective at reintegrating 
disabled veterans, why were war invalids begging on street corners, railway stations and 
other public spaces? What were the basis of rumours about unproductive war-invalids 
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being cleared from the streets and exiled to isolated locations such as Valaam if disabled 
veterans were so successfully employed? Clearly there was a gulf between official 
statements about care and attention for disabled veterans, and individuals‟ experience. 
The boundaries between propaganda rhetoric and reported information were not always 
clear. Just as disability classifications failed to reflect the physical and psychological 
impact of war upon soldiers, official statistics and pronouncements poorly reflected war 
invalids‟ social position. 
 
Medical Assistance 
 
 Leningrad was one of the most important medical centers in the Soviet Union. 
The city was home to major hospitals, medical research institutes and teaching 
institutions, pharmaceutical factories and prosthetics workshops. Here, perhaps more 
than any other Soviet city, disabled veterans expected to receive good medical care. 
Detailed plans to provide Leningrad‟s war invalids with the best of care were drawn up. 
There was, in theory, a dedicated doctor in every raion responsible for registering war 
invalids and overseeing their treatment. District nurses were also made responsible for 
visiting war invalids at home, and acting as liaison between polyclinics, hospitals, social 
security offices and other organizations.
147
 At least 1000 hospitals beds were earmarked 
for treating disabled veterans. Medical research institutes were to assist in treating 
difficult cases.
148
 Special surgeries were to be created to exclusively serve the war 
disabled. Each district was to establish a specially-equipped polyclinic to offer treatment 
to disabled veterans. Health centres were to be organized at large workplaces where the 
war disabled would be given priority treatment and specialist treatment.
149
 
 
 Plans to organize medical care for disabled veterans, just like the project to 
create a central hospital in Leningrad, were drawn up in a bureaucratic bubble detached 
from the realities of life in a war ravaged city. Medical infrastructure, like everything 
else, had been extensively damaged. According to one estimate seventy-eight per cent 
of Leningrad‟s hospitals were “knocked out of commission” during the siege.150 193 
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medical institutions were damaged or destroyed in the Leningrad oblast.
151
 
Approximately ninety per cent of the sanatoria network on the Baltic coast around 
Sestoretsk and Zelenogorsk were destroyed.
152
 The estimated cost of repairing the 
damage to medical institutions in the City and Oblast together exceeded one hundred 
million roubles.
153
 From 1944 onwards great efforts were made to rebuild the healthcare 
system in and around Leningrad.
154
 According to Professor Mashanskii virtually all 
medical institutions which had not been totally destroyed had been put in order by 
January 1946.
155
 In reality the reconstruction of clinics and hospitals, like the rebuilding 
of housing, factories and basic infrastructure, would take several more years. According 
to Vakser it was not until 1950 that the number of hospitals, total number of beds and 
number of doctors per 10,000 citizens approached pre-war levels.
156
  
 
Reconstruction did not necessarily result in improving healthcare standards. 
Across the Soviet Union medical facilities were poorly equipped, faced chronic 
shortages of drugs, medical supplies and trained staff. Although the lack of resources 
was most crippling in rural areas, the standard of care in large cities was often 
abysmal.
157
 Between 1941 and 1945 the Soviet Union relied heavily upon American 
imports of basic medicines, such as aspirin, codeine and sulphanilamides. Emerging 
Cold War tensions ended American support. The result was a national shortage of 
essentials such as glucose, boric acid, castor oil and painkillers. There were shortages of 
almost all basic materials and equipment; including soap, syringes, needles and other 
instruments.
158
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Neither were many medical professionals highly trained specialists with years of 
medical training behind them. Many surgeons, doctors and nurses acquired their 
training in a „hands-on‟ fashion on the frontlines. As Burton has argued the post-war 
programme of assessing doctors‟ and surgeons‟ qualifications revealed low levels of 
medical competence, and the need for remedial training.
159
 Dealing with large numbers 
of amputations and ballistic injuries gave many doctors and nurses valuable experience, 
but hastily trained staff were not always equipped for civilian practice. There was a 
difference between patching up injured soldiers on the battlefield and diagnosing illness 
and disease in a clinical setting. Contrary to the view that the late Stalinist health service 
worked well, an argument sometimes offered by nostalgic veterans, medicine was a low 
priority.  
 
On 20 July 1946 a Sovnarkom resolution approved the Leningrad city soviet‟s 
request to establish a new hospital for Great Patriotic War invalids.
160
 In August the 
local press celebrated the hospital‟s imminent opening. The facility was envisaged as 
one of the largest institutions devoted to the care and treatment of disabled veterans in 
the Soviet Union. It was to boast the very latest Soviet technology, and to have brand 
new surgical, orthopaedic, neurosurgical, maxillofacial and tubercular wards.
161
 The 
hospital was to be located on the Fontanka, in the grand neo-classical buildings of the 
former Catherine Institute. This placed the hospital at the very heart of the city, just a 
few hundred meters from the Anchikov bridge and Nevskii prospect. Today the 
imposing building houses the newspaper collection of the National Library of Russia. In 
many ways this hospital‟s history was a microcosm of the provision of medical services 
for Leningrad‟s disabled veterans. The project was characterized by grand ambitions 
and lofty goals, as well as delays, inadequate funding, material shortages and 
disappointments; factors which characterized the treatment of Leningrad‟s disabled 
veterans more generally.  
 
 A crumbling early nineteenth-century palace was hardly a suitable place for a 
prestigious rehabilitative institution. Prior to August 1946 the building had housed 
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evacuation hospital number 2012. Staff demobilized from the military medical service 
were recruited to work for the new civilian institution.
162
 Much of the building was in a 
state of disrepair. It was not a suitable building to provide the first-rate care described in 
the press. In mid October 1946, six weeks after the building had been transferred to the 
new hospital, its new director Nikolai Shatalov submitted an angry report to the head of 
Leningrad‟s Health Department, Professor Mashanskii. Shalatov described the 
condition of the building as “catastrophic”. The roof was so badly damaged that water 
was leaking through to the ground floor. Only half of the windows were glazed. 
Shortages of plywood meant that unglazed windows were not boarded up. The 
building‟s plumbing and heating systems had not been repaired. The lack of running 
water was a serious problem for a building intended to have surgical wards and in which 
hygiene should have been a priority.
163
 Despite Shalatov‟s demands for immediate 
improvements the hospital was not fully operational for months. In November 1946 a 
hospital for scarlet fever patients was temporarily organized in the building.
164
 It took 
another year before the planned 750 beds for disabled veterans were in regular use. In 
1950 the building passed to the public library. The hospital moved from its central 
location to a purpose-built building in the Nevskii district, on the edge of the city.
165
  
 
Abysmal conditions were not unusual. Stories of an isolated colony on Valaam 
were plausible because other isolated residential homes for seriously disabled veterans, 
without families or friends to support them, were established in the Leningrad oblast. 
According to official plans 1275 residential places for disabled veterans should have 
been established by 1945. By January 1946 only 657 places were made available.
166
 A 
year later the number of places had barely increased.
167
 Condition in these dom invalidov 
were reminiscent of those on Valaam. In January 1946 a conference of directors of these 
institutions met to discuss the heartless treatment of disabled veterans in their care.
168
 
Doma invalidov were dirty, cold and dark, and in need of urgent repair. They resembled 
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dumping grounds for vulnerable individuals on the margins of society, rather than 
therapeutic institutions. Bedding and clothing were rarely washed or changed. There 
were shortages of the most basic medical supplies, such as iodine and pain killers. Few 
had sufficient staff to care for residents.
169
 Soboleva, head of the oblast Social Security 
administration, described conditions as follows:  
“People don‟t live in human conditions, but in cattle-like (skotskii) 
conditions; and everyone an invalid of the Patriotic War. I assure you 
comrades that even in the most difficult times of the blockade troops living 
in dugouts on the Leningrad front didn‟t live in such conditions as they now 
live, since they became invalids.”170 
 
There were also allegations that the directors of some of the region‟s residential 
homes had been dismissed and prosecuted for embezzling funds intended for the care of 
disabled residents.171 Soboleva and other delegates repeatedly reminded directors of their 
responsibilities towards „living people‟ in their care.172 The attitude of staff to vulnerable 
disabled veterans was shocking. War invalids were treated with suspicion, as little better 
than thieves rather than as people who spilt their blood defending the nation. A callous 
and uncaring attitude was endemic. Soboleva reminded delegates that just because a 
veteran had lost a leg did not mean that they were different from other people. Such 
attitudes only reinforced disabled veterans‟ anxieties about their place in society. She 
counselled patience and understanding: “We must understand in them (war invalids) 
their feeling of worthlessness, in order that they may feel themselves to be useful 
members of society, rather than parasites.”173 Her enraged pleas were heartfelt, but had 
little impact in a society in which disability was stigmatized. 
 
The same accusations of neglecting disabled veterans‟ real needs were made 
against officials in the prosthetics industry. Inattentive members of staff were accused of 
making basic errors including producing limbs that were too short, issuing right arms 
instead of left arms, or glass eyes that did not match the other eye‟s colour. Another 
veteran wrote to Leningradskaia pravda about inattentive technicians and medical staff.  
“The employees of the factory have forgotten that they are dealing with 
living people, and are only concerned with somehow knocking together a 
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prosthesis. Whether it is suitable for him, or whether the invalid is able to 
walk on it, little interests them. The limb prepared for me was significantly 
longer than it needed to be. The fitting is too wide. But it would have been 
easy to avoid it while I was being measured the technician and doctor had 
paid the necessary attention.”174 
 
Such problems were not uniquely Soviet. In Britain in 1945 there were severe delays in 
supplying artificial limbs. It could take over three months for an artificial leg to be 
supplied.
175
 Modern warfare‟s capacity to injure has rarely matched medicine‟s ability to 
treat veterans. 
 
Soviet prosthetic limbs were heavy, lacked durability and required regular 
maintenance and replacement. Complaints about their quality were frequently printed in 
the national and local press.
176
 In June 1946, for example, the editorial office of 
Leningradskaia pravda conducted a raid of the city‟s prosthetics industry and invited 
proposals for improvements.
177
 Leningrad‟s prosthetics‟ research institute was accused 
by official investigations of ignoring to fit and balance limbs.  
“Because of the foolish use of prosthetics and bad fitting of prosthetics to 
stumps invalids often receive injuries and lose blood even within the 
institute‟s clinic, which could lead to repeat operations, further shortening of 
limbs, lengthy periods of hospitalization and which arouse justified 
complaints about heartless treatment amongst patients.”178 
 
Amputees found wearing artificial limbs extremely painful. Grimachev, a veteran 
employed at the Kirov factory, found the discomfort of his artificial legs more 
exhausting than his work.
179
 The crude design of artificial limbs affected all people with 
disabilities, but Leningrad‟s veterans expected better. Prosthetics were not just about 
applying modern technology to damaged bodies in order to create the new Soviet 
person. Nor were they about the best interests of the individual. Their purpose was to 
make the injuries of war invisible. Just as in Britain after the First World War; 
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“Prosthetics were intended to make it possible for those who wore them and those who 
saw them to forget the trauma of amputation.”180 Prosthetics were intended to suppress 
the memories of war prompted by empty sleeves, eye patches or crutches, and 
protecting late Stalinist society‟s squeamish aesthetic sensibilities.181 With post-war 
society retreating into a cosy domestic world of rubber plants, pink-lampshades, waxed 
parquet floors and net curtains, as Vera Dunham argued, there was little room for 
deformed and mutilated bodies.
182
    
 
  By August 1945 there were 19,486 disabled veterans registered with 
Leningrad‟s polyclinics. 11,766 were actively receiving medical treatment. Over 15,000 
were receiving special ration packs.
183
 The number grew rapidly. By mid June 1946 the 
social security officials had record of 48,667 war invalids in Leningrad. 33,511 of these 
were registered with polyclinics. 20,241 required surgery.
184
 Between January and 
November 1946 war invalids made 145,887 visits to polyclinics. Approximately 22,055 
physiotherapy consultations had taken place in polyclinics. 3528 disabled veterans had 
been hospitalized, spending on average between 30 and 90 days on the wards. Hospitals 
conducted 2796 operations and 39,026 physiotherapy sessions with disabled veterans.
185
 
Many amputees required further operations to neaten their stumps, or to stop the spread 
of infection. Shrapnel and bullet wounds had a tendency to reopen and required regular 
sterilization and redressing. Veterans paralyzed by spinal or brain injuries required full-
time care for the rest of their lives. Tens of thousands of veterans needed prosthetic 
limbs, customized shoes, artificial eyes, hearing aids, crutches and walking sticks. 
Disabled veterans represented a major drain on local medical resources.  
 
Leningrad‟s war invalids could not rely on being at the front of the queue for 
medical care. Even when their needs were prioritized or were the product of special 
initiatives treatment was inadequate. Official documents reveal that polyclinics, doctors‟ 
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surgeries and other clinics often failed to provide disabled veterans with basic care.
186
 
Some housebound group I invalids were visited by social security officials or nurses less 
than once a month. Other disabled veterans were asked to pay for their medication.
187
 
On 15 May 1946 members of the executive committee of the Leningrad soviet discussed 
progress in the treatment of war invalids. Approximately 850 beds had been earmarked 
for disabled veterans in ten different institutions. Delegates complained that this was 
inadequate for treating tens of thousands of war invalids. Bed turnover was extremely 
slow, since many patients required treatments exceeding three months. One delegate 
complained that patients refused to leave hospital. 100 heavily injured group II and III 
war invalids, who were not native Leningraders, were transferred from military hospitals 
to civilian hospitals in the city. They refused to leave hospital, despite having finished 
their treatment, until they were issued with prosthetic limbs, crutches or walking 
sticks.
188
 Other delegates feared that the lifting of restrictions on entry to the city in the 
summer of 1946 would attract a further influx of disabled veterans, and increase the 
strain on medical services.
189
 In 1947 a similar meeting of the city soviet executive 
committee acknowledged that; “The influx of invalids into Leningrad is a serious 
problem.”190  
 
The demand for medical care would have been significantly higher if all those 
veterans requiring treatment had sought it. A report from June 1946 estimated that only 
fifteen to twenty per cent of disabled veterans were actually receiving treatment.
191
 
Propaganda and educational work was suggested as a means of encouraging disabled 
veterans to seek treatment. The executive committee of the Pargolovskii district soviet 
recommended that the district newspaper Leninskoe slovo reported on the treatment and 
retraining of disabled veterans.
192
 Vechernii Leningrad published several articles 
reporting remarkable improvement in surgery, and stories of veterans recovering their 
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health after successful operations.
193
 These were intended to reassure veterans about the 
quality of care and the ways surgery could transform their lives. However, the brutality 
of wartime military medicine, when amputations were routinely conducted without 
anesthetics, hardly reassured veterans about civilian medicine. The filth, endemic 
shortages and humiliations of hospital life were also an important deterrent. Few 
patients with any choice opted to stay in hospital. There were reports of in-patients 
fleeing the wards, and even people with head injuries refusing surgery.
194
 Some health 
officials, however, had other explanations. In May 1947 Professor Mashinskii expressed 
concern that disabled veterans were deliberately avoiding treatment, because they feared 
that medical treatment might improve their condition sufficiently to endanger their 
pensions and other privileges.
195
 This was not a realistic motive.  But it does highlight 
that even officials responsible for improving medical provision, considered war invalids 
to be shirkers sponging off the state.  
 
Psychological Trauma 
 
Late Stalinist society tended to treat war‟s injuries as purely physical. The 
typical image of Great Patriotic War invalids in propaganda and archival sources is that 
of a male amputee who had lost one, perhaps two limbs. As Krylova writes; 
“Circumscribed within the limits of a physiological paradigm the party press presented 
the war legacy as readily remedied by means of reconstructive surgery and high-quality 
false limbs.”196 Amputation, of course, was the most common reason for disability 
amongst veterans, but the cost of war was more complicated. Red Army soldiers 
suffered virtually every conceivable form of injury and illness, including blindness, 
deafness, disfigurement and mental trauma. Historians of Soviet Second World War 
veterans, however, have tended to echo the official discourse and equate war‟s disabling 
effects with physical disability. Edele and Fieseler, for example, both concentrate upon 
the damage done to ex-servicemen‟s bodies, and the social and economic effects 
physical disability had on their future lives. They have little to say about damaging 
psychological effects of modern warfare, and the ways that war traumas shaped 
veterans‟ post-war lives. In part this is a reflection of the archival record. Official 
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sources were primarily concerned about physical disability, and had little to say about 
the possible mental damage caused by exposure to mass killing and extreme violence. 
By concentrating on war invalids‟ interaction with employers, pensioning bodies and 
welfare organisation much of the existing historiography replicates the Stalinist 
regime‟s own restrictive definition of disability. Just as the disability classification 
system underestimated the true extent of physical disability; it gave little recognition to 
the enormous psychological cost of modern industrialized warfare.  
 
Few historians, with the notable exception of Merridale, have questioned how 
far Soviet veterans were affected by the horrific things they experienced. Seniavskaia‟s 
ground-breaking research into frontoviki‟s psychology has little to say about the 
traumatic effects of combat, perhaps not surprising given her patriotic stance.
197
 
Seniavskaia suggests that the “frontline generation” found the war largely a positive 
experience. Extreme situations created strong characters capable of independent 
decisions and a freethinking attitude towards the Stalinist state, rather than personalities 
traumatised by violence and mass death.
198
 Even important recent research on Soviet 
military psychiatry, written by specialists in this field, has done little to prompt interest 
into post-war trauma amongst Soviet veterans.
199
 Since historians of demobilization 
have proved so reluctant to approach these complicated issues, the old Soviet myth that 
the Red Army was immune to the psychological and psychiatric problems that affected 
other armies and societies has been established by default. Much of the existing 
literature continues to stereotype veterans as either the positive heroes of Soviet 
propaganda, or as faceless unthinking brutes, who lacked the emotional and moral 
makeup of western soldiers, an image peddled in the west during the Cold War. 
 
The lack of research about the traumatic effects of the Great Patriotic War on 
Soviet veterans contrasts dramatically with the scholarship of other twentieth-century 
veterans. In recent years cultural historians of warfare have become obsessed with 
trauma. The traumatic effects of combat upon soldiers of modern twentieth-century 
warfare are the subject of a vast and ever expanding literature. Historians continue to be 
fascinated by the study of war-neuroses, shell-shock, combat fatigue, post-traumatic 
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stress disorder and military psychiatry. Much has been written about the psychiatric 
casualties of both World Wars and the Vietnam War. However, the idea that all soldiers 
were irreparably scarred by their wartime experiences has increasingly been questioned. 
As Bourke argues; “The emphasis on emotional breakdown and psychiatric illness has 
obscured the fact that most men coped remarkably well with the demands being made 
upon them in wartime.”200 Despite these important reservations the idea that modern 
warfare was inherently traumatic has entered the western cultural mainstream. The 
coining of the term post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the mid 1970s has labelled 
any event outside the range of usual human experience, which could be considered 
markedly distressing to almost anyone, as potentially traumatic. Indeed, in modern 
usage the word “trauma” has become detached from its original meanings, and is 
applied to almost any uncomfortable or disquieting experience.  
 
War trauma requires careful treatment. As Ben Shephard argues, every war is 
different. Each and every conflict is a unique confluence of social, cultural, economic, 
political, military and medical factors, which affect how war trauma is diagnosed and 
treated. Different social attitudes to fear, madness and social obligation all influenced 
the role or military psychology and even the symptoms diagnosed.
201
 Consequently 
research which tries to anachronistically apply the symptoms of PTSD to civilians or 
combatants in World War II, as Förster and Beck attempt, is fraught with 
methodological problems.
202
 Assumptions about the universality of war trauma should 
be guarded against. Although virtually every Soviet citizen experienced anguish, fear, 
shock, depression and exhaustion during and after the war, this was not the same as 
genuine psychological disorder.
203
  
 
Culture, as Merridale has so persuasively argued, has a major role to play in the 
identification and treatment of war trauma, and even the individual‟s willingness to seek 
help. Different societies respond to trauma in different ways. Russian and Soviet 
responses to trauma illustrate this point particularly clearly. Attitudes towards trauma 
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have changed over time. While ideas about the psychological origin of shell-shock 
briefly held sway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the end of the 
1920s Soviet society had developed very different attitudes towards individual 
trauma.
204
 By the start of the Great Patriotic War the myth that Soviet, and Russian 
soldiers in particular, were immune from the war neuroses which plagued the decadent 
bourgeois west was firmly established. It was believed that Russian culture offered a 
superior framework for dealing with extreme events. The myth was that almost all 
Russians survived the war without suffering crippling mental trauma.
205
 The image of 
the stoic hero has proved as immoveable as the gigantic war monuments that 
immortalised these ideas in stone and bronze. Undoubtedly, the sense that soldiers had 
been engaged in a collective battle for survival had a role in minimising trauma. But the 
minds of Red Army soldiers were no more immune to psychiatric damage than their 
bodies were immune from shells and bullets. In serving their country Soviet soldiers 
had to be prepared to not only sacrifice life and limb, but also their nerves. 
 
Although there was little official recognition of war‟s psychological effects in 
the first five years after 1945, or for that matter in subsequent decades, Soviet soldiers 
did suffer psychological and psychiatric difficulties before and after their 
demobilization. Towards the war‟s end, Soviet psychiatrists found themselves 
overwhelmed by war-related trauma and unequipped to deal with them.
206
 According to 
Gabriel approximately 100,000 active soldiers eventually became permanent psychiatric 
casualties.
207
 Yet as Wanke argues the number of neuropsychiatric casualties was 
almost certainly grossly under-estimated. Only soldiers who reached treatment centres 
had the opportunity for diagnosis. Many soldiers already broken by trauma would have 
been killed in the frontline carnage, or even executed under the notorious Order 
No.227.
208
  
 
The disparity in the levels of mental trauma in the Red Army and its allies are 
worth noting. In some combat theatres approximately one third of British servicemen 
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evacuated from the frontlines were suffering from mental trauma.
209
 According to other 
estimates between twenty to fifty per cent of British casualties sustained between 1939-
45 were psychiatric.
210
 In America, where follow up studies of veterans were at their 
most sophisticated, there were 475,397 patients with neuropsychiatric disabilities 
claiming pensions from the Veterans Administration (VA) by 1947. In addition by 1945 
there were 50,662 World War II veterans with neuropsychiatric disorders in VA 
hospitals.
211
 The estimated level of Soviet psychiatric casualties was so low it suggests 
that only acute mental illness such as schizophrenia was accepted as genuinely 
disabling.
212
 Only one percent of veterans passing through Leningrad‟s VTEKi between 
July 1945 and June 1946 were diagnosed with psychiatric disabilities.
213
 In 1946 just 
3670 soldiers and former soldiers underwent psychiatric assessment.
214
 
 
 The evidence that Leningrad‟s veterans suffered traumatic reactions as a result 
of their wartime service is abundant. Trauma was much closer to the surface in 
Leningrad than any other Soviet city. There was no shortage of triggers for traumatic 
memory amidst the rubble. Veterans settling in Leningrad were rejoining a community 
with its own claims to have been traumatized by the horrors of total warfare. The 
blockade had generated its own forms of nervous reaction. In 1948 a group of 
Leningrad doctors observed a phenomenon called Leningrad hypertension. This was 
primarily the product of nervous-psychological trauma, combined with dietary 
deficiencies. The report noted the most obvious traumatic reactions were more common 
amongst victims of bombardment and shelling rather than starvation.215 Reports of 
trauma amongst blockade survivors had mixed implications for veterans. Ex-servicemen 
returned to a community where doctors, and society in general, were more familiar with 
and experienced in dealing with nervous disorders. This, however, does not appear to 
have lessened the stigma attached to mental disorder. If anything it increased 
competition for extremely limited psychiatric help, with civilians often taking priority 
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over soldiers. The number of casualties simply overwhelmed the psychiatric care 
system. 
 
Saint Petersburg/Leningrad had a long history as the leading research centre for 
military psychology and psychiatry. Psychiatrists‟ had been studying traumatic 
responses to the battlefield here from the late nineteenth century. A Saint Petersburg 
school of psychiatry, which included V.M. Bekhterev, the father of Russian psychiatry, 
was amongst the first institutions to explore the role of external factors, rather the 
body‟s internal processes, in mental illness. Bekhterev argued that degeneration of the 
nervous system was the result of stress, injury and disease. In 1893 he was appointed 
the Chair of Psychiatry and Nervous Disorders at the Military Medical Academy. In 
1913 he resigned this position and established a Psycho-neurological Institute which 
would eventually become the Bekhterev institute. By the 1930s these two institutions, 
the Military-Medical Academy and the Bekhterev Institute, dominated Soviet military 
psychology.
216
 Both institutions studied the psychological impact of the Great Patriotic 
War upon the Red Army. Although the archives of the Military-Medical Academy 
remain closed to researchers, parts of the archives of the Bekhterev Institute are open. 
The institute invested a great deal in studying wartime neuro-psychiatric disturbances. 
Its published proceedings contained many abstracts summarising research projects 
studying the effects of head or brain damage, and their connection with depression and 
trauma.
217
 Internal unpublished research reports, preserved in the archive, provide an 
insight into the sorts of traumatic reactions researchers in Leningrad were observing.  
 
Of particular interest are research papers exploring the functional problems 
caused by shell-shock (voennaia kontuziia) written between 1947-1950. These 
documents, however, present a complicated, sometimes contradictory, impression of 
what researchers thought they were observing. This of course was not the first time that 
the Bekhterev Institute and its researchers had studied shell-shock and war trauma. 
Krylova argues that; “The cohort of Soviet psychiatrists who came to dominate the 
profession in the 1940s was unfamiliar with psychological explanatory frameworks.”218 
This seems unlikely in the case of the Bekhterev Institute, the senior staff of which 
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would almost certainly familiar with psychological explanations of trauma, having been 
trained in the 1910s or 1920s, perhaps even researching war trauma themselves. But 
there were strict limits to what could be said about the damaging psychiatric effects of 
war in the late 1940s. One senses that the writers of both internal documents and 
published proceedings were carefully navigating a tortuous theoretical path, between 
official thinking and their own observations. 
 
 Some research documents denied a link between traumatic war experiences and 
mental illness. The clearest statement of this position came in the manuscript of a 
pamphlet written by E.S. Averbukh with the title; What every doctor needs to know 
about psychiatric illness and treating psychiatric illnesses in wartime conditions. This 
was intended as a primer for frontline hospitals, evacuation hospitals and civilian 
doctors encountering forms of mental disturbance. It was written before 1946 and most 
probably before the war‟s end. Averbukh argued that; 
 
“During past wars several psychiatrists thought that special „war hysteria‟ 
existed. Now we know that in wartime special psychoses do not arise, rather 
those syndromes and forms which are common in peacetime continue to 
occur, but owing to wartime peculiarities the ratio of different illnesses 
changes, and what is more the manifestation of (mental) illness quite often 
takes on a specific nuance, significantly different from peacetime.”219     
 
Other researchers agreed that although there were differences in the pathology of 
peacetime and wartime psychological disorders, there was no such thing as “war 
psychosis” and “war hysteria”.220 F.I. Grinstein and A.Z. Rosenberg argued that older 
research describing unique forms of “war psychosis” lacked evidence. But they 
concluded their own research with the equivocal statement that; “although particular 
„war psychoses‟ do not exist, military situations create special conditions where some 
psychiatric syndromes which are rarely encountered in peacetime become more 
prominent.”221   
 
 Despite arguing that specific forms of “war psychosis” did not exist, researchers 
at the Bekhterev institute recorded a wide array of traumatic symptoms that in other 
societies would have been attributed to shell-shock, battle-fatigue or PTSD. Averbukh 
suggested that doctors could expect to encounter symptoms associated with disruption 
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of normal mental functions, such as memory loss, poor concentration or confused 
thinking. They might also encounter soldiers suffering from hallucinations, heightened 
emotions, paranoia, mania or dementia.
222
  
 
Individual case histories explored the symptoms experienced by veterans, the 
circumstances in which they developed, the course of treatment prescribed and details 
about their recovery. M.M. Mirskaia conducted a research project examining delayed or 
long-term psychiatric disturbances amongst people who had suffered head or brain 
injuries, most commonly as a result of the physical effects of shell-shock (kontuziia). 
The project sampled 120 cases, the majority of which were men between the ages of 
twenty-five and forty and therefore presumably soldiers.
223
 The case history of patient 
Sh-ik, a thirty-nine year old man, indicated the sheer variety of symptoms that 
researchers encountered. On 5 November 1943 Sh-ik was shell-shocked and admitted to 
the Bekhterev institute on 15 November 1943. Initially he suffered heightened emotions 
and a heightened physical state, as well as a loss of hearing. He was constantly hungry 
and thirsty. He would drink up to eight mugs of beer in rapid succession and smoke four 
or five cigarettes at the same time. By the time he was admitted to the institute this 
manic phase had passed. He was sluggish, drowsy, suffering memory loss and his 
mental faculties had slowed. His speech could also be blocked by a tightening of his 
lips, teeth and tongue. He was emotionally withdrawn, remaining in bed for long 
periods and taking no interest in his personal hygiene. He became obsessed with ideas 
that, “nobody loved him, that he was unwanted, and that he was a hindrance to 
everybody.”224 
 
 Another research report described forms of trauma recorded amongst soldiers 
fighting in the Winter War against the Finns. Patient P-v, a twenty-five year-old soldier, 
was admitted to hospital in January 1940. He had seen fierce fighting between 25 and 
31 December 1939, not sleeping during this period of intense activity. After the battle 
he fell into a deep sleep in which he experienced nightmares about combat. When he 
awoke he began behaving strangely, and was unable to readjust.
225
 Kr-ov, a twenty-four 
year-old soldier, was wounded in the neck and admitted to hospital, where medics 
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observed psychiatric disturbances. He began to confuse his dreams and reality, claiming 
that he had been awarded a medal by Stalin. At times during his hospitalization he 
would become agitated and confused and ask about his medal and other gifts from the 
vozhd‟.226 Twenty-three year old T-v had been injured by a grenade exploding in a 
dugout. Although his physical scars healed well his mental scars were deeper. 
Obsessive fears of death and blood infection prevented him from sleeping. Deprived of 
sleep his behaviour became increasingly disturbed. He feared that he might be punished 
and was concerned that he was being poisoned.
227
 Several instances of traumatic 
reactions to the loss of extremities or amputations as a result of frostbite were noted; 
something which researchers recalled observing during the First World War.
228
 K-ov 
had lost a foot and several toes on the other to frostbite. The injury transformed his 
behaviour. He became withdrawn and slept badly. By the time he arrived at hospital he 
was depressed, suspicious and increasingly fearful that he would be shot for leaking 
military secrets in his letters home.
229
 
 
 Although there were suggestions that fear played a role in stimulating traumatic 
reactions, researchers at the Bekhterev institute clung steadfastly to physical 
explanations for mental breakdown. Psychiatric conditions were believed to have 
organic or materialist causes. Mental breakdown in the armed services was considered 
to be the product of either physical brain damage or the sustained weakening of the 
nervous system prompted by physical exhaustion. In his manual Averbukh explained 
that shell-shock was the result of the explosive force of modern shells, bombs and 
mines, which shook the brain though rapid changes in atmospheric pressure and 
functional changes in the operation of the central nervous system.
230
 Other researchers 
argued that prolonged periods of heightened anxiety, stress and exertion gradually 
weakened soldiers‟ nervous systems making them more susceptible to breakdown or 
psychiatric disturbance.
231
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Such ideas were not unique to Soviet science. In Britain during and after the 
First World War, there were heated debates about the aetiology of shell-shock. 
Respected psychiatrists like Frederick Mott, who treated shell-shock patients at the 
Maudsley Hospital in south London, argued that blindness, deafness, mutism, paralysis 
and other symptoms were the product of structural or pathological changes in the central 
nervous system.
232
 Indeed, Soviet psychiatry‟s organic fixation upon the physical 
effects of contusion bears a striking resemblance to what the US military has labelled 
mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) amongst Iraq war veterans, and is presently 
investing millions of research dollars to examine.
233
 
 
 Less severe symptoms of war trauma were observed outside of the academy. 
Nightmares plagued many veterans for the rest of their lives.
234
 Other soldiers 
experienced the same survivors‟ guilt which affected soldiers of other conflicts. Trauma 
could manifest itself as; irritability, aggression, violence and alcohol dependency. There 
were also instances of suicides amongst war veterans. K.I. Ozerov, a metal worker 
recently demobilized from the army was discovered to have committed suicide on 2 
November 1946.
235
 Six days later Mikhailov, a demobilized soldier working in a menial 
position in a construction team, left the hostel where he was living. Two days later he 
was found hanging in one of the buildings he had been helping to rebuild.
236
 The extent 
of suicide, however, is unclear. In the 1920s the Soviet military had undertaken a 
systematic study of all acts of suicide in the ranks and amongst officers, and had 
attempted to reconstruct the circumstances of each suicide.
237
 This does not appear to 
have been the case after 1945. If investigations were made into post-war suicide they 
are not currently available to historians.  
 
The sensitivity around subjects with the capacity to tarnish the heroic memory of 
the war, such as trauma or suicide, is as strong as ever. Outside of a small circle of 
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psychiatrists manifestations of war trauma were ignored, denied or met by a collective 
silence. As the bombastic patriotic cult of the Great Patriotic War gradually emerged it 
was almost impossible to find an acceptable language to discuss the fear, horror and 
trauma of wartime experiences. As Merridale writes, “After a few years of numb 
silence, the only acceptable account of one‟s war was the one which could be shared in 
the singing of patriotic songs, the exchange of endurance stories, and the solemn 
commemoration of the heroic dead.”238  
 
Soldiers and ex-servicemen who fell ill without any clear physical explanation 
were unlikely to get help. Military doctors at the front rarely had the expertise or 
experience to deal with these problems. During the war the priority for Soviet military 
psychiatrists was to restore soldiers to fighting fitness as quickly as possible, not 
minimise long-term problems. The organic understanding of disability suggested a 
straightforward course of treatment. If psychiatric disorders were the product of run-
down nervous systems, then they could be remedied by rest and proper nutrition.
239
 The 
target was to return patients to active service within days, and certainly within three 
weeks.
240
 Soldiers not recovering within prescribed timescales might receive more 
invasive or aggressive treatments. Patients might be drugged with insulin, alcohol, 
anaesthetics or barbiturates to induce sleep. In extreme cases surgical interventions were 
developed.
241
 There were even instances of punitive tests, including simulated 
drowning, to detect cases of soldiers faking their symptoms.
242
 Disregard for 
psychological factors in the diagnosis of mental disorders inevitable resulted in their 
exclusion from treatment.
243
 
 
Things were little better once soldiers re-entered civilian life. In 1946 
Leningrad‟s psychiatric hospital No.2, located on the Moika embankment, had 360 
beds. In the course of the year the hospital treated just 110 war invalids.
244
 The 
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Bekhterev institute was primarily concerned with theoretical research, rather than 
offering practical clinical help. Of the 405 beds available in its clinic just 60 were 
reserved for treating disabled veterans.
245
 The institute also organized lectures, 
discussions and meetings with war invalids and their families which disseminated 
research findings and suggested prophylactic psychiatric treatments for depression. Yet 
such initiatives did little to address the deep underlying psychological problems 
affecting Leningraders.
246
 Conditions in Leningrad‟s psychiatric institutions were even 
lower than in hospitals for war invalids, and the forms of treatment often more 
draconian than in doma invalidov. In July 1946 the Leningrad city health department 
issued a series of instructions designed to counter an increase in the number of patients 
escaping from psychiatric institutions.
247
 The 1946 annual report for psychiatric hospital 
No.2 noted escape attempts, but asserted that there were no serious accidents resulting 
from escape attempts and all patients had been found.
248
 Euphemistic references to 
avoiding accidents and confiscating dangerous items stolen from work therapy 
workshops suggested that attempted suicide was a problem.
249
 Horrific conditions were 
not restricted to Leningrad. A psychiatrist working at a psychiatric hospital for war 
veterans in Moscow wrote to the Russian Ministry of State Control in June 1945, 
complaining about that the sanitary condition of the hospital, the lack of stimulation for 
patients and their neglected condition.
250
  
 
The psychological and psychiatric effects of war were largely ignored. Faced 
with such appalling conditions few veterans wished to pursue treatment if it identified 
them as victims. Most veterans had to get on with their lives, and find their own ways of 
coping. Much of this was familiar from the treatment of psychiatric casualties in other 
armies and conflicts. The history of European and North American armies‟ attempts to 
deal with trauma is littered with examples of soldiers being treated with suspicion and 
                                                 
245
  Miasishcheva (ed.), Nauchnaia deiatel‟nost psikhonevrologicheskogo instituta, p.122. 
 
246
  Ibid., pp.16-20. 
 
247
  TsGA-SPb/f.9256/op.4/d.491/ll.1-1ob. 
 
248
  TsGA-SPb/f.9156/op.4/d.508/l.10. 
 
249
  TsGA-SPb/f.9156/op.4/d.491/ll.1-1ob. 
 
250
  GARF-RSFSR/f.A-339/op.1/d.1821/ll.1-3ob; for the results of the investigation see GARF-
RSFSR/f.A-339/op.1/d.1821/ll.8-13. 
191 
hostility, of barbaric treatment and the failure of ex-servicemen to obtain the support 
and treatment they so urgently required.
251
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the official memory of the Great Patriotic War came to dominate 
public culture in Stalin‟s last years, many aspects of the war could not be spoken of. 
The reality of bodies torn to shreds, of soldiers driven mad by what they had witnessed, 
and of immense physical and psychological pain were strictly off limits. Disabled 
veterans were caught in a curious position. In theory they were the most privileged and 
honoured group of veterans. In practice state help was rarely able to allow disabled ex-
service personnel to rebuild their lives. All veterans understood that there was a gulf 
between official myths and the reality of demobilization. However for the war disabled 
these disparities were especially apparent.  
 
 Disabled veterans‟ real needs were frequently ignored. In Leningrad 
representatives of the party-state were interested in disability as a barrier to entering the 
workforce, and as a drain on the region‟s economic resources. War invalids were 
publicly heralded as heroes who had made enormous sacrifices on the battlefield. Yet 
when they came into contact with pensioning bodies, employers and social security and 
health officials, they found they were treated with suspicion and hostility. The 
prevailing attitude was that war invalids were work-shy shirkers who were inclined to 
cheat the system. In a society where everybody faced enormous challenges in rebuilding 
their lives disabled veterans found themselves pushed to the social margins. Many were 
forced into low status jobs at the bottom of the pay-scale, because they could not 
survive on disability pensions. They were often unable to obtain the level of medical 
treatment they needed or deserved. At best the war disabled were in competition with 
the rest of the population for very limited resources, at worst they were segregated into 
specialist institutions where conditions were horrific. The shameful aspects of war 
invalids‟ demobilization and post-war re-adaptation were never discussed openly. 
Despite the collective attempt to ignore the extent of physical and psychological 
disability, Leningraders were not entirely ignorant of the plight of the war disabled. 
They lived side by side, worked together and came into contact in public spaces. 
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 Against this background of silence and neglect stories of war invalids forcibly 
cleared from the streets and exiled to Valaam were entirely plausible. The disabled were 
often treated as a nuisance and inconvenience. Few would have been surprised if the 
Stalinist state had decided to remove them entirely from urban settings. These stories 
thrived in the space between official rhetoric and mythology, and the harsh reality of 
life in post-war Leningrad. These popular myths spread because they challenged official 
propaganda. They provided a space in which reference to the plight of disabled veterans 
could be made. The myths about Valaam offer a glimpse into forms of collective 
memory which acknowledge that disabled veterans were socially marginalized. The 
manner in which Leningrad‟s war invalids were treated, by both local state 
representative and the population at large, was often shameful. Yet the myths that 
disabled ex-servicemen were cleared from the streets and exiled to isolated locations 
distanced ordinary Leningraders from responsibility for the war invalids‟ post-war 
plight. The blame was heaped on a repressive and uncaring state. In reality, however, 
many Leningraders had failed to treat the war disabled with either compassion or 
respect. Disabled veterans were often an uncomfortable reminder of aspects of the war 
that Leningraders were desperately trying to forget.  
193 
Chapter 4: Demobilization, Crime and Violence 
 
This chapter examines what happened when Leningrad‟s veterans failed to 
reintegrate into mainstream civilian society in the ways envisaged by demobilization 
planners. It explores new archival evidence, much of it never previously seen by 
historians, of ex-servicemen‟s involvement in a criminal sub-culture within the city and 
its periphery. In contrast to the official myth of demobilization, which cast veterans as 
exemplary citizens, many former soldiers were behaving in criminal or socially 
disruptive ways. However, this chapter challenges the idea that veterans of twentieth-
century total warfare, even amidst the extreme violence witnessed on the Eastern Front, 
were brutalized by their experiences. Although mass demobilization coincided with the 
post-war crime wave, violent veterans were not to blame. In the overwhelming majority 
of cases, where ex-servicemen committed crimes, they were not habituated to violence 
or corrupted by military life. But there were individuals who had failed to find a place in 
post-war society.  
 
What was remarkable about crimes committed by Leningrad‟s veterans was the 
silence that surrounded these socially disruptive acts. The almost complete absence of 
fears about the brutalization of veterans amongst ordinary Leningraders and local 
political élites highlights something specific about the community to which ex-
servicemen were returning. Leningraders‟ unique experience of death, violence and 
criminality during the blockade shaped their responses to returning veterans, and the 
threat they posed to social stability. An examination of post-war crime, then, further 
punctures the patriotic myths which claimed that the transition between armed service 
and civilian normality was seamless. More importantly, it reveals a great deal about 
wider social attitudes to violence in a community with a traumatic wartime past, and 
high background levels of violence.   
 
The Brutalization Thesis 
 
Mikhail Klimov
1
, a thirty-two year old frontovik, was demobilized in 1945. He 
found work as a driver (shofer) for a construction trust responsible for building and 
maintaining Leningrad‟s electrical supply system (Lenelektroset‟stroi); appropriate 
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work for somebody who had driven tanks during the war. He settled down to life in the 
Novaia Sergievka, a village in the Vsevolozhskii district, approximately fifteen 
kilometres from the city centre. The job was a good one. Not only did it enable Klimov 
to use skills acquired in the army, it came with perks. Access to a Studebaker lorry, 
imported under lend-lease, offered him the opportunity to earn a second income 
transporting private citizens and their property around the city and countryside. With the 
arrival of hundreds of thousands of demobilized veterans, re-evacuees and migrants 
there was money to be earned by enterprising lorry drivers. On 31 July 1946 Klimov 
„commandeered‟ the lorry in order to make some cash. Things did not go according to 
plan. Part of the load of hay being transported fell underneath the engine, creating a fire 
which quickly engulfed the whole vehicle. Only a few parts were salvageable. When 
this accident came to light Lenelektroset‟stroi officials ordered that Klimov repair the 
vehicle at his own expense. The decision not to prosecute or dismiss Klimov, as would 
have happened in the 1930s, was curious. Perhaps Lenelektroset‟stroi was keen to avoid 
an investigation which might reveal the existence of other rackets in its transport pool, 
or that they had turned a blind eye to employees earning a private income from state 
property.  Yet repairing an American lorry, even on black market profits, was an 
enormous expense for one man.  
 
 On 15 August 1946 Klimov discovered another Studebaker lorry parked in the 
side-streets around the Mal‟tsevskii market, a hot spot for post-war criminality. He 
befriended the vehicle‟s driver, and arranged to be driven to woods on Leningrad‟s 
outskirts two days later, on the pretext of collecting firewood. On the night of 17 August 
Klimov shot his fellow driver with a foreign pistol, kept as a wartime souvenir. Klimov 
stole his papers and the lorry, and then drove to Mga. He spent several days here, fitting 
parts from his fire-damaged lorry to the stolen vehicle. Lenelektroset‟stroi accepted that 
he had repaired the vehicle, and sent him back to work in it. But this was not the end of 
Klimov‟s involvement in the shadow economy. On 9 September 1946, he was 
transporting passengers close to his home, whilst under the influence of alcohol. 
Approximately three kilometres from the village of Koltushi he collided with an 
oncoming lorry. Both vehicles were severely damaged, and the other driver was 
critically injured. Klimov fled, went into hiding and was not finally arrested until 13 
December 1946.
2
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Throughout the twentieth century the idea that the experience of war re-
socialized soldiers to be more accepting of and more proficient at violence has been 
repeatedly asserted. The “Violent Veteran Model” or “Brutalization thesis”, as this idea 
is known, has a simple logic. It suggests that post-war crime waves are the result of 
young men, trained to kill, armed with lethal weapons, returning to communities, with 
which their bonds have been weakened by long periods of enforced separation. Having 
been exposed to mass death and extreme violence on the frontlines the value of human 
life was supposedly diminished in veterans‟ eyes. Therefore, ex-servicemen were more 
prone to criminality and disruptive behaviour than non-combatants.
3
  
 
After both World Wars, to quote the historian Joanna Bourke, “civilians 
expounded frightening prophecies about the violence that would be wreaked upon 
peaceable societies once combatants returned home.” Sociologists, criminologists, 
psychiatrists and historians all suggested that combat developed violent habits amongst 
soldiers; in other words it brutalized them.
4
 Dark fears about post-war brutalization 
were particularly exaggerated in Britain after 1918. Accounts of riots in Luton, Swindon 
and Doncaster, for example, blamed brutalized soldiers and ex-servicemen for sparking 
disturbances. Fears of violent veterans armed with guns were central to the passing of 
the 1920 Firearms Bill, Britain‟s first general gun ownership controls.5 Aggression, 
destructiveness and violence were believed to be inherent to the forms of masculinity 
fostered by the war.
6
 The historian George Mosse went further, arguing that mass death 
on the battlefields of the Great War partially undid the „civilizing process‟ rupturing 
pre-war social norms across Europe. According to Mosse industrialized killing 
cheapened the value of life, creating criminality and political militancy.
7
 
 
Fears of brutalization resurfaced in Britain and America as the Second World 
War drew to a close. In 1944 the American sociologist Willard Waller warned that 
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returning veterans presented one of the gravest social threats facing post-war America. 
Newspapers and popular books expressed concern that veterans would have great 
difficulty readjusting to civilian life. As the social historian Dixon Wecter wrote in 
1944; “A civilian can be licked into shape as a soldier by the manual of arms and a 
drillmaster, but no manual has ever been written for changing him back into a civilian.”8 
Many British civilians likewise doubted how soldiers who had spilt so much blood 
could ever return to normal civilian life.
9
 Criminologists and sociologists predicted an 
upsurge in violent crime.
10
 One researcher questioned whether ex-servicemen would be 
able to abandon the aggressive and destructive impulses essential on the battlefield.  
The Metropolitan Police were deeply concerned about a potential threat from anti-social 
ex-servicemen desensitized to violence.
11
 These ideas gained renewed strength in the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War. The psychiatrist Robert Lifton wrote extensively about a 
habit of rage and violence prevalent amongst alienated veterans. He stressed how 
soldiers habituated to a pattern of violence, would continue to seek outlets for anti-
social and criminal impulses in the years following their demobilization.
12
    
 
Klimov‟s crimes, in contrast, did not provoke fears about violent veterans. The 
murder and the trial proceedings were not reported in the Leningrad press, but were 
hidden from public view. They were all but forgotten. The only trace of the incident is a 
file preserved in the archive of the Leningrad Oblast Court. Placed against a 
comparative background this was unusual. Had the same crimes been committed in 
Britain or America they would almost certainly have attracted greater attention, if not 
notoriety. Questions would have been asked about how far Klimov, and veterans in 
general, had been brutalized by extreme violence. Spectacular examples of veterans 
committing violent crimes provoked moral panics about the effects wartime armed 
service had upon young impressionable men. Late Stalinist public culture, in contrast, 
treated veterans as exemplary citizens, rather than potentially dangerous criminals prone 
to drunkenness and aggression. When veterans were criticized by the state propaganda 
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machine it was to lampoon the ways in which they had become conditioned to military 
jargon and discipline, not violence.
13
 Even in the closed world of top secret police 
investigations, procuracy reports and trial proceedings there was no official concern that 
these crimes were linked to the after-effects of the Great Patriotic War. Yet if the 
brutalization thesis is to be believed Klimov‟s crimes were not isolated incidents, but 
representative of ex-servicemen‟s behaviour more generally.  
 
Leningrad’s Post-war Crime Wave 
 
 One of the central arguments advanced by this Ph.D thesis is that the history of 
demobilization and post-war readjustment in Leningrad has been obscured by myths. 
Collectively-held notions about exemplary veterans, rapid reconstruction and the social 
solidarity between former soldiers and ordinary citizens have obscured darker realities 
about the Great Patriotic War‟s true impact on Leningrad and its inhabitants. Myth-
making has played a particularly important role in shaping the discourse surrounding 
post-war criminality. The extent to which Leningrad was affected by post-war increases 
in crime has largely been hidden from the official narrative of history. Soviet histories 
of Leningrad after 1945 reinforced propaganda myths about the indefatigable spirit of 
the „Hero City‟ and the rapidity of its reconstruction and recovery. This „useable‟ 
version of the past was preferable to confronting the darker realities of the war‟s 
enormous social costs. It also played an important role in diffusing the social tensions 
surrounding post-war criminality in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast.  
 
Research into post-war crime remains a sensitive issue in Russia. In the past 
fifteen years a number of important works about crime and policing in post-war 
Leningrad, many of them written by scholars with privileged access to closed FSB 
archives, have been published.
14
 But, the information they contain has not penetrated 
beyond a relatively small circle of scholars. The myth that Leningrad was a relatively 
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orderly and stable society, despite war‟s aftermath, persists. Attempting to challenge 
this notion is neither easy, nor popular. Much of the most detailed and sensitive 
evidence about the local post-war crime wave remains off limits to western researchers. 
Furthermore, the materials which are available in supposedly „open‟ archives are 
jealously guarded by archivists. The suggestion that demobilized veterans contributed to 
a post-war spike in crime, even in small numbers, was often interpreted as a direct 
affront to soldiers‟ achievements and was met with outright hostility. The attempt to 
highlight the issue of post-war criminality is not intended to impugn Leningraders or 
tarnish the memory of their city‟s heroic wartime sacrifice. Rather, I aim to demonstrate 
that Leningrad experienced a surge in crime in the wake of the Second World War 
comparable to that recorded in Britain or West Germany. As the historian Alan Kramer 
writes; “Descriptions of the daily struggle for survival in the ruined cities, of the crime 
wave, and of the black market, are a standard part of any overall history of post-war 
Western Germany.”15 In contrast crime has been written out of the history of post-war 
Leningrad.     
 
Mass demobilization coincided with a post-war crime wave which swept across 
not only Leningrad and its rural hinterland but much of the Soviet Union. Quarterly 
crime figures for Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast significantly increased from the 
summer of 1945 onwards, when tens of thousands of veterans began arriving in the 
region. The number of crimes recorded between October and December 1946 was 
approximately thirty per cent higher than the previous quarter and nearly double the 
level recorded between January and March 1945.
16
 The bulk of crime in this period, 
approximately sixty to seventy per cent, consisted of forms of theft or robbery, most 
commonly apartment burglaries or pick-pocketing.
17
 Yet there were also dramatic 
increases in violent crimes, such as murder and armed robberies, in 1945 and 1946, 
before gradual reductions in 1947 and 1948, as the local police force gradually regained 
control.
18
 Leningrad‟s experience of post-war crime mirrored a national dynamic. 
According to Burds, armed robbery grew by 236 per cent and banditizm by 547 per cent 
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between 1940 and 1946, with the sharpest increases between 1944 and 1946.
19
 Ministry 
of Interior Figures recorded a steady increase in murder rates from 7131 cases in 1944 
to 10,218 cases in 1946. Robberies increased by twenty per cent between 1944 and 
1945. Steady monthly rises in hooliganism were recorded between October 1945 and 
January 1946.
20
  
 
 Crime statistics, however, are a highly problematic source. In any society rates 
of reported crime and convictions rarely reflect the full extent of criminality. Statistics 
are not a transparent window upon the extent of social problems affecting post-war 
Leningrad. Rather they are a „crooked mirror‟ which reflects incomplete and 
contradictory data about the extent of crime.
21
 Given the difficulties faced by 
Leningrad‟s under-staffed, inexperienced, overworked and ill disciplined police force it 
seems likely that a large proportion of low-level criminality went unnoticed. 
Furthermore, in a political system in which the future elimination of crime was a social 
goal, crime statistics were particularly vulnerable to manipulation. Given Leningrad‟s 
fraught post-war relationship with the political centre in Moscow it was unlikely that 
local officials wanted to highlight quite how chaotic, disorderly, and dangerous daily 
life could be for ordinary Leningraders.
22
  
 
 Veterans returning to, or choosing to settle in post-war Leningrad, were unlikely 
to find the normality that official propaganda had led them to believe. Throughout the 
war soldiers were sustained by thoughts of home. Many had idealized the life they could 
expect once the war was over.
23
 It did not take long for many veterans to realise that the 
community which they had left behind at the beginning of the war, was very different 
from that to which they returned. In September 1946 a group of recently demobilized 
veterans living in a communal apartment at 26 Krasnaia ulitsa, in Leningrad‟s city 
centre, wrote a collective letter of complaint to Leningradskaia pravda‟s editors. Rather 
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than self-interested complaints about the difficulty of obtaining employment or housing 
they attacked a perceived breakdown in social order.  
“ Before the war Ploshchad‟ Truda (Labour Square) was the jewel in our 
district‟s crown. Returning from the front we hardly recognise it. On the 
square there is a bar (pivnaia), a canteen which sells vodka, two beer-stalls 
(pivnie lavki), but not one bakery. We have to go half a kilometre for bread. 
Neither is there a single repair workshop. One had to go into the city for 
every trifle.  
In the evening it is frightening to go out onto the staircase. Here the 
drunks, and various shady characters, who act like hooligans, demand 
money from passers-by and flog off stolen goods, have found themselves a 
refuge. 
Not long ago, apartment 21 was burgled, and repeated attempts have been 
made to burgle apartment 22. Our whole life has been turned into a complete 
nightmare; there are drunks and hooligans everywhere and still the police 
don‟t do anything.”24  
 
For these veterans the drunkenness and disorder which surrounded them was shocking, 
and provoked outrage. Having fought to defend their community, city and nation many 
veterans envisaged a very different post-war society.  
 
  The sense of surprise that these veterans expressed when they realised that the 
utopia they had been fighting for did not exist should not be exaggerated. Many 
veterans learnt about changes to Leningrad‟s social fabric before their demobilization. 
In the months immediately following May 1945 rumours about a post-war crime wave 
gripped Soviet Russia. According to Burds the fear of crime was so strong that it was 
comparable to the „Great Fear‟ which seized France in 1789.25 Summary reports of 
unpublished letters (svodki) sent to Pravda‟s editorial offices in Moscow in November 
1945 created the impression of a society terrified by the spread of banditism, theft and 
hooliganism. Correspondents from across the Soviet Union complained that a 
breakdown in law and order was making many cities no go areas after dark.
26
 Leningrad 
had its own equivalent fears. A party report from November 1946, which examined the 
implementation of measures to strengthen public order, noted that an increase in theft 
and robbery, particularly at night, was stimulating fears amongst workers in the 
Volodarskii, Kalininskii and Vyborgskii districts.
27
 Another public opinion report, dated 
20 November 1946, complained that armed attacks upon workers in outlying districts 
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were increasing. Workers from factory 522 were so concerned they had begun to return 
from their shifts in organized groups.
28
 Party officials were more concerned that fear of 
crime during the dark autumn nights might lower turn-out for elections to the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet.
29
 It was unlikely that the Red Army could have been entirely insulated 
from these fears. Serving soldiers almost certainly received news from friends and 
relatives about crime levels in Leningrad, in much the same way that they learned about 
the lack of jobs and housing. In 1947, for example, N.V. Iadrovskii wrote to his son, a 
serving soldier, describing the level of crime in the city. “The people are starving, and 
this is leading to a growth in crime. The level of crime has become insufferable. They 
(criminals) will tear things straight out of your hands, especially from children and the 
elderly.”30 Although such correspondence was likely to be heavily censored, word of 
mouth was harder to constrain. 
 
 Official responses to rising crime also provided veterans with information about 
the community to which they were returning. On 17 October 1945 a meeting of the 
Leningrad City Party Executive Committee heard a report from Lieutenant General 
Shiktorov, head of the NKVD in both Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast. This report 
led to the passing of a city soviet resolution which formed the bedrock of the local fight 
against crime. The euphemistically titled “On measures for the strengthening of the 
social order and safety in the city of Leningrad” proposed a series of actions to reduce 
crime. These included more police officers, forcing the legal system to respond more 
quickly and mobilising individuals not engaged in „socially useful‟ labour for tree 
felling or turf cutting.
31
 Accompanying press reports made veiled references to 
combating increases in crime, especially theft and hooliganism.
32
 On 23 October 1945 
Shiktorov gave a report to a meeting of NKVD and police employees which outlined 
the tasks facing the police and the local population. Parts of the speech were published 
in Leningradskaia pravda, making them available to a much wider audience.
33
 Reading 
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between the lines of these pronouncements literate veterans could gain an insight into 
the rise in crime. In general, however, newspaper articles mentioning crime, anti-social 
behaviour and social problems did so in closely guarded language. The public were only 
informed about individual crimes once the police had arrested suspects, or the courts 
had passed harsh sentences. Few details about crimes or the background of alleged 
criminals were mentioned in the press. Newspaper articles were intended to create an 
impression that crime was under control, although they inadvertently drew attention to 
the existence of crime.
34
 
 
 Part of the process of becoming an ordinary civilian after demobilization meant 
having to share the same social and economic conditions as the rest of society. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, veterans‟ theoretical privilege to better housing, 
employment opportunities and healthcare rarely amounted to a meaningful practical 
advantage. Similarly, Leningrad‟s former soldiers could not be protected from the social 
problems affecting post-war Leningrad. Veterans were not only aware of the growth in 
crime from published speeches, rumours of armed bandit groups and the general 
atmosphere of fear, but from their own experience as victims of the surge in theft and 
violence.  
 
Having been released from the Red Army‟s protective auspices demobilized 
veterans were now on their own, and subject to the same dangers and threats as the rest 
of society. The risks of civilian life could become apparent within hours of 
demobilization. On 25 August 1945 Sergeant-Major Merzliakov was demobilized from 
the Local Air Defence Force (MVPO). He had previously served three years in the Red 
Army and was awarded a discharge payment of 2800 roubles; a sum more than enough 
to cushion his return to civilian life. That same day the money was stolen. Merzliakov 
found the theft of such a large amount distressing. No doubt the responsibility of having 
lost the only financial reward he was likely to derive from armed service weighed 
heavily. This was not the kind of homecoming that even the most pessimistic of 
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veterans had envisaged. After a heavy bout of drinking he committed suicide.
35
 Such 
tragedies were rare. But the steady stream of demobilized soldiers arriving at 
Leningrad‟s railway stations, with discharge payments in their pockets, many 
disorientated by their new found freedom, an unfamiliar environment, and an excess of 
cheap vodka may well have presented an attractive target for the city‟s small army of 
pick-pockets. 
 
 Native Leningraders returning to pre-war homes were particularly vulnerable to 
the theft of personal property. Returning veterans fortunate enough to find that their 
homes had not been destroyed or occupied by other people often found that their 
belongings had been stolen. Many had left their possessions in the care of family 
members who were subsequently evacuated, or who died during the blockade. 
Abandoned apartments made rich pickings. In the worst days of the blockade valuable 
possessions with no apparent owner were often sold or bartered to acquire food. There 
were also rumours that unscrupulous building administrators furnished their own 
apartments with antiques and luxury items stolen from unoccupied rooms. In August 
1945 Engineer-Captain Avetikov wrote to the USSR Procuracy with an allegation that 
two people had broken into his apartment and stolen his property whilst he had been 
fulfilling his patriotic duty. Between 1942 and 1944 he had made repeated attempts to 
contact the building administrator in his apartment block, with whom he had left a key, 
with requests to check the contents of his room against an inventory. Arriving in 
Leningrad in January 1945 he found that the room was now being used as a store for 
building materials. Avetikov alleged that in April 1942 the room had been broken into 
and cleared of its contents by two officials.
36
 Avetikov‟s protests, and his foresight in 
preparing an inventory, suggested that his property was worth preserving. Yet few of 
the soldiers who volunteered in the summer of 1941, or were subsequently conscripted, 
had bothered to keep detailed lists of their property. In March 1943 a local party report 
bemoaned the failure of conscripted soldiers and the military authorities to keep such 
records.
37
 For most returning veterans it was not the loss of a few modest items of 
furniture or a spare set of clothes which provoked consternation, but the loss of personal 
items. Photographs, letters, personal mementos, very often the last connection that many 
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returning soldiers had with loved ones who had died during the blockade, had all 
disappeared.  
 
 Corrupt officials and organised scams were responsible for much of this 
property theft. Fed by the sheer volume of belongings left behind by conscripted, 
evacuated and deceased Leningraders, a thriving black-market in stolen property 
developed. In theory the city soviet had a responsibility to preserve the property of dead 
or absent residents. Evacuated citizens‟ and serving soldiers‟ belongings were supposed 
to be removed from apartments and placed in warehouses controlled by district housing 
administrations. But, property left in state hands was far from secure. In June 1946 a 
city soviet decision admitted that officials responsible for cataloguing the property of 
deceased Leningraders often failed to keep adequate records. This resulted in the theft 
of valuable items by officials, particularly from warehouses.
38
 On 2 November 1945 a 
fire broke out in one such warehouse on Bolshoi Smolenskii prospect. A police 
investigation revealed that the fire had been started by two guards in order to cover up 
systematic theft.
39
 In other facilities, where property survived, there was no guarantee 
that veterans would be reunited with their belongings. According to city soviet 
resolutions any property that remained in warehouses after 25 September 1946, before 
tens of thousands of veterans returned to Leningrad, was to be sold. Proceeds not 
reclaimed after three years would revert to the state.
40
  
  
 Occasionally demobilized veterans found themselves the victims of violent 
attacks. This appears to have been more of a problem in the Leningrad oblast than in the 
city centre. It was ironic that having cheated death for so long, a small number of 
veterans would be killed in prosaic everyday post-war settings. Unfortunately, the 
documents which described these attacks give little indication of the motives behind 
them. Some incidents appear to have been the result of drunken arguments which 
escalated out of control. For example, on 15 July 1945 in a club in Luga, in the south of 
the Leningrad oblast, Parshin, a driver working at the town hospital, was shot with a 
revolver. He had been demobilized just days earlier. His attacker, a captain of the local 
garrison, had arrived at the club and become embroiled in an argument with a number of 
civilians. Without any provocation the accused had started punching a Komsomol 
                                                 
38
  Biulleten‟ Lengorispolkoma, No.13, 1946, p.12.  
  
39
  TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.149/ll.72-77 (l.73ob).  
 
40
  Biulleten‟ Lengorispolkoma, No.14, 1946, p.14.   
205 
instructor in the face; he then shot and killed Parshin.
41 
According to one scholar 
alcohol-fuelled confrontations such as these were the most common scenarios for post-
war murder.
42 
 
 
Although many attacks upon veterans were seemingly random acts of violence, 
other killings hint at a more complicated background. In the early hours of 4 March 
1946 a fire was discovered at the Novaia Zakhon‟e collective farm in the Volosovskii 
raion. The fire had been started in the home of Ivanov, the collective farm chairman and 
a demobilized veteran. When the fire was extinguished Ivanov‟s decapitated body was 
found. The police report of the incident contained no further details.
43
 The nature of this 
killing suggests either the involvement of an organised criminal element, or perhaps a 
settling of scores. Ivanov would not have been the first veteran turned kolkhoz chairmen 
to have been extremely unpopular with his fellow farmers.    
 
 A more common experience was for returning veterans to confront the growth in 
speculation and corruption, which had become endemic in Leningrad during the 
blockade. An illegal second economy operated below the surface of Soviet society 
throughout its entire history, but during the Second World War and its immediate 
aftermath this shadow economy was particularly important in ordinary citizens‟ survival 
strategies.
44
  As Bidlack has argued during the first winter of the siege a survival-based 
consensus emerged amongst Leningraders which legitimated previously unacceptable 
behaviour.
45
 By the time that mass demobilization had begun, speculation, corruption 
and other forms of economic crime had become a way of life for Leningraders. As Fürst 
writes; “Selling private property, speculating with food and consumer items and even 
the misappropriation of state funds was something that was visible to and undertaken by 
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all.”46 Speculation, then, was rife. In October 1946 alone the Leningrad police arrested 
2387 people for speculating in ration cards.
47
 Theft of food and manufactured items 
occurred at almost every level of the production and distribution process. In 1945 alone 
Leningrad‟s restaurants and cafés lost over 958,000 roubles in wastage, embezzlement 
and theft.
48
 Losses in trade organisations in the Leningrad oblast‟ were enormous, 
totalling approximately 5,727,000 roubles in 1946 and 10,278,000 roubles in 1947.
49
 
Although speculation was accepted with grudging acceptance by many Leningraders, 
demobilized veterans were, in general, less willing to accept the growth in informal 
exchange mechanisms. In previous chapters we have encountered veterans‟ anger and 
frustration about corruption in the distribution of housing and employment. Likewise, 
veterans who viewed themselves as socially-conscious protectors of society railed 
against speculators, accusing them of enriching themselves at the expense of wider 
society.
50
 Complaints about speculation and corruption also reflected former soldiers‟ 
sense of dislocation. With the death of so many of their peers, and the arrival of so 
many new residents, it was hardly surprising that many ex-servicemen felt detached 
from the informal networks controlling the supply of goods and services. 
 
   Veterans arriving in Leningrad between July 1945 and 1950 were rejoining a 
society which had been transformed almost beyond recognition. Ravaged by fighting, 
depopulated by conscription, evacuation and mass death, cut off from the Soviet 
„mainland‟ and crippled by extreme shortages of food and basic goods the blockaded 
city became a space in which crime flourished. Leningrad after 1945 was also a more 
violent, dangerous and unstable community than it had been before the war. Many 
aspects of life in Leningrad and the surrounding region were unappealing and unsettling 
for returning veterans. The growth in hooliganism, petty theft, economic crime and 
violent crime were especially disorientating for ex-servicemen who longed to return to 
some measure of peaceful normality. 
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Explanations for the post-war crime wave 
 
 Leningrad‟s post-war crime wave had many causes and explanations. The war 
prompted many social, economic, political and cultural changes. A comprehensive 
study of the reasons behind Leningrad‟s post-war crime wave is yet to written. Precisely 
how wartime disruption shaped the dynamics of crime in local communities merits 
further research. Here I offer a number of preliminary observations about the causes of 
crime in Leningrad, including the role played by serving and demobilized soldiers.  
 
Leningrad‟s political elite tended to blame rising levels of crime, hooliganism 
and industrial indiscipline on newly-arrived „outsiders‟.  In the report of his speech 
made to NKVD and police employees published on 23 October 1945 Shiktorov blamed 
the growth in crime upon unstable criminal elements which had infiltrated the returning 
population. He called for a strengthening of the passport regime to filter out undesirable 
elements and, “methodically cleanse our city of thieves, hooligans, parasites and other 
people who have no place in Leningrad.”51 Despite this the passport regime and system 
of residence permits, designed to prevent certain types of people settling in Leningrad 
and its environs, was unable to cope with the expanding population. Many people 
managed to enter the city without official permission. 32,865 people were forced to 
leave Leningrad in 1946, and a further 37,681 in 1947, because they lacked residency 
permits.
52
 Many more managed to purchase permits on the thriving black market, or 
bribe officials to turn a blind eye.  
 
 There were good reasons to fear the arrival of criminal elements in Leningrad. In 
July 1945 an amnesty of criminals to celebrate Soviet victory released over a million 
prisoners, whose sentences had been revoked or reduced, from the GULag.
53
 Inevitably 
professional criminals found their way into the city. Between September and October 
1945, Leningrad‟s police force arrested 606 amnestied prisoners.54 The sense of 
independence and freedom from central control, which resulted from the city‟s wartime 
isolation, combined with an unstable and shifting social situation, may have made 
Leningrad an attractive destination for criminals. Something similar was observed in the 
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post-war Donbas, where the image of the free steppe combined with the need for 
manpower for reconstruction acted as a magnet for criminals and adventurers.
55
 The 
pull of the Soviet Union‟s second city, cultural capital, the birthplace of the revolution, 
an industrial and scientific power-house, and above all a proud hero city was almost 
certainly stronger. At an Oblast procuracy conference convened in February 1947 
several prosecutors blamed local surges in crime upon bands of touring criminals 
(gastrolery), who would suddenly arrive in an area, commit a spree of offences and then 
move on.
56
 Large numbers of homeless orphans (bezprizornye deti) and neglected 
youths (beznadzornye deti) left to roam the streets, many of them attracted to Leningrad 
from other areas of the Soviet Union, were also held responsible for the growth in 
crime. Arrests of minors for criminal offences were remarkably high in the first post-
war years;76,787 in 1945 alone. According to Samarin youths were often recruited to 
become members of organised criminal gangs. Approximately a quarter of individuals 
tried for banditism in the immediate post-war period were under eighteen years of age.
57
 
The level of youth crime continued to provoke concern as late as February 1948.
58
  
 
Rootless elements which had penetrated the city were a convenient scapegoat for 
Leningrad‟s social problems. Only rarely did anybody suggest that ordinary people had 
been forced to turn to crime out of desperation.
59
 In part, the link between outsiders and 
crime reflected anxieties about the arrival of an influx of uneducated and unskilled rural 
migrants. Rapid expansions in population can be destabilising for any society. But, 
following so closely upon the mass starvation of native Leningraders, the arrival of so 
many „new‟ people was especially painful. Leningrad‟s population more than doubled 
between 1945 and 1947; rising from 927,000 in 1945 to 1,920,000 in 1947.
60
 According 
to Ruble approximately 1.3 million new migrants, many of them from the Kalinin, 
Saratov and Sverdlovsk regions, settled in the city in the first few post-war years.
61
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Inward migration was something Saint Petersburg/ Leningrad had confronted many 
times in its past, particularly in the late nineteenth century and the 1930s. Yet, the influx 
of migrants after the lifting of the blockade was on a different scale from anything 
experienced previously. As Bruce Lincoln writes; “By 1948, scarcely one worker in 
eight in the city‟s textile mills, and barely more than one in three in its machine-
building plants, could claim to have any connection with Leningrad before the war.”62 
Many of these people had no knowledge of their adopted city‟s history, and only the 
slightest appreciation of the blockade‟s horrors. For the nucleus of surviving 
Leningraders, both blokadniki and demobilized veterans, the arrival of so many new 
people was hard to accept. The rapidity with which their dead loved ones had been 
replaced must have seemed almost obscene.  
 
 Although the post-war crime wave in the Leningrad region was blamed on 
arrival of criminal elements and socially marginal groups, there was no conjecture about 
the involvement of ex-servicemen in delinquent or deviant activities. In many ways 
these silences are more interesting than the stilted public statements about the risks 
posed by socially marginal outsiders. The categories of veterans and harmful social 
elements frequently overlapped. As observed in chapter three disabled veterans, 
particularly those drawn to Leningrad from neighbouring regions, were often treated as 
an unwelcome presence and were pushed to the social margins. Yet a connection 
between veterans and crime was resolutely avoided. Whereas, twentieth-century 
European and North American societies expressed fears about the return of violent 
veterans, there appears to have been almost no public or private concern that veterans 
might turn to crime. The authorities responsible for demobilization treated veterans with 
suspicion, not because they might have been brutalized by combat, but because they had 
been exposed to life beyond Soviet borders. Leningrad‟s political elite were more 
troubled by the possibility that veterans might spread and infect the local population 
with the contagion of western-capitalist ideas, attitudes and values, than the prospect 
that veterans might exhibit violent, anti-social or criminal tendencies.
63
 
 
 Demobilization officials were, however, alive to the threat of public disorder 
amongst crowds of soldiers passing through demobilization points. The dismantling of 
mass conscript armies after the First World War, and Leningrad‟s own revolutionary 
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experience, highlighted the risk of riots amongst demobilized veterans.
64 Intoxicated by 
the long awaited freedom from army discipline, as well as alcohol, soldiers in the 
process of demobilization represented a heightened risk of disorder. Troop eshelons had 
the capacity to degenerate into drink-fuelled disorder. Vladimir Kozlov argues that these 
disturbances resembled traditional forms of carnival, during which the psychological 
tensions and pressures built-up during years of highly regulated military life were 
vented through criminal or deviant behaviour.
65
 Yet outbursts of violence were more 
serious than a symbolic Bakhtinian inversion of the established order. Nationally there 
were reports of returning soldiers beating up railway staff, raping women, and even 
becoming engaged in gunfights with local NKVD detachments.
66
 Fears about the threat 
posed to public order by troop transports were not the same as fears that veterans would 
drift towards criminality. 
  
As far as can be discerned from the available evidence Leningrad avoided mass-
uprisings amongst soldiers awaiting demobilization. Reports addressed to the Leningrad 
soviet by Major-General Rastorguev, head of the City voenkomat, indicated that the 
behaviour of veterans arriving in the city was closely monitored. On 29 July 1945 
Rastorguev optimistically wrote: 
“On the whole demobilization in the city of Leningrad is progressing 
normally and in an organized way. The mood of demobilized (soldiers) is 
healthy; hitherto there hasn‟t been a single case of immoral behaviour either 
at stations or at demobilization points.”67 
 
Concerns about the threats posed by veterans to public order were restricted to the 
precise moment when soldiers became civilians. From the perspective of demobilization 
officials, once veterans had passed through checkpoints, collected their civilian papers, 
and had been transported to their homes they no longer posed a significant risk. While 
soldiers were part of an organized collective united by common experiences and close 
emotional bonds, ex-servicemen were isolated individuals cut adrift in an unfamiliar 
environment. Without officially sanctioned veterans‟ associations there was no 
institution around which a common identity or shared collective interest could form. It 
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was one thing for civilian officials to have to deal with angry veterans banging their fists 
on desks, quite another to diffuse disorderly bands of „demob-happy‟ soldiers.  
 
 The absence of official or popular anxieties about the return of deviant or 
brutalized ex-servicemen is even more remarkable when the Red Army‟s wartime 
experience is considered. In quantitative and qualitative terms the violence unleashed on 
the Eastern Front during the Second World War far surpassed anything seen on the 
Western.
68
 The Red Army was a „meat-grinder‟, which drew soldiers in, chewed them 
up and spat them out. More than eight million Soviet soldiers were killed between 1941 
and 1945. In contrast British and American losses between 1939 and 1945 amounted to 
less than a quarter of a million in each case.
69
 Extreme violence characterized the entire 
war, but some of the most vicious fighting came in the war‟s final months. When 
soldiers began returning home in the summer of 1945 memories of combat were still 
fresh in their minds. 450,000 Wehrmacht soldiers were killed in January 1945. This was 
the fastest rate of the entire war, far exceeding the 185,000 deaths recorded in January 
1943 the month of Soviet victory at Stalingrad.
70
 Not only was the Red Army killing its 
enemies at unprecedented rates, its soldiers were being killed by their hundreds of 
thousands. The offensive in East Prussia cost 584,000 casualties, the three week long 
Battle for Berlin over 300,000.
71
 The final stages of the war, fought on the basis of 
hatred and revenge, were an orgy of violence, death and destruction. Encouraged by 
their officers, state propaganda and their own memories of Nazi atrocities the Red Army 
extracted a terrifying revenge on its enemies. There could be little doubt that returning 
veterans had witnessed and experienced the darker side of total warfare, and had done 
terrible things in the name of Soviet victory.
72
 
 
 The most shocking aspect of this Armageddon was the mass rape of women in 
Eastern Europe and Germany. Rather than a lustful diversion rape was an integral part of 
the push for victory. It became a means of extracting revenge, terrifying and humiliating 
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the civilian population, of reinforcing the bonds between Soviet soldiers and inflicting 
total defeat on the enemy.
73
 Nor did rape disappear as an instrument of revenge and 
terror once victory had been won. The threat of sexual violence continued to hang over 
women in the Soviet zone of occupation beyond 1947.
74
  
 
 A collective silence quickly enveloped the reality of frontline experience. Many 
veterans never spoke about the horrors of combat or the violence of modern warfare. Ex-
soldiers tried to protect their families from detailed knowledge about the reality of war 
on the frontlines. A comprehensive study of soldiers‟ letters written between January 
and April 1945 by a Russian historian failed to encounter a single reference to violent 
attacks upon the civilian population by Soviet soldiers.
75
 As in any conflict, soldiers‟ 
correspondence was governed by unwritten rules designed to protect the civilian world 
from unpleasant information.
76
 Soldiers concerned about how they might fit back into 
society and resume everyday family life were reluctant to broach the subject that 
effective military behaviour required them to behave violently and to kill. The Red 
Army, the party-state and wider society demonstrated a similar reticence to confront the 
contradiction that returning veterans were simultaneously heroes who embodied the 
ideal characteristics of homo-soveticus, and men who had shed blood, raped innocent 
women and behaved shamefully. The speed with which these crimes disappeared from 
the documentary record and the collective consciousness was remarkable. 
 
 Other aspects of the Red Army‟s marauding, albeit in a sanitized form, were 
common knowledge. While discussion of violence was strictly off limits the 
appropriation of „trophy‟ items, the official euphemism for looting, was common 
knowledge. Soldiers wrote home with details of things they had stolen without fear of 
judgement.
77
 Exporting the spoils of war was not something that prompted pangs of 
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conscience from most soldiers or civilians. Burning hatred, the disparity in material 
wealth and a semi-official licence to loot led to the requisitioning of goods from 
Germany, Austria and Hungary on a monumental scale.
78
 The Stalinist state 
requisitioned huge volumes of industrial machinery, railway track, rolling-stock, food 
and fuel. Leningraders were well aware that their government were stripping Germany 
of its resources. Many workers installed and operated looted German plant in the city‟s 
ruined factories. Since looting was officially sanctioned, a culture of theft spread 
through the Red Army. To quote Naimark: “Corruption and thievery were as endemic as 
drinking and violence and were prevalent in the ranks from the lowest private to the top 
generals.”79  
 
 Regulations drawn up in January 1945 made provision for soldiers to send home 
monthly parcels of trophy goods, of no more than five kilograms, free of charge. The 
weight allowances for officers were more generous; ten kilograms for most officers, 
sixteen for generals.
80
 High ranking officers found ways of looting extraordinary 
volumes of luxury goods, including cars, motorcycles, pianos, carpets, tapestries and 
furs. A number of officers overstepped the limits of what was considered legitimate 
reward for loyal service, and appeared to be running semi-criminal rackets. The head of 
the Financial Administration for Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG), 
for example, was accused of sending nine automobiles and two railway carriages full of 
furniture back to the Ministry of Finance in Moscow.
81
 Major-general Botvinnik, head 
of SVAG‟s chemical service, was caught transporting 1700 metres of fabric, furs, 
pictures, furniture and a 500 gram gold bar home in a railway wagon.
82
 While 
accusations of excessive looting were later used to discredit senior officers, including 
Zhukov, nobody much cared what ordinary infantrymen managed to loot.
83
 Junior 
officers and rank and file soldiers availed themselves of opportunities to acquire 
watches, radios, bicycles, sewing machines and luxury clothing. But much of their 
looting was to supplement basic rations or to meet the practical needs of wives and 
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children. Soldiers sent back: foodstuffs (especially deficit goods such as tea, coffee and 
chocolate), clothing, shoes, fabric, but also nails, panes of glass and tools.
84
 Families did 
not have to be protected from knowledge about looting, they were one of its 
beneficiaries. 
 
 While Leningraders could claim ignorance about the conduct of troops serving 
beyond Soviet borders, they were well acquainted with the behaviour of soldiers serving 
in the Leningrad oblast and in the city during and after the war. The actions of the Red 
Army within the Leningrad region rarely descended to the depths witnessed in Germany, 
but civilians frequently encountered thuggish behaviour. Before the end of the war 
complaints about soldiers destroying buildings, stealing food and property, expropriating 
horses and carts and even blowing up fishponds with grenades were commonplace.
85
 
The arrival of peace did not end indiscipline, disorderly behaviour and outright 
criminality. Indeed, serving soldiers were responsible for a significant proportion of 
crime. Procuracy officials calculated that in 1945 and 1946 soldiers were responsible for 
approximately seventeen per cent of total crime.
86
 In December 1945, for example, 95 
soldiers were arrested in Leningrad: 4 for murder, 8 for burglary, 9 for desertion, 33 for 
thefts, 15 for hooliganism, 4 for speculation and 22 for other offences.
87
 Between 
October 1946 and January 1947 the Leningrad oblast‟ military procuracy investigated 
137 crimes committed by soldiers upon local civilians, including 97 thefts and 13 armed 
robberies.
88
  
 
 Hooliganism, drunken brawls and more serious offences were a larger problem 
amongst soldiers stationed outside Leningrad. Discipline had improved in the Leningrad 
garrison during 1946, largely as a product of reducing the amount time soldiers spent 
outside barracks, and by ensuring soldiers visiting public spaces were closely monitored 
by their officers.
89
 The same was not true of soldiers stationed in isolated locations, 
where the chain of command was weaker. According to Iaklokov, a party secretary from 
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Vartemiagi, situated on Leningrad‟s northern periphery, soldiers in Sertolovo, Agalatovo 
and Termolovo were routinely robbing trade points, shops and private apartments, 
assaulting civilians and behaving indecently in public spaces, especially cinemas, clubs 
and cafés.
90
 Behaviour of this kind was commonplace. On 27 October 1946, for 
example, a group of fifteen soldiers went on the rampage in Keksgolm, modern day 
Priozersk. Having arrived in the town already drunk, they proceeded to assault several 
customers in a café, demanded bread from a shop, and then stood in the town square 
firing their guns in the air.
91
 Residents in locations where policing was limited were 
often completely at the mercy of violent mobs of unruly soldiers. Clashes between rival 
groups of heavy-drinking soldiers had the potential to escalate into serious situations. On 
the night of 14 July 1946 two groups of drunken soldiers and their officers visited a club 
in the Efimovskii district of the Leningrad oblast. They became embroiled in a drunken 
brawl with tragic consequences. When the fight was eventually broken up one group of 
soldiers left the club and set up a roadblock on a nearby bridge hoping to re-engage their 
rivals. When a vehicle containing locals approached their position the soldiers opened 
fire killing one person and injuring four others.
92
 Incidents replicating this pattern of 
disruptive and violent behaviour continued to occur beyond 1948.
93
   
 
Criminality amongst Veterans 
 
 Given the behaviour of the Red Army during the war, and the conduct of serving 
soldiers in the Leningrad oblast in the years following the war‟s end, it was surprising 
that there was no concern about the potential dangers posed by returning ex-servicemen. 
In hindsight, had Leningrad‟s political elite been so minded conjecture about a link 
between veterans and the post-war crime wave could easily have been made. First, local 
peaks in crime rates coincided with spikes in the number of demobilized veterans 
arriving in the city. The rise in crime between October and December 1945, for example, 
occurred at the same time as one of the most intensive phases of mass demobilization. 
Over 45,000 soldiers returned to Leningrad in November 1945 alone.
94
 With so many 
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veterans competing for employment, housing, ration-cards and the attention of the 
bureaucrats allocating these resources Leningrad‟s leaders should have been able to 
predict that frustrated veterans caught in the bottleneck might find other ways of 
occupying and supporting themselves. Secondly, the mechanics of a demobilization 
conducted by age-group may also have been a contributing factor. By the autumn of 
1946, the peak in Leningrad‟s post-war crime wave, the veterans being released from 
military service were the youngest birth cohorts for whom adjustment was the most 
difficult. Sociologists often suggest that young men are responsible for a large 
proportion of crime in any society. Younger birth cohorts who returned to find that the 
best jobs and apartments had been taken by older and more experienced men were more 
likely to be involved in crime. Young men who felt insufficiently rewarded for their 
wartime sacrifice and deprived of opportunities for social advancement were more likely 
to pose a social threat. Finally, as argued in chapter two the Red Army was an 
extraordinarily diverse social entity. Men and women from all walks of life, including 
criminal elements, had been mobilized to fight. Healthy Gulag prisoners of fighting age, 
who did not pose a political threat, had been mobilized to fight by means of a series of 
amnesties. In the first three years of the war the NKVD released approximately 975,000 
prisoners and several hundred thousand special exiles. Although criminal recidivists 
were theoretically excluded from amnesties, the army‟s insatiable demand for manpower 
ensured that criminals found their way into uniform, and in turn back into civilian 
society.
95
   
 
Evidence that not all veterans readjusted to civilian life soon began to accumulate. 
Before long reports of thefts, armed robberies, violent murders committed by ex-
servicemen, as well as a wealth of lower level speculation and fraud, started to pile up 
on the desks of policemen and procuracy officials. For the Leningraders handling the 
investigation and prosecution of these crimes, as well as the administrative functions 
supporting this, it must have seemed obvious that veterans were responsible for a 
significant proportion of crime. Unfortunately, there is no available statistical data to 
shed light upon what precise proportion of recorded crime was committed by veterans. 
An attempt to reconstruct such information from court files is beyond the limits of this 
study. Samarin who has attempted to reconstruct the social structure of individuals 
arrested for banditism in the Leningrad region in this period, from an exhaustive study 
of the court files, argues that demobilized frontoviki were highly represented. He 
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calculates that in 1946 approximately thirty-seven per cent of individuals arrested for 
banditism, rising to fifty per cent in 1947, were demobilized veterans or war invalids.
96
 
To put this in perspective, at the beginning of 1947 demobilized veterans represented 
approximately fifteen per cent of Leningrad‟s total population.97 
 
 While there was no attempt to monitor the level of crime committed by veterans, 
top secret police reports contain evidence that veterans frequently failed to live up to 
their saintly public image. Spetssvodki and spetssoobshchenie forwarded to the 
chairman of the city and oblast soviets by General-Lieutenant Shiktorov often contained 
brief details of crimes committed by veterans. Although these are insufficiently detailed 
to enable a reconstruction of the circumstances of individual crimes, they do provide an 
indication of the range of offences committed by veterans. 
 
 Disabled veterans are particularly well represented in these reports. Prior to the 
beginning of mass demobilization war invalids were amongst the least controlled groups 
in society. They enjoyed relative freedom of movement and privileged access to goods 
distributed by welfare organiszations. Given the difficulties of finding suitable 
employment, and the manner in which many were cruelly pushed to the social margins 
it was hardly surprising that many disabled veterans retreated into the shadow economy 
of private trade and speculation. In August 1945 a police report examining the numbers 
of people in Leningrad not engaged in socially useful work noted that unemployed war 
invalids were visiting the city‟s markets, where they bought up goods in order to sell 
them on at a profit.
98
 In January 1946 there were reports of five unemployed war 
invalids in the Tikhvinskii district making a living from speculation and spending the 
profits on alcohol.
99
 In April 1947 two unemployed war invalids were arrested for 
speculating in ration cards.
100
 Eradicating private trade amongst the war disabled does 
not appear to have been easy. Since speculation enjoyed a measure of social acceptance, 
if not outright support, it was not always seen as overtly criminal. In January 1945 N.N. 
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Gromov, a disabled veteran living in the Volkhovskii district, was detained with large 
quantities of goods. On his arrest he was defiant: “All the same I am going to trade. 
Now, I‟m going to gather fifteen people and then try and arrest me! If you touch me you 
will have to call the whole police department out.”101 It is possible that speculation 
offered disabled veterans like Gromov a social standing and importance that they would 
have been unable to find in other walks of life. 
 
 There were indications that disabled veterans were heavily involved in property 
crime. For example, between December 1944 and January 1945 V.M. Khlebnikov, a 
twenty-six year old unemployed veteran and another unemployed man committed nine 
apartment burglaries, netting an estimated 60,000 roubles. Operating at the same time 
another two disabled veterans, aged twenty-two and twenty-five, committed a string of 
burglaries stealing approximately 47,000 roubles of property.
102
 P.Y. Feldman, another 
unemployed war-invalid, was arrested at a market trying to sell a five carat diamond and 
a diamond ring. Gold coins, 13,000 roubles in cash, five diamonds, three gold watches 
and a variety of other valuable were discovered when his apartment was searched.
103
 It 
was unclear whether these were „trophy‟ items, or property stolen from Leningraders. 
 
 Police reports tended to privilege the most audacious examples of criminal 
activity, focusing upon sensational cases involving large sums of money or valuable 
items. The bulk of crime, however, was more prosaic. It seems likely that most crime 
was committed by people driven to desperate measures by extreme poverty, rather than 
a desire for personal enrichment or because of involvement with organized criminal 
groups. This, in part, explains the over representation of disabled veterans amongst 
post-war criminals. On 31 December 1947 G.A. Svirina was excluded from the 
Leningrad communist party, because she had been given a two year suspended sentence 
for fraud. During the war she was awarded the Red Star medal for having rescued fifty-
seven soldiers from the battlefield. During one of these heroic acts she was injured and 
disabled. By 1947 she was a single mother with two young children, receiving a 
monthly pension of just 300 roubles. Demobilization had not been kind to her. In a letter 
to the party she had attempted to explain her situation: 
“At the moment I am in a very difficult material situation: I am bringing up 
two children – a daughter of four and a half years and a three month old son, 
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I live alone, I don‟t have any relatives. Also, I don‟t have any help from 
anybody. I live very poorly. My home, where I lived before the war, was 
occupied by the Germans, where they shot my brother. I don‟t even have my 
own bed or table. At the moment I‟m standing in a room with the things of a 
dead person, soon the district finance department are coming to take them 
away, I and the children even have to sleep on the floor. I don‟t have any 
money to buy anything. Everywhere I have turned for help I have been 
refused, it‟s insulting – why did I have children. My daughter isn‟t going to 
the countryside (na dachy) because I haven‟t any money, but she needs fresh 
air, she‟s susceptible to tuberculosis after scarlet fever.”   
 
In order to send her daughter to a summer camp for children, where she would have 
received better rations and had an opportunity to regain her health, Svirina attempted to 
fraudulently claim money from a bank against a coupon in a medal book. Svirina and the 
person from whom the medal book was obtained were both arrested.
104
  
 
 It is much harder to have sympathy with the veterans, like Mikhail Klimov with 
whom we started this chapter, who were accused of committing murders of exceptional 
violence. Although incidents where veterans took civilian lives had certainly not 
reached epidemic proportions, they were by no means uncommon. The frequency with 
which veterans were committing murder and the level of violence in these crimes was 
such that it would have attracted official concern, if not public outrage, in most 
societies. On 20 September 1945, for example, Viktor Kuzmin, a twenty-one year old 
disabled veteran, killed Larissa Domashnikova and her mother. According to the 
forensics report he stabbed Larissa nineteen times with a knife, and struck her mother 
around the head with a hatchet and stabbed her four times. Tragically, Viktor and 
Larissa had been engaged and Larissa was six months pregnant.
105
 Such extreme 
violence was not an isolated occurrence. On 18 March 1947 in Aleksandrovka, a village 
thirty kilometres south of Leningrad, Alexandra Novikova, who was nine months 
pregnant, and her ten year old daughter were murdered. The killing was one of 
exceptional brutality. The scene of crime photographs preserved in the court record are 
not for the faint hearted. According to the investigation Andrei Akimov a twenty-five 
year old disabled veteran had hacked Novikova and her daughter to death with an axe, 
in order to steal the 1260 roubles he knew to be in her possession.
106
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A number of scenarios in which Leningrad‟s veterans might commit murder can 
be observed in the archival record. First, arguments between ex-servicemen and their 
acquaintances could escalate out of control. As with serving soldiers a drunken fight 
could have serious consequences. In January 1945 P.A. Demidovich an eighteen year 
old war-invalid was drawn into a fight at a factory social club, where he stabbed and 
killed a seventeen year old youth.
107
 Revenge was another possible motive. Very 
occasionally police reports provide evidence of the crime passionnel. Vladimir Chernov 
was demobilized in early 1946. He returned to learn that his wife had been having an 
affair with a certain Kurakov for the past four years. At 01.00 on 15 January 1946 
Chernov extracted his revenge on Kurakov by repeatedly stabbing him in the face and 
arm.
108
 In all probability the numbers of such crimes was small. Even in Britain where 
the News of the World created hype around returning ex-servicemen killing or 
assaulting the errant wives or their lovers, the number of such incidents was very 
small.
109
 Killings as a result of robberies that had been interrupted or which had gone 
wrong were a more common scenario. On 26 August 1945 the body of a security guard 
was found in a workshop at the Obuvshchik shoe factory. Footwear and leather valuing 
approximately 20,000 roubles were stolen. The police arrested A.A. Petushkov, a thirty-
eight year old disabled veteran who confessed to both the theft and the murder.
110
 In 
another example the bodies of a sixty-four year old women and her twenty-three year 
old son were discovered in a burgled flat on Rizovskaia ulitsa on 4 May 1946. The 
police arrested N.S. Dmitriev a twenty-two year old war invalid.
111
 
  
 Several Leningrad historians have suggested, in an echo of the brutalization 
thesis, that the value of human life was diminished in veterans‟ eyes after having been 
exposed to mass death and extreme violence. They suggest that frontline service 
generated an uncompromising attitude amongst veterans, and a tendency to resolve 
personal conflict by intimidation or violence.
112
 This is a much more radical vision of 
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the impact of war that Amir Weiner‟s notion of „assertive Ivan‟.113 Rather than stoutly 
defending their interests or arguing with desk rats they suggest that men accustomed to 
taking risks with their lives and channelling their aggressive impulses could very easily 
overstep the acceptable use of force. This, however, is unfair to Leningrad‟s veterans. It 
would be an egregious error to suggest that veterans returned with either an increased 
propensity to either petty or violent crime. Only a tiny minority of over 300,000 
veterans settling in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast became involved in serious 
criminal activity, let alone violent murders. Indeed, veterans were more likely to 
become committed pacifists than violent offenders.
114
 What was remarkable about 
veterans was the manner in which they succeeded in compartmentalizing their wartime 
past and rebuilding ordinary lives, rather than any potential brutalization. 
 
 Police reports are not sufficiently detailed to draw any definitive conclusions 
about the impact of combat and extreme violence upon Leningrad‟s veterans. As 
documents their function was to briefly describe the known facts of individual crimes 
and pass that information upwards to political leaders. They were not meticulous 
investigations of the circumstances and motives which drove ex-servicemen to take a 
life.  
 
The court files preserved in the archives of the Leningrad Oblast and Leningrad 
City Courts are a more rewarding source. These documents examine individual crimes 
in great detail. In addition to the stenographic records of the trial, they contain charge 
sheets, scene of crime reports, witness statements, interrogation reports, psychiatric 
assessments, forensic evidence and appeals against sentences. Unlike police reports they 
offer relatively detailed biographical information about the defendant. In the case of 
veterans this includes details about their military careers, the circumstances of their 
demobilization and their progress in readjusting to civilian life. As part of the research 
for this thesis I have examined a sample of over twenty court files, drawn from the 
Leningrad city and oblast courts, where ex-servicemen were prosecuted under 
paragraph 167 of the criminal codex, pertaining to violent robberies which resulted in 
the death or serious injury of the victim.  
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 Although these documents represent the best source of information about the 
reality of crime amongst veterans, their use carries methodological difficulties. As 
highly ideological documents the reliability of court and investigation files must be 
questioned. Catriona Kelly, in reviewing the conduct of the investigation of the 
infamous murder of Pavlik Morozov, writes that investigating authorities, “were 
concerned with the need to underline the guilt of those who were already seen as guilty 
before the investigations began.”115 A reading of these files creates a similar impression. 
Rather than attempting to establish guilt the purpose of these investigations was to 
collect, “incriminating evidence about individuals who had been identified as guilty 
from the outset...”116 Given the standards of Soviet police investigations and judicial 
process it is inadvisable to immediately assume guilt. It is possible that violent attacks 
were pinned on disabled veterans unable to find work and engaged in a criminal sub-
culture of petty theft and speculation. Despite these reservations court files, when 
considered against police reports, challenge the notion that veterans had been brutalized 
by wartime experiences. 
 
 On the morning of 15 December 1945 sixty-three year old Olena Stepanova was 
killed in the village of Aleksandrovka. Vasilli Budogoskii, Seman Mashkov and Pavel 
Maksimov, all veterans demobilized in October and November 1945, were tried for this 
bungling crime. After demobilization all three had failed to find work or permanent 
homes. Pavel Maksimov, the only native Leningrader amongst the group, had even 
neglected to make contact with his family.
117
 This represented the nightmare scenario 
for demobilization planners. Avoiding the moderating influence of families and the 
socializing effect of the workplace all three drifted towards a criminal sub-culture 
centred on private trade at the city‟s markets. Mashkov and Maksimov earned a living 
speculating in tokens for wine and tobacco and selling other items. On 10 December, 
according to the prosecution case, they met Budogoskii at the Mal‟tevskii market and 
the three arranged to meet on the following day at Maksimov‟s flat, in order to discuss 
“a little business”. At this meeting Mashkov proposed robbing a woman, with whom he 
was intimately acquainted, who lived with her mother in Aleksandrovka. Knowing that 
his girlfriend would be working on the night of 14 and 15 December and that only her 
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elderly mother would be at home Martinov proposed exploiting this opportunity to rob 
the property.  
 
 On the evening of 14 December the three veterans arrived in Aleksandrova. 
Knowing Mashkov from his affair with her daughter Stepanova let the three men in. 
Thinking that they wanted to wait for her daughter she offered them something to eat 
and a bottle of vodka to wash it down. The finger prints of all three men were left on the 
glasses and the bottle, and they absentmindedly left their train tickets behind. They were 
invited to stay the night. In the early hours of the morning they awoke and struck 
Stepanova a fatal blow with an axe to the back of the head. The gang then collected up 
valuable items from the property in a suitcase and returned to Leningrad.
118
 During the 
course of the investigation it was revealed that this modus operandi was not a one off. 
Later in December 1945 Budogoskii befriended a woman living on Zagorodnii prospect 
and obtained a key from her. On 3 January 1946 he stole 1570 roubles worth of clothing 
from her wardrobe whilst she was out.
119
 
 
 This murder was far more typical of the circumstances in which veterans killed 
civilians than the example with which this chapter started. Mashkov, Maksimov and 
Budogoskii were not bloodthirsty trained killers unable to escape violent and murderous 
habits acquired in wartime. Although they set out with the intention of committing 
robbery, it was by no means certain that murder was pre-meditated. The trio were not 
criminal masterminds who had hatched a watertight plan, but rather incompetent petty 
thieves. Perhaps the most telling detail in this case was the choice of murder weapon. 
As the distinguished historian of crime Eric Monkkonen reminds us the choice of 
weapons can reveal a great deal about the nature of violent crime.
120
 Stepanova was 
killed with a household object which came to the hand of her assailants, an axe which 
would have been used for chopping firewood.  
 
For proponents of the brutalization thesis the fear of returning veterans was 
intensified by the knowledge that handguns, rifles, hand-grenades and bombs were 
finding their way back into civilian society.
121
 It was for this reason that fears of 
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brutalization have frequently led to tighter gun control. Post-war Leningrad was awash 
with lethal weapons. Between 1946 and 1949 the Leningrad police seized 
approximately 5500 guns, 2000 grenades, more than 160,000 rounds of ammunition, 
1500 knives, 2000 artillery shells, 12 landmines and 17 kilograms of high-explosive.
122
 
It was not unusual for returning veterans to stash pistols or knives in their kitbags as 
mementos. Sometimes soldiers falling on hard times would hawk their weapons at 
Leningrad markets to make ready cash. Despite efforts to clear the region of mines and 
ordnance, rural areas were littered with discarded military hardware. The Leningrad 
police reported that groups of children travelled out of the city by suburban train 
returning with live shells and ammunition.
123
 Weaponry was relatively easy to obtain. 
But, Leningrad‟s veterans were by and large not running amok with weaponry brought 
back from the frontlines or purchased on the black market. Klimov‟s calculated 
shooting of a lorry-driver to steal his Studebaker was the exception, rather than the rule. 
Veterans committing murder tended to use items that came to hand. As Monkkonen 
writes; “Most murderers used whatever was handy, including hands, feet, sticks, rocks, 
chairs, and combinations of all of them.”124 This same principle appears to have applied 
to ex-servicemen in Leningrad as well as New York City‟s criminals. 
 
Other case files confirm the impression that some veterans were turning to crime 
out of necessity rather than blood-lust or a desire for riches. David Sokolov was 
demobilized in December 1944 on the grounds of invalidity; he was aged thirty-three. 
On his return to Leningrad he temporarily lived with his mother in a communal 
apartment on Saratovskaia ulitsa. Officially he was registered as having no employment 
and no fixed abode. He supported himself by robbing apartments in Leningrad and the 
Leningrad oblast.
125
 In an official appeal to his sentence Sokolov claimed that he had 
been forced into crime by his inability to work, his disability, and because of poverty. In 
hope of reducing his sentence he pleaded; “I am not a depraved person, I can still be a 
useful person in the grand project of building socialist society.” In hope of clemency he 
listed his employment history, details of his military career and the medals he had been 
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awarded.
126
 Veterans were not only the perpetrators of criminal offences; in many cases 
they were also victims of a cruel set of circumstances which pushed them towards 
desperate actions. In many instances veterans tried under article 167 of the criminal 
codex were unemployed war-invalids, who had come to Leningrad from neighbouring 
regions, but had been unable to find work and had resorted to crime. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of court files are the glimpses they offer into 
the psychological and psychiatric states of the accused. In a handful of cases suspects 
were referred to psychiatrists for examination. Thanks to recent research by the 
historian Dan Healey we know something about Soviet approaches to forensic 
psychiatry, particularly in the 1920s and early 1930s. The primary function of 
courtroom psychiatrists was to assess whether defendants could be held criminally 
responsible (vmeniaemyi) for their actions, and whether they were fit to stand trial. 
Leningrad was at the cutting edge of efforts to introduce psychiatric assessment in 
Soviet legal practice. Leningrad in the 1920s, unlike minor Russian cities, had its own 
institute devoted solely to the study of legal psychiatry; the Lenin Diagnostic Institute of 
Forensic Neurology and Psychiatry, funded by the local branch of the Commissariat of 
Public Health.
127
 It was staff from the successor bodies to this institute which assessed 
the criminal responsibility (vmeniaemost‟) of veterans committing violent crimes in the 
late 1940s. Leningrad‟s status as the centre of Soviet medical science, particularly in the 
field of psychiatry and neuro-psychology, reveals insights into the minds of ex-
servicemen which might have gone unnoticed in other locations. Of course, the modest 
selection of psychiatric examinations explored in my sample can not claim to be 
representative of veterans as a whole, but they do suggest that mental trauma connected 
to wartime service was a contributing factor to many crimes. 
 
War invalids, particularly those who had suffered head wounds or some form of 
shell-shock (voennaia kontuziia) appear to have been especially likely to undergo 
psychiatric examination. In the five cases in my sample where veterans underwent 
psychiatric examination the accused had suffered from shell-shock. In two cases the 
level of trauma was severe. Andrei Akimov, for example, had spent six weeks in an 
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evacuation hospital after a head injury.
128
 Vasilli Krymov spent three months in an 
evacuation hospital, between June and September 1943 suffering from “a functional 
disturbance of the nervous system” and hysterical reaction. He spent a further three 
months between June and September 1944 in a psychiatric clinic with a diagnosis of 
“sharply pronounced psychopathy.”129 In all of these cases it is unclear whether it was 
previous medical history or self-evident psychic disturbances which prompted the 
intervention of a psychiatrist.  
 
All of these ex-servicemen were suffering from psychiatric difficulties in one 
form or another. After having been shelled in July 1944 Gerasimov began to suffer 
convulsive fits. According to his description of these attacks it became difficult to 
breathe, his emotions became heightened, he became easily upset and would often 
breakdown in tears. These problems persisted after his demobilization in October 
1945.
130
 Other cases alluded to the after effects of kontuziia and the influence of 
alcohol. One veteran who was regularly consuming excessive quantities of alcohol 
required half a litre of vodka before he became drunk.
131
 Psychiatrists also considered 
that Klimov had a problem with alcohol. Although he often drunk just 100 grams, he 
was also capable of consuming several glasses of vodka. Tellingly the word used for 
glass was tumbler (stakan), rather than shot-glass (riumka). The consumption of 
excessive quantities of alcohol and ex-servicemen disappearing on benders lasting days 
was a feature of many of these reports. Of course heavy drinking was part of the culture 
of army life and a symbol of Russian masculinity. It was something that former soldiers 
who had navigated the transition back into civilian life also indulged in. Yet, vodka was 
not just a means of relaxation, it was also a means of numbing physical, emotional and 
psychological pain; a form of self-medication. 
 
This is perhaps best illustrated by Alexei Kravchenko. In October 1945 he 
became involved in a fight with a fellow disabled veteran killing him in the process. 
The details and circumstances of the crime are of secondary importance to the 
discussion of Kravchenko‟s mental health in the trial proceedings. He had been called 
up for military service at the start of the war, and miraculously survived the carnage. He 
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suffered a catalogue of injuries. In 1941 he had lost four toes on his right foot to 
frostbite. In 1943 he was wounded in the shoulder, and in both 1944 and 1945 he had 
been shell-shocked. After the first instance he began to suffer fits and to occasionally 
lose consciousness. He also began to experience heightened emotions. He often reacted 
aggressively, and found relating to other people increasingly difficult. During the trial it 
was revealed that he spent a month in a psychiatric hospital in Moscow after his second 
attack of shell-shock. Before his medical discharge from the army he had been 
disciplined several times for provoking fights. He also began to drink heavily as a 
means of self-medication. He described, in his own words, how everyday he drank at 
least 200 grams of vodka. He estimated that he needed to consume 300 to 400 grams of 
vodka before he started to feel intoxicated. On the day he killed his victim he estimated 
that he had drunk 800 grams of vodka. He explained that alcohol helped relieve the pain 
he felt in his head, but that when drunk he became aggressive and hot-tempered. More 
remarkably he described how drinking prompted self-harming. On two separate 
occasions he had cut his own chest. There was no indication in the court record how 
serious these injuries were, or whether Kravchenko was suicidal.
132
 
 
 It seems undeniable that many veterans committing crimes were suffering from 
war-trauma. Some of the descriptions of increased arousal, hyper-vigilance, irritability, 
angry outbursts, difficulty concentrating and the abuse of alcohol are consistent with the 
typical symptoms of PTSD.
133
 All of the psychiatric examinations, despite sometimes 
acknowledging psychiatric problems, concluded that the accused were fit to stand trial 
and had been in control of their actions at the time of the crime. Doctors were unwilling 
to exculpate ex-servicemen for their crimes on the basis of mental trauma. In the course 
of the 1930s attitudes towards forensic psychiatry hardened. The discipline came under 
criticism for offering a soft option to criminals. Patients in the 1920s allegedly knew 
enough about psychiatric discourse to make articulate appeals for psychiatric 
assessment, in the hope of obtaining the sympathy of specialists.
134
 If veterans had 
drawn attention to experiences of being shell-shocked and traumatic experiences in 
hope of obtaining leniency they were to be disappointed. Mental trauma was given 
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short-shrift in Leningrad generally, but its contribution to crime amongst veterans was 
ignored. 
 
The Lack of Fears About Brutalization 
 
 The experience of killing, wholesale destruction and mass death had a profound 
impact on the lives of Leningrad‟s veterans, but not in the ways the „Brutalization 
Thesis‟ or „Violent Veteran Model‟ predicts. The behaviour of the Red Army within 
and beyond Soviet borders both during and after the Great Patriotic War was often 
violent, murderous and destructive. Yet, even in one of the most extreme examples of 
the violence of twentieth-century warfare there was no wholesale brutalization of 
combatants. Of course ex-servicemen contributed to the wave of crime which swept 
post-war Leningrad and late Stalinist society. Police reports and court records 
demonstrate that a minority of veterans were deeply involved in the shadow economy 
centred on Leningrad‟s markets either speculating in deficit items or selling stolen 
goods. An even smaller number were involved in bandit gangs terrorizing Leningrad‟s 
rural periphery, or in a variety of circumstances were committing violent crimes 
amongst themselves and wider society. A close examination of the evidence reveals that 
even the most brutal crimes committed by returning veterans were rarely the actions of 
bloodthirsty trained killers caught in a downwards spiral of violence. Crimes were more 
commonly the product of failed demobilizations. Impoverishment, traumatic reactions 
to wartime experiences, and the failure of veterans, especially the war disabled, to 
reintegrate into mainstream civilian life provide more robust explanations for veterans‟ 
involvement in crime.  
 
What was remarkable about Leningrad‟s veterans was not the violence they 
visited upon a society which seemed indifferent to the difficulties former soldiers faced 
in resuming ordinary lives, but their ability to compartmentalize their wartime 
experiences. During wartime soldiers were required to kill, behave violently and to 
channel their aggressive impulses. Once they were discharged from the military most 
ex-servicemen did as propaganda encouraged, and drew a line under the wartime 
chapter of their lives. In this instance at least ideology and propaganda appear to have 
had the desired effect. The message that the war was a struggle to the death between 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had constantly been pumped into the minds of Red 
Army soldiers and Soviet civilians. Leningrad‟s veterans had repeatedly been exhorted 
to avenge the destruction of their city and the murder of its inhabitants. Like all Soviet 
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soldiers they were encouraged to kill their enemy as a patriotic duty. In order to defend 
the nation, Soviet power and above all their families virtually anything could be 
justified. Violence deployed in the name of defeating the fascist invaders was entirely 
legitimate. The belief that soldiers were fighting for a noble cause absolved soldiers of 
fears that they had been damaged by extreme wartime violence, or any guilt about their 
actions.  
 
Clearly Leningrad‟s veterans experienced many of the same difficulties in 
readjusting to civilian life as their counterparts in other societies. Why then were 
Leningraders and wider Soviet society untroubled by the arrival of ex-servicemen 
skilled in killing and accustomed to violence? The absence of either popular or official 
fears about the brutalization of ex-servicemen clearly distinguished Leningrad and its 
hinterland from European and North American societies after 1945. A number of factors 
help explain why Leningrad departed from the experience of other post-war societies. 
Prevailing social and cultural attitudes towards violence in late Stalinist society form 
part of the explanation. Equally important, if not more so, were local factors unique to 
this region.  
 
Discussions about the conduct of war and soldiers‟ behaviour create highly 
charged moral, political and emotional debates in any society. But, confronting these 
issues within the „totalitarian‟ constraints of Stalinism was particularly difficult. Public 
expression was highly regulated through a complex interaction of state and social forces 
which placed a number of highly sensitive issues off limits. Soviet society had no public 
forum, or private back channels, through which the effects of wartime violence could be 
discussed. Against the backdrop of the all-pervasive propaganda rhetoric of victory, 
heroism and liberation public discussion of brutalization was unthinkable. Propaganda 
combined with the ossifying official memory of the war prevented any speculation 
about the long-term effects of violence on either individual soldiers or wider society. A 
collective silence quickly enveloped the violent reality of frontline service. These heroic 
myths were not simply imposed from above. The language of the official cult of the 
Great Patriotic War enabled ex-servicemen and civilians to elide uncomfortable aspects 
of wartime service and repress darker memories of the war.
135
  
 
The same was also true about violent crime in Leningrad after 1945. The 
shocking crimes which appear in the archival record were not dissected in local 
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newspapers or journals for evidence of the brutalizing effects of war. A reluctance to 
discuss crime in the public arena had not always been a feature of the local press. In 
September 1926, for example, Soviet newspapers reported details of a horrific crime 
committed in Leningrad‟s backstreets. A gang of drunken youths returning from a 
funeral, including Komsomol members, gang raped a woman near an empty building 
plot near Chubarov Alley. The case received an astonishing level of national and local 
coverage, becoming the focus of intense journalistic attention. The reporting of the so-
called Chubarov Alley affair was not exclusively about the violence of the rape. The 
story came to prominence because it coincided with a national campaign against 
hooliganism. Against the background of internecine party warfare between Moscow and 
Leningrad in the mid 1920s, this incident became a political weapon used to discredit 
Leningrad‟s party and Komsomol. Images and ideas of Saint Petersburg/Petrograd/ 
Leningrad as a corrupting social force, well established in Russian public culture, were 
repeatedly called upon to bolster ideas of the degeneracy of the Leningrad party.
136
 
 
There was nothing comparable to the outpouring of outrage provoked by this case 
in the reporting of violent crime in Leningrad in the late 1940s. Yet, the parallel with 
the 1920s is an important one. Both periods marked high points in the strained 
relationship between Moscow and Leningrad. In Stalin‟s last years these tensions 
manifested themselves in an attack on Leningrad‟s writers and the city‟s cultural élite in 
1946 and a political purge of the Leningrad party in 1949. Moscow was searching for 
ways to rein in Leningrad‟s sense of independence and the local identities formed by the 
blockade. Although Moscow was looking for reasons to attack Leningrad it did not 
resort to exploiting violent crime committed by veterans, including party members, to 
discredit the city and its political leaders. Perhaps any public discussion of the reality of 
post-war criminality, even when tightly constrained in a political campaign, was too 
explosive for a community attempting to repress its traumatic wartime past. 
 
The limits of public expression in Stalinist society provide only part of the 
explanation for the lack of fears amongst Leningraders that veterans had been brutalized 
by war. Late Stalinist society had very different social, cultural and political attitudes 
towards violence than either post 1945 Britain or America. First, Stalinism was a more 
militaristic society with strong pre-established notions about the redemptive qualities of 
military service. In late Tsarist Russia and early Soviet society, as Sandborn argues, the 
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army was an important institution in the teaching of masculine virtues, such as courage, 
selflessness and discipline, as well as qualities like loyalty and obedience crucial in 
“drafting the nation”.137 From the Red Army‟s creation during the Revolution and Civil 
War it played an important socio-political role as a “school of socialism”, particularly in 
the ongoing project to bring Soviet power to the village.
138
 The idea that military service 
offered a unique form of martial and moral training was neither new nor entirely 
Russian or Soviet, think for a moment about Britain‟s continuing obsession with 
bringing back national service, but in a highly militarised society it had greater power.   
 
Secondly, Stalinist society was the product of war, revolution, civil war, famine, 
forced collectivization and industrialisation and successive waves of political violence. 
Violence was not confined to crisis periods. It was integral to the functioning of the 
entire system. Bolshevism openly gloried in the rhetoric of revolutionary violence, 
depicting it as a force capable of cleansing, renewing and remodelling revolutionary 
society.
139
 As Sandborn writes; “Violence loomed large in the imagining and practices 
of the national political community.”140 Stalinism was a classic example of what 
Gerlach terms “extremely violent societies.” Not only did it exhibit a general culture of 
and massive levels of physical violence, violence was directed a number of different 
victim groups and was participatory in nature. Violence in Stalinist society was the 
interrelated product of entrenched social attitudes, economic factors, deeply rooted 
social conflicts, class civil war, external conflicts, ethnic violence and selective social 
policies.
141
 As Edele and Geyer argue, “the experience of unfettered violence formed 
the mental background”, to the Soviet war-effort. But, this conflict represented an 
escalation in Soviet experiences of violence. Brutality was part of the war‟s grammar, 
part of a system of wartime violence.
142
 Given its past and more recent experience of 
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violence, late Stalinist society may have developed more durable frameworks for 
dealing with wartime violence and its painful legacies. 
 
The key to the absence of fears about brutalization in Leningrad and the 
Leningrad oblast lies in the region‟s unique wartime experience. The blockade shaped 
the city and its inhabitants in ways which did not apply to other Soviet regions. During 
the blockade Leningraders had been forced to confront the social threat of crime long 
before former soldiers began arriving in the region. Official propaganda celebrated the 
heroic stoicism of besieged Leningraders. Nevertheless, crime and fear of crime grew 
amongst the rubble and confusion of the wartime city. Ravaged by fighting, 
depopulated by mobilization, evacuation and mass death, cut off from central control 
from the Soviet “mainland” and crippled by extreme shortages of food and everyday 
commodities the blockaded city was a space in which crime flourished. Heroism and 
criminality co-existed. As the celebrated scholar and blockade survivor Dmitrii 
Likhachev wrote; “At every step one encounters villainy and nobility, extreme 
selfishness and self-sacrifice, thieving and honesty.”143 For Likhachev, like many 
others, the blockade stripped people‟s characters bare revealing their true selves; “Some 
turned out to be marvellous, incomparable heroes, others – scoundrels, villains, 
murderers, cannibals.”144 
 
 During the siege Leningraders, just like disabled veterans following their 
demobilization, frequently had little choice but to resort to crime. Driven out of their 
minds with hunger, especially during the winter of 1941-42 the theft of a loaf of bread 
or a ration card became a means of survival. Extreme shortages of food, clothing and 
everyday necessities combined with weak points in their supply and distribution created 
opportunities for organised theft and speculation. Robberies of shops, warehouses and 
supply vehicles by organized criminal gangs were common. In 1942 alone NKVD 
troops responsible for protecting goods in transit detained 10,170 thieves, preventing 
5094 thefts and recovering 105,584 kilograms of stolen goods.
145
 The desperation of 
starvation combined with the profits that could be obtained from the sale of stolen good 
or ration cards could also lead to violence. Murder for food became a regular 
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occurrence. In the first half of 1942 a total of 1216 people were arrested for killing or 
planning to kill individuals for their ration cards.
146
 Worse still were the reports of 
cannibalism. Between October 1941 and February 1943 approximately 1979 people 
were arrested for cannibalism. 494 of these cases were recorded in the first half of 
February 1942.
147
 For outsiders these crimes have become symbolic of the hunger, 
poverty and violence of the blockade. On the whole these crimes were not committed by 
hardened criminals but ordinary people driven to robbery and murder by hunger. While 
foreign historians have been intrigued by the incidence of cannibalism, most 
Leningraders preferred to cling to the collective myths about Leningrad as an 
undefeated city united by the experience of extreme suffering.
148
  
 
 Those Leningraders who had remained in the besieged city throughout the 
blockade and even those who were evacuated from the city had also been on the 
frontlines in the struggle against Nazi Germany. Their struggle for survival in defiance 
of threats to wipe Leningrad from the face of the earth were heroic, but required many 
to make similar moral choices and compromises as frontoviki. Leningraders did not 
question whether soldiers had been brutalized by what they had seen and done on the 
frontlines, because any such speculation would prompt a secondary question: how far 
had Leningraders themselves been brutalized by the blockade? This after all was a 
situation in which people had resorted to desperate measures to survive, including in 
isolated cases cannibalism. The reality of life in the blockaded city was far too painful 
to be raked over in public. The blockade and its true effects on Leningraders‟ lives were 
buried deep in the recesses of survivor‟s minds. Leningraders did not question whether 
soldiers had been brutalized on the frontlines, because they knew for themselves that 
they had not been brutalized by their experiences in the blockaded city.  
 
Demobilization in Leningrad brought a series of added complexities for 
returning veterans. The legacy of the blockade meant that ex-servicemen found great 
difficulty obtaining housing. Their sense of entitlement was forced to compete with that 
of blockade survivors, who could lay equal claim to jobs, housing, healthcare and other 
municipal services. In many ways demobilization in Leningrad was more difficult than 
in regions where veterans were more privileged. Yet there were compensating factors. 
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Ex-servicemen returning to Leningrad joined a community that understood the horrors, 
traumas and pain of modern warfare better than most. Leningraders were less willing to 
judge veterans for their conduct during war, since they themselves intimately 
understood what modern warfare entailed. Therefore Leningrad‟s ex-servicemen were 
not treated with the same suspicion as their former allies in Britain or America. They 
were spared a public culture which expected them to return as broken men with violent 
and criminal tendencies. The process of mass demobilization was poisoned by 
bureaucracy, corruption and material shortage, not by public fears that soldiers who had 
sacrificed their lives had been brutalized by war. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Nowhere were the changes unleashed by the Great Patriotic War more apparent 
than amongst the Leningrad‟s ruins or the burnt-out abandoned villages in the 
surrounding countryside. The impact of the war was not only measured in terms of 
buildings destroyed, lives lost and bodies shattered but also a partial breakdown in the 
social order. Returning veterans were disorientated by rising crime and the emergence 
of a less stable and less socially cohesive post-war society. Yet the behaviour of 
Leningrad‟s veterans was not beyond reproach. Veterans unable to „find their place‟ in 
civilian life were responsible for a measure of crime, hooliganism, vagrancy and 
socially disruptive behaviour. However, the role of veterans in the post-war crime wave 
was not discussed by contemporaries and has subsequently been hidden from the 
official public narratives of the past. Involvement in crime was not the same as 
brutalization. Even in the most violent crimes other factors provide more convincing 
explanations for veterans‟ actions. The lack of concern about brutalization, in stark 
contrast to the experience of other twentieth century post-war societies, reveals 
something about the social and cultural attitudes to violence, as well as the fault lines 
running through post-blockade Leningrad.   
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Chapter 5: Leningrad’s Veterans - Politics and Memory 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between demobilized veterans and post-war 
politics in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast. Without doubt the Great Patriotic War 
had a profound effect on Soviet soldiers‟ mentalities. In attempting to resume ordinary 
civilian life veterans would have to readjust their mindsets to new post-war realities. As 
part of this process many ex-servicemen reconsidered their relationship with Soviet 
politics. The chapter attempts to reassess the commonly held myths about the 
relationship between ex-servicemen and post-war politics. It challenges the established 
notions that veterans were either opponents of the regime or convinced Stalinists. Most 
veterans held political views somewhere in between these two polarized positions. 
Veterans in Leningrad and its rural periphery were much less interested in organized 
party politics than historians have previously argued. The chapter also attempts to 
establish a link between the state‟s suspicions towards veterans as a potential source of 
opposition and their role as a repository of local wartime memory. The battle over local 
wartime memory played a significant role in Leningrad‟s post-war politics. Throughout 
late Stalinism post-war politics and Leningraders‟ memories of the war were closely 
interwoven. Veterans‟ chances of readapting to post-war lives and the re-imposition of 
centralized political control depended to a very large extent on veterans‟ abilities to 
constrain wartime memories at odds with official patriotic myths. 
Leningrad: Site of Political Opposition and Stalinist Repression 
 
Leningrad offers a unique vantage point from which to study the attempt to 
create ordinary citizens from demobilized veterans with extraordinary wartime 
experiences. As demonstrated in previous chapters Leningrad was a key location in 
mass demobilization. More veterans were demobilized in the „northern capital‟ than any 
other major Soviet city. Former soldiers from across the Soviet Union, not just native 
Leningraders, were drawn to the city. Despite the shadow of mass death and wartime 
destruction, and perhaps even because of it, Leningrad seemed to offer the prospect of a 
better life. Post-war Leningrad was not a provincial backwater, as some scholars 
suggest, but a Hero City, with a proud revolutionary heritage and unique cultural 
tradition.
1
 The opportunity to contribute to the myth of Leningrad‟s phoenix-like 
rebirth, and the possibilities of work and housing that this created, added to the city‟s 
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attractions. Leningrad‟s status as a centre of Soviet science, particularly medicine, 
exerted a further pull on disabled veterans. Many hoped, albeit mistakenly, that 
Leningrad would be able to provide the medical care they required and deserved. The 
presence of leading academic institutions researching prosthetics, military psychiatry 
and the employability of disabled veterans cast the difficulties of post-war readjustment 
into sharper focus. Although support was inadequate and frequently non-existent, 
Leningrad‟s psychiatric and psychological researchers did identify cases of trauma 
amongst veterans. In other places, without this scientific infrastructure, trauma was even 
more likely to go unidentified or be ignored. Veterans‟ experience of demobilization 
and post-war readjustment in and around Leningrad was not typical of a wider Soviet 
story, but it does highlight aspects that have been written out of the standard narrative of 
demobilization. 
 
Leningrad is an important location for studying veterans‟ post-war readjustment 
for one further reason; namely the city‟s uneasy relationship with central government in 
Moscow. Tension between the „northern capital‟ and Russia‟s spiritual heartland in 
Moscow was nothing new. It dated back to Saint Petersburg‟s foundation in the summer 
of 1703. The two cities have been presented as diametric opposites ever since. The 
literary myth of Petersburg, generated by writers such as Gogol, Pushkin and Bely, 
deliberately contrasted the alien European cultural influences of the new capital with the 
genuinely Russian and national character of Moscow. Over the course of over 300 years 
of rivalry the two cities have been presented as mirror images of each other. This 
supposed opposition became central to the ideological arguments between 
Westerninzers and Slavophiles in nineteenth century. Petersburg became the model for 
the Westernizers‟ vision of European progress, while Slavophiles idealized Moscow as 
embodiment of a true national character.
2
  
 
The Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and the decision to transfer the capital 
back to Moscow in March 1918 reversed the relationship between Moscow and 
Petrograd. Moscow became the imperial capital, the centre of power and the model for a 
new socialist society. The dynamic between the two cities shifted but the rivalry 
continued. Petrograd/Leningrad, with its proud revolutionary and industrial heritage, 
would become the centre of opposition with the party. Under Grigorii Zinoviev‟s 
leadership the city and the surrounding region reinforced its status as one of the Soviet 
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Union‟s leading economic and industrial regions. In 1925 the Leningrad party and 
Zinoviev openly opposed the party Central Committee in Moscow and Stalin‟s 
policies.
3
 Zinoviev was replaced in December 1925 by Sergei Kirov. Kirov‟s popularity 
in the early 1930s raised the possibility that he might emerge as a challenger to Stalin‟s 
pre-eminence. The cycle of purges which followed Kirov‟s assassination on 1 
December 1934 fell particularly heavily upon the membership of the Leningrad party 
and the city‟s intellectual and cultural elite.4  
 
The tense relationship between Leningrad and Moscow was recalibrated once 
again as a result of the Great Patriotic War. A shift in the balance of power between 
regional cities with a strong tradition of particularism and their capitals was by no 
means uncommon in twentieth-century Europe. Manchester or Munich, for example, 
which like Leningrad partially defined themselves against the capital, found that during 
wartime the political and legal reach of the administrative centre grew exponentially at 
the perceived expense of local interests.
5
 In Leningrad, however, the unique 
circumstances of the blockade shifted power in the opposite direction; from the capital 
to local decision makers. Isolation from the Soviet „mainland‟ and the difficulties of 
regular communication during the worst days of the blockade thrust Leningraders and 
their local political leaders on their own resources and initiative. As a consequence 
Leningrad‟s administrators were presented with an unusual degree of autonomy for a 
highly centralized authoritarian political system. Leningrad‟s nationally important 
industrial sector, for example, which was usually tightly regulated by Moscow, came 
almost exclusively under the control of the local party hierarchy. While centralized 
control was temporarily weakened the blockade fostered a renewed sense of civic pride 
and local patriotism. Many Leningraders believed that their sacrifices and determination 
had ensured their city‟s survival. From Moscow‟s perspective this nascent sense of local 
identity, strengthened in adversity, was a direct affront to centralized political control.
6
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This situation could not be allowed to persist for long. Although wartime 
propaganda harnessed local loyalties as a means of mobilizing and motivating soldiers 
and citizens, Leningrad‟s spirit of independence soon came under attack.7 The long 
historical background of rivalry between the two capitals, and Stalin‟s own perception 
of Leningrad as a source of political opposition, help explain why the city‟s post-war 
history was so closely interwoven with the course of late Stalinist high politics. Indeed, 
Leningrad was a target of Moscow‟s attempts to reassert political authority after a series 
of pragmatic wartime relaxations. In 1946 the city played an important part in the 
beginnings of the Zhdanovshchina, a campaign to strengthen ideological and cultural 
orthodoxy. In 1949 Leningrad provided the location for late Stalinism‟s single most 
murderous political purge and the first blood purge of the political élite since 1939; the 
so called Leningrad Affair. These events are part of what makes Leningrad such an 
important vantage point from which to examine demobilization and post-war 
readjustment. In addition to the myriad difficulties of adapting to civilian life in a 
community devastated by war, political repression was a constant backdrop to 
demobilization. 
 
 The first major attack against post-war Leningrad came in August 1946 with a 
public castigation of two prominent and popular Leningrad based journals, Zvezda and 
Leningrad. This spelled the end of a transitional period, since the lifting of the blockade, 
when Leningrad‟s sense of local patriotism had gone virtually unchallenged. But, Stalin 
had not forgotten that portraits of Zhdanov had almost been as plentiful as his own in 
the blockaded city, and that popular Leningrad leaders had caused him difficulties in the 
past.
8
 Yet, as Zubkova reminds us the spirit of freedom fostered by the war did not 
evaporate immediately, but remained a counterweight to attempts to recreate the pre-
war political order.
9
 On 14 August 1946 the Party Central Committee in Moscow 
published a resolution which criticized Zvezda and Leningrad for serious ideological 
irregularities. Two days later at a meeting of the Leningrad branch of the writer‟s union 
Andrei Zhdanov, First Secretary of the Leningrad party between 1934 and 1944, 
launched a vitriolic attack on Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Zoshchenko, two 
Leningrad writers with strong links to both journals. The speech became notorious for 
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humiliating two of the period‟s most gifted writers, embodiments of the Petersburg 
spirit, in the crudest and most intolerant manner. This formed the start of the 
Zhdanovshchina, literally time of Zhdanov, a campaign which forever linked Zhdanov‟s 
name with intolerance and cultural persecution.
10
 
 
The Zhdanovshchina is usually understood as a xenophobic anti-Western 
campaign, targeting the intelligentsia‟s hopes for a more liberal form of government and 
freer expression. In practice its causes were more complicated. Factional infighting in 
Stalin‟s inner circle played its part. As Gorlizki and Khlevniuk have argued the choice 
of Leningrad targets was almost certainly Stalin‟s, and was designed to place Zhdanov 
in an awkward position. “Attacking Leningrad-based institutions, and especially the 
Leningrad party, which was inevitably implicated in the running of the journals, could 
only sully his (Zhdanov‟s) own reputation as a political overlord... Attacking his old 
bailiwick was an embarrassment for Zhdanov and ran against his personal interests.”11 
The denunciation of Akhmatova and Zoshchenko also damaged the credibility of the 
Leningrad party, which had authorized publication of Zvezda and Leningrad.
12
  
 
The local aspects of the Zhdanovshchina were also important. The attack on 
Leningrad writers and journals was not just criticism of servility to Western culture, but 
also a challenge to the memory of the blockade and local wartime identities. Literature 
had played an important part in creating the myth of Leningrad‟s heroic defence and 
fostering local patriotism. It was significant that writers and journals which had played 
an important part in portraying Leningrad and the blockade in terms other than those 
constantly repeated in the sterile official propaganda were singled out for criticism. 
Cultural politics were being used as a mechanism to repress local memories and enforce 
an official narrative of the war, which allowed no room for expressing the enormity of 
Leningrad‟s wartime suffering.13 A challenge to local particularities was not unique to 
Leningrad: the Zhdanovshchina also targeted non-Russian Slavic and Central Asian 
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historical narratives.
14
 But, an attack on what could and couldn‟t be said about wartime 
experience was particularly painful for proud Leningraders. 
 
The origins of the Leningrad Affair are more complicated. As Bidlack argues the 
Leningrad Affair, “is one of the greatest enduring mysteries of Soviet high politics of 
the post-World War II era.” All explanations for this purge contain an element of 
conjecture, especially given the lack of surviving archival evidence.
15
 Historians 
disagree about what precisely prompted the purge. According to the established 
narrative history, the Leningrad Affair was engineered and exploited by Malenkov and 
Beria as a means of eliminating upstart rivals with links to Leningrad, who had been 
protected by Zhdanov until his death in late August 1948. In a refinement of this 
position Tromly has argued that the affair was an attempt to break up a local patron-
client network of Leningrad-based officials who had established themselves and 
accumulated power in the wartime and early post-war period.
16
 Other historians, most 
notably Brandenberger, have emphasised the ideological rather than political 
circumstances of the affair. He argues that rumours of the formation of a Russian 
Communist party and of elevating Leningrad to the capital of the RSFSR raised the 
prospect of an ideological rift within the party. According to this view the purge was 
Stalin‟s response to the threat of Russian nationalism acquiring an institutional base in 
Leningrad.
17
 Other historians have questioned whether Leningraders were seriously 
advocating a Russian nationalist agenda, and have suggested that accusations of a 
regional conspiracy reflected Stalin‟s own fears rather than reality.18 
   
Whatever the precise weighting of factional and ideological reasons, the 
Leningrad affair, like the Zhdanovshchina, had a local dimension. Thirty-six members 
of the Leningrad city and oblast party committees and soviet executive committees were 
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convicted as a result of the purge.
19
 In total approximately 2000 people lost their jobs as 
a result of the purge, the majority of whom had close links to Leningrad, although 
patronage politics had taken some Leningraders to Novgorod, Stalingrad even the 
Crimea.
20
 The purge also spread beyond politics and became enmeshed with the cultural 
crackdown. It extended beyond Leningrad party functionaries with patron-client links to 
Zhdanov, Kuznetsov or Voznesenskii to include figures linked to the blockaded city. 
The Leningrad Affair simultaneously removed the perceived threat of political 
opposition, and attacked local wartime myths and memories which conflicted with 
official propaganda.
21
 Expression in the visual arts, music, poetry and prose were 
further restricted, the output of Leningrad‟s celebrated film studios was limited and the 
dean of the Leningrad State University was removed from office.
22
 
  
The link between local memory and alleged political threat was more than 
coincidence. Of particular significance was the manner in which the Museum of the 
Defence of Leningrad was drawn into the purge. The museum had grown out of a 
smaller exhibition entitled, “The Heroic Defence of Leningrad”, established in the 
autumn of 1941. From the temporary break in the blockade in January 1943 onwards the 
exhibition attracted enormous interest. The museum which subsequently took shape 
became the focal point for Leningraders‟ memorialization of their city‟s tragic wartime 
story. By May 1949 the exhibition and museum together had received 1,565,300 
visitors. This was an astonishing number given Leningrad‟s depopulation and that the 
museum had been closed for relatively long periods of time to allow for the 
reconstruction of exhibits and the halls which housed them.
23
 
  
Soon after the Leningrad Affair the Museum was „temporarily‟ closed for 
renovation. S.I. Abbakumov, the head of the wartime exhibition, and Lev Rakov, the 
museum‟s first director, were both arrested. Rakov was sentenced to twenty-five years. 
They along with other members of the museum‟s staff were accused of having distorted 
the importance of Leningrad‟s contribution to the war effort and creating a special myth 
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around Leningrad‟s fate during the blockade. Malenkov visited Leningrad and the 
museum in February 1949. One former museum worker recalled Malenkov waving a 
museum guide book and shouting that the museum was full of anti-Soviet exhibits, and 
that the museum, “perverted Stalin‟s role in the defence of Leningrad, that only the 
suffering of Leningraders is emphasized in the museum, and that the role of the Central 
Committee of the party in the defence of Leningrad is not presented, etc., etc...” On 18 
February 1953, after over three years of work to transform the Museum into an 
ideologically acceptable version of Leningrad‟s wartime story, the city soviet ordered 
that the Museum‟s collections were either destroyed or redistributed to other 
institutions. This is usually interpreted as an effort to suppress the materials, rather than 
an attempt to protect them falling into the hands of propagandists.
24
 Over the course of 
1949 and Stalin‟s remaining years virtually all forms of local public memory or 
commemoration of Leningrad‟s wartime experience were repressed. Books about the 
blockade published during and after the event were removed from shops and libraries 
across the Soviet Union. Discussion of the blockade, apart from stilted propaganda 
pieces published on or around the anniversary of its lifting, disappeared from the 
national and local press.
25
                 
 
 From the Kremlin‟s perspective, although the threat of political conspiracy was 
largely imagined, Leningrad appeared to be the epicentre of post-war political 
opposition. Local memories of the city‟s wartime experience gave reason for many of 
its inhabitants to be hostile to the centralized Stalinist state. Reports of anti-Soviet 
agitation in Leningrad regularly passed across the desks of Stalin, Beria and other 
political leaders. For example, between 26 and 29 October 1946 police in the 
neighbouring Volodarski and Smol‟ninskii districts discovered six „counter-
revolutionary‟ posters, either discarded on the street or posted on doors, railings and 
post-boxes.
26
 Anti-Stalinist youth movements were well represented in Leningrad. 
Between 30 October and 1 November 1948 a total of 144 anti-Soviet leaflets (listovki) 
scrawled in pen and pencil on pages torn from exercise books were discovered shoved 
into post-boxes or passed onto the doors of apartment blocks across eight of the city‟s 
administrative districts. Two students from the Leningrad Technical College of Food 
                                                 
24
  Maddox, „Healing the Wounds‟, pp.245-48; Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, pp.144-45. 
 
25
  Maddox, „Healing the Wounds‟, pp.243-44. 
 
26
  GARF/f.9401/op.2/d.139/l.319 published in Khastov, Naumov and Plotnikova (eds), Lubianka.  Stalin 
i NKVD - RKGB - GUKP – “SMERSH”. 1939 - Mart 1946, p.35. 
243 
Production were arrested. When the apartment of one student was searched sixty-seven 
copies of anti-Soviet leaflet were discovered hidden in a piano along with a political 
programme and political tracts for an organization called “The Happiness of the 
People.”27 Even if these examples of opposition were fabrications, an attempt was being 
made to link Leningrad with anti-Soviet activity. 
 
 The fact that Leningrad was viewed as a hotbed of political opposition by central 
government makes the city a particularly important location for examining veterans‟ 
relationship to politics and their political attitudes. Leningrad‟s veterans were returning 
to a community which was convulsed by political instability and turmoil, both during 
mass demobilization and in the years following their reintegration into civilian society. 
The climate of political repression and cultural crackdown was a constant background to 
veterans‟ attempts to resume ordinary lives, and must have influenced veterans‟ 
attitudes towards the world around them. The attack on local wartime memories and 
identities was more explicit in Leningrad than any other major Soviet city, and must 
have been apparent to demobilized veterans as well as civilians.  
 
But Leningrad is important for another reason. Given Leningrad‟s history of 
opposition to Moscow and its westwards-facing traditions, the city provides a unique 
location from which to evaluate veterans‟ political attitudes. If ex-servicemen were 
disaffected Stalinists, who were highly critical of the regimes‟ re-imposition of an 
authoritarian political system, as some historians have suggested, then one might 
anticipate that opposition amongst veterans would be pronounced in Leningrad. As the 
focal point of post-war political opposition, at least in Moscow‟s imagination, one 
might expect anti-Soviet sentiments to be more vocal or voluble in Leningrad than other 
cities. Emboldened by the general atmosphere of dissent demobilized Leningraders may 
have been more willing to express critical views. Even if Leningrad‟s veterans were no 
more critical of Soviet power than those from other cities and regions Moscow‟s 
suspicions of the northern capital and its citizens may have resulted in veterans‟ 
political attitudes being better documented than elsewhere. 
The Spectrum of Veterans’ Political Views 
 
As has been argued throughout this thesis Red Army veterans were an 
extraordinarily diverse social constituency that experienced the difficulties of 
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demobilization in different ways. Between 1941 and 1945 men and women of all ages, 
drawn from all regions of the Soviet Union, from all social classes and walks of life, 
served in the Soviet armed forces. In subsequent years veterans talked nostalgically of 
the „frontline brotherhood‟ and how war had united soldiers behind a common purpose. 
But, the shared experience of military service did not entirely supplant generational, 
gender, ethnic, regional or class differences. Although Zubkova refers to frontoviki as 
an important new social layer (novyi sotsium) specific to late Stalinist society, veterans 
did not react as a cohesive social group. Nor did veterans share a common philosophy 
or a common attitude towards the communist party. Veterans inhabited a rich „cultural 
universe‟ which contained a vast array of competing influences. Their post-war political 
outlook was influenced by a combination of official propaganda, individual and 
collective memories, rumour and word of mouth, visions of the good life abroad and 
foreign propaganda. As Edele writes veterans‟ political ideas ranged from, “an embrace 
of an idealized version of Western liberal democracy and capitalism to „Stalinist‟ – with 
all possible shades of grey between.”28 Yet much of the existing literature has tended to 
categorise veterans as either hard-line Stalinists or fervent de-Stalinizers. 
 
The image of demobilized veterans as loyal servants of the Stalinist state owes a 
great deal to contemporary propaganda, which equated frontoviki with politically loyal 
and highly committed party activists. Newspaper articles often celebrated the 
contribution that veterans made to local party organizations and campaigns. Post-war 
novels told the stories of ex-servicemen who mobilized the apathetic communities to 
which they returned.
29
 In part the image of the politically committed veteran fed upon 
the memory of the role played by Civil War veterans; who were used by the party-state 
as a tool to introduce Bolshevik ideology and bring the revolution to the countryside.
30
 
For Soviet historians, like Donchenko writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
manner in which the regime under Brezhenev had co-opted veterans to play a part in 
enforcing the official memory and patriotic cult of the Great Patriotic War may have 
made veterans seem more natural supporters of the regime than they had been in the late 
1940s.   
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More importantly the image of veterans as loyal communists reflected the 
targeted recruitment of serving soldiers into the Communist Party. Decrees passed in 
August and December 1941 lowered entry criteria and swept away the formalities for 
soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle and who wanted to join the party.
31
 
Approximately eighty per cent of the 8.4 million full and candidate members recruited 
during the war were from the armed forces.
32
 By the end of the war, according to 
Fitzpatrick, more than three million soldiers, approximately a quarter of the total army, 
belonged to the Party, most having been recruited to join during the war.
33
 During mass 
demobilization more than 2.6 million party members left the armed forces and joined 
local party organizations; over 1.8 million of these between mid 1946 and mid 1947.
34
 
According to Donchenko demobilized veterans came to play a prominent part in local 
party institutions, where they often accounted for more than fifty per cent of the 
membership.
35
 Former soldiers, especially officers with experience of military 
command, were often appointed to positions of authority within the party.  
 
For scholars who argue that veterans were beneficiaries of upwards social 
mobility, party membership provided an example of the close bonds between veterans 
and the state. According to Amir Weiner‟s study of post-war Vinnitsa the local 
communist party contained so many veterans, that it almost became a substitute for an 
official veterans‟ organization. Dominated by a group of assertive Ukrainian veterans, 
controlling an extensive patronage network, the local party became a clique. 
Advancement in this tight circle of former comrades depended as much on wartime 
service records as personal merit or ideological orthodoxy.
36
 Vinnitsa, however, was a 
special case that should not be assumed to be representative of a wider Soviet 
experience. In post-war Leningrad the party was not dominated by demobilized 
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veterans. Politically committed ex-servicemen, in contrast to Vinnitsa, did not appear to 
control local patronage networks. 
 
Although the disappointments of demobilization bred cynicism amongst 
veterans, we should not preclude the possibility that many veterans emerged from the 
war as idealistic true believers. Indeed, for some veterans the remarkable turnaround in 
Soviet military fortunes was proof of the superiority of Soviet socialist system and 
Stalin‟s personal wisdom. Victory and the relief of survival could be intoxicating for 
young men. As the veteran Fedor Abramov wrote in 1990; “Drunk with the conceit of 
victory... we decided that our system was ideal, ... and we not only neglected to improve 
it, but, on the contrary we were dogmatic about it.” Viktor Nekrasov, whose post-war 
novel In the Hometown (V rodnom gorode) explored many of the difficulties and 
frustrations of demobilization, recalled how victory reinforced soldiers‟ faith in Stalin‟s 
personality cult. “We excused Stalin for everything! Collectivization, the purges, the 
execution of his colleagues, the defeats of 1941.”37 For many veterans Stalin could not 
be disassociated from the Soviet victory. May 1945 was the apogee of Stalin‟s personal 
power. It was not easy for many soldiers to escape propaganda‟s influence. Agitation 
was ceaseless. Politruks fought a never-ending battle for soldiers‟ hearts and minds. 
While the war awoke critical faculties in some soldiers, others had invested a great deal 
in propaganda. Inevitably, the Red Army contained its fair share of committed 
Stalinists. 
   
There is an opposing historiographical position. Not all soldiers found that their 
faith in the Stalinist system was reinforced by their wartime experiences. Although 
combat could be painful and traumatic, the Great Patriotic War opened new 
perspectives for many veterans. At a moment of national emergency and great personal 
danger Soviet citizens paradoxically came to appreciate their own individual strength 
and self-worth. In subsequent years many people remembered the war as a release from 
the repressive tension of the 1930s.
38
 Boris Pasternak, for example, wrote in Doctor 
Zhivago of the palpable sense of relief and common purpose created by the outbreak of 
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the war.
39
 The feeling of personal liberation was not exclusive to members of the 
intelligentsia. Although writers, poets, composers and journalists were more likely to 
document this feeling, ordinary soldiers experienced similar emotions. According to 
Elena Seniavskaia many soldiers experienced the war as a form of „spiritual 
purification‟. While fighting for the survival of their country many soldiers felt freer, 
less inhibited and more independent of the Stalinist system than ever before. Bearing 
arms in defence of the motherland was intoxicating; many soldiers felt that they were 
holding the fate of the nation, perhaps even world civilization, in their hands. Young 
men discovered untapped reserves of strength, initiative and courage in the crucible of 
war. Ironically one of the most inhuman and frightening conflicts in human history 
awoke positive qualities in Soviet soldiers.
40
 Seniavskaia‟s argument, of course, is 
consistent with her patriotic treatment of the Great Patriotic War.   
 
The wartime atmosphere of relative freedom combined with soldiers‟ 
rediscovered of a sense of agency, reconfigured the relationship between combatants 
and the state. Members of the frontline generation felt freer and more confident in their 
dealings with the state than their parent‟s generation. In Amir Weiner‟s analysis the war 
bred a new kind of Soviet citizen, “an assertive Soviet individual who held tight to his 
(and it was mostly his and not her) new right, earned in blood, to define his identity and 
status based on wartime exploits.”41 Zubkova goes further, suggesting that the 
emergence of confident and assertive veterans pre-figured the post-Stalinist thaw. The 
war awoke in people a capacity to think in unaccustomed ways, and had taught them to 
challenge the official propaganda truths.
42
 The historian and veteran Mikhail Gefter 
described the feeling of independence generated in 1941 and 1942 as a spontaneous de-
Stalinization: “People were suddenly forced to make their own decisions, to take 
responsibility for themselves. Events pressed us into becoming truly independent human 
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beings.”43 As Service notes it was not that surprising that some of the most prominent 
critics of the party in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Roy 
Medvedev, were young veterans in 1945.
44
  
 
The claim that war had created a new Soviet Man was also made by Soviet 
propaganda. But “assertive Ivan” and the exemplary veterans celebrated in the press 
were very different creatures. The values and ideas that war fostered in Soviet soldiers 
were not always welcome in peacetime.
45
 Qualities such as bravery, decisiveness, 
independence and risk-taking were invaluable on the battlefield, but dysfunctional in 
normal circumstances.
46
 As Merridale has observed frontoviki were fine for winning 
wars, but Stalinism required „people with the souls of bureaucrats.‟47 
 
 Veterans‟ outlooks on the post-war world were strongly shaped by having been 
exposed to life outside of Soviet borders. Their encounter with a society or societies 
which were politically, economically, socially and culturally alien provided them with 
an alternative frame of reference against which to evaluate Stalinism.
48
 For the 
overwhelming majority of soldiers this was their first and only experience of foreign 
travel, something that would have been unimaginable in the 1930s. The Eastern Front 
during the Second World War was of course about as far away from a Grand Tour of 
Europe as could be imagined, but contact with the sights, sounds and smells of capitalist 
societies nevertheless broadened soldiers‟ minds. Allied propaganda and fraternization 
with civilian populations and American and British servicemen gave the Red Army 
alternative information about the West. Above all soldiers‟ own observations came as a 
shock. Years later Konstantin Simonov would write of; “The contrast between living 
standards in Europe and among us, which millions of fighting people encountered was a 
moral and psychological blow that was not easy for people to bear despite the fact that 
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they were victors in the war.”49 Letters home often communicated surprise about the 
sophistication of German agriculture: the level of mechanization, the quality of 
agricultural buildings and the condition of livestock. Some soldiers wrote that all farms 
were equally prosperous and they doubted whether poor farms existed.
50
 Inevitably 
many veterans could not help concluding that the capitalist system was not as inefficient 
and dangerous as Marxist theory and Bolshevik propaganda had claimed. The swell of 
anti-kolkhoz feeling and rumours of their abolishment in the summer of 1945 were 
almost certainly linked to the return of veterans shaken by their encounter with western 
agricultural prosperity. 
 
 The reaction of serving soldiers and demobilized veterans to life beyond Soviet 
borders prompted concern from both the Red Army‟s political administration and 
civilian party organizations.
51
 Once mass demobilization got underway in July 1945 the 
order to conduct additional political work with soldiers and POWs awaiting 
demobilization was cascaded down through every level of the party hierarchy.
52
 Not 
only did veterans have to be re-educated about what they had seen, civilian communities 
had to be prepared to receive these individuals. In Moscow, according to the American 
diplomat Walter Bedell Smith, posters appeared warning that the judgement of many 
veterans was, “lopsided, that they were nervous and dazed, and that some would even 
try to claim that the cities and villages of capitalistic countries provided everyone with a 
mansion filled with luxuries.”53  
 
As demobilization progressed contact with the West came to be seen as a 
detrimental even dangerous influence. Top secret central party reports expressed 
concern that young party members, particularly those who had served abroad were 
being influenced by „bourgeois‟ western culture, especially allied propaganda 
publications such as Amerika and Britanskii soiuznik and western radio broadcasts.
54
 It 
soon became clear that frontoviki could not be allowed to remain abroad for long. In the 
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spring of 1947 the Soviet Military Administration in Germany ordered that all soldiers 
with two or more years‟ service in Germany, and anybody who had worked closely with 
candidates for repatriation were reposted to the Soviet Union.
55
 The Stalinist party-state 
clearly feared the return of disaffected veterans contaminated by the pernicious 
influence of the West. Seniavskaia and Zubkova both suggest that the return of veterans 
exposed to the liberal west raised the spectre of a form of neo-Decembrism. Political 
leaders did not have to look back as far as 1825 and the Decembrist Uprising to 
appreciate the political threat posed by discontented soldiers and ex-servicemen. The 
Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the 1921 Kronstadt Uprising, all key moments in the 
development of a Bolshevik consciousness located in Saint Petersburg, as well as the 
chaotic demobilization of the First World War and Civil War all provided examples 
closer to living memory. 
 
The months and years immediately following the war were not necessarily the 
most auspicious moment for challenging a victorious authoritarian state. To quote 
Viacheslav Kondratiev: “There was much in the system that we did not accept, but we 
could not imagine any other kind.”56 It was one thing to grumble about the behaviour of 
rear-line rats or the perceived injustices of demobilization, but another to voice dissent 
about the political system. While angry complaints about inequalities in the distribution 
of jobs and housing were tolerated, discussion about the failings of the Soviet Union‟s 
political system was strictly off-limits. The reality that the war led some soldiers to 
privately question the foundations of Stalinism could not be discussed. This was yet 
another area of the war‟s continuing effects on veterans‟ lives, like trauma, criminality 
and violence, enveloped by a collective silence.   
Leningrad’s Veterans and Party Membership 
 
 One of the most important sources of information about the political views of 
Leningrad‟s veterans are party reports about the level of political engagement amongst 
newly recruited party members. From the summer of 1945 civilian party organizations 
across the Soviet Union faced the challenge of assimilating new members. The influx of 
demobilized party members was especially apparent in Leningrad. The death of so 
many pre-war party members in the besieged city and on the frontlines dramatically 
reduced the strength of the Leningrad city party. On 1 July 1945, before the first 
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eshelons of veterans began arriving in the city, the Leningrad party totalled 81,563 full 
and candidate members.
57
 At the beginning of January 1947, just eighteen months later, 
the party membership had more than doubled totalling 179,147 members. This rapid 
increase was largely the result of the arrival or return of approximately 92,400 
demobilized party members from the army and navy.
58
 To put this figure into 
perspective of the 211,199 veterans demobilized in the city by 1 January 1947, 
approximately forty-four per cent, were full or candidate party members. Furthermore, 
demobilized veterans represented just over half of the city‟s entire party membership. 
Veterans then were a highly prominent presence in Leningrad‟s post-war party, more 
highly represented in this social institution than they were in the population at large. 
The influx of veterans into the City had, as with almost every aspect of urban life, a 
dramatic impact on Leningrad‟s party structures and institutions.  
  
According to published membership statistics approximately fifty-eight per cent 
of Leningrad‟s total party membership in January 1946 and January 1947 had joined the 
party during the war (54,915 members in 1946 and 89,763 in 1947).
59
 Demobilized 
party members who had been recruited during the war often had only the most 
rudimentary knowledge of Bolshevik ideology and little understanding of the 
conventions which governed life in civilian party institutions. The brand of communism 
which soldiers acquired in the Red Army was their own philosophy, rather than a 
carbon copy of the ideas espoused by political officers. As Merridale writes, “Front-line 
ideology was strong and deeply rooted, but it was also so distinct from that of the 
civilian élite that it might have been evolving in another universe.”60 When veterans, 
released from party cells in the army, joined civilian party organizations two very 
different forms of communism came face to face. For many veterans the polite world of 
civilian party meetings was entirely alien to life in the trenches. For frontoviki civilian 
party cells must have seemed full of people who knew little and understood even less 
about soldiers‟ wartime experiences. In other words they were nests populated by the 
rear-line rats they so despised. Civilians viewed veterans with equal trepidation, fearing 
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that the version of communism practiced by soldiers was a potentially dangerous 
ideological deviation. 
  
Official histories would subsequently imply that the high rates of recruitment 
during and after the war were a sign of the local party‟s success in attracting new 
members to the cause. Yet contemporary sources confirm that the inexperience of many 
party members created internal administrative problems. A joint plenum of the city and 
oblast party executive committees convened on 27 August 1946 heard a report from the 
First Secretary of both committees, P.S. Popkov. The report painted a bleak picture of 
party life in the city and surrounding region. Popkov estimated that nearly two thirds of 
local party membership had joined during the war. Mass recruitment during the war had 
led to a weakening of ideological standards and party activism. Party organisations were 
heavily criticized for failing to draw wartime party recruits into internal party 
mechanisms or active involvement in community work. Many grass roots party 
organisations were failing to hold regular meetings, resulting in stagnation in party 
affairs. The 350 members of the Oktiabrskii Railway‟s party organisation, for example, 
had failed to hold a single meeting in the last three months. Where meetings were being 
held a decline in party protocol had been observed. Worse still little was being done to 
improve the ideological levels of new party members. Few attended party education 
classes, thereby weakening propaganda which assumed a certain level of ideological 
understanding. Popkov complained that attempts to increase party membership had been 
made at the expense of the quality of candidates. The abandonment of individual 
selection and the approval of almost every wartime application had permitted unsuitable 
candidates to gain admittance to the party. If there was any doubt that Popkov was 
primarily talking about demobilized veterans, the report concluded by stressing the 
importance of conducting political work with demobilized communists. “It is necessary 
to ensure that they (demobilized party members) are quickly registered, that they are 
involved in community political work, and all means are taken to help them raise their 
ideological and theoretical levels.”61 
 
Coming less than two weeks after Zhdanov‟s attack on Akhmatova and 
Zoshchenko, Popkov‟s report was no doubt part of the Leningrad party‟s attempt to 
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demonstrate to Moscow that it was putting its house in order. Although these 
complaints should be viewed against this political background they nevertheless 
expressed issues of genuine concern. In part Popkov‟s report reflected the concerns of 
an older generation of political administrators for whom the political attitudes and level 
of activism amongst former soldiers seemed alien. Anxieties about whether the future of 
the communist party could be entrusted to a younger generation of party members were 
hardly new. Criticisms about failings in local party life and the inadequacy of 
ideological education of new party members could have come from any era of Soviet 
history, and will be familiar to many scholars. The Party‟s own vision of itself as a 
highly motivated political instrument represented an impossible dream, as unrealisable 
in the late 1940s as it was the 1920s, 1930s or the 1950s.
62
 More significantly Popkov‟s 
report reveals that the party, at least in Leningrad, was well aware that demobilized 
soldiers were not an immediate solution to the party‟s post-war cadres problem. 
Veterans, in contrast to official propaganda and what some historians have subsequently 
argued, were no more suitable material from which to mould party organizations that 
other members of Soviet society. It proved much harder to inspire active citizenship in 
the years following demobilization than it had been to motivate soldiers during the war.  
 
Rather than being dominated by committed ideologues the lowest levels of 
Leningrad‟s party organisation appeared to be populated by veterans little interested in 
contributing to party life. Joining the party was not necessarily a conscious decision. On 
occasion whole units were conscripted into the party with little choice to decline the 
offer. Others had joined the party as a means of social advancement, in the hope of 
bettering their families‟ and their own personal circumstances. For them party 
membership and the opportunities which it might create were part of what Dunham 
termed the „Big Deal‟; in other words the post-war accommodation between the 
Stalinist regime and a burgeoning middleclass.
63
 Time-serving members of the party 
could not be left unchallenged. On 15 February 1947 a top-secret resolution of the City 
and Oblast party executive committees discussed details of the exclusion and expulsion 
of party members. Junior party members recruited between 1942 and 1946 were of 
particular concern. Out of 2511 individuals expelled from party in 1946 approximately a 
third, 747 in total, were recent party recruits. Most were demobilized soldiers or re-
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evacuees who had lost contact with their fellow communists. This situation was blamed 
upon the failure of grass roots party organizations to implement the recommendations 
passed back in August 1946.
64
 
 
These were persistent problems with no quick solution. In mid 1949, in the wake 
of the Leningrad Affair, the Central Commission for Party Control reviewed the files of 
over 8000 party members purged from the party in 1948 and the first three months of 
1949. It upheld 96.2 per cent of the examined cases as correct decisions. The review 
was concerned that 1654 members, approximately a fifth of legitimate exclusions, were 
released from the party because of a lack of involvement in party life.
65
 This reflected 
badly on both individual party members and the wider local party. Yet, it is important to 
remember that the stated reason why an individual was purged from the party was often 
a front for more systematic political purges. Personal enmities, false denunciations and 
outright fabrications all played a role in the decisions to purge party members. The files 
examined by the Central Commission for Party Control were not necessarily a reliable 
indication of why party members were excluded.
66
 
 
 The report drew a firm connection between war veterans and individuals 
excluded from the party. Between the beginning of January 1948 and the end of March 
1949 the Andre Marti Shipbuilding Factory‟s party organization dismissed twenty-five 
party members. Of the sixteen men excluded for alienating themselves from the party 
fifteen were Red Army veterans.
67
 In May 1949 the Central Control Commission found 
forty-one personnel files of party members in the Oktiabr‟skii district party offices 
awaiting decisions on expulsions. Twenty-seven belonged to Red Army veterans.
68
 The 
report writer also noted that many of the party members submitting requests to leave the 
party were workers who had distinguished themselves in both the struggle to protect the 
motherland and the subsequent battle for production.
69
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The report also included a number of descriptions of the circumstances in which 
individual party members left the party. Many of these illustrative case studies involved 
veterans. Although the behaviour of veterans excluded from the party can not be 
assumed to be representative of demobilized veterans nor the party at large they were 
highly represented in the report. These vignettes provide an important insight into the 
culture of apathy and indiscipline which the Leningrad party faced following the war. 
This is not to argue that veterans did not believe in the socialist system, in Stalinist 
goals, or were uninterested in political issues, but rather participation in the regimented 
political culture of the Leningrad party was anathema. The detailed reasons behind 
individual veterans‟ reasons for leaving the party, or distancing themselves from it, 
further challenge the notion that party membership was a direct source of upward social 
mobility.  
 
A.P. Makarov joined the party as a candidate member in 1943 whilst fighting at 
Stalingrad. In many ways he was the archetypal veteran-hero. He was highly decorated, 
had endured great physical hardship and after demobilization found work as a driver for 
factory number 272, a typical occupation for ex-servicemen. Party membership had not 
opened doors for Makarov. In March 1948 he wrote to the party committee at Factory 
272 asking to be allowed to leave the party:  
“I ask you to exclude me from (the list of) candidate members of the 
VKP(b), because I am semi-literate. I can‟t raise my level of political 
consciousness and I think that I can‟t get to grips with the duties required of 
a member of the VKP(b).”70 
 
Many veterans found political education tiresome or dull. On top of long working hours, 
attendance at party meetings and voluntary work it represented an unwelcome 
commitment. For veterans, like Makarov, with only the rudiments of a basic education 
political education was also an intellectual burden. But, we should not preclude the 
possibility that Makarov was cleverly imitating the language of Bolshevik self-criticism 
(samo-kritika) to escape the onerous duties of party membership. Previous chapters 
have demonstrated Leningrad‟s veterans‟ resilience in the face of extraordinary 
problems. Former soldiers were remarkable in their ability to find ways of 
circumventing the official framework of housing distribution and employment 
allocation. It is possible that ex-servicemen were capable of the same flexibility in their 
dealings with the party.  
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 Makarov was far from unique in failing to derive practical advantage from party 
membership. Surprisingly, the simple act of paying party membership dues proved 
beyond the means of many veterans. F.I. Ivanov was demobilized from the Soviet Army 
in 1947. He returned to Leningrad and found work with his pre-war employers at the 
Andrei Marti Shipbuilding Factory. He had become a Komsomol member in 1943, and 
joined the Party in 1945. He had been living with friends and relatives for nearly two 
years, whilst waiting for permanent housing. He was fined several times by the police 
for not having a valid propiska. His requests for help from the factory party committee 
had been ignored. He had been forced to send his daughter to live with his parents in the 
countryside. In order to improve his living arrangements, Ivanov had come to an 
agreement with a construction trust to provide 360 hours of voluntary labour in 
exchange for a room in a communal apartment. Ivanov had wanted to remain as a party 
member, but his personal circumstances made paying membership fees difficult.
71
 S.I. 
Konushkin, a veteran of the Winter War with Finland and the Great Patriotic War, was 
excluded from the party in February 1949. He had been demobilized in 1945, and also 
found work in the shipbuilding industry. Yet over three years later he was still waiting 
for his family to be given their own accommodation. Not only was he an excellent 
worker, he was deputy chairman of his workshop committee, chairman of the comrades‟ 
court and was a member of the health and safety committee. Supporting his unemployed 
disabled wife and their child, whilst lodging with friends and relatives had made it 
impossible for Konushkin to consistently pay his membership fees.
72
 
 
 Other documents testified to the resentments that the requirement to pay 
membership dues generated. Even long-standing party members who enjoyed relatively 
good salaries complained about having to pay for the privilege of party membership. In 
September 1948 a demobilized Lieutenant Colonel who had been a party member since 
1930 was called to a party interview to explain his failure to pay his dues. He 
complained about the difficulties of having to survive on a monthly salary of 1000 
roubles, a sum that most veterans would have found generous.
73
 Angry complaints by 
another veteran about the declining purchasing power of his salary, the difficulty of 
paying his fees, and having to subsist on a diet of just vegetables resulted in him having 
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to spend time with a party instructor to have his views „corrected‟.74 Although these 
were the reasons given for disenchantment, it is likely that there were other hidden 
reasons why veterans resented party membership. Similarly there may have been 
specific undocumented reasons for these particular veterans being singled out in party 
reports. 
 
 Post-war party membership was not quite what soldiers joining the party on the 
eve of battle or in the euphoria of victory anticipated. In comparison with the firebrand 
speeches delivered by frontline orators civilian party life was stupefying. It was 
characterized by long meetings dominated by protocol and procedure. Actively 
contributing to party life required a time and financial commitment that many veterans 
were not prepared to give. Those veterans who appeared to derive little personal 
advantage from party membership, which had often been presented as a reward for loyal 
military service, were particularly likely to question why they remained party members. 
Finding the money for membership fees was more than an inconvenience when veterans 
were still living in temporary accommodation and working in menial jobs. But, party 
dues may also have been the pretext for avoiding the onerous duties and responsibilities 
of party membership. Finally, we should not rule out the possibility that some veterans 
were shrewdly exploiting the irritations of party life to distance themselves from the 
party either in the build-up to or immediate aftermath of the Leningrad Affair. Although 
the culling of the upper ranks of the local party organisation may have had little direct 
impact on veterans‟ lives it is possible that the purge shook many veterans‟ faith in the 
party. Ultimately how Leningrad‟s ex-servicemen reacted to the Leningrad Affair must 
remain speculation, but a reminder of the volatility and dangers of party life may have 
added to many veterans‟ sense of disenchantment and their decision to leave the party.  
 
 The relationship between Red Army veterans and the Leningrad Affair is a 
subject which merits further research. An understanding of precisely how Leningrad‟s 
turbulent post-war political history impinged on veterans‟ civilian readjustment would 
add to the picture of demobilization in this region. At present the archival evidence and 
existing research permits a few preliminary observations. Although veterans were 
excluded from the Leningrad party for a variety of reasons, they do not appear to have 
been a primary target of the post-war purge. As far as can be discerned there were no 
high-profile veterans caught up amongst the blood-letting. This is a significant in two 
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main ways. First, in the five years between the start of mass demobilization and the 
Leningrad Affair veterans of the Great Patriotic War do not appear to have penetrated 
the upper reaches of the Leningrad city party. Veterans in Leningrad, unlike post-war 
Vinnitsa, had not succeeded in dominating local client-patronage networks, something 
which protected them from the worst excesses of the purge. This supports one of the 
main arguments advanced by this thesis; namely that the Great Patriotic War was not 
necessarily the agent of upwards social mobility which previous research has suggested. 
It also helps explain veterans‟ sense of resentment towards the rear-line rats who 
dominated local positions of authority. Frontoviki had largely failed to convert their 
status as post-war heroes into social capital. This made the fact that desk rats continued 
to control political and municipal administration especially galling. 
 
 Secondly, the relationship between veterans and the Leningrad Affair reveals 
something about the progress of turning soldiers into civilians. Another of the main 
conclusions of this research is that despite the many and varied obstacles complicating 
post-war readjustment, veterans became ordinary civilians with remarkable success. 
Former soldiers had to live alongside civilians, do the same jobs, and often share the 
same privileges and entitlements. By 1949 and 1950, in many ways, veterans were 
indistinguishable from civilians. However, the Leningrad Affair reveals one potential 
exception. While the purge of the Leningrad party élite attacked blockade memories, 
veterans‟ memories of their war were not a target. Indeed, the official narrative which 
emerged as a result of the repression of blockade memories privileged the soldiers‟ 
experience. The patriotic myths about Soviet victory were only a partial reflection of 
veterans‟ memories. But, at least soldiers, unlike blockade survivors, had these myths to 
draw upon. The horrors of the blockade were all but forgotten. In terms of memory 
veterans and civilians were perhaps separate entities. This may also explain why ex-
servicemen seemed largely untroubled by either the Leningrad Affair or the attacks on 
Akhmatova and Zoshchenko. If assertive veterans were a potential source of opposition 
one might anticipate they would object to these prominent examples of the re-
imposition of political control. But, these were primarily events which affected 
blockade survivors. It would be fascinating to know more about how these two 
conflicting narratives of the war co-existed in post-war Leningrad. With civilians and 
ex-servicemen living and working in close proximity it would be interesting to know 
how the tensions between two competing forms of memory were negotiated. Did these 
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different versions of the war divide families, factory workshops and other groups of 
individuals, or were the met by awkward silences? 
Veterans and Anti-Soviet Opposition  
 
 In previous chapters I have examined the sense of resentment expressed by 
veterans returning to Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast‟. Many veterans felt let down 
that the provisions of demobilization legislation were frequently ignored and that 
propaganda created a false impression of the realities of civilian life. Against the 
background of grinding hardship and broken promises many veterans felt that their 
wartime sacrifices had been insufficiently rewarded and all too easily forgotten. 
Housing shortages, perceived inequalities in the distribution of employment and the 
shameful treatment of disabled veterans generated enormous disappointment.
75
 
Dissatisfaction amongst Leningrad‟s veterans, however, was rarely insurrectionary. 
Complaints about the state‟s handling of demobilization and failures in re-assimilating 
veterans were not signs of political opposition, but rather ordinary grumbling. Just as 
party membership was not the same as loyal Stalinism, disenchantment with civilian life 
was not necessarily anti-Soviet in outlook. Veterans were certainly not unique in 
complaining about the failings of local government. Low-level carping about the 
frustrations and hardships of daily life in post-war Leningrad was ubiquitous. 
Grumbling amongst veterans was part of the process of coming to terms with post-war 
life. It demonstrated that former soldiers were adapting to the modes of behaviour 
expected of civilian Leningraders. 
 
 Neither public opinion svodki nor angry letters intercepted by the military censor 
contained any convincing evidence of opposition amongst Leningrad‟s veterans. But, in 
the years following their demobilization, as the regime gradually regained control of the 
levers of power, particularly from 1947 onwards, a small number of veterans were 
arrested and imprisoned in the camp system for anti-Soviet agitation. The prosecutions 
were brought under the notorious clause 58-10 of the criminal codex. This aimed to root 
out; “Propaganda or agitation containing a call to overthrow, undermine or weaken 
Soviet power or to perpetrate counter-revolutionary crimes,” as well as the preparation, 
distribution and/or possession of counter-revolutionary literature. As many veterans 
were about to find out this was an extremely broad definition that could be applied to a 
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wide-range of behaviour and actions.
76
 Most of which were not anti-Soviet in intention 
or outlook.  
 
 On 7 November 1948 Stepan Ivanovich Kuznetsov was arrested in his apartment 
in Kronstadt for alleged anti-Soviet agitation. This individual example illustrates many 
of the key features of 58-10 cases, particularly the dubious nature of the charges and the 
role these prosecutions played in suppressing local wartime memories. He had served in 
the Red Army from July 1941 until his demobilization on 5 November 1945. The 
charges levelled against him hardly made him a convinced opponent of the regime, or a 
dangerous free-thinking liberal. Earlier in 1948 he had taken a holiday in the village 
where he had grown-up. When he returned to his job in the Baltic Fleet‟s dockyards he 
discussed the state of the collective farms he had seen with his colleagues. Neglected 
villages and hungry kolkhozniki reminded him of previous famines. Kuznetsov‟s 
colleagues evidently included informers prepared to bring his „unacceptable‟ thoughts to 
the attention of the security services. Perhaps the most damning evidence of 
Kuznetsov‟s anti-Soviet activities was the diary which he had kept whilst serving on the 
Leningrad front discovered on his arrest. The diary contained descriptions of the 
suffering of Leningrad‟s starving civilian population. He recorded his own dislike of 
army life, drawing attention to his hunger, fear of combat and the tyranny of his 
officers. He also wrote about the war‟s terrible impact on his family, including his 
wife‟s suicidal thoughts, the manner in which his brother was repeatedly patched up to 
fight and his brother‟s eventual death. On 3 March 1949, under the provision of Clause 
58-10, Kuznetsov was sentenced to ten years in the Gulag. He served six years of his 
sentence.
77
  
 
 The most important source of information about anti-Soviet agitation cases are 
the so called „review files‟ (nadzornye proizvodstva) produced by state prosecutors in 
the mid 1950s. On 4 May 1954 a Central USSR party decision established a special 
commission to re-examine the files of people prosecuted for „counter-revolutionary 
crimes‟. Nadzornye proizvodstva files were either the product of the re-examinations of 
individual files initiated by this committee, or in response to letters of complaint from 
victims of repression and their families. Between May 1954 and March 1956 procuracy 
and state security officials re-examined the files of 337,183 people. 14,338 people, a 
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mere 4.2 per cent, were rehabilitated. A further 153,502 had their sentences reduced, 
and the cases against 183,681 people were upheld.
78
 These files remain a highly 
sensitive historical source. Neither fully declassified nor totally closed to researchers, 
they require a certain amount of negotiation to access. Thanks to the efforts of Vladimir 
Kozlov and his staff at the Russian State Archives an electronic database has been 
created which enables historians to navigate the hundreds of thousands of cases. The 
database contains biographical details about the accused and a brief synopsis of the 
alleged crimes. In recent years a number of historians have made extensive use of these 
materials to make important discoveries. Vladimir Kozlov‟s own research into mass 
unrest under Khrushchev and Brezhnev makes extensive use of these sources.
79
 Miriam 
Dobson has used these documents to shed light on the process of rehabilitating victims 
of Stalinist repression.
80
 Review files form the basis of both Rósa Magnúsdóttir‟s 
research into late Stalinist perceptions about life outside of the Soviet Union, 
particularly popular myths about America, and Mark Edele‟s research into the political 
sentiments of Red Army veterans.
81
  
 
Using this rich resource I have been able to assemble a sample of twenty review 
files relating to alleged anti-Soviet agitation committed by veterans in Leningrad and 
the Leningrad oblast.
82
 The sample contains a number of allegations that Leningrad‟s 
veterans were voicing complaints about Soviet democracy. Boris Pleskhov was a highly 
decorated war veteran, who after demobilization found work in the town of Sestroretsk 
as the director of a factory club. In December 1945 he was arrested for making anti-
Soviet remarks about the standard of Soviet elections. An informer reported that 
Pleskhov allegedly complained that: 
“The elections of the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies are just a formal 
campaign, in fact the deputies were already chosen by the government long 
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ago, all that remains for us is to formally cast our vote and that‟s it. Whether 
you want to vote or don‟t want to vote for these deputies they have long 
been elected without you. With us deputies aren‟t elected by the people, but 
the government itself. But abroad their deputies are elected by the people, 
who vote for who they want, and here the government decides on a 
candidate and you vote for him.”83        
 
Other cases reported that veterans complained about press freedom and freedom of 
expression. In July 1950 Stepan Fedotov was found guilty of slandering Soviet power 
and praising Tito‟s politics. He also expressed doubts about the veracity of the Soviet 
press. Prophetically he added that, “In our country it is forbidden to tell the truth, and if 
you do tell the truth they will put you in prison.” Fedotov also suggested that Soviet 
bureaucracy was indistinguishable from Tsarist tyranny; “before the bosses could hit 
you with a stick, but now they beat you with their pencils...”84  
 
 Veterans more commonly made critical remarks about the collective farm 
system and Soviet standards of living. Sergei Gavrikov was arrested in 1950 for 
“systematically conducting anti-Soviet propaganda” amongst his colleagues at a metal 
works. The prosecution assembled a catalogue of anti-Soviet phrases allegedly uttered 
by Gavrikov between 1944 and 1949. A few examples suggest that Gavrikov was far 
from a dangerous counter-revolutionary. In early 1944 he was accused of having said 
that; “our leaders live well, but we are rotting here in dug outs, and for what, honestly 
speaking, I do not know.” In 1947 he was overheard complaining that, “the war finished 
and life was supposed to get better, but in fact it wasn‟t like that, the state is taking 
away collective farmers‟ last bread and they are left hungry although they work from 
dawn till dusk.” Whilst at work in the summer of 1949 he grumbled to his colleagues 
that;  
“In America workers live better than we do, because their work is 
mechanized, therefore they earn more, they have enough to support their 
families and dress well, but for us with heavy manual labour a workers‟ 
salary is not enough to survive on. I will have to sell my last suit.”85     
 
 My sample of anti-Soviet agitation cases from in and around Leningrad largely 
supports Edele‟s argument that the range of political views ascribed to veterans was 
surprisingly broad. Other sources demonstrate that it was possible for veterans to praise 
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American democracy, curse the hated collective farms and complain about Soviet living 
standards. Leningrad‟s veterans were capable of a broad spectrum of political attitudes. 
 
Nadzornye proizvodstva files contain vivid details about veterans‟ lives and 
attitudes, but they are not quite the transparent window on the mentalities of former 
soldiers that has been argued. Edele claims that these sources have an authenticity, 
which seems to rule out the possibility of fabrication by either state authorities or 
individual witnesses.
86
 However, as objective evidence of veterans‟ political views these 
sources are seriously flawed. Although it was possible for veterans to think and even 
say many of the things recorded in these files, in any individual case there is significant 
doubt that the accused was guilty of the accusations. 
 
 Since anti-Soviet agitation prosecutions depended heavily upon denunciations 
and the evidence of informers the reliability of witness statements must be questioned. 
In letters of appeal against their sentence many veterans claimed that they were the 
victims of hostile witnesses who had either invented or misrepresented the cases against 
them. In February 1951 Aleksandr Popov, an unemployed veteran was prosecuted for 
having slandered the Soviet state and its leaders in the presence of the residents of his 
communal apartment, as well as having kept counter-revolutionary literature. Popkov 
denied these charges. He claimed that not only were his neighbours hostile to him, but 
they had a vested interest in getting him removed from the apartment. The review of the 
case conducted in 1955 confirmed this hostility.
87
 In other cases veterans found 
themselves having to refute things they were accused of having said years earlier. Ivan 
Zharkov was sentenced in March 1952 for allegedly slandering the Red Army‟s good 
name, praising the Wehrmacht and life in Nazi Germany; all things he was accused of 
saying in December 1944. Zharkov later complained that he was on bad terms with the 
witnesses who testified against him. The reviewing prosecutor agreed, and suggested 
that Zharkov had probably been unfairly convicted.
88
 
 
 Although Edele acknowledges suspicions that cases were sometimes fabricated 
by hostile informants, he argues that prosecuting authorities were generally aware of the 
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possibility that accusations could be invented by witnesses.
89
 This does not appear to 
have been the case in my sample. Prosecuting authorities seemed little interested in 
uncovering potentially false, exaggerated or embellished accusations. Indeed they often 
instigated these allegations and even devised the supposed anti-Soviet „slanders‟ 
allegedly uttered by the accused. After demobilization in 1945 Matvei Stepanov 
returned to work in the Vsevolozhskii district as a driver for the Morozov chemical 
factory. In 1950 Stepanov was prosecuted for conducting anti-Soviet activity amongst 
his fellow workers. The case depended upon the testimony of his fellow workers.
90
 
After his brother sent a letter alleging that the accusations against his brother were false, 
the case was re-examined. According to Stepanov‟s brother, who also worked at the 
factory, the witnesses who testified against him were a drinking circle, who 
masterminded an illegal vodka racket. This group allegedly determined to have 
Stepanov dismissed from his job, because he refused to participate in their criminal 
activity. This allegation enjoyed some credibility given that many of the witnesses were 
subsequently arrested or dismissed for acquiring large sums of money at the factory‟s 
expense.
91
 
 
 Other parts of the files also seem to have been fabrications. A regular feature of 
many files are accusations that veterans were listening to American and British radio 
broadcasts, which provided an alternative frame of reference for their anti-Soviet views. 
Voice of America began Russian language broadcasts on 17 February 1947, whilst the 
British Broadcasting Corporation began slightly earlier. Although the Soviet state 
invested enormous effort in jamming these transitions it never succeeded in eliminating 
or deterring private listening.
92
 Listening to foreign radio broadcasts often appears to be 
the least convincing aspects of cases assembled against veterans. The accusations are 
formulaic and often appear to have been tacked onto other allegations of anti-Soviet 
crimes in order to bolster flimsy cases. Veterans may well have listened to the Voice of 
America and other broadcasts, but it seems unlikely that they became enthralled by 
British or American propaganda. Most veterans probably displayed the same scepticism 
as that expressed by the architect Harrison Salisbury met at the Kirov opera in 1949. 
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When the press began denouncing Voice of America and jamming radio broadcasts he 
had started to listen, thinking that, “there must be something to hear, and American truth 
which was important.” But he was disappointed and disillusioned by what he heard. The 
new American truth turned out to be illusory. “It wasn‟t a truth at all. It was 
propaganda, American propaganda.”93      
 
 The importance of these files lays not in what they reveal about veterans‟ 
mentalities, but rather the state‟s attitude towards veterans. In the vast majority of cases 
the threat of genuinely anti-Soviet activity was imagined either by prosecutors, secret 
policemen or those individuals denouncing ex-soldiers. Based on my sample of cases 
there is some evidence that ordinary citizens were using accusations of anti-Soviet 
activity as a means of removing troublesome or unpleasant veterans from their lives. 
The state, it seems, was equally prepared to accept claims of oppositional intent as a 
means of rounding up and punishing veterans who had failed to reintegrate into 
mainstream civil society. Five of the files within the sample involved veterans who 
were alcoholics, mentally ill or suffering from war-related trauma. In all of these cases 
the accused were alleged to have made loud drunken protests against the Soviet state 
and its leaders in public spaces such as markets, bread queues and railway station 
buffets. My small sample can not claim to be representative of the many thousands of 
anti-Soviet agitation cases brought against veterans, or indeed other members of society. 
But accusations that veterans had voiced anti-Soviet thoughts in public may well have 
proved the most effective means of getting rid of men whose damaged minds and 
bodies prompted uncomfortable reminders of the war.  
 
 The most vivid example concerns a series of anti-Soviet protests made by Iosif 
Martynov in 1952 and 1953. Martynov, a middle-aged group III war invalid, had been 
demobilized in September 1945. He had been injured and shell-shocked a number of 
times. He had lost two fingers on his left hand, sustained nerve damage to his right arm 
and injured the base of his spine. He was unable to find employment. He claimed that 
managers refused to hire him because they needed strong and healthy workers. The case 
revolved around a series of drunken outbursts Martynov made in public spaces. On 21 
April 1952 Martynov caused a scandal begging on the platforms of Leningrad‟s Vitebsk 
station and in the station restaurant. A variety of witnesses alleged that he had cried out 
phrases such as “Stalin is a skinflint”, “Soviet power loves me,” and had also been 
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slandering Stalin. In his version of events Martynov claimed to be so drunk that he was 
hardly conscious. On 5 March 1953, the date of Stalin‟s death, although the public 
announcement was not made until 6 March, Martynov launched a barrage of anti-
Semitic abuse in a housing administration office. On the morning of 5 March he had 
given blood. With his fee he bought vodka. Already lightheaded from the loss of blood 
it was not long before he was blind drunk.
94
 Martynov did not present a serious threat to 
Soviet power. In his case anti-Soviet agitation amounted to little more than the ravings 
of an alcoholic beggar. 
 
 Other cases followed a similar pattern. In February 1951 two veterans were 
arrested for their drunken behaviour in a Leningrad café. When a radio broadcast about 
forthcoming elections came onto the café loudspeaker the pair was alleged to have 
complained about forthcoming elections, to swear about Stalin in the crudest of 
language and to generally behave like boorish thugs. In their defence both veterans 
claimed to have been so intoxicated that they had no idea, nor control over what they 
were saying.
95
 In November 1949 Konstantin Polenov was arrested for a drunken rant in 
Leningrad‟s Troitskii market. According to witnesses Polenov had approached a queue 
of between 250 and 300 people and expressed a series of anti-Soviet sentiments. This 
included the phrase, “Why are you standing here, we don‟t have any bread and we will 
never have any under this government.” This kind of grumbling was characteristic of 
bread queues, but since Polenov was an outsider he appears to have been especially 
vulnerable to denunciation. In his letter of appeal Polenov claimed to be suffering from 
alcoholism related to wartime trauma. Indeed he had periodically undergone treatment 
in psychiatric hospitals. The reviewing prosecutor, however, was unconvinced by his 
claim to have been either too drunk or too unwell to have been conscious of what he 
was saying.
96
 
 
 In August 1952 a drunken Vladimir Krymov was alleged to have spread anti-
Soviet ideas amongst staff and customers in a central Leningrad shop. He supposedly 
made anti-Semitic remarks, slandered Soviet politics, party leaders and spread rumours 
of a forthcoming war. The case file characterized Krymov as an alcoholic who 
periodically disappeared from work on drinking binges. A letter of appeal written by 
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Krymov‟s mother in August 1953 attempted to explain that her son was mentally ill and 
had been undergoing psychiatric help. She claimed that her son had suffered a nervous 
breakdown as a result wartime shell-shock and the pain of his wife leaving him and 
taking the children with her. In her words Vladimir was no longer a normal person.
97
   
 
 Anti-Soviet agitation cases served a further function. They represented a final 
stage in what could be termed a „demobilization of the mind.‟ By this I mean the 
process by which veterans‟ wartime mentalities were gradually replaced by the modes 
of thought required to succeed in the post-war world. During the war, with the threat of 
death ever present, soldiers had enjoyed a comparative freedom to talk openly with their 
comrades. This freedom had limitations and should not be over-estimated. Soldiers 
knew that their ranks continued to include informers and that denunciation for anti-
Soviet crimes remained a risk.
98
 The opportunities for relatively open discussion with 
trusted comrades remained greater than in civilian life. At the same time there were 
many things that Soviet soldiers had seen and done which they needed to discuss to 
make sense of. Furthermore, the experience of armed service, as previously discussed, 
generated a new sense of confidence and status amongst soldiers, which allowed 
soldiers to voice their ideas more freely. Anti-Soviet agitation cases were part of the 
process of tightening the limits of public expression in post-war Soviet society. 
Veterans who were prosecuted for talking too directly about their wartime past, for 
telling stories about the comparative wealth of Germany or the technological 
advancement of the American army were not expressing anti-Soviet ideas, but were 
merely struggling with the shifting limits of public expression in post-war society. Anti-
Soviet agitation cases were an important instrument in attempting to map out the 
boundaries of what could and could not be said in Leningrad. They therefore served the 
same function as both the Zhdanovshchina and the Leningrad Affair. They were 
intended as an attack on wartime memory, the strong identities forged by the war and 
freer public expression. If veterans were in any doubt, anti-Soviet agitation cases served 
to remind them that any special status they might have enjoyed as a result of the war no 
longer existed.  
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Ordinary Stalinists 
 
Veterans just like blockade survivors learned that certain wartime memories and 
narratives could not be expressed publicly. Reacting to subtle shifts in official policy 
and language most veterans came to understand where the limits of public expression 
lay. Combat, fear, killing, death, bloodshed, psychological trauma and early Soviet 
defeats were all things that Leningrad‟s soldiers understood were not to be spoken of. 
With the passing of time the memory of the war ossified into something closely 
resembling state propaganda. Medals were dusted down annually for victory parades 
and celebrations, wistful war songs could be sung with old comrades over a bottle of 
vodka and veterans were asked into schools and colleges to reinforce official myths. But 
many aspects of wartime memory could not be discussed. 
 
Most veterans were, like Alevtina Ivanova, the central character of Veteran a 
short story published by Boris Vasil‟ev in 1984, unable to speak about the terrible 
physical and emotional cost of the war. Years after the war Alevtina is asked to give a 
public speech talking about her wartime memories. Her husband advises her to read 
histories of the war and wartime memoirs in preparation. She finds the stale language 
and dry topics of these books at odds with her own wartime memories: 
“It was altogether a different war, not her war. Alevtina Ivanovna 
remembered tiredness, which weakened one to sleep, lice on the dead and 
on the living, the heavy smell of overfilled communal graves, she 
remembered the charred body of a tank driver in a burnt out tank, a twenty-
year old lieutenant with seven strands of hair in a neat hairstyle… young 
broken bodies: male and female. Stumps torn to shreds, shot through by 
bullets, broken by bayonets, cut off by knives.”99 
 
She resolves to tell her version of the war to the meeting and to do justice to her 
memories. Yet as she is called to the platform and hears the applause she is unable to 
express her version of the war. Instead she structures her speech around the formalistic 
and bombastic language of the patriotic cult of war. Most veterans succeeded in 
perfecting this Janus-faced relationship with the state and its official narrative of the 
war. In public veterans repeated the official myths about the war and their 
demobilization. In private they knew that there was an alternative truth about the war, 
its conduct and its costs, which could not be spoken of. Veterans, then, were like the 
rest of late Stalinist society constantly negotiating and balancing their relation with the 
state with their wartime memories. Whatever soldiers thought about the Stalinist party-
state, most gradually learnt the dangers of expressing their wartime memories publicly. 
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Here then was the essence of the „Stolen Victory‟, an idea frequently expressed 
by veterans in the years and decades after 1945 and developed most fully by Elena 
Zubkova.
100
 Veterans‟ hopes and expectations for a better world gradually melted away 
in the face of extraordinary challenges of post-war life. Vasily Grossman wrote in Life 
and Fate that; “Freedom engendered the Russian victory. Freedom was the apparent 
aim of the war. But the sly fingers of History changed this: freedom became simply a 
way of winning the war, a means to an end.”101 Veterans were exhausted by their 
experience at the front. Their reserves of physical resistance had already weakened by 
years of physical stress and psychological strain. But there was to be no respite. 
Demobilized veterans were rapidly remobilized often into physically demanding jobs. 
The anxieties of the scramble for jobs, housing and the limited handouts which the state 
made available combined with grinding hardship also took their toll. Then there were 
the difficulties of rebuilding family life and learning to live with physical and/or 
psychological disabilities. Most veterans were simply too exhausted and too 
preoccupied with rebuilding their personal lives to have either the energy or the 
inclination to mount a serious attempt to become involved in politics. 
 
As the veteran and writer, Victor Astaf‟ev wrote; “The most painful thing was 
the realization that, because of the strain of the post-war years, we were not going to be 
able to maintain the high level of moral development which we had achieved during the 
war, and which we had created for ourselves, in spite of the soullessness and 
obstructiveness of our own immoral and criminal leadership.”102 The values which 
veterans thought they were fighting for, such as freedom, justice and fairness, never 
materialized. In retrospect many veterans would come to feel that their victory and their 
right to define the war‟s meaning had been stolen from them. Yet, former soldiers were 
also complicit in this process. The all pervasive post-war patriotism created a 
conundrum. “War veterans,” as Merridale writes, “many of them still intoxicated with 
the original idealistic brew and still breathing the old pietism were trapped. They could 
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not be unpatriotic and they could not stand against the government.”103 The official 
wartime myths then succeeded in binding former soldiers to the regime. In time many 
veterans found it convenient to pay lip-service to the bombastic war cult, even when 
they doubted this truth. It was better to keep quiet, accept the better pensions, free travel 
and collective praise than speak the dark truth about the Great Patriotic War.
104
 In 
Weiner analysis „assertive Ivan‟, “displayed uncompromising reluctance to let others - 
the regime included- articulate the defining moment of their lives.”105 Yet in the years 
following their demobilization Leningrad‟s veterans found that this is precisely what 
happened; they had been robbed of their right to construct their wartime experience on 
their own terms. 
Conclusion 
 
There is, however, a slightly less pessimistic way of looking at the re-adaptation 
of Leningrad‟s veterans. In many ways, local officials, civilian Leningraders and above 
all veterans themselves had achieved the impossible. By 1950 veterans in this most 
challenging of environments for demobilization had succeeded in becoming ordinary 
Stalinists. As the limited prestige and privilege that existed for ex-servicemen was 
dismantled veterans gradually blended into the community. The notion that frontoviki or 
veterans more generally represented a special category was shelved. Demobilization, in 
the fullest meaning of the term, had created a levelling in society. Veterans, who had 
once demanded respect, glory and recognition, became just other members of late 
Stalinist society. At the start of mass demobilization the prospect that the men and 
women physically and mentally scarred by the war could become ordinary civilians 
must have seemed unlikely. Although they were crammed into unsuitable housing, 
forced into unfamiliar or unpleasant jobs, and deprived of healthcare many veterans 
coped with the transition from military to civilian life surprisingly well. Despite the 
challenging material circumstances and the background of political turmoil demobilized 
Leningraders had succeeded against all the odds in rebuilding their lives. The process 
had been far from easy. It had created numerous disappointments, generated deep-
seated resentments and produced many victims. The vast majority of veterans derived 
little material reward for their service, but the conviction that the war had been just and 
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that they had played a part in a remarkable victory offset the inevitable personal 
disappointments.   
 
 Just as Moscow had succeeded in putting Leningrad in its place and restricting 
the development of local forms of identity, the Soviet state managed to draw the 
overwhelming majority of veterans back into mainstream society. Even in Leningrad 
where the prospect of political opposition was perhaps closer to the surface than 
elsewhere veterans were no more likely to be critical of the regime. Likewise, 
Leningrad‟s veterans were not the ideological die-hards that many ex-servicemen are 
sometimes presented as. Instead of becoming fierce critics or convinced supporters of 
the regime, the disenchantment that often followed demobilization led to a declining 
interest in formal politics. Having survived carnage of the frontlines, veterans quickly 
learned that in order to survive the peace it didn‟t pay to become too interested in 
politics. Many ex-soldiers, like other ordinary Stalinists, retreated into their own 
personal interests, directing their energies towards making small improvements in their 
personal circumstances. From talking to veterans, admittedly an unrepresentative group 
of the youngest and fittest soldiers, I was surprised how uninterested many were in 
ideology or high politics. For many the lessons of war were deeply personal. Survival 
had taught some to value opportunities for education, some the value of family and 
friends and others the simple pleasure of a good meal. With the passing of time veterans 
would become ordinary members of society. Aside from the ritualized moments of 
commemoration when soldiers donned uniforms and medals and gathered at cemeteries, 
monuments and memorials to remember their fallen comrades, they were 
indistinguishable from any other member of society.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has considered the complex transition between war and peace faced by Great 
Patriotic War veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast. The first five years of 
peace were defined by the challenge of re-establishing ordinary life in a war-ravaged 
landscape and a traumatized community. The aftershocks of industrialized warfare were 
felt in almost every aspect of public life. Demobilization was central to the Leningrad 
region‟s post-war recovery. The success in turning soldiers back into civilians impinged 
upon the lives of almost every member of society. Everybody had a stake in ensuring 
veterans were reintegrated into the home, family and workplace. The social, economic 
and political consequences of failing to do so were enormous. 
The history of post-war reconstruction has been dominated by studies of the 
reconstruction of housing and urban infrastructure, and the recovery of industrial and 
agricultural productivity. However, the transition from total mobilization to post-war 
normality was not played out on building sites or on the desks of economic planners, 
but in the daily lives of those who had fought the war. Post-war readjustment, in the 
sense of how soldiers coped with the physical, emotional and social cost of war, is, if 
anything, a more important subject for understanding late Stalinist society than the 
state‟s ability to mobilize populations for industrialization, collectivization and political 
campaigns.
1
. 
Demobilization and post-war adaptation unlock new perspectives on war‟s 
continuing legacy. They provide an opportunity to explore how individuals, local 
communities and nation states responded to the challenges of mass industrialized 
warfare. The formal reduction in military forces was only the start. The demobilization 
of mass conscript armies should not be seen as the exclusive realm of military 
historians. The logistical problem of transporting ex-service personnel home was only 
part of much wider social challenges. Demobilization affected almost every level of 
municipal life; including housing policy, economic planning, healthcare and policing. It 
raised issues of psychological trauma, physical disability, criminality and cultural 
memory; subjects which military historians have traditionally eschewed.  
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 The approach taken to demobilization in the present work also suggests that the 
neat periodization of wars suggested by conventional military history, needs to be 
replaced by a more fluid understanding of the transition from war to peace. Armed 
conflict may have ceased for the over-whelming majority of veterans in May 1945, but 
for many, if not all, veterans the war was never truly over. Its legacy would influence 
the rest of their lives. As Vakser reminds us; “The war was in the past, but war also 
remained. Ruins, photographs of the dead, graveyards, cripples on the streets, the un-
dried tears of mothers, wives and children all contained a constant reminder of war.”2  
Leningrad and its rural periphery provided an extreme example of the 
difficulties facing ex-servicemen and ex-servicewomen. The city and its inhabitants had 
a unique wartime experience, which profoundly influenced the course of 
demobilization. A legacy of extreme violence was closer to the surface in Leningrad 
than in many other locations. This had several implications. First, there were additional 
difficulties readjusting to civilian life in a region which had been on the frontlines so 
long. Second, veterans returned to a community which could also lay claim to special 
recognition and reward in return for their enormous wartime sacrifices and suffering. In 
Leningrad veterans‟ theoretical entitlements co-existed and competed with the rights of 
blockade survivors and re-evacuees. Third, and counter-intuitively, Leningrad‟s extreme 
wartime experience facilitated certain aspects of readjustment. Depopulation and 
destruction created employment opportunities; not necessarily in high status positions, 
but it was work nevertheless. Although ex-servicemen and women were often in 
competition for limited resources, an accommodation between them was more easily 
brokered here than in many other societies. Blockade survivors‟ experience of extreme 
violence partially explains their lack of fears about the potential return of veterans 
brutalized by combat. 
Yet despite all the obstacles placed in the way of Leningrad‟s returning veterans 
the overwhelming majority succesfully navigated the transition between war and peace. 
Most managed to pick up the threads of their pre-war lives relatively quickly. Of course, 
even when veterans successfully became civilians the war had a profound impact upon 
the shape of their future lives. But, knowing that they had come through the Great 
Patriotic War, perhaps the ultimate test, veterans would find the difficulties and 
frustrations of demobilization more manageable. 
                                                 
2
  Vakser, Leningrad poslevoennyi, p.6. 
274 
Demobilization occurred at a number of levels; trans-national, national, regional 
and local. The present work, however, is primarily a detailed local study. Only a local 
study can provide the texture of archival material and the clarity of focus to evaluate 
how soldiers became civilians, free of the distortions of myth and propaganda. 
Demobilization then was handled differently in different locations. The local 
perspective challenges many of our pre-existing notions about the treatment and social 
status of ex-soldiers during late Stalinism. Although demobilization was regulated by a 
national legislative framework imposed from above, local factors profoundly influenced 
the success of post-war adapatation. Local bureaucrats made decisions about work 
allocation, housing provision and the distribution of social welfare; all important factors 
in demobilization. These officials had a much greater flexibility in managing veterans‟ 
reassimilation than previously appreciated. Although local administrators rarely resisted 
national or regional directives, they frequently imposed restrictive understandings of 
national legislation. They found ways of reintegrating veterans more quickly, and issued 
their own policies.  
Leningrad, however, provides  a unique example of war‟s deep impact and 
continuing legacies. While Leningrad has been treated as test case of extreme violence 
and demobilization, I have shown that aspects of veterans‟ readjustment were specific. 
This implies that any study of demobilization based on all-Union generalizations 
requires reassessment. Previous studies of veterans‟ post-war lives, based on central 
archival records, have drawn examples from across the Soviet Union, thereby conflating 
local conditions and national trends. Since the impression of demobilization which 
Leningrad fed to Moscow diverged from grass roots records there is good reason to 
question whether this disparity was more widely manifested. More generally this study 
suggests a number of areas in which our understanding of the Red Army‟s 
demobilization and veterans‟ post-war readjustment requires further review in the light 
of Leningrad‟s experience.  
One of main arguments I have advanced in this thesis is that the history of 
veterans‟ reintegration has been obscured by multiple layers of myth and propaganda. 
The disparity between the official narrative of demobilization and the reality 
experienced by Leningrad‟s ex-servicemen and ex-servicewomen has been a constant 
thread running throughout the present work. The focus on official and popular myths 
has revealed how narratives about Leningrad‟s rapid reconstruction, veterans‟ 
exemplary status and the bond between combatants and civilians have obscured darker 
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realities about the difficulties of rebuilding lives in difficult social and economic 
circumstances. Demobilization was a far more complicated process than these myths 
suggested. Yet the official image of veterans as exemplary citizens has proved 
remarkably durable. The images of veterans being greeted by bunting, bouquets and 
cheering crowds from July 1945 were more palatable than the reality that ex-servicemen 
were often an uncomfortable reminder of the horrors of modern warfare. In reality 
resolving the practical barriers to resuming an ordinary civilian life could take years.  
Wartime armed service was not an agent of social mobility. In the immediate 
wake of war Leningrad‟s veterans were, by and large, not the beneficiaries of enhanced 
post-war opportunities. Chapters one and two, which examine the allocation of housing 
and employment respectively, challenge the notion that veterans were a privileged 
social group united by a shared sense of entitlement. The post-war housing crisis 
affected all members of society. The slow pace of reconstruction ensured that housing 
shortages persisted for decades. In the interim returning veterans lived in communal 
apartments or dormitories, in conditions indistinguishable from other members of 
society. Many were placed on housing waiting lists. Others became embroiled in 
lengthy legal battles to reclaim their pre-war homes. Veterans were not immediately 
privileged in decisions about housing allocation.  
The prospects of finding post-war employment were somewhat better. There 
was ample work in building trades and reconstructive industries to keep veterans 
occupied. However, relatively few veterans were able to secure work which matched 
their previous skills and experience. Good jobs were hard to come by. Officers 
especially resented offers of work inconsistent with their social status. Neither was party 
membership a direct route to social advancement. Demobilized party members were not 
cushioned from the scramble for suitable housing and employment. More importantly, 
theoretical privileges and entitlements did not necessarily distinguish former soldiers 
from the rest of society. Blockade survivors, re-evacuees and veterans enjoyed similar 
entitlements, which placed them in direct competition for finite resources. 
Leningrad‟s veterans were not a cohesive social group. Rather they were an 
extraordinarily diverse category, which did not respond to the challenges of 
demobilization in a uniform way. Different sub-groups of veterans were demobilized in 
different ways, and faced very different post-war problems. Women, war invalids and 
POWs had very different wartime and post-war experiences. Furthermore, a veteran‟s 
place in the queue for demobilization fundamentally affected their future chances. Since 
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the Red Army was demobilized by age group, older veterans discharged from the army 
in the early months of mass demobilization enjoyed a valuable advantage. They, unlike 
comrades returning during and after 1946, arrived before the best jobs and housing were 
taken, or before Leningraders became tired of welcoming former soldiers home. 
Veterans then were also competing amongst themselves for the limited resources. 
Rather than bringing people together, as patriotic myths suggested, the war‟s legacy 
created deeply rooted tensions which damaged post-war social cohesion.  
The legacy of extreme violence created more than just practical problems. 
Finding permanent housing and a rewarding job was difficult and frustrating. 
Inefficiencies and corruption in official distribution mechanisms generated enormous 
resentment. But, these short-term disappointments were easier to cope with than the 
long-term physical and psychological effects of war.  
The war‟s social costs were not simply measured on the balance sheet of lives 
lost, money spent and destroyed infrastructure. Veterans paid an enormous physical and 
emotional price for victory. Their minds as well as bodies had been sacrificed for the 
cause. Although local social security officials imposed a restrictive understanding of 
disability, almost all veterans found the war disabling in some capacity. Few veterans 
escaped the war without damaging their health or psychological well-being. On their 
return most demobilized soldiers were exhausted. They were given little or no time to 
rest or recuperate. Within days they were back at workbenches, construction sites or 
behind desks. Any intervening period was usually spent standing in queues or arguing 
with housing, employment or social-security officials.  
Patriotic myths and official propaganda suggested that Red Army veterans were 
immune to the psychological trauma experienced by combatants of other conflicts and 
from other societies. This thesis has argued that Leningrad‟s veterans experienced many 
of the same psychological difficulties as veterans in European and American post-war 
states. Different societies and cultures have different ways of dealing with war‟s 
traumatic legacy. But, total warfare took its toll on soldiers‟ minds regardless of 
nationality. 
 The response in Leningrad, like much of the Soviet Union, was to ignore the 
horrors of total warfare, and repress the reality that veterans were destabilized by 
warfare. Yet it is possible to penetrate the collective silence surrounding these issues. 
Chapter three demonstrates that the city‟s psychiatrists were aware, and interested in, 
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instances of psychiatric trauma amongst serving soldiers and veterans. Chapters four 
and five indicate that trauma manifested itself in other areas of public life. It was a 
contributing factor to violent criminality, and individuals suffering from psychiatric 
disturbances were especially vulnerable to denunciation for anti-Soviet agitation. 
Veterans‟ disorientation and dislocation, and their anger, resentment, drinking and 
disruptive behaviour could also to be ascribed to the traumatic effects of war. Physical 
exhaustion further exacerbated the frustrations of readjustment, prompting angry 
responses that were familiar amongst all veterans of modern warfare. 
Although the social costs of war in Leningrad were obscured by the heroic post-
war myths, with the passing of time these myths increasingly fulfilled an important 
social function. Patriotic narratives helped many veterans to make sense of horrific 
wartime experiences. As the decades passed the frustrations and disappointments of 
demobilization gradually faded from memory. By the time that veterans finally received 
the recognition they deserved they had already entered old age. Their support for the 
official version of demobilization was secured by improving pensions, welfare support, 
and the enhanced social status that the cult of the Great Patriotic War offered. This had 
not always been the case. Things had seemed very different in the late 1940s. But the 
battle lines had been redrawn. The propaganda and myth-making, which had so rankled 
in the wake of war, now seemed to offer renewed comfort and pride.  
Leningrad was far from an ideal environment in which to demobilize veterans. 
Few military or civilian planners would have chosen to administer demobilization or 
treat Leningrad‟s veterans as they were after 1945. Yet, this case study demonstrates 
that there was no correct way to turn soldiers into civilians. Even after the most violent 
conflicts it was not predetermined that ex-servicemen would be unable to readjust to 
civilian life. Leningrad assimilated a remarkable number of ex-service personnel. 
Despite the post-war housing crisis veterans settled in Leningrad in their hundreds of 
thousands. This rapid influx of former soldiers created problems. But, the 
overwhelming majority of veterans settled down to civilian life with surprising ease. 
Most were not brutalized or traumatized by combat. Veterans who had experienced life 
outside of the Soviet Union did not pose a genuine threat of political opposition. Some 
grumbling about the injustices of demobilization was inevitable. But on the whole 
veterans were remarkable for their ability to compartmentalized their wartime 
experiences and devote themselves to post-war reconstruction.  
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Despite all the administrative obstacles and practical difficulties veterans 
readjusted with great success. By 1950, with the exception of war invalids, most 
veterans had rebuilt their lives and were virtually indistinguishable from other 
Leningraders. Although the treatment of disabled veterans was often shocking, the 
reality was not as bad as the popular myths about Valaam and the forced street 
clearances suggested. 
How can the relative success of post-war readjustment in Leningrad and the 
Leningrad oblast be explained? This was not the product of attempts to ensure that 
veterans were greeted as returning heroes. The majority of veterans were not welcomed 
home by bunting and brass-bands. Those that were often saw through the propaganda 
apparatus. Neither can success be attributed to official policy and state welfare. 
Compared to the American G.I. Bill‟s generous provisions, Leningrad‟s veterans were 
given only the most meagre support. But, as I have previously argued, there could never 
be an adequate means of rewarding veterans for their achievements and sacrifices. 
Generous welfare payments were not a guarantor that veterans would return as well 
adjusted individuals. Nor can the fact that Red Army soldiers returned as victors explain 
their successful reintegration. Defeat and victory created different challenges for 
demobilizing armies and societies. If anything victory enhanced veterans‟ expectations 
of reward and reform, which intensified their disappointment when these hopes were 
cruelly dashed. 
 Part of the explanation lies in those factors which motivated soldiers to continue 
to fight. The universal belief that the Soviet Union was engaged in a just war against an 
odious enemy protected veterans from concerns that they had been damaged by extreme 
violence. Since they were fighting to protect their homes, families and the Soviet 
motherland anything could be justified. The decision to rapidly remobilize veterans also 
contributed to the outcome. Veterans were given no time to dwell upon the darker 
aspects of the war. From the moment they returned they were encouraged to focus on 
the socialist-realist future, rather than the past. The hardships of everyday life meant 
that former soldiers had little alternative but to reintegrate into the home, family and 
workplace.  
Ultimately veterans themselves deserve some credit for the manner in which 
they re-adapted to normal life after extraordinary events. The Soviet party-state and its 
local representatives were not the sole agents influencing demobilization‟s outcomes. 
Leningrad‟s veterans demonstrated remarkable creativity and initiative in circumventing 
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the difficulties of post-war readjustment. Reluctant to work within the official 
framework, veterans found and exploited whatever opportunities they could to ease their 
transition. 
The more I have examined the survivors of the Great Patriotic War the more I 
am struck by the achievements and resilience of a remarkable generation. Across the 
globe the notion that the Second World War was fought by the „Greatest Generation‟ 
has been co-opted by nationalists, in order to demonstrate national superiority. This is 
unfortunate because pain and suffering, like glory and heroism, transcend national 
boundaries. Although veterans‟ achievements have been distorted by memory politics, 
veterans were still special people. Those interviewed as part of the project were 
reluctant to accept that there was anything unique about their generation. With their 
characteristic humility and self-deprecation they pointed to the achievements of 
subsequent generations. Several explained that they had no choice but to fight. They 
argued that if total war erupted once more my generation, or its successors, would have 
to do the same and would demonstrate similar qualities. Let us hope that that this is a 
hypothesis that will never have to be tested.  
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Appendix 1: Map of Leningrad, 1940. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Leningrad and its surrounding territory. 
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Appendix 3:  Demobilized Veterans and Employment Levels in Leningrad  
 
Date 
Total 
Demobilized 
Number 
Employed 
Percentage 
Employed 
Reference 
15/10/1945 53,815 34,398 63.9 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.17/d.1520/l.6 
20/10/1945 54,485 40,464 74.3 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.17/d.1520/l.7 
01/11/1945 73,500 52,560 71.5 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.17/d.1520/l.15 
15/11/1945 91,067 66,737 73.3 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.17/d.1520/l.11 
01/12/1945 118,500 95,842 80.9 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.17/d.1520/l.23 
01/03/1946 162,208 141,027 86.9 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.35 
01/04/1946 172,537 157,196 91.1 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.143 
01/06/1946 171,967 165,030 96.0 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.77 
01/07/1946 191,893 180,540 94.1 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.110 
30/04/1947 262,267 252,556 96.3 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.226/116-7 
31/05/1947 265,192 256,095 96.6 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.136 
30/06/1947 267,253 258,548 96.7 
TsGA-SPb 
f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.208 
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Appendix 4:  Demobilization Figures in the City of Leningrad – Gender Breakdown and Officers 
 
Date Total 
Demobilized 
Number 
of Men 
Percentage 
of total 
Number 
of 
Women 
Percentage 
of total 
Number 
of 
Officers 
Percentage 
of total 
Reference 
31/12/1945 143,003 115,068 81 27,935 19 14,487 10 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.3 
15/01/1946 151,462 123,149 82 28,322 18 17,515 12 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.7 
31/01/1946 157,726 129,075 82 28,651 18 21,150 13 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.11 
01/03/1946 165,863 136,927 83 28,936 17 24,496 17 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.33 
01/04/1946 172,537 143,275 80 29,262 20 28,663 17 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.41 
01/05/1946 177,072 147,605 84 29,467 16 31,507 18 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.73,75 
31/05/1946 186,231 156,731 85 29,500 15 34,777 19 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.91 
30/06/1946 197,858 168,347 85 29,511 15 37,669 19 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.108 
31/07/1946 209,304 179,770 86 29,534 14 41,434 20 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.145 
31/08/1946 220,050 192,500 86 29,550 14 46,210 21 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.147 
30/09/1946 230,501 200,947 87 29,554 13 50,591 22 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.150 
31/10/1946 235,437 205,877 87 29,560 13 53,703 23 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.163 
30/11/1946 241,021 211,261 88 29,760 12 56,003 23 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.201/l.180 
31/12/1946 246,218 216,440 88 29,778 12 57,089 23 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.2261/l.104 
31/01/1947 250,720 220,942 89 29,778 11 58,499 23 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.48 
28/02/1947 252,867 223,087 89 29,780 11 59,467 24 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.54 
31/03/1947 257,221 227,441 89 29,780 11 60,371 23 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.71 
30/04/1947 262,267 232,487 90 29,780 10 61,654 24 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.116 
31/05/1947 265,192 235,412 89 29,780 11 62,804 24 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.136 
30/06/1947 267,253     63,886 24 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.201 
31/07/1947 268,378     64,684 24 TsGA-SPb/f.7384/op.36/d.226/l.208 
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Glossary 
 
Banditizm: Banditry, armed robbery or criminal activity in organized gangs. 
Blat: Literally pull, semi-corrupt practices. 
 
Blokadnik (plural blokadniki):  Blockade survivors, usually applied to people who lived 
through the entire blockade in Leningrad. 
 
Den‟ pobedy: Victory Day. 9 May. 
 
Eshelons: troop trains. 
 
Filtratsiia: filtration. The screening of POWs and refugees for anti-Soviet elements. 
 
Frontovik (plural frontoviki):  Frontlien combat soldier.  
 
FSB: Federal Security Service.   
 
Gorispolkom: Executive committe of the city soviet. 
 
Gulag: Main Administration of Camps, used to refer to the pary of the concentration 
camp system. 
 
KGB: Committe on State Security. 
 
Kolkhoz:  Collective farm. 
 
Kolkhoznik  (plural kolkhozniki): Collective farmers. 
 
Kommunalka (plural kommunalki): Communal appartment. 
 
Komsomol: Communist Youth League, the youth organization of the Communist Party. 
 
Kontuzhen: Shell-shocked. 
 
Lengorispolkom: Executive Committe of the Leningrad City Soviet. 
 
Lenoblispolkom: Executive Committee of the Leningrad Oblast Soviet. 
 
LIETIN: Leningrad Research Institute of Work Fitness and the Organization of Work 
for the Disabled. 
 
LIETIN: Leningrad Department of the Scientific Engineering-Technical Society 
 
Nadzornye proizvodstva: Case review files – here of anti-Soviet agitation cases. 
 
NKVD: People‟s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. 
 
Oblast: Province or region. Administrative level below Union Republic.  
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Obshchezhitie: Hostel or dormintory. 
 
Orgburo: Organization bureau. 
 
Osoaviakhim: Union of Societies of Assistance to Defence and Aviation-Chemical 
Construction. 
 
POW: Prisoner of War. 
 
Propiska (plural propiski): Residence permits. 
 
Raion: District. Administrative level beloe oblast or city. 
 
Raikom: District party committee. 
 
Raspredbiuro: Office for the Calculation and Distribution of Labour Forces. 
 
RSFSR: Russian Republic. 
 
Samo-kritika: Self criticism. 
 
Shofer: Driver. 
 
Sovnarkom: Council of People‟s Commissars. 
 
Sovkhoz (plural sovkhozy: State owned farm. 
 
Sovkhoznik (plural sovkhozniki): Employee of a state owned farm. 
 
Spetssoobshchenie: Special-communications. 
 
SVAG: Soviet Military Administration in Germany. 
 
Svodki: Summary reports. 
 
Trudoustroistvo: Work arrangement or work placement. 
 
Tylovaia krysa (plural tylovye krysi): Rear-line rat officials who had avoided frontline 
service having secured cushy jobs in the rear (teplye mestechki). 
 
Uchastnik voiny: participant in the war. 
 
Upravkhoz: Building administrator. 
 
Vmeniaemost‟ (adj. Vmeniaemyi): Criminal responsibility.  
 
Voenkomat (plural Voenkomaty): Military registration offices. 
 
Voennaia kontuziia: Shell-shock. 
 
VTEK (plural VTEKi): Medical Labour Expert Commissions. 
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Zabota: Care and attention. 
 
Zakon o demobilizatsii: Demobilization law of 23 June 1945. 
 
Zaiavlenie: Annoucement, petition. 
 
Zemlianka (plural zemlianki): Temporary housing in dugouts and other makeshift 
shelters/ 
 
Zhaloba (plural Zhaloby): Formal letter of complaint 
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